CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/06/04

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03189328
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: June 4, 1960

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4 June 1960
Copy No.
IIRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO, 30
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4 JUNE 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Comment on Khrushchev's disarmament
proposals.
Soviet party presidium may be dealing
with controversial issue.
Khrushchev accepts invitation to visit
Cuba; no date set.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Japan�Major newspapers warn that vio-
lence in today's strikes will lessen public
sympathy for protests against Kishi and
US-Japanese security treaty.
Turkey�Increasing evidence of illegal
activities by former regime inducing new
government to broaden arrests and in-
vestigations of former officials. 0
Sudan �Deputy commander in chief re-
ported planning to take over government;
plan is said to have Prime Minister
Abboud's concurrence.
Congo--African leader Lumumba demands
0
III. THE WEST
�Castro regime propagandizing charges
that Nicaragua's and Guatemala's suspen-
sion of diplomatic ties with Cuba is part
of US plot.
0 Venezuelan President Tots Cuban Prir-
dent to postpone visit.
movement of Chinese Corn-
munist fighters and standdown of North
Korean Air Force.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
4 June 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: The new Soviet disarmament proposals, published
five Cairs before the ten= nation disarmament conference re-
sumes in Geneva, are aimed in part at exploiting Western dif-
ferences resulting from France's insistence on giving top pri-
ority to measures for controlling nuclear weapons delivery
systems. IChrushchey's press conference statement on 3 June
made it clear that the new proposals, which include more de-
tailed provisions on the nature and functions of a control sys-
tem, are intended to appear responsive to other Western views.
Khrushchev probably hopes that this move, in addition to
DI strengthening the position of the bloc disarmament delegates
at Geneva, will help offset the damage to the USSR's image as
the champion of peace and disarmament inflicted by his per-
formance in Paris.
*Khrushchey's press conference remarks on 3 June did not
modify his earlier position that the status quo in West Berlin
-\\ would be maintained until another summit meeting takes place
in "six to eight months."' (Page 1)
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&USSR: A protracted meeting of the Soviet party presidium
on 2 June made Khrushchev and a contingent of presidium mem-
bers an hour and a half late for a scheduled appearance at a
British exhibit in Moscow. Heated discussion broke out among
them as they departed, according to a British diplomat who was
near the group. Khrushchev was overheard to remark, "All right,
we will continue the discussion tomorrow morning." The pres-
ence in Moscow of three presidium members who live in provin-
cial centers may be an additional sign of important deliberations.
There are as yet, however, no indications to support reports
that the party central committee may be convened earlier than
its meeting scheduled for 13 July.
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*USSR-Cuba: Khrushchev, exploiting Cuba's hostility to
the United States and its willingness to strengthen ties with the
Communist bloc, has accepted an invitation to visit Cuba at an
undetermined date. He will probably seek additional invitations
from other Latin American governments.
(Page 3)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Japan: Major newspapers, increasingly apprehensive about
leftist excesses in recent demonstrations, have warned that vio-
lence during the strikes set for 4 June would lessen public sym-
pathy for protests against Kishi's "dictatorial" tactics and
against the US-Japanese security treaty. Factions of the rul-
ing Liberal-Democratic party may temporarily be closing ranks
in the face of leftist attacks in an effort to complete the ratifica-
tion of the treaty by 19 June, However, Kishi's prospects for
remaining in pownr for morn than Ilia maxi- fnw 117PPkg (in not an-
ifar imnroved.
Turkey: The accumulation of extensive evidence of illegal
activity and crimes--some of which are subject to capital pun-
ishment--of the members of the former regime has resulted in
a,broadening of the current investigations and arrests. Elimina-
ibn of the nucleus of the leadership of the Democratic party
will add to its impotence when the next national elections are
Aleld. -The new government is apparently concerned, as was its
predecessor, over the possibility of disturbances in the Kurdish
areas of southeastern Turkey.:. (Page 4)
CSudan: A move by army Deputy Commander in Chief Hasan
Bashir Nasir to assume control of the Sudanese Government may
be imminent.
he intends in the next few days to abolish the Supreme
Military Council and take the position of prime minister over a
new, all-civilian cabinet, replacing the present military-dom-
inated group whose internal divisions have hindered effective
government. Prime M:inister. Abboud is said to be in agreement
with Bashir Nasir. Abboud is slated to become president, pre-
sumably in a figurehead role. - (Page 5) 3
4 June 60
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Belqian Congo: Patrice Lumumba's demand that he be ap-
pointed premier of the Congo on the basis of his plurality in
the recent legislative elections appears designed to confront
Belgium with the choice of bowing to his demand or facing the
threat of an attempt by him to seize power. In a press confer-
ence on 2 June, Lumumba also called for the immediate with=
drawal of Belgian troops from the Congo and for the election
of the chief of state by popular vote rather than by the legisla-
ture. Lumumba's warnings may have been prompted by con-
cern over the possible formation of an anti=Lumumba coalition
led by Joseph Kasavubiu, who departed for Brussels suddenly. on
1 June. (Page 6)
III. THE WEST
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Cuba: Nicaragua's suspension of diplomatic relations with
the ait-Fo regime on 1 June has again called public attention to
Cuban subversive activities in other Latin American countries,
as did the Guatemalan break with Cuba on 29 April. The Castro
regime is repeating its charges that such actions by "dictatorial,
pro-imperialist" regimes are the initial moves in a US plot to
cause its downfall. Some circles in Latin America were
tive to this propaganda tactic after the Guatemalan break.
r7j.
(Page 7)
Venezuela: President Betancourt
advise
Cuban President Dorticos not to come to Caracas at this time as
his visit would "create serious internal problems."
The visit, scheduled for 6 June,is threatening to intensify the
sharp differences within Betancourt's coalition government over
Venezuelan policy toward the Castro regime. A new point in this
controversy is the effect on Venezuela of Cuba's recent heavy pur-
chases of Soviet crude oil. (Page 9)
DAILY BRIEF iii
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NOY
t IV.
moves of up
to 129 Chinese Communist fighters �preliminary US analysis in-
dicates perhaps as many as 67--to forward coastal airfields op-
posite Taiwan, most of which occurred on 2-3 June. These ap-
pear to reflect Chinese Communist efforts to achieve a materially
Increased state of defensive air readiness. Except for abnormal
irect communications
there
s no evidence to reflect abnormal readiness or forward deploy-
ents of Chinese Communist ground or naval forces. The tone
I Communist propaganda on the Offshores-Taiwan situation does
ot appear unusually aggressive or focussed on liberation themes.
US air=
raft commenced deployment to the Far East beginning 1 June
It is believed that the Chinese Com=
unist air developments may reflect defensive moves in response
o US activities in the Pacific or alternatively as a consequence
f Malinovsky's declarations of readiness by the bloc to retaliate
forcefully against air intrusions.
The concurrent standdown of the entire North Korean Air
Force since 30 May cannot be fully explained but may have some
connection with the Chinese Communist defensive air posture. The
heavy North Korean fighter activity during late May would nor-
mally have been expected to result in a standdown of only 48 hours.
4 June 60
DAILY BRIEF iv
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NOW
New Soviet Disarmament Proposals
Khrushchev has again put forward new disarmament
proposals as a means of refurbishing the image of the USSR
as the champion of peaceful coexistence. In his letter to
President Eisenhower on 2 June, the Soviet premier stated
that "recent events have not only not lessened but, on the
contrary, have strengthened the SovietGovernment's deter-
mination to achieve a radical solution of the disarmament
problem." He reaffirmed his intention to work, as before,
to "normalize the international situation and improve rela-
tions between states."
Khrushchev's new proposals which, he said, had been
prepared for presentation to the summit meeting, are de-
signed to appear responsive to Western views on a number
of important issues. However, in an effort to exploit West-
ern differences resulting from France's insistence on giving
top priority, to measures for controlling nuclear weapons
delivery systems, the new Soviet plan provides for the pro-
hibition and destruction of all means for the delivery of
nuclear weapons in the first stage of Moscow's revised pro-
gram for complete disarmament. The USSR insists, how-
ever, that these measures must be accompanied by the liqui-
dation of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of all
foreign troops from the territory of other states.
The new proposals include detailed provisions on the
nature and functions of a control system which are designed
to give the impression that Moscow is seeking to meet West-
ern criticisms of the vague and ambiguous control provisions
Khrushchev placed before the United Nations last September.
The new proposals spell out control measures for each of
the three stages in the Soviet program and outline the composi-
tion and voting procedures of the proposed International
Control Organization. Moscow now provides for on-site in-
spection of successive disarmament steps, missile-launch-
ing sites, and plants and installations engaged in military pro-
duction.
In a move aimed at meeting the United States emphasis on
banning the use of outer space for military purposes. MoscOw's
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CONFIDENT LA L
new first stage would prohibit the launching of "special de-
vices" and confine all missile launchings to peaceful purposes.
Moscow has also adopted another feature of the Western
plan by agreeing to "joint studies" in the first and second
stages of measures to be undertaken in subsequent stages.
IChrushchev's press. conference remarks did not modify his
earlier position that the status quo in West Berlin would be
maintained until another summit meeting takes place in
"six to eight months." However, he warned the West against
believing that the conclusion of a separate treaty with East
Germany could be delayed by postponing a summit conference
beyond the time period he has suggested. He indicated that
Moscow would go through the normal steps of calling a peace
conference of wartime allies before taking any unilateral ac-
tion. As to the timing, Khrushchev stated only that the USSR
would initiate this process "when we see that enough time
has passed."
4 June 60
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Khrushchev to Visit Cuba
Soviet Premier Khrushchev has accepted an invitation
to visit Cuba, according to TASS. No date has been set for
the visit.
The announcement, following Fairushchev's recent personal
endorsement of Fidel Castro and his glowing praise for the aims
and methods of the Cuban revolution, suggests that in keeping
with the USSR's intensified anti-American propaganda since the
summit breakdown, Moscow is more willing than it was during
Mikoyan's winter visit to Havana to exploit the Cuban Govern-
ment's hostility to the United States and Havana's readiness to
strengthen ties with the Communist bloc. Soviet diplomats now
will step up their efforts to obtain additional invitations which
would expand Ithrushchev's Cuban trip into a Latin American tour.
Bolivian President Sties, whose term expires in August, re-
portedly said in late May that he would extend an invitation to
Khrushchev to visit Bolivia if the Soviet premier came to Latin
America. The Brazilian foreign minister, on the other hand,
noted in May that Brazil does not have diplomatic relations with
the USSR, and that consequently "the possibility of a visit by the
premier would never be studied." 'i/rhe Soviet ambassador in
Buenos Aires has reportedly invited Frondizi to visit the USSR,
probably angling for a reciprocal invitation to Khrushchev, but
Frondizi is not likely o respond with an invitation at this time.1
The President of Mexico in late 1959 received an invitation
to visit the USSR from Mikoyan, who subsequently told a Mexican
senator that "without doubt Premier Khrushchev will visit Mexico."
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OI SEC T.
The new government in Turkey, on the basis of additional evi-
dence, is broadening the investigation into illegal activities and
alleged crimes of the Menderes regime. A spokesman for the Na-
tional Unity Committee, which appears to be emerging as the real
power in Turkey has reported discovery of the bodies of students
killed by police during the demonstrations; of plans for a violent
purge of leaders of the .Republican People's party, professors, and
some army officers; and of large quantities of illegal arms. Arrests
have been stepped up and now include about 400 Democratic party
deputies, but an initial screening is apparently already under way
to determine who can be released immediately. The remainder will
be held for trial before civilian courts or, if military personnel,
before courts martial. In the light of the alleged murders, extreme
penalities probably will be demanded for some of those tried.
The initial report of the committee working on a new constitu-
tion appears to be an attempt at legal justification of the coup. The
report claims that the former government "had ceased to be a social
and national institution and turned into a tool of personal influence
and ambition." Although the Democratic party will probably be al-
lowed to participate in the planned election, it will probably be in-
effective as a political force.
It is still too early to determine the true power relationships
of the interim government. Even the size of the National Unity
Committee (NUC) has not been made public. ale new minister
of foreign affairs recently told the British ambassador in Ankara
that the NUC might evolve into something in the nature of a constit-
uent assembly. T'
i_The new government, as was the Menderes regime, is apparently
concerned over the possibility of disturbances in the Kurdish areas
of southeastern Turkey and may be sending troop reinforcements to
that area2
gendarmerie units in southern Turkey have been
alerted to disarm the Kurds and mak arrpstc wherp npepqRary 0
forestall "further adverse activities."
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'Woe Neer
(New Government in Sudan Reported Imminent
(The Sudan's reigning Supreme Military Council and its
subordinate cabinet of civilian and military ministers may be
replaced during the next few days by an all-civilian cabinet
under Deputy Commander in Chief Hasan Bashir Nasir
Bashir Nasir, whose plans reportedly have the approval of
Prime Minister Abboud and Ansar religious leader Siddiq
al- Mandi, is expected to assume control of the government
during the Moslem holiday period of 4-7 June. He plans to
arrest three members of the present government, while
two others slated for ouster are out of the country. The
arrests will be followed by announcement of the abolition of
the council and the formation of a new cabinet.
The planned membership of the new cabinet has not been
revealed, senior army
officers and a government official had indicated that Bashir
Nasir would emerge as a "strong-man" prime minister,
with Abboud in what appears likely to become a largely honor-
ary post of president.
f
1,The Supreme Military Council and the cabinet, most of
whose members are military men serving in both bodies,
have been under fire from political and religious leaders
for inefficiency resulting largely from acrimonious disa-
greements among council and cabinet members.
Bashir Nasir would run little risk of effective opposi-
tion. Besides having the reported approval of Siddiq al-
Mandi, Bashir Na.sies move is not expected to be opposed
by the Sudan's other powerful religious figure, Ali al-Mirghani
of the Khatmia sect. Most of the senior army officers in the
Khartoum area are either tribally related or otherwise at-
tached to Bashir Nasir. Bashir Nasir, who is not cate-
gorized as any kind of extremist, would be unlikely to make
any sudden shifts in the Sudan's generally neutralist foreign
policy.
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Congo Leader Hints at Move to Seize Power
The demand by extremist Congolese leader Patrice Lu-
mumba that he be appointed premier of the Congo on the
basis of his plurality in the recent legislative elections ap-
pears to be a threat to seize power if his various demands
are not met by the Belgians. Lumumba's National Congo
Movement won about one third of the 137 seats in the lower
house of the new Congo parliament. In a press conference
on 2 June, Lumumba also called for the immediate with-
drawal of Belgian troops from the Congo and for the elec-
tion of a chief of state by popular vote rather than by the
legislature. He hinted that there would be "trouble" if
his various demands were not met.
Lumumba's warnings may have been prompted by con-
cern over the possible formation of an anti-Lumumba coali-
tion by Joseph Kasavubu, who departed for Brussels sudden-
ly on 1 June. Lumumba might proclaim himself head of gov-
ernment, but his ability to seize power is doubtful in view
of the hostility toward him among many African groups and
Belgium's control of the Congo's security forces.
Meanwhile, Europeans continue to leave the Congo at
an accelerating rate in the face of antiwhite threats. News-
papers in Stanleyville and ICatanga Province have reportedly
published lists of Europeans who should leave the Congo
"at once."
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Nicaragua Suspends Relations With Cuba
The Nicaraguan Government cabled the Cuban Foreign Min-
istry on 1 June demanding the recall of the Cuban ambassador
and his entire staff for having repeatedly engaged in subversive
activities. The Nicaraguans regard this move as equivalent to
"suspension" of diplomatic relations, an action taken by the
Guatemalan Government for similar reasons on 29 April. Nic-
aragua's action again calls public attention to Cuban subversive
activities in other Latin American countries.
Nicaragua and Guatemala are exerting pressure to have the
governments of Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador take sim-
ilar action, since they regard Cuban subversion as directed
against all five Central American governments. Honduras may
do so, because the Cuban ambassador there has been particularly
provocative in his support of radical, Communist-inspired oppo-
sition groups. However, Costa Rica and El Salvador appear un-
likely to break with Cuba in the near future.
The Castro regime is repeating its charges that the actions
of "dictatorial, pro-imperialist" regimes are the initial moves
in a US plot to cause its overthrow. Some circles in Latin Amer-
ica were receptive to this propaganda line after the Guatemalan
break.
Meanwhile, Guatemalan President Ydigoras is reliably re-
ported to have threatened to consider withdrawal from the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS) or at least to have the Guatemalan
representative in the OAS "walk out" if the Inter-American Peace
Committee fails to act on Guatemalan charges against Cuba which
were formally, lodged with the OAS following Guatemala's break
with the Castro regime.
Latin American annoyance at the Castro regime is being re-
inforced by Cuban President Dorticos' "good-will" trip in South
America, which is demonstrating that the best organized support
4 June 60
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Ns, v.,00
in Latin America for the Castro regime is Communist. In Argen-
tina, he flouted protocol, viciously attacked the United States be-
fore a pro-Communist 'university group, and went out of his way
to meet with leaders of an actively antigovernment, Peronista la-
bor group. In Uruguay, the Cuban Embassy was admonished prior
to Dorticos' arrival that the Uruguayan Government wanted no
public statement adversely reflecting on any foreign government.
The Cubans reportedly agreed, but Dorticos nevertheless made
his usual anti-US attacks.
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Noir
Venezuelan= Cuban Relations Approach Critical Stage
Venezuelan President
Betancourt told Foreign Minister Arcaya, then in Argentina on
a South American tour, to advise Cuban President Dorticos not
to come to Caracas at this time as his visit would "create seri-
ous internal problems." The visit, scheduled for 6 June, could
cause unrest in Venezuela, where outspoken anti-Castro groups
are said to be planning a violent protest demonstration against
the Cuban delegation. On the other hand, Arcaya, a stanch sup-
porter of the Castro regime, has reportedly, insisted that with-
drawal of the invitation would also cause "grave internal prob-
� lems"; he has threatened to resign if his government takes such
action.
The issue of the visit is likely to intensify the divisions in
Betancourt's three-party coalition, in political pressure groups,
and in the press over Venezuelan policy toward Castro. At the
time of Cuban Foreign Minister. Roa's visit to Venezuela in March,
this cleavage was'clearly defined over the issue of whether Vene-
zuela would attend Cuba's underdeveloped nations conference pro-
posed for Havana this fall. 1The Venezuelan ambassador to Wash-
ington subsequently stated frat "the Cuban problem" was an ex-
tremely serious threat to internal stability in his country.] The
controlled Cuban press and radio have attacked Betancourt on
various occasions in recent weeks.
A new irritant in Cuban-Venezuelan relations is Cuba's pro-
gram to import 900,000 tons of Soviet crude oil in 1960, which
will replace about 43 percent of Venezuela's crude oil exports to
Cuba. Venezuela supplied almost all of Cuba's crude oil require-
ments in 1959, when the Cuban market took more than 3 percent
of total Venezuelan petroleum exports. A large segment of the
Venezuelan press has denounced the Cuban-Soviet deal, and the
acting foreign minister,
has called it a "rude blow to Venezuelan petroleum," ric17
already facing keen competition in its world markets.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Departmr�nt of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Politica:. Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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