CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/12/29

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02993707
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: December 29, 1960

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29 December 1960
Copy No, C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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29 DECEMBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet party presidium members travel
to provincial centers to explain outcome
of Moscow Communist conference to
local party officials.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Congo�Gizenga's move into Kivu may
have given him control over much of
province; pressure increased on! Mobutu
to initiate military action against dis-
sidents.
Yemeni-British relations strained over
alleged British support of anti-monar-
chical Yemenis in Aden.
Mali�Leftward trend in foreign relations
likely to increase Mali's susceptibility
to blandishments of Sino-Soviet bloc. 0
Laos--Soviet Premier Klumshchev's
private statements suggest Moscow not
contemplating open intervention in Laos
with identifiable forces under present
circumstances; bloc material aid to
Phoumi forces to continue.
III. THE WEST
CrEl Salvadoran Communist-front party
leaders to go to Cuba, presumably for
Castro-Communist guidance.
12)11taraguayan roppmai firm forces reportedly
planning new attempt, possibly starting
today, to overthrow Stroessner regime;
government units alerted.
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will increase pressure on Mobutu to undertake military op-
erations against the dissidents, notwithstanding Hammar-
skjold's threat to withdraw� UN troops in such, an event. In
Leopoldville, President Kasavubu has told the Liberian am-
bassador that he is ready to receive the UN Conciliation
Commission and suggested it begin meetings by 3 January.
/Yemen-TX: Imam Ahmad has declared the British
charge in �Taiz persona non grata and is recalling the Yem-
eni charge from London. The Imam's action is in retalia-
tion for alleged British support of anti-monarchical Yemenis
residing in Aden and the Aden Protectorate and believed by
the Imam to be responsible for recent bombings in Sana and
other towns in Yemen. The Imam probably does not intend a
complete break in relations but may hope the UK will take ac-
tion against such elements.
Mali: President Modibo Keita, who has been under
strong pressure from militant left-wing elements within his regime, i$ is aligning Mali more closely with its radical neigh- i? "2)
bor, Guinea, where the Sino-Soviet bloc has established a
firm foothold. Prior to his recent meeting in Conakry with
Guinean President Tours and Ghanaian President Nkrumah
during which Mali's adherence to the Ghana-Guinea "union"
was announced, Keita indicated in private that Mali consid-
ered it had more in common with Guinea than with the other
French-speaking African states. This leftward trend,L:which
may be reflected in cabinet changes expected shortlys is likely
to increase Mali's susceptibility to the blandishments of the.
Sino=Soviet bloc.
(Page 1)
K
Laos: joviet PremierKhrushchev's remarks on the situ=
ationThitaos during a private conversation with the British /)
ambassador on 26 December provide a possible indication that
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Moscow regards current bloc activities as a long-term
operation and does not contemplate open intervention with
Identifiable bloc military forces under present circum-
stances. He said the USSR would continue to aid anti-Phourni
forces and that, while fighting on the present scale could go
on for as long as seven years, he felt no major war would re-
sult.
DBloc public statements continue to create
an air of tension about developments in Laos. Communist
China's Foreign Minister Chen Yi, in a 28 December letter
to the co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference, the USSR
and Great Britain, warned that the "war in Laos is pregnant
with danger of further expansion" and insisted a solution could
be achieved only by accepting Communist terms.
(Page 3)
III. THE WEST
El Salvador: Fourteen leaders of the Communist-front
April and May Revolutionary party (PRAM) reportedly have
either left or are about to leave for Cuba. The US Embassy
at San Salvador comments that the size and composition of the
group indicate that El Salvador is about to receive a "mas-
sive injection" of Castro-Communist doctrine, guidance, and
support. Meanwhile peasant groups reportedly being organized
by PRAM and the Communist-dominated labor federation are
taking on the character of a "popular militia" and already may
rcontr71 certain strategic points in the country.
(Page 6)
*Paraguay: The Paraguayan government has taken extensive
security precautions in anticipation of a new attempt, possibly
starting today, to overthrow President Stroessner.
, the regime has information that
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opposition forces plan an uprising in Asuncion--reportedly
scheduled for 29 December--timed to coincide with an in-
vasion of Paraguay at several points by exile groups now
based in Argentina. Between December 1959 and this past
August there were a number of small-scale invasions of
the country by exile forces, but these did not draw major
support within the country. Although Stroessner reportedly
retains the loyalty of most of the armed forces, a number of
factors, including depressed economic conditions, have in-
creased popular discontent in the country, and have heightened
the possibility of more widesp
tempt against the government.
CIV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against the United States or its possessions in the imme-
diate future.
B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate
direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies,
or areas peripheral to the bloc in the immediate future.
C.
The Communist bloc airlift operations associated with
the Laotian situation continue and remain consistent with
what we believe to be a decision to provide sufficient
support to the Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces to prevent es-
tablishment of effective control over the country by an
anti-Communist Lao government. It still appears unlikely
that the Communist bloc has decided to intervene openly
with lig nwn iripn tif n1,10. i _ lf.V7 TR% vt .1 ,neo
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Mali Moving Toward Closer Alignment With Guinea
President Modibo ICeita, who has been under strong
pressure from extremist elements within Mali's single-
party authoritarian regime, is aligning his country more
closely with its radical neighbor, Guinea, where the Sino-
Soviet bloc has established a firm foothold. Earlier a dis-
tinct coolness had developed in the Mali-Guinea relationship,
largely because of indications that Guinean President Toure
expected to play a dominant role in a close partnership be-
tween the two French states following the disruption in Au-
gust of the former federation between Mali and Senegal. In
October, Mali asked Tour d to postpone his proposed state
visit to Bamako until January, then pointedly agreed to a
similar visit by Ghana's Nkrumah last month.
Since early December, however, when Keita and Toure
held a hastily arranged rendezvous at the Guinea-Mali
frontier, a rapprochement has been developing. aCeita af-
forded further evidence of this when he indicated to visit-
ing American dignitaries on 16 December that Mali con-
sidered it had more in common with Guinea than with the
other French-speaking African states. At the same time,
he made it clear that Mali did not look to the pro-Western
Ivory Coast for inspiration and political cooperation, der-
spite his own former close ties with Ivory Coast leader
Houphouet-BoignyT.] A week later the Mali President went
to Conakry to affirm Mali's adherence to the Ghana-Guinea
"union."
The American Embassy in Bamako believes that while
the Congo and Algerian situations have contributed to this
rapprochement, Mali's leaders are primarily attracted to
Guinea's Marxist-influenced approach to basic political and
economic problems.
This leftward trend, (which reportedly will be reflected
in cabinet changes to be announced shortly;) seems likely to
increase Mali's susceptibility to blandishments from the Sino-
Soviet bloc. At present Mali is in the process of establishing
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diplomatic relations with at least four bloc countries�in-
cluding Communist China and North Vietnam--and has
signed preliminary trade and: technical assistance agree-
ments with Czechoslovakia. In addition, a Soviet economic
mission has been in Mali for some time studying possible
aid projects.
SECRET
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Situation in Laos
Khrushchev
did not think ma-
jor war would result from events in Laos but that fighting
on the present scale could go on for as long as seven years.
IChrushchev's remarks are another indication that the Soviet
Union regards bloc activities in Laos as a long-term opera-
tion and does not contemplate open intervention with identifi-
able bloc military forces under present circumstances. The
Soviet premier also said that Moscow would continue to aid
anti-Phoumi forces and that ultimately those who are not now
Communist would become so and would win out. Khrushchev's
reference to the possibility of protracted civil war in Laos was
probably designed to impress the United Kingdom with the
necessity of arranging a political settlement in Laos either
through reactivation of the ICC or through an international
confprehnep siirh AA thp TTSRR h 1 ran thy raniiiacfarr--),
The Soviet leader's observations follow remarks made
by Foreign Minister Gromyko concerning Laos in his speech
before the Supreme Soviet on 23 December--the first authori-
tative foreign policy statement since the Moscow conference of
Communist leaders. Gromyko claimed that the Laotian people
"continue the struggle for the freedom and independence of
their country." He characterized events in Laos as "a militant
prelude to complete liberation from foreign rule?' Soviet prop-
aganda during the past week has also emphasized that the strug-
gle for Laos has not ended with the capture of Vientiane but will
continue throughout the countryside. Radio Moscow, meanwhile,
continues to detail charges of "US aggression" in Laos and has
accused the United States of refusing to take any steps� to "nor-
malize the dangerous situation" in Laos.
Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi, in a 28 De-
cember letter to the co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference,
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lose Noise
the USSR and Great Britain, warned that the "war in Laos is
pregnant with danger of further expansion:' Endorsing the
22 December Soviet note to the British, Chen Yi insisted that
a reactivated ICC should deal only with the "legal" govern-
ment of Souvanna Phouma--contacts with the Boun Oum gov-
ernment "would be extremely serious"--and stated that,
should it prove impossible to bring back the ICC on these
terms, another Geneva conference should be called. Peiping
would expect to participate in such a conference.
The Pathet Lao radio on 27 December broadcast a joint
statement by Prince Souphannouvong and Quinim Pholsena, on
behalf of the Neo Lao Hak Sat party (NLHS) and the "legal gov-
ernment of the Laotian kingdom" respectively, pledging close
collaboration in the fight against the "puppet" Boun Oum regime
and describing it as a "tool of the aggressors." The statement
proclaimed that the "royal army troops" and the Pathet Lao
would "combine their forces" in support of the Souvanna Phou-
ma government as the only government recognized by the "Lao-
tian people." Quinim, the extreme leftist minister of informa-
tion in the Souvanna government, has been in the Pathet Lao
stronghold of Sam Neua for several days.
Lin Phnom Penh, Souvanna Phouma
would not return to Laos
unless his proposal for a coalition government including the
Pathet Lao and General Phoumi's Savannakhet group was ac-
cepted, or unless a government was formed which excluded both
groups. Souvanna
had no intention of going to Sam Neua, as suggested
by Souphannouvong. He added that he intended to remain in Phnom
Penh for several weeks to "await developments" and to discuss
the situation with Cambodian Prince Sihanouq
At least five of the six Soviet AN-12s which arrived in North
Vietnam on 27 December have returned to Communist China. A
rg
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seventh was delayed at Canton but was rescheduled for
Haiphong on 28 December. Thus far, two AN42s have
been scheduled to return to Moscow and one to Vladivos-
tok, where additional supplies for Laos may be loaded. Two
AN-12s which returned to Canton from Haiphong now are
scheduled to return to Haiphong on 29 December. Soviet
and North Vietnamese transports continued flights to Laos
through 28 December.
The five Soviet MI-4 helicopters which entered China
from the Soviet Far East on 23 December continued their
flight from Shenyang to Tientsin on 28 December. They are
probably destined for airlift operations in Laos.
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Salvadoran Ccwrnunists Reportedly to Seek Ct,n Support
Fourteen leaders of the Salvadoran Communist-front April
and May Revolutionary party (P:RAM) are reported to have left or
to be about to leave for Cuba. The US Embassy at San Salvador
commented that the size and composition of the group indicate
that El Salvador is about to receive a "massive injection" of
Castro-Communist doctrine, guidance, and support. The group
may hope that it can obscure the real purpose of its trip by tim-
ing the visit to coincide with celebrations in Cuba on 1 and 2 Jan-
uary--to be attended by delegations from various Latin American
countries--in commemoration of the second anniversary of Fidel
Castro's revolutionary victory.
Peasant groups being organized by PRAM and the Commu-
nist-dominated labor federation reportedly are taking on the
character of a "popular militia" and already may control cer-
tain strategic points in the country. The three civilians on the
governing six- man junta and several cabinet members suspect-
ed of being Communist sympathizers have continued to fill gov-
ernment posts at all levels, particularly in the ministries of
labor and justice, with suspected Communists.
A concerted drive led by Mario Castrillo Zeledon, a sus-
pected Communist who is attorney general, to gain control over
the internal security functions of the government has resulted in
a growing awareness of the Communist threat by some military
members of the regime. The military is split by dissension,
however, and has given no recent indication that it is about to
unite to stem the Communist bid for power.
The junta reportedly has decided to hold congressional elec-
tions next May, to be followed by the election in the new Congress
of a provisional president to serve until a duly elected president
takes office in September 1962. This move may be intended to
mollify, the military and quiet the fears of the urban citizenry,
which along with other segments of the population is becoming
increasingly worried over gains being made by Communist and
Castro sympathizers. The Communists have already made con-
siderable progress in gaining control over the nation's electoral
machinery, however, and PRAM will probably soon be inscribed
as a political party and thus be able to compete in the May elec-
tions.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Detense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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