CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/08/26

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03184164
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: August 26, 1960

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26 August 1960
Copy No. C 71
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
DOCUMENT NO.
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26 AUGUST 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China's foreign minister seeks
private talks with Turkish and Iranian
ambassadors in Afghanistan.
Communist China's tight food situation
prompts reaffirmation of priority for
agriculture.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Anti-Nasir Syrian in Jordan expects coup
plans to be ready early in September. 0
The situation in the Congo.
III. THE WEST
Dominican Republic reported making
preparations for military action against
Haiti.
LATE ITEMS
�The situation in Laos.
()Iranian Shah ready to act on election
Irregularities; may dismiss Eqbal.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
26 August 1960
DAILY BRIEF
pA
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China - Turkey - Iran: Chinese Communist
Foreign Minister Chen Yi, currently in Afghanistan, has ex-
pressed a desire for private conversations with the Turkish
and Iranian ambassadors resident in Kabul,
Peiping has portrayed the re-
cent coup in Turkey as a successful "anti-imperialist strug-
gle" and probably feels the time is ripe to encourage closer
relations with those Middle Eastern countries which have been
hostile or lukewarm toward the Chinese Communist regime.
(Page 1)
Communist China: Concern for an increasingly precari-
ous food situation appears to have forced Peiping to make a
number of important decisions on domestic economic policy,
Including an increase in the relative priority accorded agricul-
ture. People's DailLon 25 August stated that agriculture must
be place m t e most important position" as a long-term, rath-
er than temporary, policy in China's socialist construction. Top
planner Li Fu- chun in the latest issue of Red Flag ascribes to
agriculture more importance than has hitre"TtoThTen noted from
an authoritative regime spokesman. An earlier article in the
Chinese provincial press stated that, if necessary, the pace of
industrial expansion would be slowed to permit a greater invest-
ment in agriculture. ) (Page 2)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
-Jordan-Syria: Retired Syrian Army Colonel Eland Jadah,
leader of a group which is seeking the support of Jordan's King
Husayn for an anti-Nasir coup in Syria, has informed the King
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[Oat the group expects to reach the "final planning stage" dur-
ing the first week in September
According to earlier reports, the conspirators have
asked Husayn to give them financial support and to intervene
If. the UAR or Iraq should attempt to thwart. the coi.m by military
means.
�
Republic of the Congo: �The opening of a conference of Afri-
can foreign ministers in Leopoldville has been accompanied by
increased local unrest and threats of new violence. An estimated d-z-b-�
1,000 Congolese--probably part of Leopoldville's 50,000 unem-
ployed�staged an anti-Lumumba demonstration on 25 August -
which was broken up by police. At the same time, UN troops
/
at the Leopoldville airport prepared for a possible Congolese
attempt to reoccupy the airport, which was placed under UN con-
trol on 21 August.
About 1,000 Congolese soldiers have been airlifted to towns
in Kasai Province near the Katanga border, in a move to block
the establishment of a new province in Kasai and possible with a
view toward invading Katanga. Although Lumumba probably hopes
that this move will be endorsed by the visiting foreign ministers,
there are indications that most African states deplore Lumumba's
baiting of the UN and are not disposed to support his military ven-
tures. (Page 3)
III. THE WEST
llomininan Rpnitihlir iti:
reported preparations for Dominican L,t
military action against Haiti may be part of a Dominican attempt
to intimidate Haiti or to reinforce the border to prevent any. ?fe-
sion by anti-Trujillo forces using Haiti as a base. Haiti, the coun-
try most vulnerable to Dominican retaliation for the unanimous OAS
vote condemning and applying sanctions against the Trujillo regime,
cast its vote despite prior Dominican threats. One of these threats,
the forceq rPnatriatinn nf TIn tian laborers, is already being car-
ried out. (Page 5)
26 Aug 60
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%410/ TO1 5EClET Nov
W. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
II
Main Trends in Capabilities and Policy, 1960-1965. Annex A,
Text of Sino-Soviet Bloc Military Strengths and Characteristics of
Selected Weapons and Equipment. NM 11-4-60. 16 August 1960.
Short-term Trends in South Vietnam: Political and Security
Problems and Probable Trends Over Next Year, SNIE 63.1-60.
23 August 1960.
LATE ITEMS
*Laos: New developments in the Laotian crisis seriously
jeopardize prospects for a settlement along lines of the agree-
ment reached on 2:3 August between premier designate Souvanna
Phouma and General Phoumi. The Pathet Lao radio has criticized
the agreement as dangerously undercutting the Souvanna govern-
ment's authority and has called on all Laotians to oppose the "Phoumi
rebel clique." On 25 August Phoumi is said to have stated that
Souvanna was not keeping his word and obviously was not master
of the situation in Vientiane. The agreed procedure for regularizing
military control over Vientiane is snagged on rebel paratroop
Captain Kong Le's reported demand for retention of effective
command in the area, and there are indications that Phoumi is
continuing to move his troops into position around the capital.
(Page 7)
110
26 Aug 60
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Ver
ell�an: The Shah is under considerable pressure to declare
the current parliamentary elections invalid because of wide-
spread irregularities.
the Shah will announce publicly on 27 Aug-
ust that he intends to take legal corrective action. He inlay `dis-
ss Prime Minister Eqbal "in the immediate future. " The
h then apparently hopes that the new parliament will pass
ew electoral law which would be the basis of another election.
h an action would tend to strengthen his position by shifting
responsibility for the flagrant rigging of the current elections
onto the prime minister. Although the more sophisticated
Iranian politicians will see the maneuver for what it is, the
move would probably be generally well received as an indi-
cation of the Shah's desire to carry out his widely publicized
promise of free electionsol
26 Aug 60
DAILY BRIEF iv
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Nor
Peiping Approaches Turkish and Iranian Representatives
Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi, currently
attending the Afghan independence celebrations, has expressed
a desire for private conversations with the Turkish and Iranian
ambassadors resident in Kabul. This is the first known approach
Peiping has made for direct talks with either government, al-
though in 1956 it made a trade overture to Turkey through the
Hungarians.
The Chinese probably feel the time opportune for encourag-
ing closer, relations with those Middle Eastern countries which
have remained hostile or lukewarm toward the Peiping regime.
Chinese propaganda has characterized the recent coup in Turkey
as a successful "anti-imperialist struggle" and Mao Tse-tung has
referred to it in glowing terms in conversations with visiting neu-
tralist delegations.
Peiping has made several efforts recently to improve its
foreign elections with Asian countries. It has softened its ap-
proach to Indonesia over the problem of Overseas Chinese, has
signed preliminary border agreements with Burma and Nepal,
and has renewed its proposal for an "atom-free" zone in the
Pacific. During his current trip to Kabul, Chen Yi hopes to ne-
gotiate a nonaggression treaty and technical aid agreement with
the Afghans. In approaching Turkey and Iran, the Chinese prob-
ably hope that a show of good will from a Chinese official of
Chen Yi's rank would be particularly appealing.
(The Iranian ambassador has asked his government for in-
structions in responding to the Chinese bid. Neither Turkey nor
Iran would appear to gain- any advantage from such a meeting,
and the approach may be ignored. Should an informal meeting
be arranged, primarily out of curiosity, the ambassadors would
avoid any move designed to increase Chinese Communist pres-
tige and influence in the Middle East.
--T-012--SEGRE1
26 Aug 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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CONFIDENTIAL
Agricultural Situation in China
Official statements and reports by observers indicate that
the food situation in China is decidedly tight in most places
and probably grim in some. People's Daily, the official party
organ, said recently that "we are still unable to produce enough
food to meet the present need." Demands for the strictest aus-
terity in food consumption continue to emanate from all quarters.
While there is no evidence to indicate that shortages have reached
critical proportions, the balance betWeen food and population is
becoming increasingly precarious with each passing year.
The marked increase in official attention to agriculture ap-
parently reflects Peiping's growing awareness of this basic food
problem and concern over the demonstrated inability of "leap
forward" tactics, despite false statistical claims, to effect any
real solution. The regime last fall acknowledged the need to de-
vote more attention to agriculture under the slogan of "taking agri-
culture as the foundation of the economy." Priority continued to
be accorded to heavy industry, however, and this policy was re-
affirmed at a party congress as recently as last April.
Domestic economic policy was evidently high on the agenda
of a series of top-level party meetings believed to have been held
in June and July. The first statement from an authoritative source
to shed some light on the possible decisions reached at these meet-
ings was from planning chief Li Fu-chun who, in an article for the
latest issue of Red Flag, ascribed to agriculture more importance
than had the policy set forth late last year. Following the same
line, People's Daily declared on 25 August that agriculture must
be placed in the "most important position," not as a temporary
but rather a long-term policy. ReferenceS to the priority of
heavy industry were conspicuously absent in both cases. This
appears to confirm signs that Peiping has decided to increase the
relative priority accorded agriculture. An earlier article from
the Chinese provincial press, reprinted in People's Daily, stated
that, if necessary, the pace of industrial expansion would be slowed
to permit a greater investment in agriculture.
CONFIDENTIAL
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The Situation in the Congo
The opening of a conference of African foreign ministers
in Leopoldville has been accompanied by increased local un-
rest and threats of new violence. An estimated 1,000 Congo-
lese�probably some of Leopoldville's 50,000 unemployed--
staged an anti-Lumumba demonstration on 25 August which
was broken up by police. At the same time, UN troops at the
Leopoldville airport prepared for a possible Congolese attempt
to reoccupy the airport, which was placed under UN control
on 18 August. aecretary General Hammarskjold has stated
that he regards the Security Council resolution of 22 July as
having given him authority to defend the airport by force if
necessary.c
Lumumba probably hopes that the visiting foreign minis-
ters will support his effort to regain control of the airport and
to curb the secessionist trend. in Kasai. A UN force yielded
to Congolese troops in a recent dispute over the control of en-
try points along the Congo River; Lumumba may feel that,
backed by this precedent, he can reoccupy the airport, which
has been run by the UN Command since Congolese soldiers
molested a Canadian UN detachment on 18 August.
Meanwhile, Lumumba has moved about 1,000 Congolese
soldiers to Kasai Province, reportedly to the towns of Ganclajika
and Luputa near the Katanga border. He may hope to isolate
Bakwanga, the capital of the "Mang state" of southern Kasai,
from contact with Katanga. President Tshombe reportedly has
indicated to anti-Lumumba leaders in Kasai that he can furnish
arms, though not troops, for use against Lumumba. Without
aid from Katanga, however, the Kasai rebels have only about
450 militia with which to confront Lumumba's forces, which
may also be augmented by pro- Lumumba tribesmen in the prov-
ince.
While most independent African states continue to favor a
unified Congo, many have become critical of Lumumba follow-
ing his attacks against the UN and Secretary General Hammar-
skjold. The conferees at Leopoldville are expected to discuss
CONFIDENTIAL
26 Aug 60
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CUP" t 1.0 LIN 1 I IA. L
Nor
issues such as technical aid to the Congo, establishment of
an African international police force, and prospects for a com-
mon language. They are unlikely to come up with a warm en-
dorsement of Lumumba, and may attempt to dissuade him from
military ventures such as that in Kasai. The Leopoldville meet-
ing may be followed by a meeting of African heads of state, pos-
sibly in Accra.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Haiti Threatened by Dominican Retaliation
reported
preparations for possible Dominican military action against Haiti
are part of an attempt to intimidate Haiti or reinforce the border
to prevent anv invasion by anti-Truiillo forces using Haiti as a
base.
no anti-Trujillo group that might be preparing to invade the Do-
minican Republic from Haiti.
Haiti, the country most vulnerable to Dominican retaliation
� for the unanimous OAS vote condemning and applying sanctions
against the Trujillo regime, cast its vote despite prior Dominican
threats. One of these threats--to force repatriation of Haitian resi-
dents in the Dominican Republic--is already being carried out and
this may account for the reported commandeering of trucks by the
Dominican authorities on 23 August. About 16,500 Haitians were
employed in the Dominican Republic during the recent sugar harvest
and thousands of others have lived there for many years. Their sud-
den return will impose a serious burden on the weak Haitian econ-
omy. ahe Haitian foreign minister informed Secretary Herter on
20 August that he fears Dominican reprisals may also take the form
of subversive terrorism and economic sabotage'.
Haiti and the Dominican Republic are historic enemies. Dur-
ing the 30-year Trujillo regime, superior Dominican military
strength was often used to intimidate and pressure Haiti, and thous-
ands of Haitian workers were massacred in 1937 by Trujillo's army.
On the other hand, Dominicans, who are predominantly of Spanish
ancestry, still fear being overwhelmed by the numerically superior
Haitian Negroes, as they were for over 20 years early in the last
century. In fact, it was only after Trujillo's consolidation of power
that Dominicans began to feel relatively safe from Haitian depreda-
tions.
Haiti is one of the five Latin American countries that have not
yet broken diplomatic relations with the Trujillo regime before or
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after the 21 August OAS resolution applying diplomatic sanc-
tions,
his government make the break after taking steps to safeguard
Brazilian interests there. Argentina,
Paraguay, and El Salvador are expected to break relations soon.
Many governments expect to retain consulates in Ciudad Tru-
jillo, but the Dominicans are reported planning to expel all Latin
American and presumably US officials except those needed for the
barest consular establishments.
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Situation in Laos
Serious obstacles have arisen to implementation of
the 23 August agreement between premier designate
Souvanna Phouma and General Phoumi for a compromise
settlement of the Laotian crisis. Honest misinterpreta-
tions of the loosely drawn agreement may be part of the
picture, but the trouble stems essentially from a con-
tinuing power struggle between the rightist, leftist, and
neutralist factions involved.
The Communist Pathet Lao, fearful that the staunchly
anti-Communist Phoumi may emerge from the crisis with
his influence virtually intact, has denounced the agreement
as undercutting the authority of the neutralist Souvanna
government and as being a great danger to the nation. A
25 August broadcast over the clandestine Pathet Lao radio
called on all Laotians to oppose the "Phoumi rebel clique
and US imperialism." The possibility that the Pathet Lao
will resort to force to prevent consummation of a compromise
settlement between Souvanna and Phoumi cannot be excluded.
In any case, the Pathets are not likely to heed Souvanna's
25 August appeal to lay down their arms in the interests of
national unity.
Phoumi, meanwhile, is said t? have stated on 25 August
that Souvanna was not keeping his word and obviously was
not master of the situation in Vientiane. In part, he may
have been referring to action taken by the National Assembly
in Vientiane on 25 August affirming the legality of the
Souvanna government despite the understanding that it was
merely a de facto temporary regime. Phoumi and Souvanna
are also in disagreement over arrangements for extending
pay and provisions to the Lao troops in the field; each is
seeking to control the operation for prestige reasons.
Restoration of normal military command in the Vientiane
area--a prerequisite to a resolution of the political problem--
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is encountering difficulty. According to one report, rebel
Captain Kong Le is demanding command over the entire
Vientiane military region. Kong Le's troops still dominate
� Vientiane and thus far no steps have apparently been taken
� to recover the arms distributed to civilian elements and
Pa.thet Lao dissidents in the area.
as of 25 August Phoumi apparently is continuing to move
his troops into position around Vientiane.
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26 Ati.-0110'
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Ione CONFIDENTIAL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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