CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/09/03

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03160562
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2016
• Case Number: F-2014-02699
• Publication Date: September 3, 1960

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3 September 1960
Copy No. C 76
CENTRAL
IYTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
3
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
3 September 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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would head the Soviet delegation to the UN General Assembly,
Deputy Minister Kuznetsov on three separate occasions at-
tempted to persuade Hammarskjold to issue invitations to
President Eisenhower, Macmillan, and De Gaulle, as well
as Khrushchev. Khrushchev has also written to Nehru urging
him to attend. These overtures probably reflect Khrushchev's
desire to use his UN appearance to underscore his commit-
ment to a policy of coexistence and high-level talks with free-
world leaders, particularly on disarmament.
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Iran: he demonstration by Iranian nationalist students
in Tehran on 1 September was easily broken up by police.
Army units had also been alerted to be ready to move against
the demonstrators if necessary,
Meanwhile,
newly "elected" members of parliament are resigning to
clear the way for another round of elections, following the
Shah's order, Opposition elements reportedly are elated by
os e ts of new elections.;
a epu � c: ar amentary elections in the Malagasy
Republic Madagascar) on 4 September will be the first impor-
tant test of strength between President Tsiranana's pro-Western
coalition government and the Congress party for the Independ-
ence of Madagascar (AKFM), an extreme nationalist party dom-
Mated by militant Communists. Although tribal rivalry and the
republic's attainment last June of independence within the French
Community should benefit the moderate parties, the AKFM ap-
pears to have attracted wide support since its strong showing in
municipal elections last fall. The AKFM is well organized and
reportedly has been receiving substantial financial support from
the French Community Communist party and the Sino-Soviet
bloc.
3 Sept 60
DAILY BRIEF
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III. THE WEST
Peru-Cuba: fPeru is considering breaking relations with
Cuba. PresidenfTPrado, under pressure from the Peruvian mil-
itary, has agreed in principle to this move when the time is pro-
pitious and particularly if other Latin American countries take
similar action. Guatemala and Nicaragua broke relations with
Cuba earlier this year. Colombia, which is incensed by a re-
cent vitriolic outburst 1* the Cuban ambassador in Bogota, will
3 Sept 60
DAILY BRIEF iv
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probably at the least declare him persona non grata. Vene-
zuelan President Betancourt, who has become increasingly
hostile toward Castro and is concerned by the threat of pro-
Castro violence to his regime, also seems to be nearing a
break.
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3 Sept 60
DAILY BRIEF
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�11101
*0 ut.)a C omm;..]n
the United States of
On 2 September
with the Peiping r
the "Cuban people."
Soviet 1�,:c:c
the inter-American
.staged rally of some
Castro's acceptance
"if we are attacked."
Communist C ,
gancia effort to Latin
major diplomatic
recognition in the We
in the most vindictive attack on
eer, Fidel Castro defiantly announced
;htion to establish diplomatic relations
in a Speech billed as the answer of
OAS warning against accepting Sine-
effc t .� his count: ;
.-.ct and from il the Western alliance. A
-,000 Cubans gave its endorsement to
:-�ese, as well as Soviet, military aid
s devoted n considerable'propa-
, i..ecent years, has achieved a
,-.)tigh in securing its first. diplomatic
He.naisphere. Cuba, with a Chinese
community of about 33.,;A':�3--the largest in Latin America�will
be a particularly valuable base for the Chinese Communists in
spreading their influee n Latin America.
Castro's announc47.nt follows by four days the sighing of
joint statement by Cuba and North Korea in which they agreed
to exchange ambassadc:.--.-,7: "as soon as possible,!' Cuba will be
the first non-bloc count r7 to establish diniont ic relations with
Pyongyang.
3 Sept 60
DAILY BRIEF vi
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Peru Consider Breaking Relations With Cub6...-
C_Peru is considering breaking relations with Cuba, apparent-
ly to recoup some of the prestige it lost through Foreign Minis-
ter Porras' actions at the seventh meeting of foreign ministers
in San Jose. After Peru had initiated the meeting, Porras failed
to take the lead in promoting the resolution against extracon-
tinental intervention in the hemisphere, defied his government's
instructions, and finally refused to sign. President Prado, un-
der pressure from the Peruvian military, has agreed to this
move when the time is propitious, and particularly if other Latin
American countries take similar action. Guatemala and Nicaragua
broke relations with Cuba earlier this year. Colombia, which
is incensed by a recent outburst by the Cuban ambassador in
Bogota, will at least declare him persona non grata. Venezue-
lan President Betancourt, who has become increasingly hostile
toward Castro and concerned by the threat of pro-Castro vio-
lence to his regime, also seems to be approaching a break.
Prado is reluctant to force the resignation of Porras, a
friend of the leftist but non-Communist APRA party, for fear of
alienating the APRA% general backing of his administration. The
cabinet unanimously censured his actions at San Jose, and the
military representatives are insisting on his ouster.
APRA, a bitter enemy of the Peruvian military and conserva-
tive elements, has tended to sympathize with the objectives of
the Cuban revolution; a dissident and militant wing of the party is
strongly pro-Castro. However, Ramiro Priale, APRA% top lead-
er in Peru, who advised Prado that the party would accede to a
break of relations with Cuba, has informed the US Embassy in
Lima that it will not withdraw its support of Prado in the event
Porras resigns�presumably voluntarily.
Porras' position at San Jose w s similar to that of Venezue-
lan Foreign Minister Arcaya, a stanch supporter of Castro, who
refused to sign the final resolution of the meeting which was ap-
proved by his government. This development has caused consider-
able tension in Venezuela, where pro-Castro groups are strong,
and could threaten President Betancourt's three-party coalition.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CO AL
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