CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/09/07

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03160565
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: September 7, 1960

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7 SEPTEMBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Discontent in South Vietnam could erupt
In antigovernment demonstrations;
army's willingness to suppress non-Com-
munist opposition elements could quick-
ly change if this involved considerable
bloodshed.
III. THE WEST
Argentina considering breaking relations
with Cuba.
LATE ITEMS
Situation in Laos.
Situation in the Congo.
SECRET--
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
7 September 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
South Vietnam:EDiscontent among labor, student, and
refugee circles in South Vietnam could erupt in antigovern-
ment demonstrations, the American Embassy in Saigon re-
ports. The embassy believes that if such demonstrations
break out, the Communists will attempt to manipulate them
from behind the scenes or engage in hit-and-run acts of vio-
lence. Security police and military forces reportedly have
plans to smother any demonstration before it can gain momen-
tum, but the army's willingness to suppress non-Communist
opposition elements miRht quickly change if this involved con-
siderable bloodshed. Page 1)
III. THE WEST
Cuba-Argentina: Argentina is considering breaking rela-
tions with tuba as a result of Cuban Foreign Minister Roa's
vituperative attacks on Argentina's position at the OAS meet-
ing in San Jose and his public vilification of President Fron-
dizi. On 5 September. Roa rejected Argentina's diplomatic
protest of these attacks, as well as a similar Brazilian pro-
test against his somewhat milder attacks on Brazilian Foreign
Minister Lafer. Earlier strains in Argentine-Cuban relations,
such as those caused by Cuban radio attacks and Cuba's mis-
use of its diplomatic pouch, had been smoothed over, but Argen-
tina will find it more difficult to maintain a conciliatory attitude
in the face of the present provocation.
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LATE ITEMS
*Laos: gremier Souvanna Phouma has told the American
Ambassador that he is prepared to dismiss General Phoumi from
the government as a rebel if Phoumi refuses to come to Vientiane.
Souvanna claims Phoumi has no reason to fear for his personal
safety if he returns, although Kong Le apparently still retains
effective control of the capital and Pathet Lao influence in the
evolving situation is becoming more pronounced. If Phoumi should
decide to assume his post in the government, the Pathet Lao may
react by stepping up guerrilla activities. Souvanna is considering
certain concessions to the Pathets' demands including nartial new
alprilAnct anti rornanitirm rffhp MIST?'
*Situation in Congo as of 0300 EDT: President KasavubuTs
coup of 5 September against Premier Lurnumba has failed,
according to the American consul in Brazzaville, and Kasavubu
is now in his own house under UN guard. The cabinet, supporting
Premier Lumumba, has decided that Kasavubu should be tried for
high treason. Lumumba, apparently controls all important facilities
in the capital except for the airport and radio station which are in
UN hands and at present inoperative for all except UN business.
The premier has protested UN closure of the radio station. This
UN action, along with Lumurnba's expected criticism of the UN's
role during the coup effort, may lead to a considerable heightening
of tension between Lumutnba and the UN officials in the Congo.
Lutnumba-controlled police broke up a demonstration of
several thousand Kasavubu supportors with gun fire in the only
major incident of violence following the coup. Most political
parties appear to be adopting a wait-and-see attitude, but as
anticipated, President Tshombe of Ka,tanga, Kasavubu's Abako
organization, Kalonji's group and the PUNA organization of pre-
viously-arrested Bolikango have promised their support to
Kasavubu, (Page 2)
7 Sept 60
DAILY BRIEF Li
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[Possibility of, Antigovernment Demonstrations in South Vietnam
The uneasy political atmosphere in Saigon resulting both
from stepped-up Communist guerrilla activities in the country-
side and dissatisfaction in certain circles over the government's
authoritarian rule could erupt in antigovernment demonstrations,
according to the American Embassy. An abortive effort to organ-
ize demonstrations reportedly was initiated in connection with the
19 August anniversary of the Viet Minh independence proclama-
tion, and some 30 arrests were reported of persons carrying arms,
explosives, and handbills.
Opposition elements have recently attempted to stir up the apolit-
ical student elements as well as certain refugee and labor circles
to demand policy changes. The trade unions are the best organ-
ized group, and their economic and social grievances make them
the most likely vehicle for any public demonstrations. The embassy
speculates that, should such demonstrations occur, the Commu-
nists would attempt to manipulate them behind the scenes and to
engage in hit-and-run acts of violence.
Government security forces reportedly have plans to smother
any demonstration before it can gain momentum, and there are
enough army and civil guard units in the immediate Saigon area to
control any outbreaks. These forces are anti-Communist and loyal
to President Diem, but it is questionable whether military leaders
would sunnort any bloody repression of non-Communist elements.
7 Sept 60
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Situation in Congo
President Kasavubu apparently has failed in his coup
attempt against Premier Lumumba who controls all of
Leopoldville except for the UN-guarded airports and radio
station. The UN has taken complete control of both airports
near Leopoldville and placed debris on the runway to prevent
Soviet planes from taking more Congolese troops to the Kasai
area. UN forces have shut down the radio station to prevent
Lumumba's inflammatory propaganda broadcasts. This action,
however, has been protested by Lumumba and may cause an
early showdown between the premier and the UN. UN officials
insist that they are not taking sides�merely maintaining order--
and on 6 September in New York refused to say which govern-
ment was recognized by the UN.
Lumumba has received cabinet backing against Kasavubu.
The cabinet on 6 September decided Kasavubu should be tried
for high treason for trying to remove the premier and thus
automatically was ineligible to continue his constitutional
functions. While awaiting parliamentary approval, the cabinet
took over the president's powers. In its communique, the
cabinet called upon all nations to refuse backing to the opposition.
Already Moscow radio and the pro-government Ghana press have
attacked Kasavubu, the latter saying he had been "seduced by
the imperialists." Early in his coup attempt, Kasavubu asked
the UN to take over control of the Congo, but a UN spokesman
indicated it would need a new mandate to comply.
Lumumba's control of the police was indicated on 6 September
when they used gunfire to break up a pro-Kasavubu demonstration.
The political party of leftist deputy premier Gizenga has rallied to
his support, but most parties are maintaining a wait-and-see atti-
tude. As anticipated, however, factions opposed to Lumumba's high-
ly centralized control have quickly announced support of ICasavubu.
Their strength may be indicated shortly when the Congo parliament
meets in response to the premier's summons for an emergency
session and a vote of confidence. It will probably be difficult for
the opposition factions to gain the two-thirds majority in each house
necessary to remove the premier legally. Even if they fail, however,
Lumumba's weakness in the Senate may induce him to disregard
further parliamentary procedures.
7 Sept 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
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President Tshombe of Katanga quickly backed 1Casavubu's
actions as "perfectly constituional" and sent an appeal for a
national conference to draw up a new, and federal, constitution.
Meanwhile, Katanga is giving attention to its air defense. Accord-
ing to the Belgian commander of the Katanga Air Force, Tshombe
now has 15 pilots and 24 maintenance personnel. The commander
hopes that by November, Katanga will have six armed aircraft,
five C-47's suitable for paratroop operations and 10 European
pilots. The ground forces reportedly have ample small arms
and automatic weapons, but some of Tshombe's European advisors
are pessimistic of receiving aid in time to offset Communist aid
to Lumumba's forces.
-SECRET--
7 Sept 60
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
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U�G AftILICAlliAL
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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