CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/03/24

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03148936
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: March 24, 1960

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24 March
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1960
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CENTRAL
IN'T ELL IGENCE
BULLETIN
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24 MARCH 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Jordan tightens border against UAR in-
filtrators.
Husayn holds to his idea of a plebiscite
in former Palestinian area.
Major oil strike in Persian Gulf by
Iranian-Italian firm reported; new field
would further Enrico Matteis empire-
building.
South African disturbances seen as
marking emergence of new generation
of dynamic African nationalists.
Ceylon--Newly appointed prime minis-
ter will try to govern with one-party,
minority cabinet.
0
0
III. THE WEST
()Dominican Republic�Increasing indica-
tions that Trujillo regime nearing its
end.
0 UAR deputy prime minister reports on
his visit to Cuba; notes Castro's pop-
ularity, recommends expanded UAR
contacts.
0 "Dark" satellite is almost certainly re-
covery capsule of Discoverer V.
LATE ITEM
()Probable ICBM launched from Tyura
Tam to usual Kamchatkai impact area.
Tin VC,IDE�r1
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
24 March 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. AMA-AFRICA
Jordan: *ing Husayn has reiterated his determination
to carry out a plebiscite in West Jordan in order to "clarify"
the status of the former Palestinian territory. This area is
at issue in Jordan's continuing dispute with the UAR and Iraq
over a separate Palestine entityD
The Jordanians have instituted more stringent border
controls aq a nreeaution atrainst nqssible infiltrators from
the UAR. (Page 1)
Iran-Oil : Er_he Societe Iran-1talienne des Petroles (SIRIP),
controlled jointly by the Italian and Iranian governments, re-
portedly has a major oil discovery in the company's offshore
Persian Gulf concession. In August 1957,5IRIP broke with the
traditional 50-50 profit-sharing formula by giving Iran a 75-
percent share. This discovery probably will encourage Enrico
Mattel, the Italian Government's oil czar, to step up his pro-
gram of building an extensive refining and distribution network
especially in underdeveloped countrie
(Page 3)
South Africa: EThe American Embassy in Cape Town be-
lieves that the present disturbances mark the emergence of a
new generation of dynamic African nationalists and that out-
breaks may occur in other areas of the Union. The situation
on the surface is calm at present, but two thirds of the African
labor force is reportedly staying away from work in Cape
and absenteeism is common in other industrial districts
(Page 4)
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Ceylon: The newly appointed prime minister, Dudley Senana-
yake, has made clear his intention to rule with a minority gov-
ernment by appointing an eight-man cabinet composed entirely
of members of his United National party. Senanayake apparently
Is counting on opposition disunity and defections to his party.
1`. Since his party holds only about a third of the seats, he will be
In. constant danger of parliamentary defeat.
(Page 5)
ot)
III. THE WEST
Dominican Republic: here are increasing signs that the
30-year span of the Trujillo dictatorship is approaching its end.
The Trujillo family is reported to have withdrawn some $46 mil-
lion from the Reserve Bank. further worsening the country's
economy, the regime would
last only one or two more months, and
gives it even less time. Trujillo's downfall will probably be
sudden, leaving a power vacuum. Leftist and pro-Communist ex-
iles will make every effort to return promptly to seize the initia-
tive--a situation which Fidel Castro would view with favor and
which he is probably prepared to exploi,:t_.
(Page 6)
Cuba-UAR: The UAR deputy foreign minister, Dhu al-Fiqar
Sabri, who is touring Latin America, advised Cairo
to expand IJAR contacts with Cuba "on all levels." Sabri and Cuban
officials discussed a long-term commercial agreement and the
possibility of holding a neutralist chief-of-state meeting in Cairo.
which Castro is tentatively scheduled to visit in June.
Castro's popularity was "astonishingly high" in Cuba's
rural areas, and commented that agrarian reform may make the
Cuban economy so sound that in a few-years "American pressure
will be of little importance." (Page 7)
Dark Satellite: The "dark" satellite is now confidently be-
0 lieved to be the recovery capsule of Discoverer V which was
1`.1 launched on 13 August 1959. At the time the retro rockets were
24 Mar 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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fired to bring the capsule back to earth, its orientation may have
been such that the rockets increased the capsule's velocity, caus-
ing it to go into orbit.
IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
A. o Sino- Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hos-
tilities against the continental US or its possessions
In the immediate futur_93,
B. asjo Sino- Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to
Initiate direct military action against US forces
abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit
In the immediate future_g
C. he following developments are susceptible of di-
rect exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action
which could jeopardize the security of the US in the
Immediate future: None:1
LATE ITEM
*USSR: at approximately 2105 EST on 23 March, a prob-
able ICBM vehicle was successfully launched on the Tvura Tan
Missile Test Range.
flight to the usual impact area on Kamchatka. To date, 19
tL) probable ICBM test vehicles have reached the Kamchatka im-
\ pact area; six others have impacted at various extended ranges
in the Pacific. In addition, five, or possibly six, probable ICBM
test vehicles have failed in f1ieht.1
24 Mar 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
The West Jordanian Plebiscite
'Ring Husayn insists
that he did not make his offer of a plebiscite in Palestinian
West Jordan simply as a propaganda gesture. He says he
intends to push the issue to a clear-cut conclusion as a step
toward resolving Jordan's dispute with the UAR and Iraq over
a separate Palestine enti_D Husayn believes the idea of a
plebiscite has caught Nasir, his principal antagonist in the
dispute, "off balance" and wants to exploit the presumed ad-
vantage. Jordanian Prime Minister Majalli has indicated
the government would welcome an investigation by "neutral"--
i. not UAR, Iraqi, or Saudi Arabian--members of the Arab
League to determine whether Jordanian Palestinians want
such a plebiscite.
Opinion in Jordan varies as to what might be the result
of a free plebiscite. The American Consulate General in
Jerusalem reported that private Arab reactions there to the
King's offer have ranged from cynical apathy to heated ques-
tioning. Some Western diplomats in Amman believe UAR
propaganda might swing a vote in favor of West Jordanian
independence.
If Husayn becomes convinced that a plebiscite might go
against him, he could cite manifestations of Palestinian sup-
port he has received as reasons for changing his mind. For
example, at a banquet in his honor in Jerusalem on 19 March,
the mayors of eleven West Bank towns reportedly told the King
that a plebiscite is unnecessary, since the country is firmly
united under his leadership,
24 Mar 60
CENTPAI INITFI I IkIC QI III crim Page 1
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..J--JjELINE I
The King is apprehensive about possible subversive
activity by the UAR and Arab nationalist elements in Jordan.
a "conspiracy" being plotted in Syria against
Jordan and of impending infiltration of fedayeen have prompted
the institution of stringent controls along Jordan's borders.
T C3 SECT Er1
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LP-WEN 1 IAL
Italian-Iranian Govetnment-ControlTetl Company Strikes Oil
&he Societe Iran-Italienne des Petroles (SIRIP) reportedly
has a major oil discovery in the company's offshore concession
at the northern end of the Persian Gulf. Early tests indicate
the well has a production potential of about 3,500 barrels a day
b_IRIP was formed in August 1957, by agreement between
the Italian government-controlled oil company Ente Nazionale
Idrocarburi (ENI) and the Iranian government-owned National
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). Breaking the traditional 50-50
profit-sharing formula, EM agreed to give the Iranian Govern-
ment approximately 75 percent of the profits of the jointly owned
SI RIP_D
dills discovery probably will encourage Enrico Mattei�the
Italian Government's oil czar--to step up his program of build-
ing an extensive refining and distribution network. Mattel's cur-
rent activities range as far as Argentina but his major efforts
appear to be concentrated in Afric;D
LMattei is bitter against American and British international
oil companies. He has long felt that these companies were in-
strumental in keeping EM out of the consortium of Western com-
panies set up to operate Iran's oil industry after the Mossedeq
nationalization fiasco. Since then, in competition with these com-
panies, he has been expanding KM operations on an extensive
scale. His success thus far can largely be attributed to his gen-
erous use of bribes and his willingness to offer local governments--
especially in underdeveloped countries�joint participation on
terms which hold the promise of a more generous share of prof-
its than usually obtains.',
CONF1 AL
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Tension Continues in South Africa
be violence in South Africa has abated following the riots
on 21 and 22 March; however, two thirds of the African labor
force is reportedly staying away from work at Cape Town,
and absenteeism is common in other industrial districts. Amer-
ican officials comment that violence may still occur in other
areas, particularly in the Johannesburg area on 27 March,/
be South African Government has arrested 132 members
of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), which organized the
demonstrations, and Prime Minister Verwoerd has stated that
they will be charged with sedition. Verwoerd reportedly de-
scribed the disturbances as periodic phenomena which had noth-
ing to do with the government's apartheid polic.iejj
ternational comment on the government's action against
the demonstrators has been highly unfavorable. Strong criticism
came from other members of the Commonwealth. Indian Prime
Minister Nehru told parliament that the shooting "shocked the
conscience of the world" and might be a "prelude to further con-
flict." The Australian representative in the Union has been in-
structed to inquire into the "unhappy. affair." In Britain, the op-
position Labor party has exerted heavy pressure on the Macmil-
lan government to make an official protesIg
although the 22,000 South African police-12,000 of them
Africans�cannot prevent the occurrence of isolated disturbances,
they are believed capable of controlling riots once they start.
However, the embassy. in Cape Town believes that the recent
riots mark the emergence of a new generation of dynamic Afri-
can nationalist leaders. As a result, nonwhite opposition in the
Union may be more widespread and militant in the future.7
SEC
24 Mar 60
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*rare
Conservative Party Forms Minority Government in Ceylon
Ceylon's new Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake has made
clear his intention to rule with a minority government by lim-
iting the cabinet thus far to members of his relatively conserv-
ative United National party (UNP). The party won only 50 of
the 151 parliamentary seats contested in the national elections
on 19 March. Senanayake and his seven cabinet ministers
were sworn in on 21 and 23 March, respectively. Senanayake,
48, served as prime minister from 1952 to 1953 following
the death of his father, the first prime minister of independ-
ent Ceylon.
Having eliminated for the present a coalition with the 46
members of the moderate-socialist Sri Lanka Freedom party
(SLFP), the UNP will be unable to acquire enough support to
command a reliable majority when Parliament convenes on
30 March. Senanayake is counting on opposition disunity and
defections to the UNP to keep his government in power. He
may succeed temporarily. The SLFP reportedly does not
yet intend to join forces with the leftists in Parliament. The
Tamil Federal party has publicly stated that its 15 members
would not support the UNP, but the Federal party leader re-
portedly told Senanayake that his party would not oppose the
government in the initial parliamentary confidence vote.TNP
elements are trying to promote defections from the SLFP,
reportedly with some success, and the small size of Senanayake's
cabinet suggests that he has reserved a few ministries to of-
fer likely defectors.]
The government, at any time, however, could be defeated
by opposition elements willing to unite in a no-confidence vote.
New elections would be the most likely consequence of the UNP's
fall. The SLFP might be given the chance to form a govern-
ment, but probably could do no better than the T1NP
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111, THE WEST
End of Trujillo Dictatorship May Be Near
Mere are increasing signs that Generalissimo -11ael
L. Trujillo's 30-year rule in the Dominican Republic may be
approaching its end.
the Generalissimo's eldest son and favorite
daughter had withdrawn $46,000,000 from the state-owned
Reserve Bank, presumably in anticipation of the family's early
exile. Reports of heavy withdrawals from the bank have also
been received by the American Embassy from numerous sources
during the past week.
Trujillo would last only one or two months, and
gives him
even less time/
&ice the beginning of the year, Trujillo has been unable to
stop the steady deterioration of the Dominican economy brought
on by his heavy military spending and the low market prices for
the country's export crops. He has also failed to curb the spread-
ing dissidence. Widespread arrests and police brutality have led
the country's six Catholic bishop's to condemn the regime publicly
in pastoral letters twice since 31 January for violating human
rights. Although the armed forces still appear loyal, they may
turn on Trujillo if he continues repressive measures against the
dissidents, some of whom are relatives of high-ranking officerAj
DJ the event of Trujillo's downfall, leaving a power vacuum,
leftist and pro-Communist exiles will make every effort to return
promptly to seize the initiative--a situation on which Fidel Castro
would look with favor and which he probably is prepared to ex-
ploit. Radical elements appear to have growing influence among
the increasingly desperate dissidents inside the country. In mid-
March, DoTr:nican university students were circulating pictures.
of Castro labeled "liberty." About 40 of the students were Quickly
arreste9
SECR
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UAR Official Recommends Expanded UAR-Cuban Contacts
UAR Deputy Foreign Minister Dhu al-Fiqar Sabri--broth-
er of Nasir's close adviser Ali Sabri--has given Cairo an en-
thusiastic account of his 9-16 March visit to Cuba, ending with
a recommendation to "expand contacts on all levels."
Salon reported that Nasir's invita-
tion to visit Cairo had "pleased" Castro, who indicated he
might make the trip in June. The possibility of a Cairo meet-
ing of neutralist leaders, including Castro, Nasir, Tito, and
Sukarno, was also discussed with Cuban Foreign Minister Roa,
but Sabri added he had "made no commitments of any kind."
Sabri told Cairo that he had been misquoted in some ac-
counts of his press interview in Havana on 15 March. These
alleged he had promised UAR arms and men in the event of
aggression on Cuba. Sabri maintains he said only that the
UAR was ready to "discuss" means of support, if requested,
adding that in the event of economic pressure against Cuba,
the UAR was prepared to increase trade. An increase in
trade appears already under way. A UAR draft for a long-
term commercial agreement has been submitted to the Castro
government, following up the recent barter deal to exchange
Egyptian cotton for Cuban sugar.
Sabri was apparently much impressed by the regime's
agrarian reform program, which he said had made "great
progress." He predicted that if this trend continued, the
Cuban economy would become sound in a few years and "A-
merican pressure will be of little importance." The UAR
diplomat found Castro's popularity in the rural areas "as-
tonishingly high," but suggested that city dwellers might
blame him for financial difficulties caused by the decline in
tourism from the United States.
24 Mar 60
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
,_CONFIDENTTAT
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