CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/03/25

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02992200
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: March 25, 1960

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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT N. 112_
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25 MARCH 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR--Comment on 23 March launch of
supersonic, aerodynamic vehicle.
Chou En-lai to visit Southeast Asian
countries after his talks with Nehru.
Peiping's aid agreement with Nepal re-
flects substantial Chinese effort to in-
crease influence there.
active supervision of Pathet Lao activ-
ities in Laos.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq--Security forces crack down on
Communist and anti-Communist demon-
strators.
Semiofficial Indonesian daily blasts Pei-
ping for its critical comment on Djakar-
ta's handling of Overseas Chinese.
South Vietnam's claim to disputed islands
puts new strain on its relations with
Cambodia.
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III. THE WEST
0 Cuba planning early purchase of aircraft
from LIAR.
0Adenauer's position on Common Market
may intensify anti-German feeling in
Britain.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
25 March 1960
DAILY BRIEF
�
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: On 23 March a supersonic, aerodynamic vehicle
was launched from the Vladimirovka - Lake Balkhash Test
Range, apparently intended to reach the Kamchatka Penin-
sula. Available evidence does not indicate whether the ve-
hicle reached the Kamchatka area;
. This was the third operation involving a
transcontinental flight of this type of vehicle. One of the pre,
vious flights may have reached the intended target area; the
other apparently terminated southeast of Tiksi.
(Pagel)
Communist China: Peiping has expanded Chou En-lai's
trip to India in April into a swing through Southeast Asia,
probably in an effort to restore Peiping's prestige and dem-
onstrate its new "reasonableness."
Chou and Foreign Minister Chen Yi will
visit Cambodia in early May and will stop in Hanoi for talks
with T-Trt OH Minh affrar stops in Burma, India, and Nepal.
(Page 2)
*Communist China - Nepal: The text of the Sino-Nepalese
economic aid agreement signed in Peiping on 21 March and re-
leased to the press on 25 March indicates a substantial effort
to expand Chinese influence in the Himalayan kingdom. The
Chinese have granted Nepal $21,000,000 in additional aid; will
send technicians to help implement the program; and will open
an embassy in Katmandu. The Chinese also signed an agree-
ment accepting Nepal's request that the "traditional" boundary
be used as a basis for final border demarcation. The 'establish-
ment of a joint boundary commission undoubtedly will be cited
as a precedent by Chou En-lai in his April border talks with
Nehru. (Page 3)
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North Vietnam - Laos:
a North Vietnamese "agents corn
for Laos was reactivated at least as early as January 1960
forthcoming Laotian elections and with
party organization.
contain guidance from a "higher
I echelon," instructions to create "new bases" as a counter to
Laotian Army security sweeps, and arrangements for the dispo-
sition of "cadres responsible for training troops during the corn-
ing year." (Page 4)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq: Violent incidents between Communists and anti-Com-
munists in several parts of Iraq have increased internal tension
during the past week. Iraqi security forces, apparently fearful
of larger disturbances, have cracked down on demonstrators.
(Page 5)
Indonesia - Communist China: In a revival of the bitter ex-
changes between Djakarta and Peiping last fall over the Chinese
in Indonesia, a Djakarta daily which frequently reflects govern-
ment policy has vehemently attacked Peiping radio for criticiz-
ing Indonesia's handling of Overseas Chinese repatriates. The
paper labeled recent Peiping radio attacks "an open insult" and
"a big lie." Djakarta apparently is using this means to answer
the 15 March letter from the Chinese foreign minister which ac-
cused the Indonesians of persecuting Overseas Chinese and ob-
structing their repatriation. (Page 6)
11
Cambodia - South Vietnam: The recent trend toward im- frA
proved relations between Phnom Penh and Saigon appears to //z.,.
/ have received a setback as the result of a formal Vietnamese
-,z
,-7., i demand on 9 March that Cambodia renounce its sovereignty over
several disputed islands in the Gulf of Siam. Prime Minister
, V

zv Sihanouk denounced the Vietnamese claim and declared that his
4
/ country would defend itself against invasion and would "not lack A
friends whose higher interest is to help us." KA
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III. THE WEST
Cuba-UAR: Cuba is planning the early purchase of air-
craft from the UAR, which has offered as many as 23 obso-
lescent British-made jet fighters and numerous lighter planes.
a Cuban army captain will leave Cuba for Cairo
on 25 March, authorized to buy the planes and to continue earlier
discussions on the training of Cuban pilots in Egypt.
(Page 8)
Britain-Germany: .::lifferences between Britain and the
Common Market (EEC) countries over European economic co-
operation may add to anti-German feelings in Britain. Chan-
cellor Adenauer's endorsement of the EEC Commission's rec-
ommendations for accelerating completion of the six-nation
economic integration has dimmed British hopes for closer co-
ordination between the EEC and the British-backed "Outer,
Seven" free trade area. The United States is blamed in part
for Adenauer's mov.g (Page 9)
IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Communist influenre in Culls WM: 15-60. 22 Mar 1960.
Outlook in West Germany. NIE 23-60. 22 Mar 1960.
Soviet Attitude and Tactics on the Berlin Problem. SNIE
100-5-60. 22 Mar 1960.
25 Mar 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Third Transcontinental Flight of Soviet Aerodynamic Vehicle
On 23 March .a supersonic aerodynamic vehicle was
launched from the Vladimirovka - Lake Balkhash Test Range,
with the Kamchatka Peninsula as its apparent destination. An
attempt to launch this vehicle, probably that which the Rus-
sians call Object 350, was noted on 18 March, but adverse
weather conditions and possible launching difficulties caused
rescheduling of the operation. Available evidence does not in-
dicate an impactpoint, but the vehicle could have reached Kam-
chatka.
racking positions
and times similar to those noted in transcontinental operations
the latest available
located it about 300 nautical miles
southeast of Tiksi.
a test
program for a vehicle identified as Object 350 have indicated
that it is a cruise-type vehicle which, at least at present, is
pilotless. It is believed to be rocket boosted and to have a
chemical ram-jet engine producing a cruising speed on the or-
der of Mach 3, an altitude capability of at least 65,000 feet,
and a range of more than 3,000 nautical miles.
Object 350 might be a surface-launched, supersonic, cruise-
type weapon or reconnaissance system.
25 Mar 60
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TJECNLI
Premier Chou En-lai to Tour Southeast Asia
The Chinese Communists have expanded Chou En-lai's
mid-April visit to India into a swing through Southeast Asia,
probably in a major effort to recover prestige lost in 1959
through the suppression of the Tibetan revolt and the armed
border clashes with India.
Chou and Foreign Minister Chen Yi, after
stops in Burma, India,and Nepal, will visit Cambodia in early
May and then proceed to Hanoi for talks with Ho Chi Minh.
Chou will attempt to confirm Peiping's new "reasonable-
ness," as demonstrated in its recent boundary agreement
with Burma and Nepal. Chinese Communist propaganda to
the area has increasingly stressed the "Bandung spirit" and
China's "need" for a peaceful environment in order to build
its economy.
Since Chou's swing through the area in late 1956, no top-
level Chinese delegation has toured Southeast Asia. Peiping
may feel the need to follow up the recent series of high-level
Soviet visits. The Soviet delegations gave Peiping virtually
no support for its recent pose of "reasonableness" and main-
tained a neutral attitude toward Chinese disputes with India
and Indonesia.
In Hanoi, Chou and Foreign Minister Chen Yi undoubted-
ly will discuss with Ho Chi Minh the situation in Laos, particu-
larly the effort by the Neo Lao Hak Sat to function as a legal
political party.
25 Mar 60
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Sino-NepaleF.- CLILU. A7M.J.1. LICA .n.5A ziar 1-0
Ana,�
The text of the Sino-Nepalese economic aid agreement
signed by the prime ministers of the two countries in Peiping
on 21 March and released to the press on 25 March indicates
a substantial effort to expand Chinese influence in the Hima-
layan border kingdom. Peiping will give Katmandu an addi-
tional $21,000,000 in economic aid during the next three years,
bringing total Chinese grant aid since 1956 to $33,600,000.
Chinese Communist "experts and technicians" will be sent to
Nepal to help implement the aid program, and Nepalese will
receive technical training in China, Peiping, which for at
least a year has been seeking permission to open an embassy
in Katmandu, now has Prime Minister Koiraia's agreement,
The Nepalese will establish an embassy in Peiping.
Katmandu probably gave its approval for a resident em-
bassy and the entry of Chinese construction technicians in
return for the increased financial aid. Nepalese officials have
been wary of any influx of bloc experts, however, and probably
will limit the admission of Chinese technicians to the minimum
necessary to carry out the projects involved.
The Chinese Communists also signed an agreement on 21
March accepting Nepal's request that the "traditional" boundary
be used as a basis for final border demarcation. A joint boun-
dary commission will set out boundary markers and work out
exact border alignment in those areas where boundary lines
shown on Chinese and Nepalese maps do not coincide. In those
areas, "actual jurisdiction" over the ground will determine
which side gets the territory or, if there is disagreement as to
who currently has jurisdiction, the matter will be settled on
"the principles of mutual benefit and friendship." These clauses
leave Peiping room to prolong final demarcation, yet acknowledge
the Chinese position that jurisdiction is a significant factor in de-
termining ownership. The Chinese have repeatedly advanced this
contention to the Indians, and when Chou visits Nehru for border
talks in April he undoubtedly will cite the border commission and
jurisdiction aspects of the agreement with Nepal as a suitable
precedent for future agreement with India.
Koirala's main objective had been to secure Peiping's recog-
nition of the customary boundary following the Himayalan watershed
in order to forestall any border incidents and possible entanglement
in the Sino-Indian dispute. He probably feels that the border and
aid agreements consolidate Nepal's neutral position and balance
its relations with the major powers in such a way as to gain max-
imum benefit from each.
25 Mar 60
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TC3EVRET
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North Vietnamese Supervision of Pathet Lao
1.1anoi's agents committee in Laos has been reactivated
since at least 1 January 1960. This body supervised the opera-
tions of the Pathet Lao before the latter agreed to integrate its
forces with the Royal Government in late 1957, following which
the majority of the Vietnamese cadre withdrew from Laos.
Hanoi may be trying to exert greater direct control over
the Pathet Lao as a substitute for the guidance formerly, given
by Prince Souphannouvong and other Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS)
leaders who are now in iail.
the forthcoming Laotian elec-
tion and with NLHS party organization and activities.
)rovided
guidance on the political line to be taken in connection with
the Laotian government crisis.
exhorted "all
units" to "create new bases" to counter "Laotian Army se-
curity sweeps" and to "direct the people in the struggle in
order to compel Phoui to give effect to the agreement signed."
Phoui was premier at the time. The agreements referred
to are presumably the 1954 Geneva agreements and the 1957
Pathet Lao - Royal Laotian Government integration agreement.
a number
of "cadres who will be responsible for training the troops
during the coming year."
TOP RET
25 Mar 60
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1 I
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Internal Disturbances Increase Tension in Iraq
The tense situation in Iraq appears to have grown out of
the Communist-inspired strikes and threats of a general
strike last week, as well as arrests of strike leaders by the
Qasim regime. Scattered clashes between Communists and
anti-Communists occurred subsequently throughout the coun-
try.
Security forces have cracked down heavily on disturb-
ances in Baghdad and Basra.
In clashes in Baghdad in which several participants were
killed, troops are reported to have fired on demonstrators
for the first time since the 1958 revolution. A violent clash
in Basra on 19 March resulted in 15 injured and up to 75 ar-
rests, according to the American Consulate there. The con-
sulate reports that the Basra port union has threatened to
strike if its leaders are not released. Incidents have occurred
in southern Iraq and in the north along the Turkish border,
but rumors of troubles in Mosul have not been substantiated
As a result of pressures by anti-Communist regime ele-
ments, the Communists may fear they will soon face out-
right suppression.
25 Mar 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE RIKIFTIN Page 5
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CONF. "i"IAL
Indonesia Threatens Further Obstruction of Overseas
Chinese Repatriation
In an apparent revival of bitter Sino-Indonesian exchanges,
a Djakarta daily�Suluh Indonesia, which frequently reflects
government policy--on 24 March vehetnently attacked Radio
Peiping for alleging that Djakarta obstructs the repatriation
of Overseas Chinese and that Indonesian Foreign Minister
Subandrio does not keep his promises. The paper charged
that Peiping radio propaganda was "an open insult," "a big
lie," and was "aimed at undermining Indonesia's prestige a-
broad." The daily concluded that "such base propaganda"
may cause "unnecessary delays and obstructions that could
have been avoided."
Peiping's news agency has noted the "seemingly official
tone" of the Suluh Indonesia editorial. The Indonesian Gov-
ernment apparently, is using this means to answer the letter
of 15 March to Subandrio from the Chinese foreign minister
accusing the Indonesians of persecuting Overseas Chinese
and demanding a speedy agreement on repatriation. Radio
Peiping, which carried the letter and which has continued
to conduct a querulous campaign on Indonesia's "uncoopera-
tive" attitude, also broadcast a People's Daily editorial of
18 March which charged that the "wanton persecution" of
Chinese in Indonesia had reached "ferocious proportions."
Paralleling Suluh Indonesia's blast, however, the army
commander in Centrallava�where most of the action to re-
settle Chinese is now taking place--ordered provincial offi-
cials to implement orders pertaining to the Chinese "expedi-
tiously and in an orderly way." He appealed to the Chinese
not to exaggerate their problems, as any excesses could
create tension between Indonesia and friendly countries.
25 Mar 60 CENTRAI IKITFI I IMPKIFF RI III FTIKI Page 6
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LL�erni-111,
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Cambodian - South Vietnamese Relations Strained by
Territorial Claims
The recent trend toward improved relations between
Cambodia and South Vietnam threatens to be reversed by
Saigon's renewed claim to several small offshore islands in
the Gulf of Siam presently under Cambodian control. Phnom
Penh, has reacted strongly to a note of 9 March demanding
that Cambodia renounce its rights of sovereignty over lie de
la Baie, Ile du Milieu, Ile a l'Eau, Ile du Pic, and the Iles
des Pirates, all lying in an arc between the Cambodian - South
Vietnamese shoreline and the large island of Phu Quoc, which
is under Vietnamese control. Disputes between the two coun-
tries over ownership of these islands, which were arbitrarily
attached to Cambodia for administrative purposes under
French colonial rule in 1939, have flared intermittently in
recent years.
Cambodian Foreign Minister Son Sann, denying South
Vietnam's right even to Phu Quoc, has stigmatized Saigon's
note as "revealing the annexationist aims of Vietnam"; Prime
Minister Sihanouk has called it another example of the "good
will" illustrated in Thai occupation of a disputed border monas-
tery and the Vietnamese "invasion" of Stung Treng Province
in 1958.
Cambodia has maintained small garrisons on these islands
since 1958, and Sihanouk has announcd Cambodia will fight if
necessary to retain them. In a recent speech he clearly im-
plied he would turn to Peiping for assistance if hard pressed.
French diplomats close to Sihanouk are impressed by his
"calm but determined" attitude and fear that South Vietnam's
action will lead him to make some further move toward the
Communist bloc.
The furor over the Vietnamese note, allegedly intended
only to reiterate Vietnamese claims "for the record" before the
Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva, may prevent or make
useless the impending visit to Phnom Penh by a South Viet-
namese ministerial delegation headed by Vice President Tho
for the purpose of ironing out long-standing problems be-
tween the two countries.
CONFI
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III. THE WEST
Cuba to Buy Military Aircraft From UAR
Cuba has evidently decided to purchase from the UAR
at least some of the military planes Castro so insistently
seeks.
Captain Victor Pina Cardoso
would arrive in Cairo before the end of March with author-
ization to buy "the planes: Pina Cardoso, who makes
frequent arms-purchasing trips for Castro, will also dis-
cuss pilot training for 30 to 50 Cubans whom Nasir's govern-
ment has said it would accept in September.
Cairo
had available for sale to Cuba some 23 obsolescent
British-made jet fighters, numerous trainers, and ammu-
nition for all the planes. issue
an invitation from the commander of the UAR Air Force to
a responsible Cuban official to visit Cairo for discussion of
the sale.
the Cuban Embassy in
Cairo will not be notified of the mission and Pina will directly
contact the UAR Air Force commander. This confirms other
Indications that Che Guevara, who evidently directs Castro's
very substantial arms-purchasing program, does not want too
many other Cuban officials to discover the extent of the pur-
chases.
The aircraft are not mentioned in
a long-term commercial agreement discussed with Castro offi-
cials by UAR Deputy Foreign Minister Sabri during his visit to
Cuba from 9 to 16 March. Thus they may have to be paid for in
foreign exchange funds, of which the Castro government is still
critically short despite its success in selling the year's sugar
crop.
25 Mar 60 CFNTRAI INTFI I IMPKIrF RI III FTIKI
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Difficulties in Anglo-German Relations
Differences between Britain and the Common Market
(EECJ countries over European economic cooperation may
provide anew irritant to Anglo-German relations. Chancel-
lor Adenauer's endorsement on 15 March of accelerating the
completion of EEC integration has dimmed British hopes for
greater coordination between the British-backed European
Free Trade Association, or Outer Seven, and the EEC.]
khere had been doubt whether Bonn would approve the
EEC Commission's recommendations of 3 March for lower-
ing members' internal and external tariffs more rapidly and
for taking the first step toward the common external tariff
on 1 July 1960, rather than on 1 January 1962 as scheduled.
The latter move would raise duties in the Benelux countries
and perhaps in West Germany--areas which account for two
thirds of Britain's EEC trade. Under the acceleration pro-
posals, Bonn would also have to restore the 25-percent re-
duction of customs duties it made in 1957. The British had
hoped that before these moves took place, the impact of the
discrimination could be reduced by arrangements between
the two groupings, and they had pinned their hopes on Eco-
nomics Minister Erhard and other influential 'West Germans
who oppose the acceleration. Adenauer's endorsement is
blamed partly on the United State0,
An lo-German relations could be further harmed if the
British Government sponsors access by members of Parlia-
ment to the American-operated Berlin Document Center's
records on Nazi party and affiliated organizations. Although
the British Foreign Office is aware of the dangers of indis-
criminate use of material on former Nazis now prominent
In the Federal Republic, one official believes that Foreign
Secretary Lloyd's inclination to avoid parliamentary attacks
for "shielding Nazis" might cause him to give in)
CONFi IAL
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Nue '1011"
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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