CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/08/19

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03172661
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: August 19, 1960

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19 August 1960
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CENTRAL
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INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO, '13
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19 AUGUST 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Congo--US ambassador warns of possible
new depredations by Force Publique and
of precariousness of UN position.
Iranian security chief believes Iran headed
for revolution.
Burmese Prime Minister U Nu highly
gratified by border agreement with Pei-
ping.
III. THE WEST
Mexico invites Supreme Soviet delegation
in attempt to forestall Khrushchev visit.
Bonn believes Cuba may recognize East
Germany.
West German foreign minister stresses
need to equip NATO forces with medium-
range nuclear missiles.
LATE ITEMS
0 New South Korean prime minister
approved.
0 Situation in Laos.
PpiD
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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19 August 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II, ASIA-AFRICA
6
*Republic of the Congo IJJN forces in the Congo have re-
portedly been authorized to shoot in their own defense follow-
ing new anti-Western and anti-white incidents which were
apparently instigated by Lumurnba. On 18 August, a Canadian
officer of the UN force was injured and other Canadians sub-
jected to indignities by Force Publiaue soldiers at the Lecool
ville airport.cIr
the Force Publique could be incited to action against
rhe UN troops, or to new depredations against whites in general.
Secretary General Hammarskjold, meanwhile, has stated
hat he will invite any nation in the Security Council which dis-
agrees with his recent actions in the Congo to present its views,
)ossibly in the form of a resolution. He appears confident that
critical resolution will obtain only the votes of the two Commu-
list nations. The British, meanwhile, are exploring means of
averting a showdown between Lumumba and Hammarskjold, be-
lieving that UN operations could not continue in the face of a
determined Congolese demand for withdrawa_D
(Page 1)
Iran: neral Timur Balditiar, chief of the Iranian National
telli ence and Security Organization (SAVAK),
believes Iran is headed for revolution as a
result of the election policies followed by the Shah and Prime
7-4,0
Minister Eqbal, and that the Shah will lose courage and flee when
e realizes the situation has gone out of control. Last week and
gain on 17 August Balchtiar submitted his resignation to the Shah.
On the first occasion, he withdrew it after a "heated discussion"
during which the Shah accused Bakhtiar of pulling out at an "im-
portant time" when the Shah is planning a two-week trip to Europe
in September), (Page 3)
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Burma - Communist China: Prime Minister U Nu, grati-
fied by Chinese Communist concessions in recent border nego-
tiations, has proposed that the conclusion of the border treaty
be made a major attraction of each country's national day. In a
letter to Chou En-lai, U Nu told of his intention to bring a dis-
tinguished delegation and cultural exhibit to Peiping to celebrate
the treaty's signing`on 1 October, and has invited Chou to visit
Rangoon on 4 January, Burma's independence day, for the ex-
change of treaty ratifications. U Nu also asked China's permis-
sion to mark the agreement with symbolic gifts of food to the
border tribesmen in Yunnan Province and suggested that Burma
would like to divert some of its trade with Japan to China.
) (Page 4)
III. THE WEST
Mexico-USSR: The Lopez Mateos government has invited a
Soviet parliamentary delegation to come to Mexico in connection
with the 15-17 September celebrations of the 150th anniversary
of Mexican independence,
By extending a specific invitation for the %,
parliamentary delegation, Mexico hopes to forestall a possible
visit by Khrushchev. On 12 July the Mexican Foreign Ministry is-
sued emphatic instructions to all its diplomatic missions not to in-
vite foreign representatives of higher rank than vice president.
rage 5)
West Germany - Cuba: Following the breakdown on .5 August
of trade negotiations between Cuba and the Federal Republic, Bonn
believes that the Castro regime may extend diplomatic recognition
to East Germany. Paul Verner, a high-ranking East German Com-6 k
munist party official now in Havana, could be the vehicle for an at-
tempt to get the Cubans to accept establishment in Havana of a con-
sulate general, and West Germany is trying to block such action.
r:Page 6)
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DAILY BRIEF
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� West Germany: foreign Minister Brentano has stressed
o Ambassador Dowling that it is essential to equip NATO
orces with medium-range nuclear missiles, and that this
hole question must be discussed "calmly and earnestly" by
ATO members as soon as practicable next spring. This
ay indicate that the Bonn cabinet has accepted Defense Min-
ister Strauss' reported view that West German forces should
be equipped with Polaris missiles. In several NATO coun-
tries, especially Britain, there are serious misgivings over
the possibility that Bonn might be provided with Polaris mis-
siles, even though nuclear warheads would remain under US
control (Page 7)
IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
� (Available during the. preceding week)
Main Trends in Capabilities and Policies, 1960-1965.
Annex B, Tables of Sino-Soviet Bloc Military Strengths and .-2' -0
Characteristics of Selected Weanons and Enuinmpnt NTT
11-4-60. 16 August 1960.
LATE ITEMS
,t)
*South Korea: The House of Representatives on 19 August,
by a vote of 117-107 with one abstention, approved the nomination
of Chang Myon as prime minister. Chang has indicated he will
appoint a cabinet broadly representative of all Democratic party
groups, in an attempt to bridge the intraparty breach between his
supporters and those of Kim To-yun, the first nominee for the
premiership. The government also may include one or more 6 ee-
independents. The near-even strength of Chang and his op-
ponents suggests that the new government, which is subject to
a simple majority of the powerful lower house, might be short-
lived. The balance of power between the feuding Democratic
factions appears to rest with a combination of the 40-odd inde-
pendents in the house. However, Chang's constitutional authority
to dissolve the house and call new elections after a vote of no con-
fidence may have a restraining influence on the members, who
19 Aug 60
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presumably would be reluctant to face elections aeain so
soon.
*Laos: Premier Souvanna Phouma in Vientiane is urgently
trying to arrange some understanding with General Phoumi in
Savannakhet to avert possible civil war. Souvanna is bitter
6 e
over King Savants attitude in withholding royal sanction for his
government, thus undercutting its authority. In contrast to c,
Souvanna's anxiety, Phoumi seems increasingly confident over ,
prospects for his counterrevolutionary effort, Snd is refusing
to make any settlement until rebel paratroop Captain Kong Le
relinquishes control of Vientiane. Phoumi is proceeding with
deployment of troops around Vientiane, and anticipates that
this pressure, combined with stepped-up psychological warfare
o erations, will frighten the capital into submission.
(Page 8)
19 Aug 60
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ii
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The Situation in the Congo
Wremier Lumumba's fulminations against Secretary Gen-
eral Hammarskjold and against non-African contingents of the
UN occupying force have led to new anti-Western and anti-
white incidents in Leopoldville. On 18 August, a Canadian of-
ficer was clubbed and other Canadians forced to lie down and
be searched by members of Lumumba's Force Publique during
a "security check" at Leopoldville airport. UN troops were
subsequently authorized to shoot if necessary in their own de-
fense. On the same day, US Ambassador Timberlake was
barred by Congolese soldiers from entering Lumumba's
denc e)
the
physical presence of a UN force in the Congo was by itself in-
sufficient to maintain order. "thousands" of
armed and undisciplined Force Publique soldiers were still
at large in the Congo and that the situation had become criti-
cal in Leopoldville, where such units had come under, the per�
-
sonal authority of Lumumba. the Force Publique
could be incited to action against the UN troops or even against
whites in general_:3
,j.iumumba's most recent anti-UN proclamations have coin-
cided with seemingly stepped-up bloc and Communist activity
in the Congo. Two leading officials of the Belgian Communist
party reportedly plan to arrive in Leopoldville on 23 August
to supervise the establishment of a "true" Communist party in
the Congo. On 16 August, a four-man delegation from the East
German Foreign Ministry left Berlin unannounced for Prague,
from where it was to fly to the Congo on an unstated mission.
At the same time, members of the Czech delegation to the In-
ternational Labor Organization in Geneva stated that Prague
was prepared to assist the Congo "in all possible ways," includ-
ing personnel, materiel, and finances. The Czech interior
minister had stated on 13 August that Prague was sending the
Congo "immediate" aid worth about $300,000
CIn New York, Secretary General Hammarskjold has stated
that he will invite any nation in thfiecurity Council which
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disagrees with his recent actions in the Congo to present its
views, possibly in the form of a resolution. He appears con-
fident that a critical resolution will obtain only the votes of the
two Communist members,
oncerning a possible UN withdrawal from the Congo,
Hammarskjold professed to regard such a demand by Lumum-
ba as unlikely. He expressed the conviction that Lumumba is
being advised by Communists in Leopoldville, but stated that
he could see no alternative to Lumumba at this time.3
ahe British Foreign Office is exploring means of averting
a showdown between Lumumba and Hammarskjold, believing
that the UN operations could not continue in the face of a deter-
mined Congolese demand for withdrawal. The preliminary
British views are that the best way of supporting the UN effort
would be by tackling the constitutional dispute between Lumum-
ba and Tshombe , perhaps by having the UN Security Council
appoint a committee of three African nations to seek to resolve
the issue. I
SE
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Iranian Security�hief Predicts Revolution.
it. Gen. Timur Bakhtiar, chief of the Iranian National in-
telligence and Security Organization (SAVAK),
believes Iran is headed for revolution,
that the armed forces cannot be relied on, and that he believes
the Shah will flee to Europe when he realizes things are out of con-
trol. Bakhtiar claims the Shah is turning his property into cash3
[Bakhtiar, considered a loyal supporter of the Shah, attempted
to resign on 11 August, at the same time warning Prime Minister
Eqbal that rigging of the current parliamentary elections and other
policies were leading the country to revolution. He withdrew his
resignation after a tense interview with the Shah during which the
latter angrily rejected Balchtiar's suggestion that the elections be
declared void and the irregularities blamed on Eqbal. Bakhtiar
claims that Eqbal forced him to use SAVAK, which is part of the
prime minister's office, to aid in rigging the elections.
or
fs_om Bakhtiar that SAVAK is not to interfere in the elec-
tions,�,
&he Shah, preparing for a short trip to Europe in late Aug-
gust or early September, granted Bakhtiar a two-month leave of
absence after he returns. Bakhtiar hoped then to leave SAVAK
and return to a troop command position, possibly as chief of the
ground forces, feeling he would be in a better position to take
Immediate action if the Shah flees. He is known to have been in
touch with other groups for many months engaged in "contingency
planning" for just such an occurrence. On 17 August. however.
he reportedly resubmitted his re7ignatio
SAVAK and other security organizations are keeping a close
watch on the elections in Tehran. Balloting in the capital has been
orderly thus far, but a small disturbance could spread quickly.
Clashes over the elections continue in the provinces, and report-
edly during one incident in a northwestern constituency about 150
persons were injured when fired on by security forces:j
goviet propaganda attacks on the Iranian Government and the
Shah are continuing at a high level.
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U Nu Plans Special Fetes to Celebrate Sino-Burmese
Border Treaty
Prime Minister U Nu, highly gratified by the relatively
minor Chinese Communist concessions during recent border
negotiations in both Peiping and Rangoon, has suggested that
China and Burma make the treaty signing and exchange of
ratifications a chief function of their respective national hol-
idays.
� In a letter to Chou En-lai, U Nu reported that his official
delegation for the 1 October signing of the treaty in Peiping
will be the three men who have served as Burma's prime min-
isters since independence: U Ba Swe, currently the president
of the opposition AFPFL, who laid the foundations for the cur-
rent treaty in 1956; 'General Ne Win, Burma's military com-
mander in chief, who signed the preliminary border agreement
in January 1960; and himself. At the same time, he warmly in-
vited Chou to visit Rangoon on 4 January, Burma's independence
day, for the formal exchange of treaty ratifications. An accept-
ance of the invitation, which seems probable, would afford Com-
munist China the opportunity to exploit the border treaty to pro-
ject an image of reasonableness toward Asian countries.
Of U Nuts other proposals to Chou, only one may cause dif-
ficulty�permission for Burma to send token gifts of rice and
salt to approximately a million Yunnanese residents in the bor-
der area in celebration of the signing. In order not to appear to
be a recipient of Burmese charity, Peiping may either politely
refuse permission or counter by suggesting reciprocal Chinese
gifts to border residents in Burma. U Nu's proposal to bring a
large troupe of Burmese boxers, actors, and artists to Peiping
with him, as well as his proposal to bring Burmese movies for
distribution throughout China, fits well into established patterns
of cultural exchange missions.
Peiping will probably regard U Nu's stated desire to expand
Sino-Burmese trade relations as the first fruit of its conciliatory
approach to the border disputes. It was Chou En-lai who first
brought up the subject of trade possibilities in conversations with
U Nu during his April visit to Rangoon.
Ttf,PS'ERE7'
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Mexico Invites Soviet Parliamentary Mission to� Independence
Celebrations
his government has invited a Soviet par-
liamentary mission to attend the celebrations from 15 to 17 Sep-
tember of the 150th anniversary of Mexican independence. Ma-
dero reported on 11 August that the invitations had been delivered
to the President of the Supreme Soviet, who promised to inform
him "within a few days" of the composition of the mission.
The Lopez Mateos government is anxious to forestall the
widely rumored possibility that Khrushchev�if, as speculated,
he appears at the UN General Assembly on 20 September�will
stop off in Mexico en route to New York,
the composition
of all foreign missions to the celebrations was not yet known, but
that it was felt none would be headed by an official higher than vice
president, chief of a legislative or judicial branch, or foreign min-
ister. This limitation, they said, was deemed necessary in view
of the inability of President Lopez Mateos to give proper attention
to officials of higher rank because of his other activities in connec-
tion with the celebrations. Instructions plainly spelling out this
policy were cabled to all Mexican diplomatic missions on 13 July.
Mexico's reluctance to welcome Khrushchev
a Foreign Ministry official had
remarked privately to him, "The Mexican Government does not in-
tend to make any exceptions to the principle, at least for so embar-
rassing a person." There would be nothing to prevent Khrushchev
from making the trip, however, if he insisted.
T93 SE IC1'
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Bonn Anticipates Cuban Recognition of East Germany
Bonn believes that the Castro regime may extend diplomatic
recognition to East Germany. Paul Verner, a high-ranking
East German Communist party official now in Havana attending
a Cuban Communist party congress, could be the vehicle to get
the Cubans to allow his government to establish a consulate gen-
eral in Havana, and West Germany is trying to block such action.
In view of the breakdown on 5 August of West German - Cuban
trade negotiations, Bonn has little bargaining power. It hopes,
however, to persuade the Cubans to do no more than the UAR,
which in September 1959 permitted the establishment of an East
German Consulate General in Cairo but issued a public statement
denying that this action constituted diplomatic recognition. East
Germany now is recognized only by Yugoslavia and the bloc coun-
tries.
Cuban recognition could lead to a rupture of ties with West
Germany. Bonn's policy--known as the "Hallstein doctrine"�
calls for breaking off diplomatic relations with any country other
than the USSR that recognizes the Ulbricht regime.
The trend toward closer Cuban economic and political ties
with the bloc, which has developed at an increasingly rapid pace
since the Cuban-Soviet trade and assistance agreements were
signed last February, suggests that recognition of East Germany,
with which Cuba already has economic agreements, could come at
any time. Antonio Nunez Jimenez, executive secretary of Cuba's
powerful Agrarian Reform Institute, went to East Germany as head
of an economic mission early last month. During the visit he made
a formal address at Humboldt University, saying: "We have de-
clared that we desire diplomatic relations, not only with the Soviet
Union, but with all socialist countries."
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..�EGRET
West Germans Indicate Desire for Polaris Missiles
eat German Foreign Minister Brentano has stressed to
Ambassador Dowling that NATO forces must be equipped with
medium-range nuclear missiles. Commenting that MRBMs now
mean what machine guns meant in World War I, Brentano told
Dowling they are fundamental to European defense, and that this
is the vital NATO question which should be discussed with the
new US administration as soon as practicable next spring)
bowling surmises that Brentano's comments indicate cabinet
acceptance of the position reportedly taken by Defense Minister
Strauss that German forces should be equipped with Polaris mis-
siles. Publicly the West Germans have maintained that they have
not asked for MRBMs, and that NATO rather than Bonn must de-
cide whether to accept the American offer of such weapons to
NATO. On 17 August, Bonn rejected a Soviet protest made on
19 July against alleged plans to equip the West German Army. with
Polaris missiles. NATO countries have
serious misgivings about providing West Germany with MRBMs
even though the United States would retain custody of the nuclear
warheads.
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Situation in Laos
Ibemier Souvanna Phouma has sent emissaries to General
Phoumi at his Savannakhet headquarters in south-central Laos
in an urgent effort to reach some understanding that would avert
civil war. Discussing the situation with Ambassador Brown on 18
August, Souvanna said: "Phoumi should know that there are no
Communists or Pathet Lao in my government." Souvanna complained
of lack of help in his efforts to avoid bloodshed, and was particularly
critical of King Savang's refusal to sanction his government. Souvanna
indicated he felt the King's pose as a "prisoner" of troops in Luang
Praloang loyal to General Phoumi was contrived
cr.....
In contrast to Souvanna's anxiety, General Phoumi appears in-
crea ingly confident over prospects for his counterrevolutionary
campaign. Phoumi continues to retain the loyalty of all military com-
mands with the exception of Vientiane,
Savannakhet stresses the high morale and
will to win of Phoumi's force'
(Ehoumi has also obtained impressive backing among civilian
leaders, including many deputies and other high officials. Kou Abhay,
respected elder statesman,
was in sympathy with Phoumi's aim to restore
order in Vientiane and to punish rebel paratroop Captain Kong Le, but
that he hoped hostilities could be avoidea1.3
WJ�le willing to negotiate with the Souvanna Phouma government,
Pho mi refuses to come to any settlement until Kong Le withdraws his
troops from Vientiane. Kong Le ostensibly has turned over authority
to the new government, but his troops still control the town, and
Premier Souvanna admits that "no one is technically in charge" at
this time,
�neral Phoumi says he is proceeding with deployment of troops
around Vientiane, but does not intend to attack the capital. He feels
this pressure, combined with propaganda leaflet drops and other
psychological warfare measures, will be sufficient to frighten the
capital into submission. However, he apparently is determined to
push the issue, since he feels a protracted stalemate could be readily
exploited by the Pathet Lao dissidents;?
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(he situation in Vientiane is generally calmy and inter-
national air flights were resumed, at least temporarily, on
18 August. There is imminent danger, however, of flooding
by the Mekong River, swollen by heavy rains. Because of this
threat and the unsettled political situation, dependents of Ameri-
can personnel in the town were evacuated to Thailand on 19
August
19 Aug 60
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CQI,LIPiFfTIAL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State'for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
�PrLJENTIAL
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