CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/03/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03148934
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: March 22, 1960

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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. /7
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22 MARCH 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq negotiates a sale of its royalty crude
oil to East Germany and Communist
China. 0
Laos- -Communist-front group enters
nine candidates for April elections.
South Africa�Riots in Transvaal show
growing African organizational ability.
CD
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III. THE WEST
0 France--De Gaulle facing attacks from
all sides on his refusal to call parlia-
ment on agricultural policy.
0 Minor issues being resolved in negotia
tions on Cyprus; late May seen as
earliest possible date for independence.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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22 March 1960 /-
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq: araq plans to ship .a total of 825,000 barrels of crude
oil to East Germany and Communist China within a few weeks.
Under its agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company, Baghdad
receives a royalty of one eighth of annual oil production either
In cash or crude oil. Until this year Iraqi governments have
elected to take cash except for that oil used locally. Iraq's ef-
forts to sell its share of this year's estimated output of crude--
nearly 43 million barrels--in Western countries have failed so
far, and only these small sales to the Communist bloc are known
to have been .mad (Page 1)
Laos: Nine candidates from the Communist-front Neo Lao
Hak ST.t*TNLHS) have belatedly entered the 24 April electoral
contest for the 59 seats in the National Assembly. The 149 other
candidates include a government-approved "unified slate" of some
"?760 who are to receive government support. The rest are largely
"unaffiliated" non-Communist candidates of varying political colora-
tion. The list of non-Communist candidates may be substantially
reduced, particularly in districtsl having _NLHS or other known left-
1st candidates. (Page 2)
0)4
South Africa: The riots in South Africa's Transvaal Province
on 21 March, which resulted in at least 50 deaths, were stimu-
lated by the campaign of a militant new antiwhite nationalist or-
anization against the restrictive South African identity-card sys-
tem. Peaceful demonstrations by this group, the Pan Africanist
Congress, which has contacts with pan-Africanists in Accra and
elsewhere, are taking place in other parts of the country. The riots
indicate a growing organizational ability among the Union's Africans,
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� and the handling of them is increasing nervousness within, the South
African security forces. (Page 3)
III. THE WEST
France: De Gaulle's refusal to meet demands for a special
session of parliament to discuss the government's agricultural
policy has produced a hostile reaction among the majority of
deputies and given De Gaulle's rightist opponents new impetus
for attacks on the government. Left and center parties are con-
cerned over the trend toward "one-man" government and dismayed
D by De Gaulle's recent emphasis on a military solution in Algeria.
De Gaulle will probably continue his hard line during Khrushchev's
23 March - 3 April visit, but new farmer demonstrations and an
effort to censure the government are reportedly planned to follow.
(Page 4)
Cyprus: he current round of negotiations among high-level
representatives of Britain and the two communities on Cyprus has
resulted in some progress in resolving minor issues. The all-
important and interrelated problems--the extent of future British
base areas, administrative arrangements for these bases, and
i 0 British financial aid to the Cypriot Republic--have been put off for
fa the time being. Both Greek Cypriot and British negotiators appear
reluctant to make new concessions on the bases problem, fearing that
this would be considered a sign of weakness and lead to increased in-
transigence' on the part of the other side. Late May now is considered
the earliest possible date for Cypriot independenc2j:
(Page 5)
22 Mar 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
L ASIA-AFRICA
Iraqi Government to Sell Oil to Communist China and
East Germany
kaq plans to ship a total of 825,000 barrels of crude
oil to East Germany and Communist China in the next few
weeks,
East Germany is scheduled to receive 450,000
barrels and Communist China 375,000 barrels. If the crude
oil is shipped in Communist bloc tankers, or Western tank-
ers of comparable size, the entire amount would be equiva-
lent to seven or eight shiploadg
bider the terms of its concession agreement with the
Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), Baghdad receives a royalty
of one eighth of IPC's annual crude-oil production, either
in cash or crude oil. This and income taxes assure the
government of 50 percent of IPC's profits. The Qasim gov-
ernment's share of crude-oil production in 1960 will be about
115,000 barrels a day or 43,000,000 barrels:2
tin the past Iraqi governments have elected to receive the
cash equivalent for the crude due them as royalty payments,
except for enough oil to cover local requirementsj
Last June the Qasim regime, chiefly for political reasons,
launched a major effort to sell its royalty crude oil. Baghdad
hopes to develop a marketing organization which will decrease
its total dependence on the IPC sales organization. Thus far,
the effort has failed, however, and only these small sales to
the Communist bloc are known to have been made. The prices
East Germany and Communist China will pay are not known,
but Iraq probably will receive slightly less than if it had al-
lowed IPC to market this crude oil*.7
_CONFIDEN 77 A L
22 Mar 60
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Communist Neo Lao Hak Sat to Participate in
Laotian Elections
Nine candidates from the Communist-front Neo Lao Hak
Sat (NLHS) have belatedly filed for seats in the 59-member
National Assembly to be elected on 24 April. The nine can-
didates do not include Prince Souphannouvong and other jailed
NLHS leaders, the government having resisted local and inter-
national Communist demands that they be released in order to
participate in the elections. The government initially tried to
frustrate NLHS candidacies by refusing to issue the required
certificates of residence. It subsequently changed its position,
however, and gave the NLHS candidates an extension beyond
the 9 March filing deadline in which to complete the documen-
tation of their candidacies.
Of the 149 other candidates now in the race, some 60 are
on the "unified slate" reached by mutual agreement between
former Premier Phoui's Rally of the Lao People (RLP) and
the reformist Committee for Defense of National Interests
(CDNI). Presumably only these candidates will receive gov-
ernment support. Five others are members of the Santiphab
party, the NLHSts neutralist ally in the last assembly. Most
of the rest are "unaffiliated" non-Communists of varying po-
litical colorations.
The American Embassy in Vientiane emphasizes that the
list of candidates is by no means final. A substantial number
of the "unaffiliated" candidates may yet be pruned from the list,
especially in districts having NLHS, Santiphab, or other known
leftist candidates. The embassy suspects that many entered
the race in order to be "bought off" later by the government or
in the belief that the government will permit wide-open compe-
tition in districts in which only non-Communists are competing
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22 Mar 60
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Riots in South Africa's Transvaal Province
The campaign of the newly formed Pan- Africanist Con-
gress (PAC) against South Africa's restrictive identity-card
system has resulted in violent demonstrations in Vereeniging
In which at least 50 Africans were killed after a stone-throw-
ing crowd of 2,000 had surrounded a police station. The dem-
onstrators were dispersed by police, reinforced by white
civilians and air force jets, but tension in the area remains
high. At least six Africans were reported killed and 30 in-
jured in another outbreak at Langa� Township near Capetown.
The PAC, which held its first national conference in De-
cember 1959, has apparently displaced the rival African Na-
tional Congress (ANC) as the nationalist spokesman in impor-
tant parts of Transvaal and Cape provinces. Although its
program emphasizes peaceful opposition to apartheid meas-
ures, the PAC generally takes a more militantly antiwhite
stand than does the ANC. It apparently has contacts with
Accra and other centers of pan-Africanism on the continent.
As a result of the high degree of organizational effective-
ness which the PAC showed in these disorders, the South
African Government may well suppress the organization and re-
strict the movements of its leaders. However, the growing
boldness of the Africans and the increasing nervousness of the
police could lead to more freauent disturbances
,CONFIDEN7
22 Mar 60
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L(Ji'4r1it4iV I .11-114
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III. THE WEST
Opposition to De Gaulle Mounting
De Gaulle's flat refusal to accede to demands for a spe-
cial session of parliament prior to the regular 26 April ses-
sion has produced a sharply hostile reaction among the
majority of deputies, widened the existing breach between
the government and parliament, and probably furnished his
rightist opponents with a new basis for attacks on his govern-
ment. De Gaulle will probably continue his hard line against
public displays of hostility to the government during the Khru-
shchev visit--23 March to 3 April�but he will probably face
new farmer demonstrations and efforts to censure the govern-
ment.
Rightist criticism of De Gaulle, centering primarily on his
self-determination policy for Algeria, had become increasingly
overt since he dismissed Independent party leader Antoine Pinay
and UNR leader Jacques Soustelle from the government. UNR
deputies have continued to support the government, but they are
beginning to fear that the agricultural issue may cost them their
parliamentary seats. Independent party elements closely tied
to agricultural interests have long been planning to move into
outright opposition, and the implication that De Gaulle is increas-
ingly unsure of his ability to solve the Algerian problem will en-
courage them to develop their forces with an eye to the period
after he leaves office.
Left and center parties, similarly concerned with De Gaulle's
"disregard" for parliamentary opinion, have been dismayed by his
recent tough statements on Algeria. In general they have with-
held criticism on other domestic and foreign policy problems in
order to give De Gaulle a freer hand in Algeria, but they now are
afraid that such restraint will lose them what influence they still
have with the French voter.
The embassy in Paris doubts that an absolute majority can be
obtained in the next session to overturn the Debrd government.
� The lack of a ready alternative to De Gaulle probably still contin-
ues to be the main deterrent to all-out opposition.
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Cyprus Negotiations
he current rounu u nuguuctuoub uebigneu Co remove
differences which have postponed the proclamation of Cypriot
independence is entering its fifth week. British Governor
Foot of Cyprus confirmed on 19 March that a draft "treaty
of establishment" had been approved but stated that the major
problems--the size and administration of the future British
military bases and financial aid to the new republic--remain
untouched...)
F ot anticipates that after a�new presentation of British
views on the size of the bases, the discussions will turn to
the administrative and financial problems. There are three
or four administrative issues still to be solved,and there is
no agreement on the amount of British aid to an independent
Cyprus, with London offering $28,000,000 and the Cypriots
asking $36,400,000
Con the question of the size of British bases, there have
been few indications that an early settlement is likely and sev-
eral warnings that a deadlock may result. The Cypriots have
suggested 80 square miles, London continues to insist on 120
square miles, and both sides appear to fear that further con-
cessions would be regarded as signs of weakness
the
Greek Cypriot leader might accept any figure under 100
square miles. The British have noted repeatedly that mili-
tary requirements make it impossible for them to yield more
than a few square miles, but Governor Foot recently indicated
continued flexibility in the British position by expressing con-
fidence that the two sides could "come together" on size of
bases if all other issues were resolved. If agreement on all
issues were reached by the end of March, independence could
be proclaimed during the latter part of May."!
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
rnNWiFNTIA L
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