CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/02/29

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03177885
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: February 29, 1960

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29 February 1960
Copy No. C 67
CENTRAL
TELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
-TOP-SECRET
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29 FEBRUARY 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chou En-lai agrees to meet Nehru in
New Delhi in April.
Khrushchev extends $250,000,000 credit
to Indonesia.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
UAR-Israel--Government officials on
both sides are attempting to avoid in-
flammatory statements; UAR alert
continues, however, in fear of Israeli
attack.
Morocco--Long-rumored replacement
of Premier Ibrahim may take place soon.�
Laos--Communist influeme and activity
widespread in rural areas.
III. THE WEST
0 Panama--Nationalist plans for a march
Into the Canal Zone on 1 March have ap-
parently been abandoned or postponed,
but anti-US feeling remains high and
demonstrations are still possible.
SECRET
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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,
29 February 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China - India: Chou En-lai's letter inform-
ing Nehru that he will go to New Delhi in April opens the way
for the Chinese leader to persuade Nehru that Peiping is pre-
pared to reach agreement on the principles and procedures
for settling the border dispute. Chou will probably try to
gauge the extent of Nehru's commitment to the Ladakh claim.
He may hint at Peiping's willingness tacitly, to recognize the
McMahon line in the east if New Delhi eventually accepts the
status quo in Ladakh. Nehru will welcome Chou's agreement
�to meet in New Delhi, rather than Rangoon as previously sug-
gested, as giving his government a psychological advantage.
Neither leader expects the initial talks to produce any substan-
tive agreements. (Page I)
USSR-Indonesia: Ithrushchev, in order to revitalize the
Soviet Union's lagging economic aid program in Indonesia, has
extended a $250,000,000 credit to Djakarta. The new credit's,
to be used to finance industrial projects and agricultural devel-
opments, probably under Indonesia's forthcoming five-year plan,
and is apparently separate from the $126,300,000 in Soviet credits
previously granted. Khrushchev and Sukarno also signed an am-
bitious cultural and educational exchange program, and the Indo-
nesian President accepted an invitation to visit the USSR at a
later date. (Page 2)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
UAR-Israel: foovernment officials on both sides are at-
0 (4- tempting to avoid inflammatory statements, and there appears
to have been some relaxation of tension. At the same time,
the UAR general military alert remains in force with only slight
II
II
II
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Nor
g_nothfications, and there has been no withdrawal of UAR troops
from the Sinai Peninsula. The selective call-ups undertaken by
the Israeli Defense Force would permit full-scale mobilization
within 12 to 18 hours,
trage
Morocco: The long-rumored replacement of Premier Ibrahim
by former Premier Si Bekkai, a political independent, may occur
within the next few days. A Si Bekkai government would probably
Include representatives of most of Morocco's political factions.
It would not be likely to undertake any important changes and
would probably remain in office only until the local elections
planned for May. These elections, the first ever to be held in
Morocco, are expected to lead to the formation of a new govern-
ment on the basis of the relative
in parties.
Laos: aecent reports indicate that Communist influence and
activity ri Laos is more widespread than the government has ad-
mitted. The US Embassy agrees with the Cambodian ambassa-
dor's comments that real calm exists only in towns, that it is con
siderably less in adjacent villages, and that it is virtually nonex-
istent in most of the rest of the country. This view seems borne
out by a report of a trip by a USIS-led team which found villagers
under constant threat of reprisals and subject to intense Commu-
nist propaganda in areas where the team had been assured by
Vientiane that there was no probability of clancrpr from Pathet Lao
forceg (Page 4)
III. THE WEST
Panama: aqationalist groups have apparently abandoned or
postponed their plans for a mass march into the Canal Zone on
1 March, which is Panama's National Constitution Day and the
final day of the pre-Lenten Carnival celebrations. Anti-US feel
ing is still high, however, and demonstrations by small extrem-
ist groups remain possible, either on 1 March or later. The
canal issue is a favorite topic in the campaigning for the national
elections to be held in May. and any demonstrations could easily
take a violent tur3,3 (Page 5)
29 Feb 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Premier Chou En-lai Agrees to Visit New Delhi in April
Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai's letter of 26
February informing Nehru that he will go to New Delhi in
April opens the way for the Chinese leader to persuade Nehru
that Peiping is prepared to reach agreement on the principles
and procedures for settling the border dispute. Neither lead-
er, however, apparently expects the initial talks to do more
than create a more favorable atmosphere for later substantive
negotiations.
Chou will probably try to gauge the extent of Nehru's com-
mitment to India's border claimsland he may hint that Peiping
would be willing tacitly to recognize the McMahon line in the
east if New Delhi eventually accepts the status quo in Ladakh.
The Chinese have consistently claimed that their troops have
not crossed the McMahon linesand they accepted the eastern end
of the line as the "traditional" border in their recent agreement
with Rangoon.
Chou apparently hopes that his willingness to go to New Delhi
will be interpreted as a concession which will help ease tensions
between the two countries. He had previously proposed Rangoon
as a meeting place. Nehru will welcome Chou's agreement to
meet in the Indian capital as giving New Delhi a psycholog-
ical advantage. A meeting there also will help Nehru mollify
those in India who have opposed talks with Chou.
Chou is likely to be received by the Indian public and press
with thinly concealed rancor,, Conservative and Socialist opposi-
tion groups probably will now begin efforts to undermine Chou's
mission and try to prepare the public for anti-Chinese demonstra-
tions during the visit. Nehru's government, however, is probably
capable of keeping such activities within bounds.
�eONFIDEN�TharL
29 Feb 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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*sow Na00
New Soviet Economic Aid to Indonesia
In an attempt to revitalize the Soviet Union's lagging eco-
nomic aid program in Indonesia, Khrushchev climaxed his
ten-day visit by concluding a $250,000,000 economic and tech-
nical cooperation agreement with Djakarta. Khrushchev pre-
sumably hopes that the new agreement will help to arrest what
he feels to be Indonesia's drift toward the United States and
will soften any antibloc sentiments in Indonesia occasioned by
Djakarta's dispute with Peiping.
The new Soviet line of credit apparently is separate from
the $126,300,000 in credits Moscow has previously extended,
Including $118,000,000 in economic assistance since 1958 and
an earlier credit for 4,000 jeeps. The new line of credit is to
be used for extensive industrial projects and agricultural devel-
opment, presumably under Djakarta's five-year plan tentatively
scheduled to begin in 1961. It also envisages Soviet technical
and material assistance for constructing ferrous and nonferrous
metallurgical enterprises, chemical plants, and textile mills.
� In addition, the USSR probably will build a nuclear reactor for
research purposes.
The Soviet Union will provide technicians and skilled work-
ers to carry out the projects called for under the agreement and
will train Indonesian personnel both in the USSR and in Indonesia.
Indonesian Army leaders reportedly opposed the acceptance
of extensive credit from the Soviet Union and tried to persuade
Sukarno not to request it. Now that he has done so, however, it
seems unlikely that there will be any significant army reaction.
Sukarno is anxious to receive and to publicize new foreign aid
offers in order to give the appearance that he is taking swift and
decisive action with regard to the country's, economic problems.
Indonesia hoped to reali
zu percent ot its p billion live-year development program through
Soviet aid, another 10 percent from other bloc countries, and the
remainder from the West. Japanese r7parations, and domestic re-
sourcelj
CONFIDENTIAL
29 Feb 60
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
UAR-Israeli Situation
oth the UAR and Israeli governments have continued to
refrain from inflammatory statements during the past few days,
and there appears to have been some relaxation of the acute
tensions between them. Spokesmen for President Nasir and
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion alike have again assured Western
diplomats and journalists that, despite their military precau-
tions, they do not expect war.
The general UAR military alert remains in effect with only
slight modifications, however. The flow of supplies to troop con-
centrations in the Sinai Penninsula is continuing, and there has been
no indication of troop withdrawals from Sinai. On the other hand,
a number of UAR field grade officers were observed en route to
Cairo for the holiday, last Friday, and other officers formerly re-
stricted to their barracks are reportedly permitted to return to
their homes in the eveninC
/he Israeli Defense Force has instituted a selective alert,
and some 5,000 reservists were called up on the nights of 25 and
26 February. The call-ups included officers and noncommissioned
officers who would have a key role in carrying out a general mobili-
n.
full mobilization would now require only 12 to 18 hour23
rgven without a deliberate aggressive move by either side, a
new border incident or an air clash resulting from routine recon-
naissance activities by either side could quickly lead to broader
hostilities. Moreover. the UAR military com-
mand is continuing to receive reports
an Israeli attack may be immineal
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29 Feb 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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'NO
Laotian Security Situation
*cent reports indicate that Communist influence and
activity in Laos are more widespread than the government
has admitted. The Communist Pathet Lao insurgents seem
particularly active in propagandizing and organizing the ru-
ral populace in Luang Prabang Province, a large percentage
of whose population consists of tribal minority groups who
have long resented Vientiane's neglect of their simple
needs. Other areas heavily infested by the Communists in-
clude portions of Vientiane and Xieng Khouang provinces and
the southernmost province of Attopea.3
he US Embassy agrees with the Cambodian ambassador's
comment that real calm exists only in towns, that it is con-
siderably less in adjacent villages, and that it is virtually non-
existent in most of the rest of the country. The Cambodian
envoy compared unfavorably the effectiveness of government
propagandists with that of the Communists, who he claims are
active in one degree or another in almost all of Laos' villages.
He implied that the government was losing the loyalty of the
minority groups virtually by default, whereas the insurgents
enlist their sympathies by small gifts of salt and other basic
necessities
� rThese impressions would seem to be borne out by the re-
cent experience of a USIS-led team traveling in tribal villages
in Xieng Khouang Province and adjacent parts of Vientiane
Province. Despite the prior assurances of the government
that there was no probability of danger from Pathet Lao forces
in the area, the team found the villagers under constant threat
of reprisal and subject to intense Communist propaganda. The
team itself encountered uniformed Pathet Lao elements in one
village and, while unmolested by the Communists, decided to
abandon its tour in anticipation of .danger ahead.
SECRET
29 Feb 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Reduced
tionalist gri5ups apparently have-reversed their earlier
decision to lead a mass sovereignty demonstration into the Canal
Zone on 1 March, Panama's National Constitution Day and final
day of the pre-Lenten Carnival celebration23
III. THE WEST
Threat of Anti-US Demonstrations in Panama on 1 March
P
Nationalist student
and civic leaders who were responsible for the anti-US outbursts
last November favor postponement of the flag-planting demonstra-
tion until after 1 March and possibly until the results of Panama's
current efforts to publicize its case against the US throughout the
world can be evaluated. Panamanian business interests, which
might sustain considerable financial losses if demonstrations
erupted on the peak day of the Carnival festivities, also have an-
nounced opposition to the plans for 1 IvIarch:7
attempts may
be made by small groups to divert Carnival parade marchers or
spectators into the Canal Zone in order to plant flags. Such dem-
onstrations could easily result in violence, as anti-US feeling is
high among all segments of the Panamanian population, and the
canal issue is a favorite topic in the campaigning for the riational
elections in May. There are continuing indications that the Pana-
manian National Guard would merely protect Panamanian property
in the event of troublq
29 Feb 60
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
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CTINFITWAJTIA
_THE PRESIDENT Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177885
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director CONFIDENTIAL
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