CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/04/20

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03177891
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: April 20, 1960

Approved for pg.& SECRET
3.3(h)(2)
20 April 1960
Copy No. C 1; 8
CENTRAL
IYTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO,
NO MANDE IN CLASS.
1:3 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED 1O2 IS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AWN,: HO 10.2
JUN 1990
'Art. -----. REVIEWER:
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20 APRIL 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Kishi planning to push for Diet vote on
US-Japan security treaty between 22 and
26 April; demand of opposition Socialists
for more time for debate gets some in-
fluential press support.
South Korean army chief of staff claims
situation now under control in Seoul and
other population centers; popular resent-
ment and possibility of further disorders
remain.
0
Senanayake government in Ceylon given
only slim chance of surviving test vote
in Parliament this week; governor gener-
al may order new elections if Seranayake
is defeated. Q.)
Increased tensions in Turkey expected to
follow Menderes government's announce-
ment of three-month ban on all political
activity.
Hammarskjold may visit Union of South
Africa in June or July; failure of Black
Africans to respond to work-stoppage
calls indicates temporary drop in their
ability to organize campaigns against
Union government.
0
III. THE WEST
� Castro, angered by some recent Cuban
Supreme Court decisions, may replace
court head; other reports indicate For-
eign Minister Raul Roa may resign or be
"retired" to presidency.
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III CENTkAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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20 April 1960
DAILY BRIEF
. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Japan: eliberations in the Diet on the new US-Japanese
security treaty are reaching the decisive stage. Prime Min-
ister Kishi, who is assured of sufficient votes for ratification,
is planning to push for a vote by the lower house between 22
and 26 April. However, the opposition Socialists are insisting
on further time for debate, and this demand has recently won
some influential press support. Informed observers believe
that unless the government delays its plans for ten days to two
weeks, it will risk a Socialist boycott of the Diet and possibly
widespread public furor over what would be considered its dic-
tatorial attitud92 (Page 1)
*South Korea: EI.'he South Korean army chief of staff reporte
late on 19 April that the situation was under control in Seoul and
other population centers which were placed under martial law
following large-scale clashes in the capital. Despite the imposi
tion of martial law, demonstrations were reportedly held in
Seoul and several other South Korean cities during the morning
of 20 April. Since the populace bears less animosity toward
the military forces than it does toward the police, efforts of
the troops to maintain order are less likely to provoke further
violence. The situation will remain tense, however, and fur-
ther disorders are possible. In any case, the resentment
which led to the spontaneous disorders of the past month will
remain as deep-seated ill feeling throughout the nation until
drastic reforms are effected], (Page 2)
Ceylon,: Prime Minister Senanayake's month-old minority
government appears to have only a slim chance of surviving the
first test vote in Parliament on its policies. The vote is sched-
uled for 22 April. Although opposition abstentions or defections
,
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might yet enable Senanayake to squeak through Friday's vote, this
would only postpone his government's fall. Governor General Goo-
netilleke now seems inclined to order new elections if Senanayake
is defeated, rather Ihan to call on thP ivided opposition to try to
form a government. (Page 3)
Turkey: The three-month ban on all political activity, announced
in Ankara on 18 April followed several weeks of rising friction be-
tween the government and its political opposition, and at the least
the move seems certain to increase tensions further. Administra-
tion spokesmen have accused the major opposition force, the
Republican People's party, of "subversive, illegitimate, and il-
legal" activities, and have threatened that the Menderes govern-
ment will "liquidate" that party. Meanwhile, recent attempts by
the government to use the army for political purposes have caused
dissatisfaction in military qua tprs uthprp nprmihlican leader
Inonu retains great popularity. (Page 4)
South Africa: LUN Secretary General Hammarskjold believes
that the South African Government's reply to his approach about
visiting South Africa presents an opening for further negotiations
and thus postpones the need for further UN action on that country,
at least for the time being. The Union government has suggested
that Hammarskjold meet Foreign Minister Louw in London at the
close of the Commonwealth prime ministers' meeting on 11 Ma
to discuss arrangements for a visit in July or August)
Within the Union, the failure of Black Africans to respond to
calls for a work stoppage this week indicates that the virtual ex-
fiaustion of the urban Blacks' meager economic reserves, coupled
with the widespread arrests of native leaders, has temporarily
reduced Black African ability to organize antigovernment cam-
paigns.
III. THE WEST
Cuba: Fidel Castro has been angered by recent decisions of
the Cuban Supreme Court favoring owners of expropriated prop-
erties, and he may be planning to name President Osvaldo Dorticos
to head the court in an effort to control it more closely. There are
20 Apr 60
DAILY BRIEF 11
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also reports that Foreign Minister. Raul Roa, under fire from
extremists in the regime and discouraged by Latin American
criticism of ies, may resign or be "retired" to the
presidency. (Page 6)
P
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20 Apr 60
;fr
DAILY BRIEF ill
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CONFIDENTIAL
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
IL ASIA-AFRICA
US Security Treaty Imitue Approaches Dzitisive Stage in Japan
,Deliberations in the Japanese Diet on the new US-Japanese
security treaty are nearing the decisive stage. Prime Minister
Kishi is planning to push for a vote between 22 and 26 April.
Most of the conservative party dissidents who sought to extract
from Kishi a commitment to resign as the price of their support
for the treaty have been brought into line, and the government
has more than sufficient votes to assure passage.
[The opposition Socialists, despite a near-record 80-hour
discussion of the treaty in committee, are insisting on further
time for debate. Although unab le to arouse popular interest in
their nationwide campaign against the treaty, the Socialists re-
cently have won some influential newspaper support for their in-
sistence on additional time for debate.1
unless the government de-
lays for ten days or two weeks in bringing the treaty to a vote, it
risks public charges of "arbitrary and arrogant" railroading of
legislation. A delay, however, would necessitate extending the
present Diet session beyond its expiration on 26 May to allow the
upper house 30 days for action, as provided by the constitution.
The Socialists, who have vowed to fight the Diet extension as well,
are expected to boycott the treaty vote regardless of timing.]
CONFIDENTIAL
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Seoul Declares Martial Law
fiension remains high in South Korea following what one
American observer has described as a full-scale revolt]
Louth Korean Army Chief of Staff Song Yo-chan has state
that the situation is under control in Seoul and other major
population centers which were placed under "emergency" mar-
tial law the afternoon of 19 April after having earlier in the
day been put under less stringent "ordinary" martial law. An
estimated 70, 000 persons led by students stormed the pre-
idential palace during the day to protest the rigging of the 15
March presidential elections. Preparations reportedly had
�been made to evacuate President Rhee by helicopter if neces-
sary, but the rioters were repulsed by gunfire. During the
morning of 20 April, however, demonstrations were held in
Seoul and several other South Korean cities despite the im-
position of martial law.]
(Since the populace bears less animosity toward the mil-
itary forces than it does toward the police, efforts of the
troops to maintain order are less likely to provoke violence.
Further disorders, however, remain possible. According to
the minister of defense, an ammunition warehouse has been
looted by students and they now possess considerable amounts
of firearms. The government has ordered universities and
high schools closed throughout the country]
ile the government appears to have enough force to im-
pose its will on the people, the resentment which led to the
spontaneous disorders of the past month will remain until dras-
tic reforms are effected. The regime, however, has given no
indication of willingness to grant political concessions to re-
dress the situation.
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20 Apr 60
CENTRAi MITP1 I irtrmrc DliiiG1
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ikkCONFIDENTIAL011
Ceylonese Government May BeDefeated on First Parliamentary
Test Vote
Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake's conservative minority
government seems to have little chance of surviving the test vote
in Parliament scheduled for 22 April. The ruling United National
party (UNP) commands no more than 59 sure votes out of the total
of 155 to be cast, and the outcome will depend entirely on uncom-
mitted opposition elements. Some of these might abstain or even
support the government, but it is unlikely that the UNP will re-
ceive the 19 additional votes necessary for an absolute majority.
In the event of the government's fall, Governor General Goo-
netilleke would be empowered either to dissolve Parliament and
establish a caretaker government pending new elections or to re-
quest the second-ranking Sri Lanka Freedom party (SLFP) to form
a government. Goonetilleke at present seems inclined to take the
more reasonable step of dissolving Parliament and calling for new
elections, presumably realizing that the SLFP could neither sur-
vive as a minority government nor patch together a lasting coali-
tion from among the divided opposition ranks.
A government victory during Friday's vote would merely post-
pone its fall. Senanayake presumably realizes this and might
choose to resign voluntarily rather than court damaging political
attack and nubile disfavor by ruling without a clear mandate.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Turkish Government Bans Political Activities
The three-month ban on all political activity in Turkey,
announced on 18 April, follows increasingly bitter exchanges
between the two major political parties. The ban was an-
nounced by a commission set up earlier that day by the Grand
National Assembly to investigate the "destructive, illegiti-
mate, and illegal activities" of the opposition Republican
People's party (RPP).
During the debate prior to establishment of the commis-
sion--composed exclusively of members of the governing
Democratic party (DP)--fighting broke out between deputies
on the floor of the assembly. g?n 19 April street fighting
broke out in Ankara when police dispersed a crowd near RPP
headquarter_s_.j
A cabinet member has publicly stated that the govern-
ment will "liquidate" the RPP, which holds 173 of the 610
assembly seats. New repressive action against the opposi-
tion press in Turkey also appears imminent. These latest
events seem certain to heighten tension and may result in
increased underground activities by opponents of the present
regime.
The latest crisis developed rapidly following events near
the Turkish city of Kayseri in early April. The government
had sought by warnings and the use of troops to prevent or
delay the tour of the Kayseri region by Ismet Inonu, head of
the RPP: These heavy-handed methods backfired, however,
and Inonu appears to have emerged from the trip with en-
hanced support throughout the country.
At this point the Democratic party apparently decided to
attack the RPP directly through the legislature. A statement
issued by the DP on 12 April warned that the RPP was im-
plementing "a very violent policy of provocation and organiz-
ing plans capable of leading to incidents or uprisings." On
20 Apr 60 CENTPAI imrci I IfICkIrc DI iii or I a
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17 April, the RPP replied by introducing a motion accusing Pre-
mier Menderes and his party of "attempting to crush the consti-
tutional rights of citizens" and calling for a parliamentary inves-
tigation.
While bitter partisanship is not new on the Turkish polit-
ical scene, the present situation contains new and potentially
dangerous implications for both Turkish democracy and the
security of the state. At least four army officers resigned--
and were subsequently arrested--following the Kayseri affair.
In addition, reports of irritation in high military circles at
the government's treatment of Inonu--a former military lead-
er--have created new doubts regarding the army's support for
the present regime. In Istanbul, a recent crudely handled at-
tempt by the police to "plant" a weapon on the person of a
prominent opposition newsman has caused new consternation
over the administration's use of the police for political pur-
poses.
20 Anr 60
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III. THE WEST
Castro May Be Planning High-Level Government Changes
Fidel Castro and the officials who run his revolutionary re-
form program are dissatisfied by the Cuban Supreme Court's
recent decisions favoring owners of expropriated properties and
by its agreement to investigate charges of mistreatment of polit-
ical prisoners. Castro is always angered by such obstructions to
his plans or authority. There is one unconfirmed but plausible
report that the compliant President of Cuba, Osvaldo Dorticos,
will be named president of the Supreme Court in an effort to bring
it more closely under Castro's control.
rumors that Foreign Minister Raul
Roa would be retired to the presidency and Education Minister
Armando Hart would be made foreign minister. There is increas-
ing evidence that extremist officials like Vice Foreign Minister
Francisco Chavarry are critical of Roa's handling of the proposed
Havana conference of underdeveloped nations and of his choice of
personnel for posts abroad, and that they are trying to have him
removed.
Criticism of Castro's policies by Venezuelan President Betan-
court and other Latin American leaders whom Roa respects appar-
ently has discouraged Roa, and he may prefer to return to his
teaching career or accept some figurehead post such as the pres-
idency. Hart, his rumored successor, is believed to be dominated
by his wife, Haydee Santamaria, and other pro-Communists influ-
ential in Cuban foreign affairs.
Continued guerrilla opposition activity in Oriente Province height-
ens the possibility that Castro will make some move to strengthen
his control. He said on 18 April that he would make important an-
nouncements in a speech at the May Day celebrations.
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Aft
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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