CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/10/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02977783
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: October 1, 1960

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CENTRAL
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INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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1 OCTOBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Iran somewhat ociimigtir about current
talks with USSR.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
South Korean army chief of staff sees
urgent need to dismiss top officers asso-
ciated with Rhee.
Laos--Early showdown between Kong Le
and Souvanna Phouma possible.
Morocco may move against French Army
in Algeria if border violations continue.
0
Congo--Mobutu continues to stress Lu-
mumba's dependence on foreign support. 0
III. THE: WEST
NATO members not united on travel re-
strictions on East German officials.
Opposition to De Gaulle's proposals for
confederation of Common Market coun-
tries declining.
0
LATE ITEM
Evidence indicates high-level Soviet
dde-
gation has been in Peiping trying to iron
out Sine-Soviet differences.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
1 October 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Iran: Khrushchev,
with the Shah, apparently repeated standard Soviet
eman s for concessions by Iran as the price of "normal"
relations, he also
evived a proposal�previously described by the Shah as
meaningless--that the two countries withdraw their troops
from along their common frontier. The Shah and other lead-
ing Iranian officials are maintaining their opposition to con-
cessions to Moscow, but are continuing to seek a means of
Improving relations,
he and
Acting Foreign Minister Afshan took a firm position in ex-
changes of views with Pegov on 28 and 29 September.
that such talks. "if they encounter no obstacle, will be prom-
ising."
III. ASIA-AFRICA
uth Korea: Army Chief of Staff Lt, Gen. Choi Kyong-
nok believes that the dismissal of top general officers associ-
ated with the corruption of the Rhee regime is the basic re-
uirement for eliminating dissatisfaction among junior officers
nd restoring discipline in the armed forces. Choi believes
hat failure to take early action on this problem will create
he real possibility of a revolt supported by the great majori-
y of officers, who as yet have not agitated. While contending
that a coup is not the proper solution, Choi noted that military
rule has been suggested by civilian as well as military elements.
(Page 1)
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Laos: A showdown may be approaching between Captain
Kong Le and the Souvanna Phouma government following Kong
Le's apparent refusal to abide by the cease-fire reached be-
tween Souvanna's military commanders and General Phoumi's
Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee. While Souvanna has
publicly rebuked Kong Le, his ability to bring Kong Le into
line is still open to serious question.
(Page 2)
Morocco-France: Moroccan Acting Deputy Premier
Ab elkhalek Torres--the ranking executive in Morocco in
the absence of both the King and the crown prince--reportedly
will order military action against the French Army in Algeria
if alleged recent border violations continue. Torres is said
to have the King's permission for such extreme action if
necessary. Torres is reported to believe that Moroccan mil-
itary counteraction would create an international incident on
the basis of which Morocco could request the intervention of
UN forces. Such intervention is the avowed aim of the Al-
gerian rebels and seems to be the motive underlying Tunisian
President Bourguiba's interest in "close union" of the Tunisian
and Algerian rebel governmentsj (Page 4)
*Republic of the Congo: Katanga President Tshombe's
refusal on 30 September to attend the forthcoming political
round-table conference in Leopoldville appears designed to
emphasize ICatanga's political independence of the Congo. In
Leopoldville, Mobutu is continuing his efforts to discredit Lu-
mumba by emphasizing the ousted premier's dependence on
foreign support. However, his charge that Lumumba success-
fully solicited a loan from Communist China is unsubstantiated.
Lumumba continues to have the active support of rUAR7
Ghanaian, and Guinean representatives in the Congo.
instructed the UAR ambassa-
dor to urge that Lumumba emphasize that he is prime min-
ister, especially while the General Assembly is in session,
by making a large number of declarations, statements, and
press conferences and other similar acts within his power."
Lumumba reportedly told the press yesterday he would not
1 Oct 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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attend the round-table conference nn thP iirnilmig that nnlv iarlia-
ment could call such a conference.
III. THE WEST
Berlin: Some NATO governments are refusing to cooperate
inflinposing travel restrictions on East German officials as a
countermeasure to recent East German interference with access
to West Berlin. Denmark has stated that trade considerations
and the importance of cooperation between the Danish and East
German railway systems prevent it from concurring in the re-
strictions placed by the Allied Travel Office in West Berlin on
travel by semiofficial or trade representatives. The Dutch
Government has relaxed its travel ban on East German officials
in response to urging by the KLM airline that these officials
would merely use alternative routes to Western countries.
*On 30 September Bonn denounced the 1961 interzonal
trade pact with East Germany, over the apparent opposition of
Britain and France. The West German move will not affect
interzonal trade before the end of the year. East German offi-
cials who have threatened Bonn with retaliations for such a
step now may feel compelled to take some action. Possibly
aware that Western countermeasures were being contemplated,
Foreign Minister Gromyko stressed to British Foreign Secre-
tary Home on 28 September that Moscow was "fully aware" of
recent East German actions and warned that if a crisis devel-
oped it would be the fault of the West. He indicated, however,
that Khrushchev was prepared to resume negotiations on Berlin
after a new American administration took office.
(Page 6).3
Euro ean Confederation: The initial hostility to French
proposa s for a confederation of the six Common Market coun-
tries appears to have declined considerably since De Gaulle
first publicly outlined his plan on 5 September. Although still
strongly opposed to De Gaulle's related plans for a revamping3
1 Oct 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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/....pf NATO's structure, Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg apparent-
ly feel that De Gaulle's proposals are still subject to modification
and have been impressed with French assurances that the Com-
mon Market would not be weakened. Premier Debre will
probably try to overcome Adenauer's reservations during his
7-8 October visit to Bonn.
(Page 8)
LATE ITEM
*USSR-China: There is accumulating evidence that a high-
level Soviet delegation--including Presidium members Mikoyan
and Suslov--has been in Peiping since mid-September holding ,4,Lat
discussions with Chinese leaders. In addition to attempting to
work out an agreed position prior to the forthcoming meeting of �'
all Communist parties in Moscow this November, such a delega-
tion may have been sent to China to determine if a meeting of
Chinese leaders with Khrushchev during his planned visit to North
Korea this month would be possible and fruitful. Recent Chinese
propaganda suggests that this attempt at reconciliation has been
as unsuccessful as earlier attempts were.
(Page 10)
1 Oct 60
DAILY BRIEF iv
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Purge of Tovievenerals in South Korean Armtmoi
South Korean Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen, Choi Kyong-nok
believes that the "one-shot" dismissal of top general officers
associated with the corruption of the Rhee regime is the basic
requirement for eliminating the dissatisfaction among junior
officers and restoring discipline in the armed forces. Prime
; Minister Chang Myon, faced with disunity in the Democratic
party, also favors removal of these generals, believing they
might align with opposition political leaders. The purge prob-
ably will, include Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt, Gen.
Choe Yong-hui, First Army Commander Lt. Gen. Kim Chong-o,
Second Army Commander Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong, and others
senior in rank to Choi.
Choi said that he also recognized the necessity of disciplin-
ing junior officers who, hoping for promotion, are agitating
for the ouster of senior commanders. He added, however,
that failure to remove the generals in the near future could en-
courage a revolt supported by the great majority of officers
who as yet have not agitated. He intimated that the intensity
of the feelings of Korean junior officers on this issue is not
fully appreciated outside Korean circles.
The junior officers concerned recently visited Chang and
the minister of national defense to present their demands. Of-
ficials of the ministry,
believe that these officers are becoming increasingly con-
fident of their influence, that the prime minister is afraid of
them, and that the officers believe they can take over the gov-
ernment if the situation warrants.
Choi noted that a military coup had been suggested by well-
informed civilian as well as military elements to restore politi-
cal stability to the country. Students of two leading Seoul uni-
versities are reported to support Choi's program to remove the
general officers. One group indicated it would not oppose a
military coup by voune. honest officers to restore stability in
South Korea.
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The Situation in Laos
An app rently rancorous exchange between Premier Sou-
vanna Phouma and Captain Kong Le in two separate press con-
ferences indicates that a showdown between the Vientiane gov-
ernment and the paratrooper may be imminent. Kong Le an-
nounced that he would continue his offensive against the Phoumi
forces east of Paksane despite the cease-fire reached at Luang
Prabang and accused Souvanna of being "very soft." He warned
that the "people" would have to remove Souvann if he did not
"lead his country in the right direction." He also made slurring
remarks about General Ouane, the armed forces commander
and his ostensible chief. Souvanna subsequently retorted that
Kong Le "was making up stories. Do not talk about him. That
will be decided by army headquarters."
icr
It is problematical whether Souvanna's top commanders--
Ge al Ouane and General Amkha, the Vienti ne garrison
commander--could win in any test of strength with Kong Le.
Although the bulk of Kong Le's 2nd Paratroop Battalion is now
outside of Vientiane, he probably can count on the support of
the numerous irregulars he armed in the period immediately
after his 9 August coup d'etat. He is also believed to have gen-
erated considerable popular support in the capital. In earlier
phases of the crisis, moreover, neither Ouane nor Amkha
showed much appetite for action against Kong Le. The scales
might be tipped decisively against Kong Le, however, were
Phoumi's forces east of Paksane to unite with Amkha's units
in Vientiane
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Phoumi's Radio Savannakhet, meanwhile, has issued an
ppeal "to our foreign friends" for help in the face of the al-
eged presence in Laos of three North Vietnamese units.
ch statements, whether true or not, would be calculated to
excite Thai Premier Sarit and would possibly be used by him
to justify increased support.,:7he Thai general staff is reported
to have a plan for direct Thai intervention if its becomes clear
that the Communists have taken over Vientiane.
British Ambassador Addis in Vientiane reports being in-
formed by Souvanna that the USSR has accepted Laos' proposal
SURE T
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ahat nonresident diplomatic relations be established. Souvanna
claimed all he needed now was the approval of the King. Under
Souvanna's proposal, the Soviet ambassador to Cambodia would
also be accredited to Laos, while the Laotian ambassador to
France would be accredited to the USSR. The King's decision
could well be delayed pending the outcome of political discus-
sions that may result in a new government.7
The Soviet counselor in Peiping recently told
that Peiping did not intend to intervene. in Laos, but if the
Chinese should decide to send troops to counter a United Na-
tions move into Laos, the USSR would support Peiping "even
to the extent" of sending Soviet troops. The US consul gen-
eral in Hong Kong points out that the authority of the Soviet
counselor is probably limited but that his statement is indica-
tive of the impression Moscow wants conveyed to the West.
Moscow propaganda has emphasized the gravity of the La-
otian situation and, together with Peiping and Hanoi, is making
an effort to forestall intervention by Laos' pro-Western neigh-
bors or the United Nations while avoiding any specific threat
of bloc counteraction.
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Moroccan Government Seeks New Means of Embroiling UN
In Algerian Question
The Moroccan Government is reported to have protested
sharply several recent incidents of alleged shelling by French
military units in Algeria of Moroccan territory along the east-
ern border of Morocco where several thousand armed Algerian
rebels are based. Such incidents occur fairly regularly, but
are seldom publicized. Abdelkhalek Torres�Morocco's acting
deputy premier and, in the absence of both King Mohamed V
and Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, the ranking Moroccan offi-
cial--is reported to have decided that should similar incidents
recur he will order the Moroccan armed forces to take military
action against the French.
Such a Moroccan counterattack would be designed to cre-
ate an international incident enabling Morocco to request the
Intervention of the United Nations, General Ben Hamou 1Cettani,
commander of Morocco's forces in the Congo, returned to
Rabat on 29 September and may have been summoned to ad-
vise Torres on this question. Torres is said to have the King's
permission to take even such extreme measures as military
retaliation.
Torres has recently held talks with Algerian rebel leaders,
who may have sought to enlist Morocco's support in enlarging
the Algerian conflict just before the question is debated by the
UN General Assembly.
Meanwhile, the Tunisian Government is exploring ways
to implement the Algerian-Tunisian "union" which President
Bourguiba suggested on 3 September might be formed if such
an action "would hasten the end of the war." Bourgruiba de-
signed his announcement as a gambit to break the Algerian-
French deadlock resulting from the failure of the Melun talks
last June and is aware that any such "union" would entail the
risk of war with France.
North African leaders apparently consider the use of the
United Nations forces to restore and maintain order in the
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r,_Congo as a precedent which may be followed to obtain Algerian
independence if De Gaulle cannot be induced to open negotia-
tions with the rebel leaders. There have been North Africa
overtures to some of France's NATO allies to exert pressure
on De Gaulle to reopen talks with the Algerians.
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(Allied Regtrictions on Travel by East German Officials
Some NATO governments now are refusing to cooperate
in imposing travel restrictions on East German trade and
travel representatives as a countermeasure to recent East
German interference with access to West Berlin. Previous-
ly, the Benelux governments had given support to the re-
strictions by a tentative decision to withhold visas from East
Germans who had not been cleared through the Allied Travel
Bureau in West Berlin. The Netherlands even suspended
short-stay permits for those in transit to other countries.
The Danish Government has informed the American Em-
bassy in Copenhagen that because of trade considerations and
the importance of cooperation between the Danish and East
German railway systems, it is unable to concur in the proposed
restrictions. There is evidence that since early this year,
the government has been under considerable pressure from
Danish trade and travel interests to expand contacts with
East Germany. Despite reported opposition from the justice
and defense ministries, the Foreign Ministry has acceded to
certain East German requests for privileges and permitted
the East German railways to open an office in Copenhagen.
The Dutch Government has modified its travel ban as a
result of pressure from the KLM airline on behalf of an East
German official en route to Cuba, and it now appears likely
that entry will be granted to East Germans making a stopover
in transit to other countries. The airline argued that if the
Netherlands refused such entry, the East Germans would
merely use alternate routes.
On 30 September Bonn denounced the 1961 interzonal
trade pact with East Germany, over the apparent opposition
of British and French officials. The West German move will
not affect interzonal trade before the end of the year. Bonn's
move may compel the East Germans to give meaning to the
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Ghreat made by Foreign Trade Minister Heinrich Rau on 6 Sep-
tember, when he said that if West Germany took steps to inter-
fere with trade between East and West Germany, "it will only
hasten the measures needed to make West Berlin a free city."
Possibly aware that Western countermeasures were being con-
templated, Soviet Foreign Minister Grornyko stressed to Brit-
ish Foreign Secretary Home on 28 September that Moscow was
"fully aware" of recent East German actions and warned that
if a crisis developed it would be the fault of the West. He indi-
cated, however, that Khrushchev was prepared to resume ne-
gotiations on Berlin after a new American administration took
office.
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Opposition tO De Gaulle's European Confederation Plan Lessening
Hostility to De Gaulle's proposals for a confederation of the
six Common Market countries, which he first publicly outlined
in his 5 September press conference, appears to have moderated
considerably in the past few weeks. Opposition is still strong to
De Gaulle's related ideas for a revamping of NATO's structure to
permit France to "speak for" a Continental bloc, but several of
the Common Market countries seem prepared to accept the con-
federation plan itself as a basis for negotiation.
Typical of this more receptive attitude is the Italian posi-
tion as outlined by an Italian Embassy spokesman in Washington
on 26 September. According to him, Rome "strenuously op-
poses" creation of a "restricted steering group" in or outside
NATO but feels De Gaulle's "proposed version of Europe could
be accepted in principle." The spokesman explained that Italy
believes it is impossible to make progress toward political in-
tegration without France and without extending integration be-
yond the economic field.
Luxembourg's prime minister, who visited Paris in mid-
September, is said to have been "relieved and encouraffed" by
De Gaulle's exposition of the French position.
the Belgian foreign minister has also said he agrees with the
objectives of the De Gaulle plan, which is being considered
with a "favorable preconception."
Paris has been attempting since De Gaulle's press con-
ference to give the impression that his plan is open to nego-
tiation and would not weaken the Common Market, Foreign
Minister Couve de Murville, for example, has publicly re-
ferred to the Common Market as the "cornerstone of the
European edifice." Considerable interest has also been
aroused in the Common Market by a series of press articles j
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Lby a prominent Gaullist deputy in which he implied that the
confederation's decisions might ultimately be reached by ma-
jority vote�that is, not subject to French veto.
To find out whether France is prepared in fact to make any
such far-reaching concessions will probably be Bonn's major
objective during French Premier Debre's visit on 7-8 October.
Adenauer, whose position will be crucial, has remained pub-
licly noncommittal on the confederation plan, but has implied
certain reservations about it and has freauent17, reiterated his
strong support of NATO.
J
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Sovi6t Delegation Visits Peiping
A high-level Soviet delegation has been in Peiping since mid-
September holding discussions with the Chinese on the "ideological
issue,"
Ovlet Ambassador to India Benediktov
Informed Indian Party General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh that the five-
man delegation included Presidium members Anastas Mikoyan and
M. A. Suslov, as well as candidate Presidium member P. N.
Pospelov.
Ambassador Thompson reported on 27 September that a rumor
was circulating in Moscow that Mikovan and Suslov were visiting
Communist China. There have been several
unscheduled VIP -associated flights from Moscow to Peiping, one
on the 15th of September and another on the 27th.
A delegation of this stature, including Suslov, the Soviet Union's
top ideologist, would be empowered to conduct serious negotiations
with the Chinese in an effort to bring their positions closer together
so that the forthcoming meeting of Communist parties in Moscow in
November would not result in the same impasse as the Bucharest
meeting of last June. The Soviet party may have felt that its efforts
of the last two months to marshal support for its own views and thus
isolate the Chinese within the world Communist movement would
induce the Chinese to adopt positions closer to those of the Soviet
Union. In addition, the delegation may have been sent to China to
determine if a meeting of Chinese leaders with Khrushchev during
his planned visit to North Korea in October would be possible and
fruitful.
Recent Chinese propaganda suggests that this latest attempt at
reconciliation has been as unsuccessful as were earlier attempts
to resolve the dispute. On 29 September, two weeks after the talks
were reported to have begun, the CCP Central Committee, in a
commentary on a new volume of Mao Tse-tung's works, issued its
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trio,
(most substantial reaffirmation since the Bucharest meeting of
--s-everal of the most important Chinese positions in the dispute.
Chinese comments on the occasion of the October 1 celebration
of the 11th anniversary of the regime, while asserting the need
for "unity" within the Communist world, have adhered to the
hard-line positions set forth in the Central Committee's pro-
nouncement.
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Yr IL /L.1 V I zra
NIS
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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