CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/11/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02977809
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: November 10, 1960

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10 November 1960
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
75
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO 9
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1 0 JUN 1980
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10 NOVEMBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR attempts to mollify De Gaulle on
policy toward Algeria but retains free
hand to aid rebels.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Europeans in Algeria increasingly bitter
over De Gaulle's policy; extremists may
be encouraged by sudden protest resigna-
tion of the number-tvio French civil offi-
cial there. 0
Belgian Communists, with Soviet support,
reportedly plan base in Ghana for sub-
versive operations aimed at the Congo.
Japanese expected to begin production
from Persian Gulf offshore oil conces-
sion early next year.
III. THE WEST
Italy�Failure of national government
coalition to control important city coun-
cils in local elections may eventually
pose new cabinet crisis.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
10 November 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*USSR-France-AlgeriaCSoviet Foreign Minister Gromyko,
In a talk with French Ambassador Dejean on 5 November,
maintained that it is not the USSR but France that has shifted
its policy on Algeria. Gromyko repeated Khrushchev's ob-
servation in New York that the USSR, in extending de facto
recognition to the Algerian rebel regime, had only gone as
far as De Gaulle on the question of recognizing the provisional
Algerian government. Soviet leaders probably still hope to
avoid provoking an open break with Paris for the immediate
future, and assurances of this type appear primarily designed
to mollify the French while retaining for the USSR a free hand
to aid the rebels. In addition to recent well-publicized ship-
ments of relief supplies and small quantities of nonmilitary,
equipment, Moscow is likely to supply the rebels with at least
small quantities of light arms and ammunition and possibly
some "technical personnel," and to give strong diplomatic and
propaganda support for the Algerian proposal for a UN-super-
vised referendum in Algeria:7
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Algeria: De Gaulle's 4 November speech has created a
feeling of bitterness and depression among members of the
European community in Algeria, according to the American
consul general in Algiers. Although popular demonstrations
have been few and the powerful Front for French Algeria has
reportedly urged the Europeans and loyal Moslems "to clench
fists and wait," the sudden resignation of Andre Jacomet, the
second-ranking civil official in Algeria, shows serious con-
cern over De Gaulle's policy and may encourage extremists
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and some elements of the army to overt action against
De Gaulle. The rebel provisional government, now meet-
ing in Tunis, will probably continue to assess Algerian
reaction before making any official comment on the speech.
(Page 1)
*Republic of the Congo:/he Belgian Communist party,
which in the past has had a primary responsibility for the
development of Communist assets in the Congo, plans to es-
tablish in Ghana a base for propaganda operations and for
the indoctrination of selected Congolese leaders,
Two Belgian Communists
who visited Moscow in late October reportedly received a
promise of "all necessary, aid" for the establishment of such
a center, whose activities would include publication of a
newspaper. The projected center appears to be one effort
to counter Mobutu's expulsion of bloc diplomats and techni-
cians in mid-September, a move which jeopardized Commu-
nist propaganda and penetration operations in the Congdi
(Page 2)
*Japan - Persian Gulf Oil: Japanese oil interests in the
Middle East are expected to begin production from their off-
shore oil concession in the Persian Gulf near Kuwait in early
1961. It is estimated that by 1963 this production will amount
to 30 percent of present Japanese requirements. The crude
probably will be refined and marketed almost totally in Japan
In a determined effort to cut Tokyo's foreign exchange costs
for petroleum, whicti in 1959 amounted to $385,000,000.
v
III. THE WEST
Italy: The Italian Communist party will be encouraged
by its gains in the 6-7 November local elections to press the
Nenni Socialists to abandon their "autonomist" policies and
return to close cooperation with the Communists because their
combined electoral strength has almost reached that of the
10 Nov 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
--T-OP�SEeRET-
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Christian Democrats. The government coalition parties won
a slim nationwide majority but failed to gain control of such
Important city councils as those in Rome, Genoa, Venice,
Florence, and Naples. If the Christian Democrats form mu-
nicipal alliances outside the pattern of the national govern-
ment coalition, Fanfani's minor coalition partners may threat-
en a cabinet crisis. (Page 3)
IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
he conclusions with respect to initiation of hostilities re-
main unchanged. The following was approved as Conclusion D'.3
(There are indications that, unless some progress is made
in the near future toward a negotiated solution of the Algerian
roblem, the Algerian rebels will request military aid from
e Sino-Soviet bloc and that transit rights for such aid will be
ranted by one or more of Algeria's North African neighbors.
I requested to send such aid, the bloc would be likely to com-
ply to the extent of arms and some technicians. In this event
the French would probably try to seize bloc arms shipments
and might attack depots of bloc arms on Tunisian and Moroc-
can territory:
10 Nov 60
DAILY BRIEF
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Algeria
President de Gaulle's 4 November speech has cre-
ated a feeling of bitterness and depression among mem-
bers of the European community in Algeria, who, ac-
cording to the American consul general in Algiers, feel
tricked and betrayed. The Europeans are particularly in-
censed because of their belief that the option for a French
Algeria has disappeared from De Gaulle's thinking in re-
gard to a referendum on self-determination in Algeria.
Popular manifestations of opposition to the speech
have been limited to easily controlled street demonstra-
tions, mostly in heavily European Oran; the powerful
Front for French Algeria has reportedly urged the Eu-
ropeans and loyal Moslems to "clench fists and wait." Ur-
gent sessions of reserve officer and veterans associations
have been reported since the speech, and French security
officers have expressed concern over these meetings. The
general Moslem reaction has been cautious.
The resignation of Andre Jacomet, the second-ranking
civil official in Algeria, took place without warning at a
meeting of leading French officials presided over by Del-
egate General Delouvrier. Jacomet's somewhat dramatic
gesture--he has since been summoned to Paris and "dis-
missed" by the government--is evidence of the state of
mind among those who must implement De Gaulle's Algerian
policies, and may encourage the extremists and some ele-
ments of the army to overt opposition to De Gaulle,
The Algerian provisional government, now meeting in
Tunis, maintains its official silence on the speech, but the
rebel minister of information indicated on 8 November that
he might soon be able to inform the American Embassy in
Tunis of the government's reaction. There are signs that
Tunisian President Bourguiba wants the rebels to keen men
all possibilities for negotiation with France.
--CONFIDENTIAL
10 Nov 60 CENTRAI INITFI I InFtWF RI III MN] Page 1
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SECRET Noir
Belgian Cthnmunist Party Mapping Operations
Against Congo
(Moscow has promised two Belgian Communist party
officials, Albert Deconinck and Jean Terfve, "all neces-
sary aid" for the establishment in Ghana of a propaganda
and indoctrination center aimed at the Congo,
Activities at the projec e
base--which would operate as a "studies center" for
Congolese--would include propaganda, indoctrination of
"progressive" Congolese, and publication of a newspape6
EPrior to the Congo's independence on 30 June, the
Belgian party and the Czech Consulate in Leopoldville ap-
pear to have shared responsibility for Communist prop-
aganda and penetration efforts, with the Belgian Commu-
nists operating primarily among Congolese visitors to
Brussels. It appears likely that Communist efforts in
the Congo have been seriously hampered by Colonel
Mobutu's expulsion of bloc diplomats and technicians in
mid-September. if Lumumba re-
gains power, Soviet and Czech specialists are prepared
to return to Leopoldville "at once0
�SEeRE-T--
10 Nov 60 CENTRAI INITF1 I inpmrr RI III Prito
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CONFIDENTIAL
Italian Local Elections
The Italian Communists made gains in the nationwide lo-
cal elections held from 1 to 7 November. Interest in the vot-
ing for provincial councils�always an indicator of party
strength for the country as a whole--was heightened this year
because television for the first time played an important part
in a political campaign and the appeal of the party chiefs to a
national audience emphasized broad issues. The ruling Chris-
tian Democrats and their center party allies in the national
coalition�the Democratic Socialists, the Republicans, and
the Liberals--retained a margin of popular support, but the
total Communist and Nenni Socialist vote nearly equalled that
of the Christian Democrats, whose percentage was down 2
percent from the national elections of 1958.
Nenni may argue that his policy of political independence
from the Communists did not prevent the Socialist party from
holding its own in the voting--as the party left wing had sug-
gested it would. Nevertheless, the party's failure to make sub-
stantial gains will put him under strong pressure from the
left wing to renew close ties with the Communists. This issue
may cause trouble at the next Socialist party congress, planned
for January or February.
The Christian Democrats and their coalition allies failed
to gain a majority on the provincial councils of such important
cities as Venice, Naples, and Genoa. Deadlocks in the coun-
cils have in the past been resolved by having a government
commissioner appointed who is responsible to Rome. The
Christian Democrats may try to avoid this unpopular step by
making alliances with parties to the right or left of the national
coalition. Alliance with the neo-Fascists, however, would be
strongly opposed by the Democratic Socialists, while alliance
with the Nenni Socialists would be anathema to the Liberals.
If the Christian Democrats persist, a cabinet crisis might en-
sue.
CONFIDENTIAL
10 Nov 60 CENTRAL INTELLIC;FNCT RI III FTIKII
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IA I L.01.-�1 'V 1 I '1 L.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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