CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/04/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02977779
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: April 22, 1960

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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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21 APRIL 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Flow of East German refugees increases;
number in week ending 19 April appears
to have surpassed all records since 19530
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Rebel Algerian government announces
plan to send ministerial delegation to
Communist China.
Laotian elections this Sunday seen cer-
tain to result in victory of progovern-
ment elements; exclusion of all or near-
ly all leftists from assembly would be
likely to stimulate increased activity by
insurgents.
Leftist government in Singapore said to
be seriously considering allowing Soviet
commercial office to open there; govern-
ment of Malaya strongly opposed.
South Korean opposition elements refuse
to accept cabinet resignation as sign of
willingness by Rhee to satisfy popular de-
mands; Mee reportedly not considering
easing of police-state methods.
III. THE WEST
()Cuban Labor Confederation rent by dis-
sension over Communist efforts to con-
trol it; confederation's head reportedly
in hiding and may resign.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
22 April 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
East Germany: The number of East German refugees
fleeing to West Berlin in the week of 13 to 19 April, against
the background of the regime's clrive against private farmers
and businessmen, appears to have surpassed all records
since the aftermath of the riots of 17 June 1953. As of 19
April, 2,734 persons, including large numbers of farmers
and craftsmen, had been processed in the West Berlin refu-
gee center, and refugee authorities reported that the actual
Influx for the week was double that figure. The apparently
extreme concern of the Ulbricht regime over the mass exodus
� of its citizens is shown by the reported attempt of East German
police�until stopped by the West German police--to question
travelers and examine their baggage in West Berlin stations
of the East German - operated elevated railroad.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Algeria: The rebel Algerian government's announcement
that it will send a ministerial delegation to Communist China
appears designed in part to pose the threat of closer rebel re-
lations with the bloc if Western support for the Algerian posi-
tion on a cease-fire is not forthcoming. Although the rebels
are believed in fact to be reluctant to establish close relations
with the bloc, they probably hope to obtain a commitment from
Peiping on the delivery of equipment which the Chinese promised
in January 1959. (Page 1)
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,
Laos: Progovernment elements are certain to win a major-
ity in Sunday's elections for the 59-member National Assembly.
The number of seats which will be won by the 20-odd Commu-
nist and pro-Communist candidates will depend in part on the
amount of pressure put on voters by local army and police ele-
ments. The exclusion of all or virtually all leftists from the
new assembly�whether by government rigging or as a result
of a possible last-minute protest withdrawal by the leftists--
would be likely to stimulate intensified guerrilla operations by
the insurgents. (Page 2)
Singapore: [The leftist government in Singapore appears to
be giving serious consideration to requests of visiting Soviet
trade officials to open a commercial office there. The Malayan
Government is adamantly opposed to this and will probably seek
to discourage Singapore acceptance of Soviet overtures by threat-
ening economic reprisals, possibly including closure of the cause-
way connecting Singapore with the mainland. j
(Page 3)
South Korea: I Opposition elements are refusing to accept
the resignation of Rhee's cabinet as evidence of any real change
in the government or as an indication of willingness by Rhee to
satisfy the demands of the people. Lt. Gen. Song Yo-chan, corn
mander of the troops enforcing martial law, has expressed the
opinion that riots will resume in Seoul if the police do not change
their present tactics. Rhee, meanwhile, is reported to have indi-
cated he does not contemplate easing of police-state methods and
has said those who demonstrated will be treated as traitors.1
(Page 5)
III. THE WEST
Cuba: The Cuban Labor Confederation is rent by dissen-
sion over Communist efforts to control it. Secretary General
David Salvador is reported to be in hiding and may resign just be
May Day to bring the issue to public attention. Castro offi-
cials reportedly are infuriated and fear that Salvador's action will
22 Apr 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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interfere with the large demonstration of support for the regime
planned for 1 May. (Page 7)
22 Apr 60
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DAILY BRIEF
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Algerian Rebels Sending Ministerial Group to Communist China
The Algerian rebels' announcement that they will send a
ministerial delegation to Communist China appears designed
in part to pose the threat of closer relations with the bloc in
the absence of Western supportior the Algerian position on a
cease-fire. The Algerian delegation may be that headed by
Deputy Premier Belkacem Krim which has lately toured the
Middle East soliciting aid for the Algerian cause.
Rebel spokesmen, in conversation with Western officials,
have indicated distrust of Communism, while warning that the
absence of Western support for rebel objectives might force
them into closer cooperation with the bloc. ) Rebel disappoint-
ment at Khrushchev's apparent failure to support the Algerians
in his conversations with De Gaulle has made it likely that any
rebel move toward the bloc would involve Peiping rather than
Moscow.
The rebel delegation appears likely to raise the possibili-
ty of material or financial support by the Chinese. In January
1959, Peiping offered the Algerians $5,000,000 in such aid.
Apart from a few radio sets and some miscellaneous clothing,
however, there is no evidence of delivery. This previous com-
mitment may be discussed and expanded by the Chinese, who
want to increase their influence with the rebel movement. If
asked, Peiping may offer a small number of military techni-
cians to participate in the rebel "foreign legion" being recruited
in the Arab League states. It is unlikely, however, that the
Algerians would request or Peiping furnish Chinese combat
"volunteers."
In addition to the rebel ministerial group--whose depar-
ture date has not yet been announced--an Algerian "youth dele-
gation," which includes a representative of the Ministry of Arma-
ments, will leave for China in mid-April.
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progovernment Elements May Win Sizable Majority
In Laotian Elections
Progovernment elements are expected to win a majority
which may reach substantial proportions in elections on 24
April for the 59-member Laotian National Assembly. Ap-
proximately 120 candidates were at last report still in the race,
including some 60 on the government-approved slate--com-
posed mainly of members of former Premier Phoui's Rally of
the Lao People (RLP) and the Committee for Defense of National
Interests (CDNI)--andnine eachfrom the Communist-front Neo
Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) and the fellow-traveling Santiphab party.
An estimated 25 of the 40= odd independents are in reality RLP
or CDNI followers who failed to gain acceptance on the govern-
ment slate] A few of the remaining independents are considered
leftists who would probably vote with the NLHS if elected.
The number of seats won by candidates or allies of the NLHS
will depend in part on the amount of pressure exerted on the voters
by local police and army units.
to assure free elections "in districts where no Santiphab or NLHS
candidates are running," provides a strong if indirect indication
that the government is in fact planning to manipulate the voting
where Communist or pro-Communist candidates are seeking of-
fice.
The exclusion of all or virtually all leftists from the new as-
sembly�whether by government rigging or as a result of a last-
minute protest withdrawal by the leftists�would be likely to stimu=
late intensified guerrilla operations by the Communist Pathet Lao
insurgents and would reflect adversely on Laos internationally.
French, Indian, End Britis_hjofficials, for example, have already
shown considerable concern.
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22 Apr 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
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Singapore Government Considering Soviet Request to Establish
Permanent Trade Mission
The leftist People's Action party (PAP) government of the
internally self-governing State of Singapore appears to be giv-
ing serious consideration to the request of visiting Soviet trade
officials to establish a permanent trade mission in Singapore.
the Soviet mission has re-
tained the law Iirm ot which singapore's Prime Minister Lee
Kuan Yew is senior partner to renresent the TTSSR in its PffOrth
to open a corlmercial office
t_The Malayan Government is adamantly opposed to any type
of Soviet representation in Singapore and will probably seek to
discourage acceptance of Soviet overtures by threatening eco-
nomic reprisals, including possible closure of the causeway con-
necting Singapore with the mainland.
the Malayan Government sees Singapore's action
in this case as a major test of its sincerity in seeking closer
economic and political relations with the Federation and is await,
ing Singapore's move for consultation. It seems unlikely that
Singapore officials would risk Malayan displeasure unless they
believe that agreeing to Soviet requests would result in large-
scale economic benefits for Singapore, possibly including a long-
term low-interest loanq
LU_nder Singapore's new constitution, its foreign affairs are
controlled by the UK, while Singapore has responsibility for the/
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conduct of matters concerning trade. . ." While the opening
of an official Soviet Government trade office would quite clearly
require UK consent, it is possible that Singapore officials be-
lieve they can unilaterally enter into an agreement with a Soviet
trading corporation to open a Singapore branch.'
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South Korean Opposition Unappeased by Cabinet Resignation
!Opposition elements refuse to interpret the resignation of
President Rhee's cabinet as evidence of any real change in the
government or as an indication of willingness by Rhee to satis-
fy the demands of the people. Opposition Democratic party
leader Chang Myon, the "lame duck" vice president defeated
by Rhee's unpopular running mate Yi Ki-pung in the elections
on 15 March, has called for "further demonstrations" and new
elections. Rhee reportedly was angered by Yi's flight from
Seoul during the rioting, and there has been some speculation
that he may be replaced.'
}An uneasy calm appears to have settled over Seoul follow-
ing the establishment of martial law. Army Chief of Staff U.
Gen Song Yo-chan, commander of the troops enforcing martial
law, has warned, however, that riots will probably break out
again in the capital unless the police change their tactics.
Earlier, Song who fears the police will try to blame the army
for anything that goes wrong, commented that during the riot-
ing the police had "lost their heads" and had been in a "frenzy."/
[There are strong indications that President Rhee neither
comprehends the nature of the demonstrations nor appreciates
the extent of popular resentment against his regime. A high-
level Korean Government official reports that Rhee has indi-
cated he does not contemplate easing "police-state" methods
and intends to treat the demonstrators as national traitors.
If former Rhee strong man Yi Pom-sok is included in the cabi-
net, it would lend weight to this report. Rhee apparently has
interpreted statements of concern by President Eisenhower,
Secretary Herter, and Ambassador McConaughy as interest
in his own "welfare and safety" and has no strong impression
of US disapproval of his methods. Bloc propaganda is exploit-
ing the situation in South Korea, and free-world reaction is
almost unanimously negative to the Rhee government. 7
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In Japan where South Korean developments are followed
very closely, the government and press attribute the demon-
strations to popular resentment over the elections and pent-up
dissatisfaction with the regime's high-handed policies, as well
as to economic factors. In an unofficial statement, Prime
Minister Kishi discounted possible Communist instigation, al-
though Foreign Ministry officials are concerned that the long-
latent opposition to the Mee government may develop into
widespread disaffection which would be exploited by the Com-
munists and eventually affect security in the Far East.
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22 Apr 60
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III. THE WEST
Cuban Labor Troubles Annoy Castro Regime
The Cuban Labor Confederation (CTC) is rent by bitter dis-
sension over Communist efforts to control it.
CTC Secretary
General David Salvador is in hiding in Havana and is planning to
resign just before May Day in order to bring the issue to public
attention. Salvador was chosen by Fidel Castro to run Cuba's
strong labor movement as an important component of the revolu-
tion. He and some other labor leaders have resisted the Commu=
nists, with whom they have had previous experience. Castro in
recent months has endorsed the support given the Communists by
his brother Raul and Raul's protege, pro-Coxnmunist Labor Min-
ister Martinez Sanchez.
Castro and his advisers are anxious to postpone a showdown
in the CTC until after the May Day rally they are staging to dem-
onstrate domestic and international support for the revolutionary
regime. They are infuriated by Salvador's action, which they see
as a threat to the rally's success. Martinez considers it impera-
tive that Salvador make a speech at the celebration.
Martinez evidently has already asked Conrado Becquer, head
of CTC's powerful sugar workers' federation who has avoided in-
volvement in the power struggle, to replace Salvador. Becquer,
opportunistic and politically astute, is reported to be reluctant
to accept and to have said that in the event he took the post, he
would demand government support for a non-Communist CTC di-
rectorate. The Castro government is unlikely to accept or hold
to such terms; if Becquer does replace Salvador, however, it
would indicate that he believes he can control the Communist la-
bor leaders, as he is too ambitious to share power with them.
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rf-INICITIVAITI A
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Nal
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
- Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CIIMPITWIVTIA I
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