CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/05/18

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03177895
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: May 18, 1960

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177895
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18 May 1960
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18 MAY 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev might initiate action on way
home from Paris leading toward separate
East German peace treaty. 0
I I. ASIA-AFRICA
Progress toward Cyprus settlement re-
mains slow; Makarios reference to
'deadlock' apparently tactical.
Indonesia--Communists take initiative
in mass demonstrations against Dutch
reinforcement of New Guinea.
III. THE WEST
Panama--Appeal to electoral tribunal
causes further delay in announcement
of B May presidential election results.
Highlights of world reaction to summit
developments--Page 4.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
:18 May 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*USSR: Khrushchev may start action on a separate peace
treaty wi-h East Germany on his way home from Paris. To
protract, without actually implementing, the threat of denying
the West the right of access to Berlin, and to minimize the
risks inherent in such a course, Khrushchev could use several
� devices such as setting a date for an international peace treaty
conference, initialing a draft treaty with the announced inten-
� tion of ratification at a later date, specified or unspecified, or
stringing out the ratification process. This would give further
time to assess Western reaction, but would nonetheless carry
the USSR a significant and inexorable step further toward a
unilateral denunciation of Western rights in West Berlin.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Cyprus: 5).rogress toward a Cyprus settlement remains slow,
but Archbishop Makarios' 16 May statement terming the negotia-
tions "deadlocked" does not accurately reflect the continuing in-
tensive efforts behind the scenes to reach agreement. Makarios'
statement, outlining the problems still to be resolved, appears de-
signed primarily to bolster his prestige on Cyprus and place the
onus on London for the developing Cypriot economic problems.
Accordingly, his warning that the Cypriots would be forced to al-
ter their policy toward Britain unless London changes its atti-
tude in the negotiations probably does not presage any immediate
change in the security situation on the islancli
(Page 1)
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Indonesia-Netherlands: The Indonesian Communist party
Is benefiting from the mounting public indignation over the an-
nounced Dutch intention to send reinforcements to Netherlands
New Guinea in the near future. Anti-Dutch student demonstra-
tions, coordinated by the Communists, occurred in four major
cities in Java over the week end. The government is aware that
the Communists are using the issue to increase their own pres-
tige, but sees no way to interfere with what purport to be spon-
taneous expressions of patriotic indignation. Meanwhile, in an
apparent show of force, the Indonesian Navy is conducting naval
and air exercises near New Guinea. (Page 3)
11 I. THE WEST
Panama: Announcement of the official results of Panama's
8 May presidential election, previously expected on 16 May, will
be postponed pending a ruling by the election tribunal. Ricardo
Arias, the government's candidate, has filed charges of improper
election procedures. The electoral law provides for a delay of as
much as 15 days to determine the validity of challenged ballots.
President de la Guardia and National Guard commander Vallarino
are reportedly continuing to resist strong pressure from leaders
of the governing party to invalidate the election, which apparently
was won by opposition candidate Roberto Chiari. Violence is pos-
sible if the official announcement does not proclaim Chiari the
winner.
*For highlights of world reaction to summit developments, see
Page 4.
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18 May 60
DAILY BRIEF Ii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
ASIA-AFRICA
Cyprus Negotiations
[Little progress has been reported recently in the negotiations
between the British and the Cypriots. British Colonial Under Secre-
tary Julian Amery has remained on Cyprus and is in contact with
Archbishop Makarios arid Turkish Cypriot leader Fazil Kuchuk.
Makarios has twice labeled the talks "deadlocked," most recently
In a statement on 16 May. The American consul general in Nicosia,
however, reports that intensive efforts are being made behind the
scenes in an attempt to find an acceptable compromise solution for
the remaining problems,]
(The prolonged dispute over the total area of the British military
bases to be retained by London after independence was settled in
late April. The remaining problems involve: (1) the future of the
bases if Britain abandons them, (2) the exact boundaries of the bases,
(3) civil administration within the bases, and (4) British economic
aid to the new republicd
1lVlakarios insists on a statement that London will transfer the
bases to Cyprus if the British ever abandon them. The British have
countered that no statement is needed, as they have no thought of
withdrawing and the bases are fully under their sovereignty. Pri-
vately British officials have indicated belief that acceptance of
Makarios' demand would stimulate early atteppts by the Cypriots
to force the British to abandon the bases. The boundary problems
stem from the Cypriot desire to maintain corridors through the
base areas to link the villages which are within the areas but are
not under British jurisdiction. The disputes over, administration
of the bases and potential British financial aid are both problems
which have repeatedly escaped solution in past negotiationsj
Lille warning by Makarios on 16 May that the Cypriots might
have to change their tactics toward the British probably does not]
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andicate an imminent change in the security situation. Makarios
appears to have issued his statement in order to bolster his fal-
tering prestige among the Greek Cypriots and to blame th
ish for growing unemployment and economic stagnation.
the Archbis op � 8-
pulls no sense cm, urgency in me negotiations�apparently believing
that time is on his side."I
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Communists-oeize LeaderMipCRoignti-Dutch wctivity in Indonesia
The Indonesian Communist party (PKI) is promoting an anti-
Dutch campaign based on the Netherlands' announced intention to
send reinforcements to Netherlands New Guinea (West Irian) in the
near future. Anti... Dutch student demonstrations�clearly coordi-
nated by the Communists--occurred in four major cities in Java
over the week end. Although aware that the Communists have
seized the leadership on the West Irian issue, government officials,
despite an army ban on demonstrations, are reluctant to crack down
on activities which ostensibly reflect genuine national apprehension.
The PKI platform emerging from the demonstrations and previ-
ous resolutions includes severance of relations with the Dutch, sei-
zure of remaining Dutch assets in Indonesia, submission of the dis-
pute to the UN, and all-out support of President Sukarno.
The government has requested student demonstrators to await
official orders and has urged that all anti-Dutch activities be chan-
neled through the army-controlled West Irian Liberation Front.
Both civilian and army officials appear to be awaiting the return
of President Sukarno from his global tour in the presumption that
he will undertake a government-controlled mass campaign. The
President, however, is not expected to return before the first week
,in June, and if the Communists continue to exploit this issue at their
present rate, Sukarno will be hard put to control the situation.
The Indonesian Navy, in an apparent show of force, is conduct-
ing naval and air training exercises in waters adjacent to West Irian.
These reportedly include practice in convoy, protection, torpedo at-
tacks, mine laying, and commando tactics. The Foreign Ministry
continues its approaches to Afro-Asian governments for cooperation
In obstructing Dutch moves.
The West Irian issue increasingly diverts public attention from
the anti-Communist, anti-Sukarno campaign of the Democratic
League. The Communists are using the West Irian issue against
the league, identifying both the Dutch and the league as opposed to
President Sukarno.
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"Me
III. THE WEST
Reaction to U-2 Incident and Summit Developments
The limited Asian reaction received thus far has been sur-
prisingly sophisticated over the U-2 incident and dismayed and
critical of Khrushchev for his summit actions. Nevertheless,
the United States has not escaped blame for provoking Khru-
shchev.
In Japan, initial official reaction blamed Khrushchev for the
threatened breakdown of the summit meeting. Foreign Minister
Fujiyama stated that Khrushchev is using the "spy plane" incident
as an excuse for breaking off the talks because he feels there is
no prospect of agreement on the German problem. The chairman
of the left-wing Socialist party termed Khrushchev's action "re-
grettable" but said he understood the reason.
In Southeast Asia,there has been no high-level official comment
yet on the U-2 incident and succeeding developments. Distress over
the serious setback to hopes of a world detente was a major theme
in widespread press commentary on the situation. While the com-
ment was generally sympathetic to the American position in this
matter, there was recurring criticism of the United States for hand-
ing the USSR a major propaganda issue.
India, while critical of the overflights in general, has played
down the U-2 incident. New Delhi had placed much hope in the summit
as a means of relieving world tension and is greatly concerned by
the breakup of the meeting. Early Indian comments blame Khru-
shchev for making a propaganda play. Pakistani President Ayub
has lodged .a mild protest with the United States over the U-2 inci-
dent, but publicly has charged the USSR with overflying Pakistan.
Reaction of the nationalist press in Iraq has been relatively sub-
dued, but pro-Communist newspapers have made intensive attacks on
the U-2 incident. Radio Cairo, which had earlier treated the incident
as constituting a major barrier to any progress at the summit, has
alleged "the present tension has intentionally or unintentionally been
created by certain groups in the United States." The Israeli press
and radio regard the U-2 incident as a Soviet propaganda victory
which Khrushchev is exploiting to the hilt. aurkish Foreign Minister
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orlu in conversation with Ambassador Warren was genial and
showed every desire to maintain a united front before the USSR.
The Turkish Government intends to reply to the Soviet protest
note of 13 May along lines acceptable to the United States.:j
There has been little editorial comment in the African press
except In Ethiopia and Tunisia, where the need for world peace
and disarmament was stressed. Neither the United States nor the
USSR was specifically blamed. /President Bourguiba of Tunisia
complimented Secretary Herter for a "courageous and master
stroke" in handling the matter publicly.)
ICh rushchev's actions in Paris have brought universal condem-
nation from the non-Communist press in Western Europe. Influ-
ential papers that had been most critical of American handling of
the U-2 incident have a]pplauded Western firmness. West German
papers have likened Khrushchev's tactics to those of Hitler or
"Stalin in his best days," French papers blame Khrushchev for
the conference break, and speculate that some internal crisis which
caused his brusqueness may point to his own weakness and possible
loss of power in Moscow.
British papers all hold Khrushchev responsible for the turn of
events, with the pro Liberal Manchester Guardian noting that "while
the British Government over the past 18 months has gained a reputa-
tion for supple diplomacy, it may now have to earn a reputation for
firmness." The Laborite Daily Herald, which alone had unreservedly
condemned the American role in the U-2 incident, on 17 April de-
cided that President Eisenhower's statement had made it "impossi-
ble for Khrushchev to say he is being threatened by aggressive
Americans, and it will be monstrous if he can still think of throw-
ing the worldt hopes in an ash can."
Limited non-Comnaunist Latin American press opinion on the
U-2 incident thus far has been moderately critical, but has ex-
pressed some sympathy for the US position and explanation. It has
also reflected concern over the incident's effect on the summit meet-
ing. The controlled Cuban press and radio for the most part have used
the U-2 affair to bolster their charges of "US aggression" against
the Castro regime.
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"me
There has been virtually no official or unofficial opinion on
summit developments. A Chilean radio has commented that
Khrushchev "wants the talks to fail" so that "Ike will finish his
presidential term with a great failure."
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'Noe
TH:E PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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