CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/12/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02993703
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: December 21, 1960

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21 December 1960
Copy No. C 75
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO, 419
NO MANGE IN CLASS.
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANCED TO: TS .AS 0
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2,010_
AUTH: HR 704
o JUN 1980
D REVIEWER!
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21 DECEMBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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USSR--Budget shows continued increases.
0
Albania -Bloc - -East Germany attacks
Albanian "sectarianism" at Moscow con-
ference.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Algeria--FLN reported determined to
refuse dealings with any post-referendum
administration.
Ceylon--Discontent with Bandaranaike
regime growing; coup plotting reported.
Laos--Airlift to Pathet Lao continues.
III. THE WEST
e
Ecuador -Czechoslovakia--Ecuadxchange cacao for small arms.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
21 December 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: A brief TASS summary of the 1961 Soviet budget
announced today indicates that planned revenues and expend-
itures will continue to increase. The defense category in the
budget, "expenditures for maintenance of the armed services,"
shows a 3.6-percent decrease from 1960; however, expend-
itures for items such as research and development and atomic
weapons are concealed in other budget categories. Appropria-
tions for science will increase by 15.6 percent. Gosplan Chief
V. N. Novikov, reporting on the economic plan, implied that
gross industrial production for 1960 will show a 10-percent in-
crease over 1959, and the summary for 1961 anticipates a fur-
ther increase of 8. 8 percent--still slightly above the average
annual increase needed to meet the goal set by the Seven-Year
Plan. According to a press summary, Novikov admitted this
year's poor grain harvest but claimed that grain production would
still exceed the 1959 level. (Page 1)
Albania-Bloc: In a move reminiscent of the pressures
against Yugoslavia in 1948, East German leader Walter Ul-
bricht has openly attacked the Albanian regime for holding
"dogmatic and sectarian" views at the recent Moscow confer-
ence. This public attack would appear to reflect an increase 0
In Soviet efforts to force the Albanians back into line. The
Albanian leaders have postponed the party congress from De-
cember to mid-February. While they may be attempting to for-
mulate a line acceptable to Moscow, initial comment in the re-
gime press after the Moscow conference gave no indication of
any change in Tirana's line. (Page 2)
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ILASIA-AFRICA
Algeria: The Algerian rebel National Liberation Front
(FL encouraged by the pro-FLN attitude of the Algiers
Moslem rioters and subsequent expressions of international
support, is reportedly determined to refuse to deal with any
administration De Gaulle sets up in Algeria following the
forthcoming referendum.
De Gaulle now has no alternative but to ne-
gotiate directly with the FLN, and that the rebels will refuse
overtures unless the UN has "some role in the proceedings_n
The resolution passed by the General Assembly on 19 Decem-
ber recognizing UN responsibility to assist Algerian self-
determination will probably harden this position.
*De Gaulle's 20 December speech, in which he expressed
willingness to discuss Algeria's future "notably with the lead-
ers of the rebellion," concedes greater importance to the FLN'$
role in any settlement than he has hitherto publicly accorded.
At the same time he made more explicit his standing threat of
partition of Algeria if the FLN does not cooperate in a settle-
(Page 3)
ment.
Ceylon: he Bandaranaike government's measures to con-
solidate the influence of the Singhalese-Buddhist community are
eightening discontent among high-level military and civilian of-
ficials, many of whom belong to ethnic and religious minorities.
The senior officers in the military and police services are par-
ticularly alarmed over the government's determination to switch OK
in January from use of English to Singhalese in government op-
erations. A group identified with disgruntled police and military
leaders reportedly is planning a coup to be attempted within the
next three weeks. The prime minister, Mrs. Bandaranaike,
will be absent in India from 20 December to 6 January. The chances
of success of such plotting at this time would seem limited in view
of the wide support enjoyed by the present regime among the peo-
ple and probably among the midd e and lower grades of the serv-
ices as well:3 (Page 5)
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21 Dec 60
DAILY BRIEF
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� *Laos: The Communist airlift into Laos continues to
strengthen Pathet Lao capabilities. live to six IL-14s were ob-
served on 20 December in airdrop operations about 40 miles
north of Vientianfjtotal tonnage delivered to Kong Le and the
Pathet Lao since 3 December is now about 250 tons, approx-
imately half of which is military equipment and supplies and
the remainder POL carried to Vientiane before the city fell to19
Phoumi. There are some indications that the Chinese Commu-
nist airlift to the south China rail center of Nanning may have
begun to slacken on 19 December. The Chinese on 19 December
termed the Laotian situation a "menace to the security of our
country," although no specific threat of retaliatory action was
made. (Page 6)
III. THE WEST
Ecuador-Czechoslovakia: Recent Ecuadorean arms talks
with Frantisek Mares, key figure in Czech arms deals, con-
cerned the exchange of Czech small arms for Ecuadorean cacao,
There are several indi-
cations that the bloc, particularly Czechoslovakia, is increas-
ingly interested in this kind of arms deal. It became evident dur-
ing these talks that the recent Ecuadorean-Czech agreement to
re-establish diplomatic relations will be imn1Pmente.t1 nn 2.7 fl
cember.
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached
by its special committee on the Berlin situation for the period 22
November 1960 through 19 December 1960.
1. The USSR is still pointing toward negotiations with the
West and does not wish to increase tensions over Berlin at this
time.
2. The East Germans appear to be urgently seeking a rein-
statement of the Interzonal Trade Agreements (IZT) and to be
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NO"
offering far-ranging concessions. At the same time Ulbricht
and East German propaganda media are taking a hard line on
the consequences to West German and Allied access to Berlin
if the IZT is not reinstated by the deadline of 1 January 1961.
It now seems likely that the IZT will be reinstituted by 1 Jan-
uary on terms favorable to Bonn. However, the details of the
East German concessions are not yet clear,and the possibility
cannot be excluded that an agreement will not be reached and
a period of increased tension might ensue.
3. Without an agreement, some trade could continue on the
basis of ad hoc. arrangements,but (a) the effects on the already
strained East German economy would be.serious; (b) Bonn would
lose all present arrangements for West German commercial ac-
cess to Berlin; (c) West Berlin's economic future would be fur-
ther imperiled.
21 Dec 60
DAILY BRIEF iv
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Soviet 1961 Plan and Budget
The TASS summary of the 1961 Soviet budget announced
today reports revenues up nearly 7 percent and expenditures
up nearly 5 percent over 1960.
The only defense category in the budget, labeled "expendi-
tures for the maintenance of the armed forces," indicated
planned expenditures of 9.255 billion new rubles (92.55 billion
present rubles), 12 percent of the entire budget, and approxi-
mately a 3.6-percent decrease from the 1960 allocation. This
decrease is probably related to the partial demobilization an-
nounced this January by Khrushchev. As usual, however, mil-
itary expenditures--such as items for research and develop-
ment and atomic weapons-are concealed in other budget cat-
egories. Appropriations for science will increase by 15. 6
percent.
In his speech on the 1961 plan, GaspIan Chief V. N.
Novikov reported that the gross index of industrial produc-
tion is planned to increase 8.8 percent. This is only slightly
above the 8.6-percent average annual increase called for in
the Seven-Year Plan. Actual performances during 1959 and
1960 welleexceeded this average. Gross industrial produc-
tion increased over 11 percent in 1959, and Novikov implied
that this year the increase will be over 10 percent. The
plan for 1961 maintains the recent growth rate in capital in-
vestment, scheduling a 12. 6-percent increase over 1960.
The few major industrial products included in the sum-
mary indicate higher percentage increases in 1961 than
needed to meet the present seven-year goals: crude steel
output is scheduled to increase 9 percent, pl.g iron 10 percent,
and electricity 12 percent.
The TASS summary of NovikoVs report gave little in-
formation on the present state of agriculture. According to
Reuters, he admitted this year's poor grain harvest and dif-
ficulties in meat production but claimed that 1960 grain pro-
duction would still exceed the 1959 level.
Reported planned investment in state agriculture is con-
siderably higher than contemplated in the Seven-Year Plan.
-CONFIDENTIAL
21 Dec 60 Clki-rn A I ikrrri le�r�kle.r. ni 1. v.1k
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Now
Bloc Builds Up Pressure on Albania
The Albanian regime, long under pressure to abandon its
pro-Chinese stand in the Sino-Soviet dispute, has been sub-
jected to a new and unusual form of pressure--that of public
criticism by another satellite leader. In a speech to the SED
central committee published on 18 December, East German
boss Walter Ulbricht singled out the Albanians for holding
"dogmatic and sectarian" views at the Moscow conference.
This public charge confirms reports that the Albanian dele-
gation�led by First Secretary Enver Hoxha--sided with the
Chinese against the USSR at the congress despite many months
of Soviet effort to force the Albanians to desist.
[Reports vary as to the extent of the Albanian "deviation"
at the conference, with several claiming that the Albanians
criticized Polich internal and foreign policies.
the Albanians suc-
ceeded in angering the Soviets and irritating the Chinese to
the point that the latter suggested the Albanians be silen_tij The
Albanian leaders departed from Moscow about a week before
other leaders did.
Specific criticism of the leadership of one bloc state by
another has not been seen in Eastern Europe since the period
before Yugoslavia was ousted from the Cominform. Public
criticism from East Germany--particularly if echoed by the
other European satellites--is a means of warning the Tirana
leadership to get into line with Moscow.
The Albanian fourth party congress, originally scheduled for
December, has now been postponed to 13 February. It is possible--
in light of Ulbricht's statement--that the East Germans and other
satellites indicated to the Albanians that they would not send high-level
delegations if the congress were to be used as a forum for'llogmatic
and sectarian" views. Pre-congress preparations had not been
carried through, suggesting regime leaders may be attempting to
work out modifications in their policies that would mollify Moscow
while at the same time not compromising their basic hard-line
attitudes. Initial Albanian editorial reaction to the Moscow con-
ference indicated no fundamental change in attitude. Any Modification
at this time might encourage pro-Soviet elements in the Albanian
party--elements which the regime apparently sought to repress by
limited purges last summer--to renew their opposition to the party
leadership.
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Nine
Algerian Rebels Encouraged by Developments
While the Algerian rebel National Liberation Front (FLN)
apparently did not plan the recent Moslem violence in Algiers,
it has been encouraged by the pro-FLN attitude of the rioters
and by subsequent expressions of international support and
sympathy for the victims. The UN resolution on Algeria has
also encouraged the rebels.
Consequently, the provisional government is reportedly
determined to refuse to deal with any Algerian administration
De Gaulle sets up following the referendum to take place in
Algeria on 6, 7, and 8 January, and in metropolitan France on
8 January.
De Gaulle now has no alternative but to negotiate directly
with the FLN, and that the rebels will refuse any overtures
unless the UN has "some part in the proceedings."
the FLN would not demand direct UN participation in
the talks, but would be satisfied with UN good offices to arrange
the initial meeting, provide a neutral site, and receive progress
report�A However, the FLN may insist on greater UN partici-
pation in view of the resolution passed by the General Assembly
on 19 December which recognizes the responsibility of the UN
to assist in implementing Algerian self-determination.
The Sino-Soviet bloc and the Arab press have strongly con-
demned the "massacre" of Algerian Moslems. There have been
sporadic "free Algeria" demonstrations in Libya, and the Tuni-
sian foreign minister called personally on rebel Premier Ferhat
Abbas to present condolences.
the Moroccan Government has agreed to permit the Algerian
rebel army to receive Soviet arms shipments in Moroccan ports_11
A Soviet vessel began unloading what appear to be small arms
and munitions in Casablanca on 16 December. A similar delivery
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of bloc arms was made under Moroccan auspices in late
November.
De Gaulle's 20 December speech, in which he ex-
pressed willingness to discuss Algeria's future "notably
with leaders of the rebellion" concedes greater impor-
tance to the FLN.'s role in any settlement than he has
hitherto publicly accorded. At the same time he made
more explicit his standing threat of partition of Algeria
if the FLN does not cooperate in a settlement.
His more favorable references to negotiations with the
rebels and the absence of a formal prerequisite of a cease-
fire will win over some of the wavering voters on the left
and center in France in the January referendum. De Gaulle's
reiteration of Premier Debre's 16 December assurances in
the National Assembly of guarantees for the European settlers
and pro-French Moslems in Algeria is aimed at breaking the
solid opposition of French rightists to a more liberal Algerian
policy.
CONFIDENTIAL
21 Dec 60 CF`'" " '''""
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'UIIberVLLLVt uppobiLiuu Lu %.,eyiunese utwernment
rowing apprehension within conservative minority groups
in Ceylon, resulting from the government's actions favorable
to the Singhalese-Buddhist majority, reportedly has led top-
ranking security officials to plan a coup within the next three
weeks. The key developments motivating such plans presum-
ably are the Bandaranaike regime's takeover of denominational
schools and its intention to switch from use of English to Singha-
lese in all . government departments on 1 January. The school
takeover has been opposed primarily by the Catholic community,
which is a small minority but heavily represented in the top mil-
itary ranks. The language switch has aroused more general con-
cern in view of the lack of preparation among most military and
civil service personnel, and of the possible militant reaction
against it by the Tamil-speaking minorityj
LLittle information is available concerning the membership
or specific plans of the coup group. However, it may include
several naval officers recently suspended because of alleged
smuggling activities as well as other non= Buddhist military ele-
ments, who, in addition to being concerned over their profes-
sional tenure, may fear that the inexperienced top government
members' emphasis on neutralism and their accommodation of
various leftist-inspired measures are setting a definite leftist
trencQ
qrime Minister Bandaranaike will be in India from 20 De-
cem er to 6 January. A coup at this time seems unlikely to
succeed, however, in view of widespread support for the gov-
ernment among the people and apparently among the military
rank and file. Furthermore, the traditional respect for govern-
ment authority among most of the British-trained officer corps
probably would make effective coup action difficult uriless chron-
ic economic or political problems become more acute.
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Situation in in Laos
Soviet civil transports continue their Hanoi-based air
supply operations insunnort of the KontLe-Pathet Lao forces
north of Vientiane. I On 20 December five to
six Soviet IL-14s were making drops on an area
about 40 miles north of Vientiane. The aircraft were apparently
engaged in paradropping ifonlies. and about 7 parachutes were
observed on the groune !
"today's drop zone is at Phong Hong,"
about 50 miles north of Vientiane. The message also stated that
the previous dron was too far away0
e seriously wounded were to be
evacuated to Hanoi and the slightly wounded to Sam Neua. Re-
quests for motor gasoline, motor oil, and military uniforms to
be dropped at Phong Hong were also noted. It was also stated all
supplies and troops would be withdrawn to a location about 70
miles north of Vientiant.)
Total tonnage delivered to Kong Le and the Pathet Lao in the
Vientiane area is estimated to be in the neighborhood of 230 tons,
about half of which is military supplies and the remainder POL
carried to Vientiane before the city fell to General Phoumi. Pos-
sibly 15 to 25 tons were delivered to Pathet Lao headquarters in
Sam Neua by North Vietnamese aircraft. Based on aircraft cana-
bility and the number of flights
the following tonnages apparently earmarked for the Laos
operation could have been delivered to points within Communist
China and North Vietnam: about 100 tons to Nanning; between 50
and 60 tons to Canton. About 45 tons have been flown on to Hanoi
from both cities. Although these tonnages are relatively small,
they may be symptomatic of larger CIP11vPrieg by spa and rail, on
which information is lacking.
Although Soviet IL-14s continue to shuttle between Canton
and Hanoi through 20 December and at least one Chinese Communist
civil transport was flying between Nanning and Hanoi through 19 De-
cember, the Chinese Communist airlift to Nanning appears to have
slackened as of 19 December. On 19 December, at least eight
CCAF 13th Air Division IL-12s and IL-14s involved in this oper-
ation returned to their base in the Kaifeng area. Also on the same
date, three CCAF 3rd Independent Regiment transports returned to
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Peiping. The three Soviet military AN-12s which arrived at Canton
on 1R Deremher denarted for Peiping on 20 December as scheduled.
The newly activated "Radio Station of the Laotian Kingdom"
on 20 December stated that the "Government of the Royal Laotian
Kingdom" warmly welcomed Indian Prime Minister Nehru's pro-
posal to the British Government for the reactivation of the Inter-
national Control Commission (ICC) for Laos. This new station is
almost certainly located at the Pathet Lao headquarters in Sam Neua
and is part of the Communists' effort to maintain the fiction that the
Souvanna Phouma overnment is still the legal government of Laos.
Communist China and North Vietnam also have called for
reactivation of the MC for Laos and for another Geneva conference.
Peiping, on 19 December, coupled its endorsement for this proposal.
with a statement that the situation in Laos menaced "the security of
our country." In Peiping on 20 December the North Vietnamese am-
bassador repeated Hanoi's charges of US "intervention" and added
that the "situation in Laos has threatened to become a very destructive
war which could possibly grow bigger." In line with the lip service
being paid to the Geneva agreement by the bloc, the Soviets and Chi-
nese apparently have used civil rather than military transports in the
flights to North Vietnam.
Up Vientiane, General Phoumi's forces are
ying an early three-column offensive against Kong Le's forcesj
21. Dec 60
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
coNnnrivrtA I.
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