CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/02/15

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03174705
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: February 15, 1960

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Eck 3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
DOCUMENT NO. 312
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
gi DECLASSIFIED
15 February 1960
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HR 702
MIRO JUN 1980x
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Copy No. C 69
CENTRAL
NTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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15 FEBRUARY 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
On tenth anniversary of friendship treaty,
Peiping and Moscow stress that their bas-
ic unity remains firm despite indications fn,
of diSagreement on some points.
USSR's economic agreements with Cuba
indicate shift in Soviet policy from
aloof-
ness to active support of Castro regime.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Somali Government to ask for arms from
US, Italy, and UK; if requests are re-
fused, -will nrnhahlv makp romrst Of
UAR.
Pakistan will take strong line in response
to Afghanistan's propaganda regarding
Pushtoonistan; increased tension along
border likely. 0
III. THE WEST
�French nuclear test device yield prob-
ably about 70 kilotons; initial Soviet re-
action suggests USSR does not now intend
to resume testing.
()West Berlin threatened by transportation
and utility workers' strike; East Berlin
workers may undertake "sympathy" ac-
tion.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
15 February 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China - USSR: The tenth anniversary of the
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual As-
sistance is providing both Peiping and Moscow with an oppor-
tunity to point out that their basic unity remains firm, even
though there are indications of disagreement on some points.
In speeches, editorials, and even poems prepared for the 14
February celebrations, the Chinese emphasize that mutual ad-
herence to Communist doctrine makes the alliance "an unbreak-
able fraternal relationship." Peiping's commentary harshly at-
tacked the United States, however, and gave no indication that
the Chinese allegiance to Sino- Soviet unity would be extended to
Include accommodation with Mose7w's detente tactics toward the
United States. (Page 1)
USSR-Cuba: An agreement for a long-term Soviet purchase
4 of Cuban sugar and the extension of the USSR's usual $100,000,000
economic development credit indicate a shift from Moscow's
attitude of aloofness of the past year to active support of the
Castro regime. These agreements and Mikoyan's statement in-
jrf a willingness to supply military materiel to Cuba "if
1,vvi
requested" will be viewed with alarm by some other Latin Amer-
') ');�11"I'L' jean states, which have been apprehensive of Cuban developments
and of Communist influence in the Castro government.
(Page 2)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Somalia: Prime Minister Issa of the Italian-administered
UN trust territory of Somalia, which is scheduled to become in-
dependent on 1 July, says that within a few weeks the Somali Gov-
ernment will deliver a formal request for arms to the United
States, Italy, and Britain. If a favorable response is not forth-
coming from a Western supplier, Issa's regime, which has already
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taken steps to establish a 5,000-man army, will probably re-
quest arms from the UAR. Cairo last year reportedly offered
to equip and train a Somali army.
a UAR "grant" covering the education of Somali
students in the UAR's military and air colleges is already being
implemented. Addis Ababa, extremely sensitive over claims by
Somali nationalists to Ethiopia's large eastern province, can be
expected to react vigorously against any stren.1 at ening of Soma-
lia's. military potential.
Afghanistan-Pakistan:fflakistan has decided to take a strong
line in replying to Afghanistan's recent propaganda regarding
Pushtoonistan. President Ayub apparently has concluded that
in order to persuade Kabul to adopt a more conciliatory line he
must make a show of "firmness," even though continuing to hol
out the alternative of friendly cooperation. Recent Pakistani
radio attacks alleging that the Afghan royal family "sucked the
blood of Pushtuns" will probably antagonize the Afghans, however,
and result in increased tension along the Afghan-Pakistani bor-
deE,...3 (Page 3)
III. THE WEST
French Nuclear Test: he US Joint Atomic Energy Intell
gence Committee has issued the following announcement: "Th
Atomic Energy Detection System has confirmed that the first
French nuclear test was a tower shot which occurred at 0604
hours Zulu on 13 February at 26�12'N, 00012?E, in the vicinit
of Reganne, Algeria. Signals have been reported from four
seismic stations, six acoustic stations, and six electromagnetic
stations.
"A preliminary estimate of the yield is in the range of 20
to 200 kilotons, with the most probable value being about 70 kil-
otons."'
filoowwinivai reaction to tfle Jrenches sugges s that
the USSR does not intend to use it as an immediate pretext for
resuming tests. The official TASS statement warns, however,
that if "nuclear explosions should continue," the Soviet Union
cannot "fail to draw the proper conclusions" for safeguarding its
15 Feb 60
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014
security. In India, Khrushchev expressed "regret" over the
French action but stated that he still felt De Gaulle favored a
relaxation of international tension.
West Berlin: Labor leaders are threatening a transporta-
tion and utility strike which would cripple the city's economy.
A decision to strike, scheduled to be put to a vote on 16 Feb-
ruary, would lead to a walkout--possibly for several weeks--
of 50,000 workers, involving the entire transportation system
and most utilities. A strike could bring possible "sympathy"
action from East Berlin such as cutting off the elevated S-
Bahn service. (Page 4)
15 Feb 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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Noe
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Peiping and Moscow Stress Basic Unity
The tenth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friend-
ship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance is providing both Moscow
and Peiping with an opportunity to emphasize their basic unity de-
spite indications of disagreement on some points. Pointing out that
mutual adherence to Communist doctrine creates an identity of fun-
damental interests, the Chinese publicize the alliance as "an un-
breakable fraternal relationship."
In its comments on the anniversary, Moscow appears to
have taken pains to avoid any suggestion of policy differences such
as were contained in Khrushchev's speeches last fall after his re-
turn from the United States. The Soviet ambassador in Peiping
stressed that both countries have actively and consistently supported
each other's foreign policy, and he went so far as to specify the com-
munes as being one factor contributing to the success of Chinese
economic efforts.
Foreign Minister Gromyko, in a Pravda article praising the
alliance, said "The many foreign and political activities of our coun-
tries are subordinated to the task of ensuring peace and pursuing
Lenin's policy of peaceful coexistence." This statement was prob-
ably intended to convey an impression of unity on basic issues, while
allowing for policy variations on issues of primarily regional impor-
tance.
The Chinese, however, avoided endorsement of "peaceful co-
existence" which would imply an acceptance of Moscow's current
detente tactics toward the United States. On the contrary, Chinese
commentary attacked the United States as the implacable enemy of
both "socialism and peace," repeated the accusations that "US peace
gestures are a disguise for war preparations," and stressed the past
and future value of the Sino- Soviet alliance for "smashing imperialist
intrigues." This final note indicates that Peiping's allegiance to Sdno-
Soviet unity will not be extended to include accommodatio
shchev's efforts to relax tensions with the United States.
15 Feb 60
CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Moscow Irlueates Economic Ties With Cuba....
The Soviet-Cuban communiqu�stablishing close economic
ties and calling for discussions of renewed diplomatic relations
"at a convenient time" reveal a shift in Soviet attitude from the
aloofness of the past year to active support of the Castro regime.
The new relationship will be viewed with alarm by some Latin
American states, which have been apprehensive of Cuban devel-
opments and of Communist influence in the Castro government.
The agreement to buy nearly 5,000,000 tons of sugar in the
next five years means that Soviet purchases in Cuba will increase
from an average of $22,000,000 annually over the past five years--
about 4 percent of Cuba's exports--to $60,000,000 annually at
current sugar prices. The USSR has paid cash for about 50 per-
cent of its sugar imports from Cuba in the past few years. Be-
tween 1955 and 1958 Moscow's annual sugar imports from all
sources have averaged 600,000 tons, and the USSR is attempting
to increase supplies for its domestic market.
The barter provisions of the agreement--only 200,000 tons
is to be paid for in cash each year--will require Cuba to make
substantial purchases in the USSR. Cuban imports from the USSR
heretofore have been negligible.
The $100,000,000 economic aid credit, similar to that re-
jected by Mexico during Mikoyan's visit there in November, is
the usual Soviet offer when no specific development program
has yet been prepared. The long-range effect of such a credit
would be further to support the growth of Cuba's trade with the
bloc.
The USSR's expressed willingness to provide military aircraft
"if requested" suggests that Mikoyan did not encourage Cuba to
seek military items at this time. The Castro regime, however,
probably pressured Moscow to offer military aircraft, which it has
been unable to obtain from Western sources. Havana has publicly
declared its intention to purchase aircraft from any country will-
ing to sell them and has taken up a public subscription to finance
such purchases. There may be a token delivery of military equip-
ment by Czechoslovakia, which received a Cuban purchasing mis-
sion last fall. Another such mission reportedly
is now in Prague.
15 Feb 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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II. AM-AFRICA
Pakistan Intensifies. Protiaganda Attacks Cein Afghan Government
a?akistan has decided to intensify its replies to Afghanistan's
strongly worded Pushtoonistan propaganda attacks. Rawalpindi
apparently has concluded that if it is to persuade Kabul to adopt
a more conciliatory line, it must make a show of "firmness" even
though it continues to hold out the alternative of friendly coopera-
tion.A
_iakistan recognizes the need to improve relations with Af-
ghanistan, but it remains impatient with Kabul's policies and
questions the value of a conciliatory approach. Afghan Foreign
Minister Naim's visit to Rawalpindi in early January failed to im-
prove relations, apparently because Naim felt Ayub's offers of
economic cooperation were overshadowed by his allusions to the
strength of the Pakistani Army. The fluctuation in Pakistani
policy will probably continue, but the tendency to follow the harder
line seems to be growing stronger3
ff..3akistan's intensified radio counterattacks, accusing the
Afghan royal family of "sucking the blood of Pushtuns" and of
"flattering their Communist masters," will probably increase
Afghan-Pakistani tension, thereby reducing the likelihood of con-
ciliation. Pakistani Foreign Minister Qadir, however, believes
this language goes beyond his government's intentions, and he ap-
parently intends to try to have it modified;]
he Pakistani attacks may be partially intended to discredit
Afghan-Soviet cooperation in anticipation of Khrushchev's two-day
visit to Kabul, scheduled to begin on 29 February. The effect,
however, may be to increase Afghan receptivity to any aesture
Khrushchev may care to make7
15 Feb 60
�SEGRET"
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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III. THE WEST
� Crippling Strike Threatened in West Berlin
West Berlin is faced with the possibility of a strike of
transportation and utility workers which would affect the city's
entire economy. Union leaders, representing 50,000 workers
of the city-run public transportation system and utilities (ex-
cept electric power) as well as of the city government, are
planning a strike vote on 16 February in anticipation of dead-
locked negotiations by their counterparts in West Germany.
The union is demanding a 15-percent wage increase, which
the city authorities cannot afford. West Berlin officials have
assailed the union leaders' disregard for the city's "special
status."
So far there has been no mention of the possible strike in
the press or any indication whether the East Berlin Commu-
nists would take "solidarity action." In a one-day strike of
transportation and utility workers in March 1958, the East
Germans halted all service of the S-Bahn (elevated) rail service
to West Berlin. Gas and water service was not affected, but
in a strike of 36 hours or more, gas and water pressures would
drop sufficiently to cause service to be cutoff. The union chief
claims the strike might last "several weeks," and that the union
has financial reserves for two weeks.
CONFIDENTIAL
15 Feb 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Aaministration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
'The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs'
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDEN
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