CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/08/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03172663
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: August 22, 1960

CENTRAL
INTEWGENCE
BU
LLET1N
DICUMENT ND.
141 OUNCE IN CLASS, yr
Li DECIASSNr,r0
CUSS. CHAkilfi TD: TS S_..4
NEXT REVION .010101V.
NC 76 7
OATE9 JUN 19811 REVIEWER:
TOP-SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663
ZFEAN� itC I e 5
N*0.-
p 3.5(c) /
3.3(h)(2)
22 August 1960
Copy No. C 70
1010%03/1S 60-31716637
irt rya e� aRix.m.vr�
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663
�'.001
TO P_SrFeR-Irr
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663
---Tthl""Ste.t-E4L
Now'
22 AUGUST 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet recovery of space capsule.
USSR asks Nepal to propose admission of
Communist China to UN.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Mali Federation--Senegalese secession
may bring violence.
Laos--Souvanna Phouma and General
Phoumi continue to seek negotiations
while Phoumi moves troops toward Vien-
tiane.
North Vietnam increases number of il-
licit radio stations in South Vietnam.
The Congo situation.
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663
TE -
\ \\
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663
_TOP-SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
22 August 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. mg COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: Preliminary evaluation of all source data tends to
support Soviet statements of 20 August regarding recovery of
the capsule contained in Sputnik V. The capsule, which was
moving across the USSR from southwest to northeast, was re-
covered at about 0530 hours EDT, 19 August, at a point (ap.
proximately 510 13'N-610 47'E) about 220 nautical miles due
nnyth nf tha TZ.0"11�"" v..r 650-nautica1 mile impact area.
.1 (Map)
Communist China-UN: The USSR has asked Nepal to re-
quest inscription of an item on the UN General Assembly agenda
for the admission of Communist China,
At
a reportea meeting of Sin� -Soviet bloc foreign ministry officials
In early August, the Chinese Communists expressed hope that
India would raise the issue as in the past, but it was agreed that
a bloc country would do so if necessary. The Indian Government
apparently does not intend to initiate action this year, although it
would support the move. Katmandu also favors Communist Chi-
na's admission but, like New Delhi, may be reluctant to take the
lead while its border problems with the Chinese remain at issue.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Mali Federation: Senegalese authorities appear to be exer-
cising complete control in Dakar, following their proclamation
of secession from the Mali Federation of Senegal and Soudan on
20 August. ("Trouble may break out, however, in rural areas of
Senegal where there are Soudanese residents. The attitude in the
Soudanese capital of Bamako is reported bitter, and a strong
CRET
"Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663 =
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663
*mitime
Astrakhan
60 70 -7,-111
Mat Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range.
�
Kustanay
Point of
Recovery
Aktyubinsk.
22 AUGUST 1960
USSR
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663
%.;
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663_
LOP--SEeRET
reaction may be forthcoming from the repatriation of Soudanese
Officials of the Mali Government including Modibo Keita, the
president of the Mali Council of Ministers and Soudanese premier.
Senegal's action, which follows a lengthy period of tension with
Soudan, was greatly influenced by the secret visit to Guinea of the
Soudanese interior minister in early August,
He is said to have committed Mali to
join the Guinea-Ghana union, and he may also have reached agree-
ment on a union of Soudan and Guinea in the event of a breakup in
the federation.; French officials are striving to maintain a public
position of neutrality in this issue concerning a French Community
republic. De Gaulle has proposed talks in Paris, and the
Sene le e premier has announced his acceptance.
(Page 1) (Map)
*Laos: Souvanna Phouma apparently is moving to meet at
least some of General Phoutni's preconditions for negotiations.
He has reinstituted General Ouane as armed forces commander
and has placed him in charge of security in Vientiane, with
Captain Kong Le serving as Ouane's "temporary deputy." Ouane's
freedom of action under such an arrangement is questionable.
There also are reports that Kong Le's paratroopers are with-
drawing from the city and are being replaced by civil and military
police and possibly regular army elements as well. Souvanna
claims that either he or Ouane will meet Phoumi in Savannakhet
as soon as the "arrangements' now in process in Vientiane are
completed. Meanwhile, Phoumi continues to apply pressure on
the Vientiane regime by moving up his troops, although the lo-
cation of his units is the subject of conflicting reports. He may
interpret Souvanna's conciliatory gestures as a sign of weakness
and hence raise his price for a settlement.
(Page 3)
South Vietnam:
Hanoi has increabea tne number oi its mica radio stations
in South Vietnam from six to 17 since late 1959, presumably
for tighter control and coordination of clandestine activity and
intelligence collection. Almost all of the new stations are located
in the southern portion of South Vietnam, where Communist
guerrilla activity has intensified ereativ since Jate last year
22 Aug 60
DAILY BRIE
T T
lApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO3172663\
()/(<
0,
';�,'Ms'..\ \;\ ,
is,.;, ' ',�� `,", � \ , � ' \ \ \ \ ,� r .,
%,-
',.,W
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663'
H
-
44avr T RET
� *Congo (Information as of 0300, 22 August 1960): The UN
Security Council adjourned early on 22 August without taking f_
formal action on Lumumbais appeals for the withdrawal of ,&-
non-African troops and for UN assistance in re-establishing
central authority in Katanga. The expected rejection of ip gi LA
Lumumba's appeals�which were supported by the USSR--
will probably increase the tension between the Congolese
Government and the UN. Lumumba, who has continued his
bitter criticism of Hammarskjold, may demand the comolete
withdrawal of UN forces from the Congo.
Recent public statements indicate that many
African leaders are increasingly concerned over Lumumbes
continued criticism of the UN. With the exception of Guinea
and possibly Ghana, all African states appear to be solidly
behind Hammarskjold. Ghanaian President Nkrumah seems
to be under conflicting pressures, with his delegation to the
UN favoring cooperation with Hammarskjokk and his representa-
tives in the Congo pressing for a position supporting Lumumba.
1 (Page 5)
22 Aug 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
CRET
lApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663 ,
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663
SECRET
Mali Situation
Senegalese authorities appear to be in complete control of
Mali's capital city of Dakar--which is also Senegal's capital--
following the announcement on 20 August that Senegal had seceded
from the Mali Federation. They have had the Soudanese officials
of the Mali Government�including Modibo Keita, who is presi-
dent of the Mali Council of Ministers and Soudanese premier--
under house arrest but have now expatriated them by train to the
Soudanese capital of Bamako. Soudanese officials are bitter
about Senegal's actions, but any countermeasures will probably
be delayed until after Soudan's leaders arrive in Bamako late
today.
:Trouble may break out in some rural areas of Senegal where
there are Soudanese residents, but in view of the reported unity
among top Senegalese leaders, local authorities should be able to
contain any disturbances. The Soudanese leaders, realizing that
Senegal might secede, reportedly alerted Soudanese residents out-
side Dakar and contacted opponents of Senegal's leadership for pos-
sible political action in St Louis, Thies, and Diourbel. Appar-
ently the Soudanese had expected to use Mali troops and security
forces to prevent secession,. but 600 of Mali's best troops are in
the Congo with the UN force, and the French command of the 7,000
Community troops in the Dakar area would hesitate to intervene in
an internal Mali problem.
(Although a crisis has been developing between Senegal and Sou-
dan over allocation of top administrative posts--Soudan has gone back
on a promise to support Senegalese leader Leopold Senghor in�his bid
for Mali President on 27 August-- the immediate reason for seces-
sion was the r7 ri repent visit of Snainn or ARP Interim mi7ister Madeira
Keita to Guinea He reportedly
committed the federation to join the Guinea-Ghana union; he may
have reached agreement with Conakry for a union between Soudan
and Guinea in the event of the federation's breakup. After learning
of the visit, the Senegalese apparently decided to delay secession
in the hope of reaching a last-minute compromise, but Modibo
Keita's declaration on 19 August of a state of emergency and his
22 Aug 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663
=we'
SP NISI-
AHAR
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
�
00821
St. 1..ouis
Thies
Dakar
GAMBI
PORTUG
GUINE GUINEA
MAURITANIA
'Diour el
(SEtNIEGAI:
FED
RATION OF MA
Bamako
Conakry
SIERRA
LEONE
22 AUGUST 1960
UNCLASSIFIED
31319
LI
IVORY
COAST
ALGERIA
(SOUDAN)
UPPER
VOLTA
GHANA
DAH
NIGER
MEY
BR. CAM.
NIGERIA
TOGO
Accra
Gulf of Guinea
RIO
EROUN
GABON
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663
Lorder to the Mali chief of staff to alert his troops convinced
Senegal's leaders that Keita was planning a coup.
French officials are striving to maintain a public position
of neutrality. In response to appeals by both Senegalese and
Soudanese leaders, De Gaulle, as president of the French Com-
munity, stated that France would not take sides, since the crisis
was an internal Mali affair. He suggested that the leaders should
come to Paris to discuss with him a rapprochement between the
two states or their intended relations with France and the Commu-
nity. There are extensive agreements between France and Mali
covering cooperation in defense, finance, and foreign affairs.
Senegalese Premier Mamadou Dia has indicated his desire to at-
tend; Soudanese officials have not been in a nosition to renlv.
SECRET
22 Aug 60 A Fov�eClio. r 'F0-2.'026-371 3-a 'Tie 63
Page 2
Approved for Release-7503070M C03172663
Situation in Laos:
:From their respective headquarters at Vientiane and
Savinnakhet, Souvanna Phouma and General Phoumi continue
to seek a basis for negotiations. After, rejecting Souvanna's
first delegation on 19 August as not having proper authority,
Phoumi sent a message insisting that Souvanna dispatch a
competent emissary to Savannakhet, that Captain Kong Le
return to his pre-coup duties, that the second parachute
�battalion withdraw to its base about ten miles from Vientiane,
and that General Ouane ensure the security of the capital.
Souvanna is meeting
at least part of Phoumits demands. General Ouane has been
reinstituted as armed forces commander and is now ostensibly
in charge of the security of Vientiane, with Kong Le serving
as "temporary deputy"--an arrangement which casts doubt
on Ouane's freedom of action. Kong Levs paratroopers,who
had been maintaining security in Vientiane, now appear to be
withdrawing--although it is not clear to where--and are being
replaced by civil and military police and possibly also by
regular army. troops.
Souvanna informed Ambassador Brown on 21 August that
the situation was in the hands of the military and that the
"issues were being resolved." He added that either he or Ouane
will meet Phoumi in Savannakhet after the arrangements in
process--presumably the transfer of control of Vientiane from
the paratroopers to other elements--are completed. Souvanna
said he believed these arrangements would soon be complete.
Souvanna, who has tended to be overly optimistic in the past,
may well be so in this case also, particularly in his apparent
confidence that Kong Le will quietly take a back seat to Ouane.
Souvanna has harbored Prince Souphannaouvong in his home
SECRET
22 Aug 60
r*CkITED A I IkITCI I 1/^01..lar'L DI II I Ellkl
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663
Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/07/7 C03172663
*my
441111,"
(since 11 August. This report is unconfirmed and may be
tendentious. Souphannouvong,. Souvanna's half-brother and
the titular leader of the pro-Communist Neo Lao Hak Sat,
escaped from jail in Vientiane in late Stine.
Phoumi, meanwhile, continues to maintain pressure on his
opponents in Vientiane through psychological warfare methods
and by moving his troops toward Vientiane. The exact location
of the units involved is the subject of contradictory reports;
there are indications that certain units have not advanced as
far as previously reported. In any event, it will be at least
several days before the bulk of Phoumi's forces could be in
position around the capital. While he would probably prefer
a bloodless solution to the crisis, Phoumi may interpret
Souvanna's conciliatory gestures as a sign of weakness and thus
be emboldened to raise his price for a settlement�possibly
even asking for a return to the status quo ante the Kong Le
coup. Any such demand would probably end all prospects for
a negotiated settlement.
22 Aug Aug 60 r`CkITII Al Ikrrel I lif�Ckle�C DI lit CTII,L1 page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663
The Congo fApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 C031726692 August)
1TOF-SECRET
Nor
The UN Security Coundil adjourned early on 22 August with-
out taking formal action on Lumumba's appeals for the withdrawal
of non-African troops and for UN assistance in re-establishing
central authority in Katanga. Although the Soviet delegate de-
nounced the use of "NATO forces in the Congo" and bitterly
criticized Hammarskjold, the Secretary General was supported
by Italy, Argentina, Ceylon, Ecuador, and Tunisia, the only
African country represented on the Security Council. The
expected rejection of Lumumba's appeals will probably increase,
tension between the Congolese Government and the UN; Lumumba,
who has continued his criticism of Hammarskjold, may demand
the complete withdrawal of UN forces from the Congo.
Public statements made prior to the Security
Council session indicate that many African leaders are in-
creasingly concerned over Lumumba's continued criticism
of the UN.
the UN is the only agency which can keep the Congo
crisis from spreading. _Tunisia is supporting Hammarskjold's
interpretation of the UN mission in the Congo, and most African
delegations reportedly are irritated at Lumumba's attacks on
him. This concern may lead to considerable criticism of the
Congolese Government at the forthcoming conference of inde-
pendent African states, whose foreign ministers are scheduled
to convene in Leopoldville on 25 August.
African support for Lumumba now appears to be concen-
trated in Guinea, which has repeatedly criticized the UN, and
among some influential leaders in Ghana. Ghanaian President
Nkrumah seems to be under conflicting pressures, with his
delegationAo the UN favoring cooperation with Hammarskjold
4and his representatives in the Congo pressing for a position in
support of Lumumba,1 Nkrumah, whose prestige in Africa makes
him a key figure in the dispute, has not committed himself, He
apparently hopes to assume the role of mediator, either between
the UN and Lumumba or between the Congolese Government and
Katanga.
TOP SECRET
22 Aug 60 rCkITD A I IkITCI I irtnorc Dliii CTIkl
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663
Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663
-*or'
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663
TOP 5ECRT
I
;#.
TOP SECRET
/ZIZZZIZZZA rieZ, Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03172663WMZ 1ZZ, OW/Z/7 f