CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/10/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02977788
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: October 10, 1960

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10 October 1960
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
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INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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planning takeover from politicians.
10 'OCTOBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Cairo's claim that King Husayn's uncle
shot Syrian pilot adds to Jordanian-UAR
tension.
UAR continues its aid to Lumumba
; rumors in Ghana of
forthcoming Ghana-backed move to re-
store Lumumba.
Burma--Discontented senior army officers
0
Laos--Phoumi continues to rebuff Vien-
tiane's truce proposals; Souvanna Phouma
to begin talks with Pathet Lao on Tuesday.�
III. THE WEST
Berlin--West German Social Democratic
leaders pessimistic about Berlin situation
and possibilities for Western countermeas-
ures; some privately urge negotiating with
the USSR.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
� 10 October 1980
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
UAR-Jordan: Tensions between the UAR and Jordan
remain high, even though the situation along the Syrian-
Jordanian border has eased somewhat. The propaganda
battle between the two countries has again become intense,
with the UAR's Middle East News Agency now accusing
King Husaynts uncle of shooting to death a Syrian pilot whose
plane crash-landed in Jordanian territory on 28 September.
The LIAR is likely to sanction new subversive efforts aimed
at the overthrow of Husaynt regime, and Jordan may seek
Iraqi cooperation in attemits to further secessionist tend=
(Page 1)
encies in Syria.
6:;
z
Congo: the
UAR ambassador in Leopoldville, he is still in regular con-
tact with Lumumba, to whom he has transferred more funds
believed primarily for the purchase of parliamentary support.
On 6 October, Lumumba told the ambassador about the new
cabinet that he announced the following day, which included
anti-Lumumba leaders and was intended to put the "opposition
in a dilemma." Lumumba's maneuver failed when Mobutu ar-
rested 12 Lumumba followers�most of whom were named to
the new "cabinet"--immediately after it was announced.
Meanwhile, rumors are circulating in Ghana that attempts,
supported by Ghanaian troops, to restore Lumumba as pre-
mier will be made "in about a week." (Page 2)
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1.Burma: There are continued rumblings of discontent
with U Nutsladministration among senior officers in the
Burmese Army.
they are "waiting, planning, and will be ready"
o take over again when the government "makes a mistake."
hese officers, who probably represent the military fac-
ion which argued against the surrender of power in the fall
of 1959, feel that General Ne Win made a major error in
turning the country back to the politicians after the Febru-
ary elections. (Page 3)
e k--
Ljaaos: Renewed attempts by the Souvanna Phouma re-
gime To arrange
some form of truce with General Phoumi's -ri) i
Revolutionary Committee have been rebuffed. Souvanna Phou-
ma has announced tht his neaotiations with the Pathet Lao are
to begin 11 October. (Page 4)
III. THE WEST
Berlin: At a meeting of the Executive Council of the
Social Democratic Party (SPD) on 29 September, Mayor
Willy Brandt of West Berlin, the party's chancellor candi-
date in the 1961 national elections, indicated his pessimism
about the Berlin situation,
Brandt was
skeptical of the value of possible Western countermeasures,
but on the following day publicly supported denunciation of
the interzonal trade agreement. Deputy SPD chairman Weh-
ner agreed with Brandt that the Berlin situation would prob-
ably get worse and saw no possibility of hindering this from
the Western side. One SPD leader urged the party to revert
to a position of advocating negotiation with the USSR. Al-
though Brandt also favored negotiations, he warned against
saying anything publicly because Chancellor Adenauer would
use surh a statement to open a political attack on the SPD.
(Page 5)
10 Oct 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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Tensions Still High Between UAR and Jordan
The situation on the Jordanian-Syrian border has eased
somewhat. The Jordanian Royal Guards Brigade has been
moved from the frontier area back to Amman, and sabotage
in Syria by Jordanian infiltrators has decreased. The state
of alert of Syrian military and internal security forces re-
portedly has been reduced.
The propaganda battle between the two countries, however,
has again intensified. The UAR is making a martyr of a Syrian
pilot who crash-landed his MIG-17 south of Amman on 28 Sep-
tember. The Jordanians claim that he was a defector ready to
denounce the Nasir regime; an 4 October they announced that
he had committed suicide:. The UAR initially declared that he
was either murdered or driven to suicide by Jordanian torture.
On 8 October Cairo's Middle East News Agency went a step far-
ther by alleging that, when he refused to break under torture,
he was shot by Sharif Nasir, the uncle of King Husayn.
LSharif Nasir was reported to be one of the targets of the
UAR- supported assassination plot which. killed Jordanian Prime
Minister Majalli on 29 Augusta It appears likely that the UAR
now will sanction new assassination attempts against Jordanian
leaders, in further subversive efforts aimed at overthrowing
Husayn.
Jordan's recognition of the Qasim regime in Iraq has laid
the groundwork f9r possible cooperation between the two coun-
tries in subversive activities in Syria. Both have a strong in-
terest in encouraeine those elements in Syria eager to secede
from the UAR.
Cairo's belief
that the object of recognition was to isolate the Syrian region,
and it warns of possible attempts "to win friends for the Baghdad
Amman axis."
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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. The Situatio4wi the Congo
Cairo's
ambassador In Leopoldville continues to maintain regular con-
tact with Patrice Lumumba. On 6 October when the ambassador
turned over to Lumumba "three fifths of the amount sent," he
found Lumumba "more cheerful than on the previous occasion."
Lumumba apparently discussed with the ambassador his inten-
tion of announcing a new cabinet to include anti-Lumumba lead-
ers in order to place the "opposition in a dilemma."
) This maneuver was thwarted, however, by the
arrest of 12 Lumumba followers--most of whom were among
those named to the cabinet�immediately after the announce=
ment was made on 7 October.
Lumumba assured the UAR ambassador that he would im-
mediately both resume publication of his newspaper and dismiss
an Egyptian Jew who served as a press aide and had been useful
because of his linguistic ability. The ambassador assured Cairo
he would see that the dismissal was effected within two days.
Also on 6 October the UAR ambassador pressed UN repre-
sentative Dayal to strengthen the guard on Lumumb a and to
the salaries of the members of the Congolese parliament.
the ambassador had cited the danger
that members of parliament loyal to Lumumba might be bought
off because their salaries had been denied them. The ambassador
estimated on 6 October that the Congolese Army was more strongly
armed than UN forces, pointing out that it was equipped with ar-
mored cars, many bazookas, mortars, and light guns. He added
that "any soldier would be able, by himself, to gain complete con-
trol of the situation."
Meanwhile, rumors are circulating in Ghana that an attempt
with Ghanaian support will be made "in a week" to restore Lu-
mumba as premier. One such report claims that Ghanaian troops
in Kasai will be flown by IL-18s to take over Leopoldville. Although
admitting that the Leopoldville airport could be closed to such a
flight, the Belgian ambassador in Accra claimed that such a plan
could explain the disappearance of 40 Soviet technicians not seen
in Accra since4 October, CThe Soviet ambassador to the Congo is
reported to have returned to Accra, after consultations in Moscow,
with the full intention of returning to Leopoldville.
the USSR is supporting Ghana
completely in the move to restore Lumumbao
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Noe' Neff
Discontent Continues in Burmese Army
LISenior officers, apparently from among those who op-
posed General Ne Win's decision to return the government
to U Nu, continue to be dissatisfied with the way Burma is
being administered,
they are "unhappy," too, with General Ne Win and are
waiting, planning, and will be ready" to take over when the
government "makes a mistake." They appear to hope for MD-
ular support in case they take action.
"The Burmese people realize things are getting
ad and remember the good things the military government
did for them."__
With the exception of the boundary treaty with China, which
was almost entirely an army venture, the Nu government has
accomplished little in the six months in office, and administra-
tion has deteriorated markedly. Rangoon's leading newspaper
recently observed that, unless there is a marked improvement
in the government leadership, "Burma will have the distinction
of having one of the best prime ministers and one of the worst
administrations in the world." Discontent is not yet widespread,
however, and both Prime Minis
pear to retain their popularity.
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The Situation*upi Laos *of
Lyremier Souvanna Phouma has informed Ambassador Brown
that his most recent attempt to arrive at some kind of concord
with General Phoumi's Revolutionary Committee was rebuffed.
Souvanna said he had sent a note to Savannakhet asking that the
committee be dissolved on the basis of no reprisals. Phoumi had�
countered with the suggestion that both his committee and the
Souvanna cabinet resign, after which the King could name a new
government. Souvanna commented that PhoumPs reply put the two
camps back to 30 August, when the King appointed the present
government and Phoumi refused to participate.
Phoumi's determination to have nothing to do with the Souvanna
regime may be strengthened by reports of a Meo tribal uprising,
details of which are still fragmentary, in the Second Military
Region, which has jurisdiction over Sam Neua and Xieng Khouang
Provinces. This region was declared loyal to the Vientiane re-
gime by a regional subcommander on 28 September following
a revolt in the internal command structure which formerly had
supported Phoumi. It is possible that Meo tribesmen have been
armed by pro-Phoumi officers in the area in an attempt to redress
the situation, or at least to cause further difficulties for the
Vientiane regime.
Souvanna Phouma may be in for trouble from another quarter.
General Ouane, armed forces commander, and some of his sub-
ordinates in Vientiane are reported to be considering plans for
mounting a coup against the Souvanna government.
General Ouane stated on 9 October that he and
other officers would carry out a coup if Souvanna's negotiations
with the Pathet Lao, which now are scheduled to begin 11 Oc-
tober, do not "go well" for the royal government. Ouane has
information that the Pathet Lao will demand, among other things,
a reintegration of their civil functionaries and the regrouping of
their forces in specified areas. The reasons for Ouane's reported
change of attitude would appear to bring him considerably closer to
an alignment, at least in political objectives, with Phoumi.
Meanwhile, there are reports of a sizable attack by Pathet Lao
fora-es on a government post in Phong Saly Province of the First
Military Region. A significant upsurge of Communist military
activity there could be an additional persuasion for Ouane to take
some action. The loyalty of the regional military commander and
of his officers to the Vientiane regime has also been reported as
wavering.
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West Germatocialist Leaders Pessimistic biller Berlin
At a meeting of the Executive Council of the Social Dem-
ocratic party (SPD) on 29 September, Mayor Willy Brandt
of West Berlin, the party's chancellor candidate in the 1961
national elections indicated his pessimism about the Berlin
situation.
Brandt was skeptical of the value
of possible Western countermeasures. On the following day,
however, he publicly supported Bonn's denunciation of its trade
agreement with East Germany. Brandt also stated at the meet-
ing that he had persuaded leaders of several veterans' organ-
izations to abandon plans for a mid-October meeting in West
Berlin because such a gathering would make the situation
worse.
_SPD Deputy Chairman Herbert Wehner agreed with Brandt
that the Berlin situation would probably get worse and saw no
possibility of hindering this from the Western side. One SPD
leader urged a reversion to a position of advocating new nego-
tiations with the USSR. Although he specified no details, he
may be thinking along the lines of the party's 1959 "Germany
plan," which advocated the military neutralization of Germany.
Wehner, however, took the view that the SPD would be certain
to lose the 1961 elections if it should move away from its en-
dorsement of Germany's membership in NATO�which the SPD
indicated during the Bundestag foreign policy debate last June.
CAlthough Brandt, apparently with general support, also
favored negotiations, he cautioned against saying anything pub-
licly because Chancellor Adenauer would use such a statement
to accuse the SPD of "defeatism" and "softness on Communism"
charges which have hurt the party in the past. Brandt noted,
however, that the "big front of neutral countries" is forming in
the UN and that this group might exert enough pressure to place
the German problem within the framework of international con-
siderations again. For this reason, Brandt said he would con-
duct himself in such a way during the present crisis that the door
will always stand open for negotiations,
-SEeRET-
10 Oct 60
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�told -uvivr WEIN I 1241.1_, km0
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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