CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/08/05

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03185146
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: August 5, 1960

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3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
5 August 1960
Copy No. C 71
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO OHAHGE IN CLASS.
DEGLAsseriED
CLAS, Eii.iN.:1-13 TO: 34.5100
NEXT 11.��trlaNi
AUTH: RR 7U.2
9 JUN 1980
DATE: REVIEWElli
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jO?�SEGREI
5 AUGUST 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
New Soviet early warning radar's detection
capability considerably in excess of previ-
ous types. 0
Moscow offers arms and technical assist-
ance to Lumumba.
USSR seeking to defeat US request for UN
' Lent
meeting.
Moscow and Peiping making new offers of
aid to Yemen.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Comment on Congo situation.
Syrian nationalist leader and former UAR
vice president flees to Lebanon.
Indonesia--Sukarno planning to ban two
major anti-Communist political parties
despite army's opposition.
III. THE WEST
�Fidel Castro's illness raises possibility
of power struggle between brother Raul
and Guevara.
LATE ITEM
�Two officials of Soviet organization
which deals with arms supplies to
foreign countries have been in Havana.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
5 August 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
3
USSR: xistence of a new Soviet early warning radar
with capability considerably in excess of previ-
alloy knnwn Anviet enuinment is revealed
Preliminary analysis indicates this new radar should
ue awe to detect targets of B-47 size at ranges of at least
300 nautical miles, at altitudes depending upon the line-of-
sight horizon and other operational factors. Increasing op-
erational deployment of the new radars apparently has oc-
curred in several sensitive peripheral areas of the USSR.
(Page 1) (Maeg
USSR-Congo:
Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister
Kuznetsov discussed plans for Soviet "assistance" to the Con-
golese Government, including "the donation of a large quantity"
of arms and ammunition, medical specialists and equipment,
and an airplane "to facilitate travel,"
Kuznetsov also urged Lumumba to ask for an emergency ses-
sion of the UN Security Council with a view to having UN ob-
servers, appointed from the Afro-Asian bloc, sent to the Congo
to assure the implementation of the council's resolutions.
Moscow has stepped up its propaganda efforts to discredit
the UN role in the Congo, and in Leopoldville Soviet officials arg
actively encouraging the Congolese authorities in their demands
for total Belgian withdrawal. (Page 2)
USSR-UN:
extensive Soviet effort to defeat the US request
for a meeting of the UN Disarmament Commission on 15 August.
The acting chief Soviet delegate in New York stated flatly to the
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Japanese representative that the USSR would boycott the meet-
ing, and the UAR's delegation reported that similar statements
were made to delegations from Asian and African states.
Soviet op-
position to tne meeting was partly based on a desire to avoid
weakening the impact of a possible appearance by Khrushchev
before the General Assembly in September, in connection with
Moscow's proposal that all heads of government be invited to
attend the discussion on disarmament.
exemen=1:31oc: Moscow and Peiping are continuing to empha-
size their support for Yemen by offering cash loans as well as
other economic aid to the Imam. A Yemeni mission left for
Peiping on 3 August to negotiate for further Chinese assistance.
the USSR has agreed in
principle to provide a cash loan to the Imam.
Moscow has also offered to trai Yemeni military person-
nel in the USSR. (Page 3)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
*Republic of the Congo: Katanga Premier Tshombe's oppo-
sition to a UN occupation of Katanga may result in a postpone-
ment of the UN's scheduled entry on 6 August. Tshomb0
has threatened armed resistance to any UN occupation. Eu-
ropeans in Elisabethville are said to be concerned not only
by the possibility of new violence, but by Tshombe's harsh crit-
icism of the Belgians, whose decision not to oppose the UN entry
Tshombe regards as a betrayal. A large-scale exodus of whites
from Katanga may be imminent. The apparent stalemate appears
certain to draw heavy fire from Lumumba, who on 4 August in Tunis
threatened "radical" action if Belgian troops have not evacuated
the Congo prior to his return to Leopoldville on 8 August,
0 i<
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UAR: Akram al-Hawrani, Baathist leader and former
UARVITF president, has left Syria and gone into exile in Leb-
anon, according to a press report from Beirut. Michel Aflaq,
the Syrian Booth's other founder, has been a political refugee
In Lebanon for some months. Hawrani has been reported to be
associated with disgruntled Syrian civilian and military elements
planning an attempt to separate Syria from Egypt and remove it
from Nasir's control,
(Page 5)
4 I/ 62
Indonesia: Sukarno, despite army opposition, apparently
plans to ban the anti-Communist Masjumi and Socialist parties
in the near future, probably on grounds of disloyalty to the gov-
ernment. This move would be in line with Sukarno's drive toward
authoritarianism and his plan to downgrade political parties. Some
army officials are hoping Sukarno, after having banned the two
parties, would be willing to permit further repressive action a-
gainst the Communist party as a balance. Sukarno, however,
would probably permit such action only on a limited scale.
(Page 6)
III. THE WEST
6 k
Cuba: The potential exists for a power struggle between Raul
Castro, Fidel's designated heir, and "Che" Guevara, who has al-
ready assumed much of the authority formerly exercised by the
5 Aug 60
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elder Castro. The danger to the regime of such a power strug-
gle will increase if Fidel Castro's illness is prolonged. Neither
Raul Castro, Guevara, nor the increasingly influential Pres-
ident Dortilcos possesses Fidel Castro's great popular appeal
among lower income groups, upon which the regime has come
� to depend.
Meanwhile, Cuban officials have exhorted delegates to the
Communist-dominated Latin American Youth Congress to carry
the struggle initiated by Cuba for "Latin American liberation'
back to their home countries. (Page 7)
11
LATE ITEM
*USSR-Cuba; Two officials of the Soviet Chief Engineering
Directorate�the component of Moscow's Ministry of Foreign
Trade responsible for the supply of arms and military equipment
to foreign countries--have been in Havana. One of these men, Iv 0
Yastrebov, is the Soviet official responsible for the shipment to
nonbloc countries of military equipment from the Black Sea port
of Nikolaev, where almost all Soviet arms shipments originate.
His presence in Havana strongly suggests that Moscow has agreed
to provide military aid to the Castro regime. Similar arrange-
ments between Czechoslovakia and Cuba may have been worked
out earlier this year, although no bloc arms are believed yet to
have been delivered.
IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Soviet Capabilities for Long-Range Attack Through Mid-1965.
N1E 11-8-60. August 60.
5 Aug 60
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DEPLOYMENT OF NEW SOVIET
E/W RADAR- AUGUST 1960
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New High-Performance Soviet Radar
Existence of a new Soviet early-warning radar with a de-
tection capability considerably in excess of previously known
Soviet equipment is revealed
This radar
apparently has been increasingly deployed for operational use
in several sensitive peripheral areas of the USSR since mid
-
1959, when its signals were first intercepted.
the large antenna observed are con-
sistent with long-range and high-altitude performance. This new
early-warning VHF radar should be able to detect targets of
B-47 size at ranges of at least 300 nautical miles, at altitudes
depending on the line-of-sight horizon and other operational fac-
tors.
probable locations at Baku, the Cri-
mean Peninsula, the Soviet-Iranian border area south of Kras-
novodsk, an area near the Pechenga airfield on the Kola Penin-
sula, and the Vladivostok area. Less firm that
the new radars may be also located in the Kaliningrad and Tbi-
lisi areas in the USSR, and in� Bulgaria and Rumania.
It can be assumed from past Soviet practice that some de-
ployment of these new radars may be under way in the interior
of the USSR as well as in the areas notes
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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Soviet-Congolese Relations
Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov
discussed plans for Soviet assistance to the Congolese Govern-
ment,
This would include the "dona-
tion" of a large quantity of arms and ammunition, medical spe-
cialists and equipment, and an airplane.
On 2 August TASS announced that 20 Soviet medical work-
ers, doctors, and surgeons would leave for the Congo in a few
days, and the USSR dispatched an aircraft to London on 1 August
to fly Lumumba back to Leopoldville by way of several African
capitals. ean mid-July Congolese Vice Premier Gizenga claimed
that following withdrawal of Belgian forces the Congo
would receive arms, technicians, and "volunteers" from bloc
countries. The subject may have been discussed with bloc rep-
resentatives who attended the 30 June independence celebrations
In Leopoldville.;
Kuznetsov also urged Lumumba to ask for an emergency
session of the UN Security Council with a view to having UN ob-
servers, appointed from the Afro-Asian bloc, sent to the Congo
to assure implementation of the council's resolutions. The TASS
chief at the UN told correspondents on 31 July that the USSR in-
tended to call for a Security Council meeting while Lumumba was
in New York. Lumumba departed on 2 August, however, appar-
ently persuaded by other African delegates not to demand a coun-
cil meeting.
The USSR has stepped up its efforts to discredit the UN role
in the Congo. Soviet officials in Leopoldville, described as "free-
wheeling," are openly predicting the failure of UN measures to
restore order, after which they say the USSR will step in and
"save the day." Moscow propaganda has become increasingly
critical of Hammarskjold, accusing him of aggravating the situ-
ation and of using UN trooDs to surmort the Western military ag-
gression.
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Bloc Assistance to Yemen
Moscow and Peiping are continuing to step up their efforts
to exploit Yemeni aspirations for economic development through
new offers of aid. A high-level Yemeni delegation left on 3 Au-
gust via Moscow for Peiping to discuss further Chinese assist-
ance, presumably including additional economic aid for road
building and light industrial enterprises. In May the first of
75 Yemenis arrived in Peiping "to study highway and textile
technology," accordingly to Radio Peiping. The Yemeni mis-
sion reportedly also will explore a Chinese offer to mint $10, -
000,000 worth of silver coins imprinted with the Imam's like-
ness. These may be presented as a gift, if Peiping feels it will
substantially advance the bloc's cause in Yemen.
The Soviet Union now may be willing to provide a cash loan
to Yemen. In the past Moscow has on several occasions re-
fused the Imam's requests for such financial aid. In addition,
the Soviet Union presumably has agreed to construct the Hudayda-
Taiz road, and Soviet technicians now are investigating the
feasibility of carrying out an irrigation project in the Tiharna
coastal region.
The Imam is said to have agreed to send a group of Yemeni
military personnel to the USSR for training. Presumably these
trainees will undergo naval training in Odessa.
N ID NTIAL
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41Wir
Syrian Baathist Leader Goes Into Lebanese Exile
CKormer UAR Vice President and Syrian Baathist leader
Akrarn al-Hawrani has gone into exile in Lebanon, according
to a press report from Beirut. Hawrani, who was one of
those most instrumental in bringing about the union between
Syria and Egypt in 1958, has been dissatisfied with his relega-
tion to a minor role in Syrian affairs and Nasir's suppression
of the Baath. He resigned as UAR vice president last year.
During the period 1949-54 Hawrani was allied with army
officers in four successful coups against various Syrian govern-
ments. The man who collaborated with him in founding the Baath
(Arab Socialist Resurrection party), Michel Aflaq, has been a po-
litical refugee in Lebanon for some months. Hawrani is the
Baath's activist leader, while Aflaq is its political theorist.
Hawrani was reported in touch with
King Husavn of Jordan reaardina plans for an anti-UAR coup in
Syria. la group of
formerly influential Syrian politicians, including Hawrani, was
seeking Jordanian support for an anti-UAR coup. Husayn has al-
so been approached by a group of Syrian Army officers who feel
they have the capability to overthrow the Nasir regime in Syria
and re-establish an independent Syrian republic. Hawrani may
also be connected with this group, which asked for financial sup-
port but said it wanted Jordanian military support only if the UAR
or Iraq attempted to thwart the coup by military means. Hawraniis
departure for Lebanon may have been motivated by fear that th
plotters have been exposed by UAR security authorities.
5 Aug 60
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Indonesian President Plans to Ban Two Anti-Communist Parties
President Sukarno, despite army opposition, reportedly in-
tends to ban two anti-Communist parties--the Masjumi, which
is the largest Moslem party in Indonesia, and the much smaller
Socialist party--sometime before 17 August, Indonesian inde-
pendence day. He will charge them with not meeting the criteria
stipulated in two presidential decrees regulating the role of
political parties and may accuse them of disloyalty to the gov-
ernment. The Masjumi and Socialist parties have earned Su-
karno's ill will by consistently opposing his implementation of
"guided democracy"; although they have formally disavowed
the 1958 provincial rebellion, party members have been in fre-
quent communication with rebel leaders.
The principal effect of the ban will be psychological, since
Sukarno had already largely excluded the two parties from both
executive and legislative positions at the national level and is
planning other measures to divest them of influence in the prov-
inces. Anticipating the latter, the Masjumi has already with-
drawn from regional councils in Java. The ban, however, will
discredit the Masjumi in non-Javanese areas where it is strong
and will further impair the anti-Communist position in Indonesia.
It will also serve as a warning to the two large non-Communist
parties, the National party and the orthodox Moslem Nandatul
Ulama, of the probable fate of organizations which oppose Su-
karno's policies.
Some army officials hope that Sukarno, having banned two
anti-Communist parties, would then permit further repressive
action against the Communist party as a balancing measure.
Significant restrictive action is not likely, however, since the
President feels he must preserve the Communists as a balance
against the army.
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Cuban Developments
Fidel Castro's illness raises the possibility of a power
struggle between Raul Castro, who is Fidel's designated heir,
and "Che" Guevara, who already has assumed much of the
authority formerly exercised by the elder Castro. The resulting
threat will increase if Fidel's illness is prolonged. Neither Raul
Castro, Guevara, nor the increasingly influential President Dor-
ticos has Fidel Castro's appeal among lower income groups, on
Which the regime has come to depend.
Meanwhile, Guevara, Raul Castro, and other Cuban leaders
have exhorted delegates to the Communist-dominated Latin Amer-
ican Youth Congress to carry back to their home countries the
struggle initiated by Cuba for "Latin American liberation." Both
Raul Castro and Guevara emphasized in their speeches that a
genuine revolution must include destruction of the regular armed
forces, which in all countries but Castro's Cuba serve the inter-
ests of "imperialism." Raul Castro told the delegates on 4 Au-
gust that Cuba does "have something for which to thank imperialism.
Without Batista, imposed by imperialism, we would probably still
be playing with representative democracy."
The escape from Cuba on 3 August of Raul Chibas, an early
Castro supporter, is a major blow to the regime. Chibas headed
one of the two major anti-Batista political parties prior to the ad-
vent of Castro and was the brother of the party's late founder, one
of Fidel Castro's early heroes.
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(uu ri ufm-ri-1a.44.--
THE PRESIDENT'
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Asststant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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