CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/12/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02066874
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: December 27, 1960

%Ise I %Or ta 061%� WE I
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874 3.3(h)(2)
P /"9 3.5(c)
27 December 1960
LOpy
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 47
NO DINHOE
cz-
0 DECLASSMED
CLASS. ONACU TO:
NEXT R.:I/LW ItATh.
AbTH: HH 7C.-2
DATI � 7t11EVIEWERI
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
I %Jr btlerit. I
veto
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
27 DECEMBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Taiwan Strait--Almost no Communist
shelling in past month. Nationalists con-
tinue some shelling.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Laos--Peiping endorses USSR's "just
stand" on ICC and Geneva C
bloc air support continues.
Congo--Hammarskjold implies he will
try to take UN out of Congo if Mobutu
uses force in Orientale Province.
King Saud promises some reforms; pop-
ular reaction to his take-over generally
favorable. Some officers continue to
plot against King.
Ethiopia--Security precautions continue
high; Emperor's decision to reconstitute
Bodyguard likely to antagonize army.
Ghana, Guinea, and Mali release new
propaganda on "union."
<
0
III. THE WEST
()Belgian cabinet threatened by Socialist-
inspired strikes.
�Bolivia reportedly offered $150,000,000 in
economic aid by USSR.
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
'Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
1.0 TOP SECRET *or*
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
27 December 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*Communist China - Taiwan:ECommunist shelling of the
offshore islands has almost completely ceased for the past
month. Only one firing of 33 propaganda rounds has oc- dr, X--
curred since 27 November--the lowest ebb since the odd-day
firing pattern was established in October 1958. The "liberate y)
Taiwan" theme has been a negligible ingredient in mainland
propaganda since mid-1960. On the few occasions when the
Taiwan issue is mentioned, however, Peiping continues to un-
derscore its determination to use force if necessary while ex-
pressing hope for a peaceful solution
an contrast to the Communist behavior, Chinese National-
ist batteries have increased the number of high-explosive shells
fired against the mainland since mid-November.. Much of the
shelling has been registration and practice firing and is appar-
ently intended to maintain morale and combat readiness among
the troops on the islands; in addition,. Taipei seems to believe
it is politically advantageous to keep a state of tension in the
strait :3 (Page 1)
�di
II. ASIA-AFRICA
K
*Laos: Peiping, in a People's Daily editorial on 25 Decem-
ber,-"Eaiirsed the "just stand" taken by the Soviet Government -PaTu
in formally requesting British support for reactivating the In-
ternational Control Commission in Laos and reconvening the
Geneva Conference. The Chinese Communists would expect to
participate in such a conference. The editorial implied, how-
ever, that Communist China would disapprove any Soviet effort
to bring the Laotian situation before the United Nations. Lao-
tian Government troops meanwhile have occupied Phong Hong,
�781,P�SE�RE-T-
4Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
/,
Approved forsRltair:,21020/03/13 CO2066874
TOf
about 40 miles north of Vientiane; the slight resistance of-
fered by Captain Kong Le's troops is in line with other indi-
cations that the bulk of his force are withdrawing northward
toward Van Vieng, a Pathet Lao hich has re-
cently received Soviet airdrops.
Seven Soviet AN-12 heavy transports have been scheduled
for flights from Canton into North Vietnam. Such flights will
improve the efficiency of the Communist airlift into Laos by
eliminating one step previously observed�that of offloading
cargo at Canton for transshipment to Hanoi aboard IL-14s. An
AN-12 can carry as much cargo as six IL-14s.
(Page 3)
*CongoJJmmarskjo1d has sent a letter to Kasavubu im-
plying that he will ask the Security Council to take the UN out
of the Congo if Mobutu uses force in an attempt to take Orien-
tale Province�still nominally controlled by Antoine Gizenga's
"government. " Hammarskj old told US officials, however, that
he does not expect civil war in the Stanleyville area, since he
believes neither Gizenga nor Mobutu is strong enough to force
a military showdown. Hammarskjold plans to be in the Congo
on 3 and 4 January-J Khrushchev, after a delay of ten days, re-
sponded to Gizengat appeal for support by reiterating Soviet
promises of support and, sympathy but avoiding any specific com-
mitment of assistance. CSudan continues to refuse transit to UAR
planes bound for Stanleyville, but President Abboud admits that
flights over remote areas of the country could probably be made
without Sudanese knowledge3
(Page 5)
*Saudi Arabia: Since reassuming personal control of the
government on 21 December, King Saud has promised on 24 and _ 5
25 December to take steps to eliminate economic "stagnancy" ri)
and decentralize the government, to have a constitution drawn 4 q
up, and to make other moves suggestive of greater democrati- a- 71)
zation.CSaud also reportedly sent an emissary to assure Nasir
27 Dec 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
/77
Ar
tuoipproved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
7
TOP ET
of the "progressive" nature of the new government :S These
moves and the relatively liberal character of his cabinet
� appointments indicate that Saud hopes at least to create the
Impression of sponsoring a reformist government. [-The first
popular reactions to the King's take-over appear to be favor-
able, although educated Saudis reportedlv have adopted a
wait-and-see attitude
A group of dissident baucti military officers continues to
express dissatisfaction with King Saud's resumption of con-
trol of the government
Representatives of
the officers' group told the charge that their movement was
inspired by the IJAR's success with its revolution and that they
felt the time was favorable for action because of the "intense
disputes among the members of the royal household." The UAR
charge., noting that his views were unofficial, pointed out to the
officers the "economic and international" difficulties they, would
face if they undertook a coup and advised them to be patient and
remain vigilant.. (Page 6)
*Ethiopia: [Although all the leaders of the attempted coup
against Emperor Haile Selassie are now reported to have been
killed or captured, considerable sympathy for the coup effort
persists, and the Imperial Government's position may still be
precarious. Because of the elaborate precautions considered
necessary for the Emperor's safety, the royal family has not
attended the funerals of the government ministers killed by the
rebels. The Emperor reportedly decided on 21 December to
reconstitute the Imperial Bodyguard, and some junior officers
and men have already been released from custody. This action
could seriously antagonize the army, which crushed the revolt.
Officials of the government claim to have captured documents
which they say clearly indicate Soviet and Czech involvement
in the coup attempt, but the officials have not produced the evi-
dence they claim to ha.ve-.3 (Page 7)
27 Dec 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
--T-ept-SEeRic7T-
AApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO206604
A
z
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
14400 .1.UP ,SECR T
*Gha,na-Guinea-Mali: The "union." announced on 25 De-
cember by the presidents of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, after
a two-day meeting in Conakry, represents a further sym-
bolic gesture by these three radical and leftist-inclined Afri-
can states. There will probably be few tangible results be-
yond the establishment of some joint diplomatic missions and
the "coordination" of economic policies. Nkrumah's announce-
ment, after a visit to Bamako last month, that Ghana and Mali
had decided to establish a joint parliament has since been great-
ly modified, in private, by the Malian President. The Ghana-
Guinea "union" proclaimed in 1959 still lacks substance. The
membership of Mali in the French Community and Ghana in the
British Commonwealth, along with Guinea's close ties with the
Communist bloc, would make it difficult to arrange a genuine
union.
III. THE WEST
*Belgium: The Socialist-instigated strikes, designed to
force modifications of the government's fiscal austerity bill,
have reached general strike proportions in the "red belt" of in-
dustrial south Belgium. In an effort to placate the workers and
to retain the support of Roman Catholic trade unions, Premier
Eyskens has adjourned parliament until 3 January and is seek-
ing a compromise. However, the Socialist leaders now appar-
ently aim to topple the cabinet and are likely to reject any mod-
erate proposal. If in addition the Roman Catholic trade unions
desert the government, its chances for surviving are slim.
*Bolivia-USSR: A Soviet parliamentary, delegation which ar-
rived in La Paz on 21 December for an 11-day visit has appar-
ently offered a $50,000,000 credit to construct a tin smelter in
Bolivia and an alleged additional credit of $100,000,000. Pres-
ident Paz has replied that a technical commission leaving for
Europe and Moscow will study the details of the offer. Moscow
Is probably interested in arranging an exchange of diplomatic mis-
sions as well as an economic aid agreement.
(Page 8)
27 Dec 60
DAILY BRIEF
iv
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874v
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
SECRET
7.4./
� Decline in 'Chinese Communist Shelling
Of the Offshore Islands
ommunist artillery action against the offshore islands
since 27 November has been confined to the firing of 33 prop-
aganda rounds against the Chinmens on 13 December, The
Matsus have not been shelled since 27 October. This marks
the lowest ebb in shellings since the odd-day firing pattern was
established following the October 1958 crisis in the Taiwan
� Strait2?
/According to an unconfirmed press report of 23 Decem-
ber, Peiping announced over the loudspeaker opposite the
� Chinmens that it plans to abandon the odd-day firing pattern.
The Chinese Nationalist Defense Ministry denied knowledge of
such an announcement. The regularity of the shellings during
the past two years has tended to detract from their propaganda
� impact, and Peiping now may be planning to schedule them at
more infrequent intervals:S
an contrast to the Communist behavior, there has been an
increase since mid-November in the number of high-explosive
shells fired against the mainland by the Chinese Nationalist bat-
teries. Much of the shelling has been registration and practice
firing and probably is intended to maintain morale and combat
readiness in the event Peiping steps up action in the strait. Tai-
pei also may hope to provoke the Communist guns into action,
feeling that continued tension in the area is politically advanta-
geous. In the past, Peiping has often responded in kind to heavy
Nationalist shellings of the mainlanei
/The "liberate Taiwan" theme has almost disappeared from
Chinese Communist propaganda, dropping from the peak during
Peiping's "anti-US imperialism" week in late June. In the few
references made to the subject, however, Peiping continues to
couple its assertions of preference for a peaceful solution to the
Taiwan issue with insistence on its readiness to use force if
necessary. This line was taken in a 5 December broadcast which")
�SEeRE-T---
27 Dec 60
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
� ,
NoP.' Nor
(stated that the Communists still entertained hopes of peaceful
negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek
(The current lull in Chinese Communist militancy toward
Taiwan was also reflected at a 28 November propaganda brief-
ing of Communist newsmen in Hong Kong. Peiping's professed
position, as set forth by the spokesman at the briefing, was that
the "military liberation" of Taiwan had been put off because
China wished to avoid the risk of a full-scale war whieh wm ld
jeopardize its economic achievements-0-
SECRET
27 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
Note 1UI1Ll Nar
Situation in Laos
Peiping, in a People's Daily editorial on 25 December, en-
dorsed the "just stand" taken by the Soviet Government in for-
mally requesting British support for reactivating the Interna-
tional Control Commission (ICC) in Laos and reconvening the
Geneva Conference. The Chinese Communists would expect to
participate in such a conference. The editorial implied, how-
ever, that Communist China would disapprove of any Soviet ef-
fort to bring the Laotian situation before the United Nations.
The editorial accused the Thai Government, and by implication
the United States, of scheming to make the UN interfere in the
infcirnal nffnirs of Laos
the main purpose of his trip to Vientiane had been to
gather evidence of US interference, to be used in presenting
charges in the Security Council,
North Vietnam, in a memorandum published in Hanoi on
22 December and in a letter of 25 December to the co-chairmen
of the 1954 Geneva Conference, continued its drumbeat of charges
against the United States for "intervention" and "acts of aggres-
sion" in Laos. Both communications appeal for the reactivation
of the ICC and the reconvening of the Geneva Conference,
Laotian Government troops have occupied Phong Hong, about
40 miles north of Vientiane on the road to Luang Prabang. The
lightness of resistance offered by Captain Kong Le's forces is in
line with other indications that the bulk of Kong Le's troops are
withdrawing northward toward Van Vieng, a Pathet Lao stron
hold which has been the site of recent Soviet airdrops.
morale among irregular troops with Kong Le is
poor. Kong Le's support may 'eventually be reduced to the hard
core of his Second Paratroop l3attalion; if properly integrated with
the Pathet Lao, however, the paratroopers could pose a potent
guerrilla threat to the government.3
King Savang's current visit to Vientiane is aimed at buttress-
ing the new provisional Boun Oum regime through ceremonial
SECRET
27 Dec 60 CFNTRAI INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
N�pe SECRET
association with the monarchy. [General Phoumi and his advis-
ers seem to be of two minds regarding the desirability of having
the National Assembly formally invest the new government
through a vote of confidence. Although such action would tend
�to legalize the new government in the eyes of world opinion, some
of Phoumit advisers claim that it would constitute a retrogres-
sion from the "revolution" said to be represented in the actions of
Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee since 10 Septem-
ber. It seems clear that the Phoumi group would like to rewrite
the constitution immediately so as to weaken the assembly and
strengthen the executive:3
Steps are apparently being taken to improve the efficiency of
the Sino-Soviet bloc airlift into Laos. Seven Soviet AN.. 12 heavy
transport aircraft, six of which arrived at Canton from Peiping on
24 December and the seventh probably on 26 December, have been
scheduled for flights to North Vietnam on 27 December. One is to
fly to Hanoi and the remaining six are to go to Haiphong. This will
be the first time bloc transports of military subordination have
flown into North Vietnam.
The flight of these aircraft to bases in North Vietnam will elim=
mate one step in the airlift--that of offloading
cargo at Canton for transshipment to Hanoi aboard IL-14s. Seven
AN-12s could carry between 105 and 140 tons of cargo--six times
as much as an equal number of IL-14s. Offloading at bases in North
Vietnam will free the Soviet IL-14s which had been engaged in shut-
tle operations between Canton and Hanoi for flights directly to Laos.
Both Soviet and North Vietnamese transports continue to ferry
supplies into Laos. At least five Soviet IL-14s were engaged in
flights to Laos� on 24 December. Five were scheduled for flights
to the Vientiane area on 25 December, and four additional flights
were scheduled for Sam Neua on the same day. In addition, sev-
eral North Vietnamese transports were scheduled for flights to Sam
Neua and Dien Bien Phu on 25 December,
27 Dec 60 CCAITE1 Al IkITCI I letcbort Dliii CTIkl
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874 Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
Now SECRET
Hammarskjold's Views on Congo
CuN Secretary General Hammarskjold has sent a letter to
President Kasavubu implying that he will ask the Security Coun-
cil to take the UN out of the Congo if Mobutu uses force in an
attempt to take Orientale Province-=still nominally controlled
by the "government" of Antoine Gizenga. On 25 December
Lumumba supporters entered adjacent Kivu Province and ar-
rested the �governor and several other provincial officials.
Mobutu may be expected to take some kind of retaliatory ac-
tion:)
CHammarskjold told US officials that he does not expect civil
war in the Stanleyville area, since he believes that neither Gizenga
nor Mobutu is strong enough to force a military showdown. The US
ambassador in Leopoldville, however, believes that barring sub-
stantial airborne assistance from the bloc or the UAR, economic
collapse will come to Oriental() Province in two to four weeks, and
that there may then be attacks on Europeans and their shops. He
points outthat since the Europeans are widely scattered throughout
the province, it will be very, difficult for the UN force to protect
them. The Sudan continues to refuse transit to UAR planes bound
for Stanleyville, but President Abboud has admitted that planes could
overfly remote areas of the country without Sudanese knowledge�-;_c
Cilammarskjold, who plans to visit the Congo on 3 and 4 Jan-
uary, hopes soon to get the Guinean troops out of the country, as
he considers them Communists for all practical purposes. He does
not think that either. the UAR or India will withdraw its forces, and
he hopes to be able to keep the Moroccan troops in the Congo. The
army personnel who returned to Morocco on 25 December were mem-
bers of a special training mission and not part of the Moroccan UN
force-4
Soviet Premier Khrushchev, after a delay of ten days, respond-
ed to an appeal for support from Gizenga by reiterating promises of
Soviet support and sympathy but avoiding any specific commitments
for assistance to the Stanleyville group. Moscow may be awaiting the
outcome of the Rabat meeting of African leaders, to begin on 3 Jan-
uary, before taking a definite stand toward Gizenga and his rump
government.
-sEeRf+T--
27 Dec 60 CcAITD A I IkITC1 1 letICkIrC DI 11 1 CTIkl
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
TOP SECRET
King Saud Promises Government R-erurrrrs�
. Since reassuming personal control of the Saudi Arabian
Government on 21 December, King Saud has promised domes-
tic reforms and foreign policies apparently designed to fore-
stall possible criticism by Arab nationalists both within and
outside his kingdom. , the King
also sent a secret emissary to inform UAR President Nasir
that the new government will initiate progressive measures
that should exempt it from propaganda attacks by Cairo's Voice
of the Arabs. The King apparently, received no assurances from
Nasir. the emissary shortened his trip
as a result of critical statements made in Cairo about the new
Saudi Government:3
In policy statements of 24 and 25 December, Saud stated
he would take steps to improve the Saudi economy, decentral-
ize the government, provide for constitutional rule, and guar-
antee freedom of the press "within reasonable limits." He also
pledged a policy of close cooperation with the Arab states and
"complete neutrality" in dealing with other foreign governments.
He promised to "exert all efforts" to aid the Arabs of Palestine,
Algeria, Oman, and the Arab south--Aden and the Aden Protec-
torate--as well as to "adopt,all methods" to win the Buraimi
Oasis dispute with the UK. LThe first popular reactions within
Saudi Arabia appear to be favorable toward the King's reassumption
of authority, but educated Saudis reportedly have adopted a wait-
and-see attitude.
In Jidda, the UAR charge has met again with two represent-
atives of a group of Saudi military officers planning a revolt
against the monarchy,
the officers felt dis-
sension within the Saudi royal family favored action at this time.
was again cautious in advising the officers, giving them
his "unofficial" view that they should consider the economic and in-
ternational difficulties they might face and urging patience and vig-
ilance.
-T-OP-S-E-C-RfTT
27 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE RULLETIN Page 6
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
=too �SfeRET--
Ethiopian� Government's Position Still Precarious
(Although all the leaders of the attempted coup against
Emperor Haile Selassie now are reported to have been killed
or captured, considerable sympathy for the coup effort per-
sists, and the Imperial Government's position may still be
precarious. Apprehension within the American community
has abated, and Addis Ababa now is much calmer-:(
CElaborate security precautions, however, are considered
necessary to protect the Emperor. The palace in which he is
residing is under, heavy armed guard, and army troops are
preparing entrenchments. For security reasons the royal fam-
ily did not attend the funerals of government ministers who
were killed by the rebels. Sympathy for the objectives of the
coup is reported still to be strong in some government minis-
tries-A
The Emperor reportedly decided on 21 December to recon-
stitute the Imperial Bodyguard, and some junior officers and
men have already been released from custody. If the Bodyguard
is reorganized as a large, elite corps, the army, which crushed
the coup, will be seriously antagonized. Army leaders report-
edly favor rotating army divisions to serve as a guard for the
Emperor, and fear that Haile Selassie may try to exploit the tra-
ditional hatred between the army and the Bodyguard to maintain
his own positions
COfficials of the government claim to have captured documents
at the headquarters of the Imperial Bodyguard which, they say,
clearly indicate Soviet and Czech participation in the coup effort.
They have not produced this evidence, but the Soviet ambassador
was reportedly seen at the rebel foreign ministry and Bodyguard
headquarters during the coup, the Soviet Embassy was reported
stocking up on food prior to 14 December, and a Soviet ship off
the Ethiopian coast acted in a suspicious manner during the coup.
The actions of individual Yugoslays were reportedly also open to
uestion but the embassy apparently remained neutral.
SECRET
27 Dec 60 CKI
FTDA I IIQTFI I ini:mrr 11111 I PTIKI Page 7
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
Niari -e0Pir I D,CNT-1-Ab
Bolivia Apparently Considering Large Soviet Credit Offer
A Soviet parliamentary delegation which arrived in La Paz
on 21 December for an 11-day visit has apparently offered a
$50,000,000 credit to construct a tin smelter in Bolivia and an
alleged additional credit of $100,000,000. Bolivian President
Paz has been under strong domestic pressure to explore Soviet
overtures concerning economic aid since Khrushchev suggested
the possibility to Bolivia's UN delegation last September. Paz
told the Soviet parliamentary delegation on 22 December that a
technical commission leaving for Europe and Moscow will study
the details of the offer. One press report indicates that the corn-
missien will leave in the last half of January.
Any offer to construct a tin smelter is particularly attrac-
tive to Bolivians, although the economic feasibility of such a
project is controversial. Tin is Bolivia's most important ex-
port, and virtually all must be sent to a smelter in Britain in
which former owners of the expropriated Bolivian mines have a
part interest. Many Bolivians feel that nationalization of the
mines--a key objective of the sweeping revolution of 1952--will
never be completed until the country has its own smelter.
Moscow is probably interested in arranging an exchange of
diplomatic missions as well as an economic aid agreement. Bo-
livia recognized the USSR in 1945, but representatives have
never been exchanged. Czechoslovakia is the only bloc country
which has a mission in La Paz.
TONFIDEN-11-At
27 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
.1w
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Detense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
_CCIAtri rwr' vrrrg
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 002066874
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874
/
/
/
/
/
//
/
/
/
74; , /
y /
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
.4
/
/ TOP SECRET I
/
7/ �
/Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO2066874////////77/M/