CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/11/23

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03172673
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: November 23, 1960

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23 November 1960
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CENTRAL
TELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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Lail,
23 NOVEMBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Situation in Laos.
The Congo--Lumumba adherents report-
edly losing ground in Stanleyville.
Gabon--President Mba survives plot
against his pro-West regime.
III. THE WEST
Cuban foreign exchange reserves report-
edly exhausted, with no normal replenish-
ment in sight before January.
Switzerland reportedly planning to coun-
ter Chinese Communist harassment of
Swiss nationals by imposing restrictions
on Chinese activities in Switzerland.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
23 November 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Laos: Souvanna Phouma is pressing for talks in
Luang Prabang with General Phoumi and Pathet Lao
leader Prince Souphannouvong looking to the formation
of a coalition government. The prospects are remote
that Phourni would agree to such negotiations, The
widely reported movement of Vientiane troops toward
Luang Prabang may be in part designed by Souvanna to
pressure Phoumi into such talk.sZi Soviet Ambassador
Abramov, accredited to both Laos and Cambodia but
resident in Phnom Penh, arrived in Vientiane on 22 No-
vember on a. hurriedly arranged trip, possibly to offer
Souvanna specific assistance as a follow-up to the gen-
eral aid offer accepted by the premier on 28 October.
(Page 1)
Republic of the Congo: Opposition by Congolese Army
units in Orientale Province to the pro-Lumumba regime in
Stanleyville has forced Lumumba's chief lieutenant, Antoine
Gizenga, to seek UN protection,
however, that Rikhye was receiv-
ing conflicting reports from Stanleyville "every four hours!'
The emergence of anti-Lumumba opposition in Orientale
Province, along with Mobutu's violent expulsion from Leo-
poldville of the pro-Lumumba Ghanaian representative,
would appear to be a major setback for Lumumba and his
supporters, who were considering shifting their base from
Leopoldville to Stanleyville.
(Page 3)
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Gabon: President
French Community F4
tempt to overturn h.e:
of the plot, including'
bly, are reported in :�
Several important fg
ward Ana, such as V ".; out in his support. T.,.
secure for the time be2i'
term political stability
(r
of the newly independent
G21/,-,,n has broken up an at-
. regime. Some leaders
7ffici.2ls in the National Aseem-
- others have been arrested.
,7ho have been lukewarm to-
.10:n ;minister, now have come
esident's position appears
, but the prospects for long-
Gabon are not favorable.
III. THE WEST
Cuba: The Cuban Go�L.rrirnent's foreign exchange re-
serves are almost exhawncdo and finance officials were
forced on 18 November to cancel orders for urgently
needed materials�such ;as sugar bags--according the American American Embassy. Fi-
del Castro himself was f;ot immediately informed of the
situation for fear of hi.sreaction. The National Bank's
account with' one of the t- .o principal Canadian tanks in
Cuba is overdrawn, re-1:, there can be no normal signif-
icant replenishment c e Cubn reserves until the new
sugar crop is exported; 7.,:-ginning in January. Cuba is
still dependent on sources for some materials
not available through ::reeent Sino -Soviet barter deals.
Continued inability to purchase such goods, particularly
food and consumer goods and materials for the critically
Important petroleum industry, would pose grave problems
for the regime. Cuban banking officials reportedly doubt
that relief will be forthcoming from the Soviet Union.
Switzerland - Communist China: Switzerland is re-
ported to be increasingly concerned by Peiping's harass-
pents of its nationals and threats to their property in
China, and to be planning to encourage all private Swiss
23 Nov 60 DAILY BRIEF
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Ciationals resident in China to liquidate their remaining
holdings there and to return. Bern also contemplates
taking other actions short of a diplomatic break, such
as closing or reducing in size the Chinese Communist
trade mission in Switzerland, and limiting travel through
Switzerland by Chinese trade and cultural delegations en
route to Africa and Latin America. These restrictions
would inconvenience the Chinese but, since Peiping ap-
parently places considerable value on maintaining out-
wardly friendly relations with Bern, it may make some
conciliatory gesture...3. (Page 6)
IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostil-
ities against the United States or its possessions in
the immediate future:-
. Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to
initiate direct military action against US forces -
abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the bloc
in the immediate future.--.i
i___There are indications that the situation in Laos has
entered a critical phase, and general military con-
flict between the Phoumi and the Pathet Lao - support-
ed Souvanna Phouma forces may ensue at any time. The
Pathet Lao under such circumstances can be expected
to oppose vigorously, with the help of the Communist
bloc, any attempt to unseat Souvanna Phouma:
D. _Other developments affording increased opportunities
for exploitation by the Communist blod:
^gx.ipn-
1. ,jageria. Morocco's acceptance of Soviet military
aid will make it ea�ler for the bloc to supply Al-
gerian rebel forces.,!
23 Nov 60
DAILY BRIEF
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V. CONCLUSIONS CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions
reached by its special committee on the Berlin situation,
for the period 25 October 1960 through 22 November 1960.
1. There has been no significant change in the Berlin
situation since the subcommittee's previous report of 25 Oc-
tober. During the early half of November, references to
Berlin have been played down in Soviet new media�prob-
ably in part reflecting the current preoccupation of the Com-
munist world with the meeting of bloc leaders in Moscow and
a wait-and-see attitude regarding the impending change in the
US administration.
2. While the East Germans appeared primarily concerned
with assessing and consolidating their earlier moves against
West Berlin, the GDR did take some further minor steps in its
campaign to assert control over goods moving in and out of
West Berlin,
3. With the 1 January cut-off date for interzonal trade
agreements between East and West Germany only a month and
a half away, both the East and the West appear to be uncertain
as to what actions and counteractions will be taken. However,
it appears now that the West Germans may request that nego-
tiations be started on the Interzonal Trade Agreement in the
near future.
23 Nov 60
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JIA.Ati:,
Nino,
The Situation in Laos
Souvanna Phouma sent a letter to King Savang on 22
November to enlist the King's support for his proposed
meeting with General Phoumi and Pathet Lao leader Prince
Souphannouvoyg looking to the formation of a coalition
government.Couvanna claimed
during his recent trip to Sam Neua, he
had secured Souphannouvong's agreement to participation
in a coalition cabinet with representatives of the Phoumi
group, excluding Phoumi himselfj It is doubtful the King
will offer Souvanna much encouragement in his latest ven-
ture, and in any event there seems little chance that
Phoumi would agree at this stage to talks on coalition with
he Pathet Lao.
the contemplated attack on Luang Prabang by
Joint Pathet Lao = government force will be deferred
pending receipt of Phoumies reaction to the proposal for
negotiationsjjt had been previously reported that the Vien-
tiane elements slated to participate in the attack, including
some of Captain Kong Le's paratroopers, departed by truck
from Vientiane on 20 November. They were allegedly to
rendezvous with Pathet Lao elements at Muong Kassy, about
55 miles south of Luang Prabang on the road from Vientiane.
A later report indicates the Vientiane force may have stopped
only a short distance from Vientiane.j
initiation of a previ-
ously planned offensive, the nature of which is not spelled
out "Mobile Group 1" may be Captain
Siho's commando battalion of about 800 men which report-
edly joined other Phoumi elements recently in the Pak Ca
Dinh area, about 20 miles east of Pak Sane. The empha-
sis on infiltration tactics suggests the
operation does not envisage a frontal assault on Vientiane
forces disposed between Pak Sane and Pak Ca Dinh, but
rather an attempt to bypass them. General Boun Leut,
Phoumi's top militarykleader, recently divulged plans
aimed at cutting off the Vientiane forces in the Pak Sane -
Pak Ca Dinh area.
Soviet Ambassador Abramov, who is accredited to
both Laos and Cambodia but resides in Phnom Penh,
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arrived in Vientiane on 22 November, possibly armed with
an offer of specific assistance as a follow-up to the general
aid offer accepted by Souvanna "in principle" on 28 October.
abramov postponed a trip to Moscow, in connection with
the forthcoming arrival of Cambodian Chief of State Sihanouk,
in order to make his hurried visit to Vientianej Soviet propa-
ganda reflects Moscow's increasing concern over Souvanna's
position and has repeatedly charged the ITS with attempting
to strangle Laos economically. A few hours before Abramov's
arrival, Souvanna told the press that he would discuss with
Abramov economic and "perhaps" military aid, pointing out
that it could be flown in from Hanoi, in Communist North
Vietnam.
-SEGREZ
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'COO' N1/4111
The Situation in the Congo
Tension continues high in Leopoldville after the 21 No-
vember clash between UN troops and Congolese Army units
attempting to expel the pro- Lumumba Ghanaian representative,
Nathaniel Welbeck. Sporadic firing continued through much of
the night, even after the UN announced at 2000 hours that it
had agreed to expel Welbeck. Although casualties are not be-
lieved to have exceeded 14, Congolese troops were reportedly
"screaming forrevenge" following word that one of their dead
was a popular commander, Lt. Col, Kokolo.
Forces favoring Lumumba were dealt a second setback
with the emergence of army opposition to their strong-arm re-
gime in Orientale Province. Since the arrival there in mid-
October of Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba's principal lieutenant,
pro-Lumumba elements had been developing the province as a
politico-military springboard for the "reconquest" of the Congo.
Although army units there were known to be irritated by Gizen-
ga's wholesale arrests, Lumumba's supporters in Leopoldville
considered Gizenga sufficiently in control to warrant plans to
set up in Stanleyville a Congolese government to rival that of
Mobutu's.
the situation in Stanleyville was unclear and
that UN representative Rikhye was receiving conflicting reports
"every four hours."
Gizenga had been forced to take refuge in a UN build-
ing anleyville.
um the UN yesterday, the General Assembly voted to seat
the Congolese delegation headed by Kasavubu, after first de-
feating another attempt led by Ghana and supported by the So-
viet bloc to postpone consideration of the seating of the Kasa-
vubu group. Guinea had announced beforehand that it would not
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,serve on the UN Conciliation Commission if the Kasavubu
delegation were recognized, and after the vote Mali an-
nounced that it also was withdrawing from that commis-
sion. Prospects are that there will be further defections
from the commission--which has again delayed its depar-
ture�before it leaves for the Congo.
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LA..n I Lic:At V I rum',
NowiP `44.1
Coup Foiled in Gabon
President Leon Mba of the French Community state of
Gabon, which attained independence last August, has blocked
a plot to destroy his political power. The President has
proclaimed a state of alert for six months, and acted against
several top government officials who were accused of try-
ing to poison him. As a result, the president of the National
Assembly, Paul Gondjout, and several others are in hiding.
Foreign Minister Gustave Anguile and the leader of the par-
liamentary opposition, Jean Aubame, now have come out in
support of Mba.
Mba's victory should ensure Gabon's continued pro-
Western policies. If his regime had been upset and an al-
liance between Gondjout and Anguil6 formed, Gabon would
have been vulnerable to Soviet bloc infiltration. Gondjout
has disagreed with Mba over the relative powers of the
legislature and executive and apparently has been scheming
to upset Mho for several months. He had succeeded in
temporarily dividing the governing party and leaving Mho
in a minority position. Anguile, who together with Gond-
jout has represented ambitious elements among the most
highly developed segments of local society, has in the past
reportedly been influenced by Gabonese students in Paris
who were members of Communist organizations.
Although the President's position appears secure for
the time being, long-term political stability in Gabon is
endangered by tribal rivalries and political immaturity.
Gabon, which is heavily dependent on French economic
and political assistance, has maintained closer ties with
Paris than any Equatorial African republic, and there is
virtually no antiwhite feeling at this time. This repub-
lic, alone of the economically underdeveloped four states
of the former French Equatorial Africa, has rich resources
--particularly wood products, oil, and mineral deposits al-
ready of interest to American industry. At Lambarene in
the interior, of Gabon, Dr. Albert Schweitzer conducts his
world-renowned medical work.
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Swiss Relatiohs With Communist China Worsen
C.Switzerland, which has long tried to maintain correct
relations with all nations of the Sino-Soviet bloc, is becom-
ing increasingly concerned by Peiping's harassments of
Swiss nationals and threats to their property in China,- and
Is planning to retaliate with actions short of breaking dip-
lomatic relations.
Bern's long-range strategy will be to withdraw all
private Swiss nationals resident in China, try to sell at any
price the few remaining Swiss-owned industrial installa-
tions there, and reduce its diplomatic representation�pos-
sibly by closing the Swiss Consulate in Shanghai.
i-While the Swiss are not greatly concerned about their
assets in China, valued at several million dollars, they
are disturbed by the Chinese practice of taxing Swiss
nationals in China on their total income instead of on that
part earned in China.. Some Swiss residing in China have
been presented with bills for over a million Swiss francs
in back taxes. The Chinese refuse existing Swiss assets
in China as, payment for these bills, and instead demand
foreign exchange from abroad. The Foreign Ministry
official said that in effect the Swiss are held as hostages�.
LBern contemplates that after the Swiss nationals have
left China it will close or reduce in size the Chinese Com-
munist trade mission in Switzerland and limit travel
through Switzerland by Chinese trade and cultural delega-
tions en route to Africa and Latin America by reducing
the number of Swiss visas issued in Peiping. These re-
strictions would inconvenience the Chinese,who maintain
a large trade mission in Bern. Although the use of
Switzerland as an intermediary for trade with the West
in strategic goods has fallen off in recent years, - Bern
and London are the focal points for Chinese economic
activity throughout Western Europe:c
LAlthough Peiping treats Swiss nationals in China no
better than other Westerners, it seems to attach consider-
able value to friendly relations with Bern, and may make.
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Lsome conciliatory gesture to prevent their deterioration.
In an unusual appearance at Swiss National Day celebra-
tions in Peiping last summer� Premier Chou En-lai spoke
In high terms of his country's relations with Switzerland,
holding them ut) as a model of peaceful coexistence77
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--CONFIEGNI-TIAt
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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