CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/11/09

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02977808
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: November 9, 1960

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9 November 1960
Copy No. C 75
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT KO
NO (At JOE RN CLASS. g
0 LitCLASSIFIED
CLASS. diaL2 TO: TS 6 0
PILXT fLVILW DATE: 2.0/0
ALiTH: RH 70.2
1 0 JUN 1980
DATE: REVIEWERI
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9 NOVEMBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet and Chinese parties reportedly
reached compromise on some aspects
of their dispute during Moscow meet-
ings in September and October, but re-
mained far apart on others--including
some central issues.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Jordanian forces end "emergency" alert
and withdraw more units from Syrian
frontier; both Jordan and UAR, however,
expected to continue subversive activity.
Situation in the Congo.
Saigon issues communique on previously
reported late October Communist attacks
in effort to focus attention on Hanoi's
stepped-up campaign against Diem re-
gime.
Laos--Former Premier Phoui Sanani-
kone now in Luang Prabang assessing
possibilities for reconciliation of divided
non-Communist elements.
0
�Sukarno moving Indonesia closer toward
his concept of "guided democracy" in
naming leaders for his People's Congress.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
9 November 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*USSR-China:LIfter long and bitter wrangling during
September and October in meetings preliminary to the
world Communist conclave to begin on 10 November in
Moscow, the Soviet and Chinese parties managed to ar-
rive at some compromise formulas on certain aspects of
their dispute but remained as far apart as ever on other
issues, including some of the central ones.
the Soviet party, represented by Suslov and Kozlov, traded
personal insults with the Chinese delegation, headed by
Teng Hsiao-ping, and both parties at times descended to
"puerile but heated" exchanges. Most of the parties rep-
resented supported the Soviet views, but Albania continu-
ally and the Asian satellites frequently sided with the Chi-
nese, At a banquet following the apparently inconclusive
meetings, Khrushchev and Teng Hsiao-ping quarreled
"violently" about the nature of Soviet leadership of the world
Communist movement
(Page 1)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Jordan-LIAR: Jordanian forces have been ordered to
end the "state of emergency" alert in which they were placed
after the assassination of Prime Minister Majalli last August,
and some units--in addi-
tion to the Guards Brigade already withdrawn--are being
pulled back from the Syrian border area. There has been no
evidence of a comparable step-down in the readiness posture
of Syrian forces near the frontier. The Jordanian action indi-
cates diminished concern in Amman over the imminence of a
large-scale military clash with the UAR, but terrorist and
propaganda activity by each side can be expected to continue.
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Republic of the Congo: The prospect for a full-
dress UN debate on the Congo has brought a reitera-
tion by Tshombe and Lumumba_91 their positions in
�the current political impasse. (In a 7 November mem-
orandum passed to the American consul, Tshombe ex-
pressed the hope that Congolese and Katangan leaders
would agree on a "new" formula for a political associa-
tion�presumably a confederation�which would be "in
conformity with the regional peculiarities" of the Congo
area: On the same day, Lumumba endorsed the UN role
In the Congo and applauded the criticism of Brussels and
the Mobutu government contained in the report of UN rep-
resentative Dayal.
In contrast with the political lull in Leopoldville, the
struggle in Orientale Province between pro- and anti-
Lumumba elements continues unabated.LCongo Army ele-
ments reportedly threatened on 4 November to march on
Stanleyville if pro-Mobutu officers were not released
from detention`O (Page 3)
South Vietnam: The South Vietnamese Government's
communique of 8 November charging an incursion into its
territory by three regular North Vietnamese battalions
from bases in Laos appears designed to dramatize its
struggle against local Communist dissidence. The
charges apparently refer to the previously reported at-
tacks between 21 and 26 October against outposts near the
Laotian border in the central highlands of South Vietnam.
These attacks reportedly were carried out by bands of lo-
cal tribesmen under Communist cadres who probably were
Infiltrated from North Vietnam, In implying that its charges
may be brought before the International Control Commission,
South Vietnam may hope to focus attention on North Vietnam's
increasing activity aimed at the overthrow of the Diem gov-
ernment.
0 g-
c
.) Laos: Tomer Premier Phoui Sananikone, who has just �L
ILh
returned to Laos after an absence of several months is now /--5---t-/
.xn Luang Prabang assessing the situation with an eye to 1---/
9 Nov 60
DAILY BRIEF Ii
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conciliation of divided non-Communist elements in
Laos. Presumably he will consult with Premier Sou-
vanna Phouma, who is at present on another fence-mend-
ing tour of the northern provinces. However, Phoui's
fall from power last January was attended by a great deal
of bitterness, the scars of which may limit his usefulness
as a mediator;j
(Page 4)
Indonesia: President Sukarno's choice of leaders for
his new 610-member People's Congress, which he plans
to convene on 10 November, advances his concept of "guid-
ed democracy" looking toward the amalgamation of all po-
litical elements, These leaders have been drawn from the
major parties and include the Communist party secretary
general as well as an army representative. The congress
is expected to be another rubber-stamp body. Sukarno and
the army will continue as the principal forces in the actual
governing of the country. (Page 6)
9 Nov 60
DAILY BRIEF *ill
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New
Moscow and Peiping Fail to Resolve Disagreements
an account of the
conference in Moscow during September and October of
bloc and nonbloc Communist parties which was called in
an effort to resolve Sino-Soviet differences prior to the
meeting of world Communist leaders that is to begin
on 10 November. According to this accou4t, the exchang-
es between the Soviet and Chinese representatives were
extremely bitter, and a number of issues were left un-
settlecti
fAs a basis for discussion, the Soviet party had pre-
pared a document setting forth issues in the Sino-Soviet
dispute. Some 100 pages of amendments to this document
reportedly were proposed during the conference:j
ahe principal Chinese spokesman, Teng Hsiao-ping,
"fiercely attacked" Soviet strategy for the world Commu-
nist movement. In particular, there was a "heated argu-
ment" about Soviet views on the noninevitability of war,
with the Chinese insisting that the bloc should be willing
to undertake and to support local wars. In the course of
this discussion, Teng reportedly reaffirmed the Chinese
position that Peiping should be given nuclear weapons and
rejected the idea that the Soviet Union should have a con-
trolling voice in the defenses of other bloc countries:3
EThe Chinese further attacked the USSR for having with-
drawn technicians from China. Moscow countered that the
technicians had been withdrawn because Peiping had tried to
indoctrinate them-4
[In the last of the discussions, Soviet spokesman Suslov
criticized the Chinese at considerable length, both on sub-
stantive issues and for their derisive attitude toward the
"right of a majority," i. e. those supporting the Soviet party.
Suslov argued that the decisions supported by the majority
should be made unanimougj
[The delegates attempted, with only limited success, to
work out the draft of a document that would presumably be the]
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Noe
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C6asis of the communique' to be released after the No-
vember meeting. China and the USSR are said to have
reached agreement on wording to cover, the issue of
disarmament and to have arrived at compromise for-
mulas on some other issues, such as the character of
the present epoch and the relative dangers of revision-
ism and dogmatism. On other central issues in the dis-
pute, however�especially questions related to war--
not even superficial agreement could be reached. The
Chinese delegation reportedly insisted that the only ab-
solute guarantee against war was the victory of socialismTi
Cburing the discussions, the Albanians were the only
outspoken supporters of the Chinese, although the repre-
sentatives of all the Asian parties�except the Indian and
possibly the Indonesian�supported Peiping at least in
part. At a banquet following the meetings, Khrushchev
and Teng Hsiao-ping quarreled "violently" about the nature
of Soviet leadership of the world Communist movemenei
(it is doubtful that there is yet an agreed draft resolu-
tion to be issued at the end of the Moscow conclave begin-
ning this week. Even if Moscow and Peiping do manage to
paper over the dispute, this report provides additional evi-
dence that serious disagreements will continues'
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The Situatioiti. the Congo
*ape
The likelihood of a full-dress UN debate on the
Congo has brought a reiteration by Tshombe and Lu-
mumba of their respective positions. On 7 November,
Lumumba endorsed the current UN role in the Congo
and applauded the criticism of Brussels and the Mobutu
government contained in the report of UN representative
Dayal.
{Also on 7 November, Tshombe. passed a memorandum
to the American Consulate in Elisabethville expressing hope
that Congolese and Katangan leaders would agree on a "new"
formula for political association�presumably a confedera-
tion--which would be "in conformity with the regional pecu-
liarities" of the Congo area. Tshombe has periodically in-
dicated he would accept some form of political association
with the Congo, provided it involved a sufficient degree of
provincial autonomq
In contrast with the political lull in Leopoldville, the
power struggle in Orientale Province between pro- and anti-
Lumumba elements continues unabated. CA recent shipment
of automobile parts from Czechoslovakia to Stanleyville was
reported to include arms for pro-Lumumba forces there.
Elements sympathetic to Lumumba, led by his leftist vice
premier, Antoine Gizenga, have maintained the initiative in
Orientale Province and have imprisoned or placed under, house
arrest numerous supporters of Colonel Mobutu.
however, the Congo Army garrison
at Watsa�in northeast Orientale Province--has threatened to
march on Stanleyville if imprisoned army officers there are
not re1eased:7
Elsewhere, there are indications that many Congolese are
sensitive to the need for a restoration of political stability. In
two areas of Kivu Province--one of them a Lumumba strong-
hold�minor officials and businessmen recently spoke to an
American official concerning the need for a restoration of
popular confidence and for the return of Belgian employers.
Several expressed apprehension concerning the effect of a re-
turn to power by Lumumba.
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The Situation' in Laos
(yormer Premier Phoui Sananikone, who has just returned
to Laos after an absence of several months, is in Lu ng
Prabang assessing the situation with an eye toward ttempting
to reconcile non-Communist elements in Laos. Phoui is a
conservative, old-guard politician who shared the leadership
of the probably now moribund Rally of the Lao People with
Souvanna Phouma. In the past he took a somewhat harder line
toward the Communist-dominated Pathet Lao than did Souvanna.
Phoui could conceivably serve as a bridge between the v rious
factions which have arisen since Captain Kong Le's August
coup, although his usefulness may be impaired by bitterness
stemming from the conflict with the King and General Phoumi's
Committee for Defense of National Interests which led to
Phoui's fall from power early last Januarya
tiPhoui will presumably consult in Luang Prabang with
Souvanna Phouma, who is on another fence-mending tour of
the northern provinces. Phoui has already concluded that
it is necessary to encourage opposition to the Pathet Lao and
Kong Le in Vientiane itself, rather than to rely solely on build-
ing up anti-Pathet forces in Luang Prabang and Sav nn khet.
Souvanna and his moderate supporters have for some time
been trying to pursue such a policy, but with only marginal
effect 3
an a statement to the National Assembly on 7 November--
just prior to his departure for the north--Souvanna is reliably
reported to have informed the deputies that nothing had been
achieved in the nearly four weeks of talks with the Pathet Lao.
He claimed the government had rejected Pathet demands for
inclusion in a coalition government, while the Pathet Lao had
stalled on the government's demand for a supervised cease-fire
between opposing forces in the field. A Pathet Lao negotiator
is said to have gone to Sam Neua to get a decision from Prince)
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LSouphannouvong on the question of a cease-fire. Quinim
Pholsena, Souvanna's extreme leftist minister of informa-
tion, is also in Sam Neua for talks with Souphannouvong:I.
CAt the same session, the assembly reportedly appointed
a delegation to enter into negotiations with General Phoumi's
Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee. The delegation re-
portedly will seek talks with Phoumi's representatives at
some neutral site, since it fears it will be arrested if it goes
to Savannakhet. The chances of success in this venture are
highly uncertain, although a settlement worked out by the
assembly might possibly be attractive to both Souvanna and
Phoumi as a face-saving means of reaching a settlement
without the necessity of a direct personal confrontation.
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Awe moir
"Guided Democracy" in Indonesia
President Suk,arno's appointment of leaders of the 610-
member People's Consultative Congress on 8 November com-
pletes the reorganization of the Indonesian legislature under
the reinvoked 1945 constitution. His choice of the congres-
sional leaders, drawn from the three major parties and the
army with a nonparty leftist as acting chairman, is continued
evidence that the president is still trying to integrate all po-
litical elements under "guided democracy."
The two-house legislature will be a rubber-stamp organiza-
tion, as evidenced by activities of the Council of Representatives.
The Communists control about 25 percent of the members of
both houses. The or nizational trappings of "guided democra-
cy" also include the Supreme Advisory Council,which is expected
to ensure political guidance, and the National Planning Board to
provide economic direction. Yet to be formed is the National
Front, a mass organization to function through a multilevel
structure ranging from a central board in Djakarta to village
organizations throughout the nation; as yet, only the central
board has been appointed.
Sukarno's stated ambition is to create an administration un-
hampered by political dissension which can direct all its energies
toward national fulfillment. He regards the various councils,
all of which include Communists, as an important step toward
his goal. In practice, the congress and councils are largely
facades behind which Sukarno, assisted by the cabinet and the
army, governs the country.
Although the army continues to obstruct the Communists in
a fairly effective manner, it has failed to influence Sukarno
against the Communist party or against the acceptance of large
amounts of bloc aid. he Indonesian cabinet is reported, as of
1 November, to have decided to proceed with a Soviet loan offer
of over $400,000,000 for naval equipment4
-SEGREW--
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'moue
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
.Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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