CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/05/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03179255
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: May 27, 1960

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I 1 r Ultr
27 May 1960
Copy No. C. ICS
CENTRAL
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
INTELLIGENCE
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27 MAY 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet spokesmen assert increase in in-
ternational tensions is "temporary."
East German regime reportedly consid-
ering tighter controls on travel of East
German citizens to Berlin.
USSR extends additional $45,000,000 in
economic aid credits to Iraq.
ASIA-AFRICA
0
Position of Indonesian rebels on Sumatra
described as critical by important rebel
military leader; statements indicate some
rebel leaders may be interested in Dja-
karta's feelers for triice or cease-fire.
Singapore government's insistence on
granting visa to a Soviet trade official
� remains an issue in Singapore-Malaya
relations.
�Mali Federation, which attains inde-
pendence within the French Community
on 20 June, plans embassy in Moscow
and will probably support admission of
Peiping to UN.
III. THE WEST
Early announcement expected on Cuban-
Polish diplomatic relations. (TOP
SECRET DAUNT) Arrival of 80 Rus-
sians in Cuba on 22 May to join Soviet
Trade Commission there reported.
LATE ITEM
�Turt.ey - Armed forces tale over
government; promise early elections.
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CENTRA
INF"
L INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
27 May 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*USSR: A public lecturer in Moscow in a 25 May discussion
of the international situation stressed the "temporary" nature
of the current increase in tensions, and assured his audience
that the "basic forces" :leading to a further relaxation of ten-
sions were still operative. A Soviet Embassy official in Bel-
grade, apparently acting under instructions, expressed his view
that US-Soviet relations would soon improve and that new nego-
tiations could begin "at any time." Soviet propaganda commen-
tary on President Eisenhower's address of 25 May, however,
and Gromyko's UN speech of 26 May indicate that Moscow intends
to maintain its shrill public criticism of the United States over
the U-2 incident. (Page 1)
East Germany: Dince Ithrushchev's East Berlin visit of
1941 May, party boss Ulbricht has been holding urgent meet-
ings of East German officials, including police and security
functionaries, to reappraise the problem of limiting travel of
East German citizens to Berlin.
stricter measures for controlling access
of East Germans to East Berlin are being discussed, but no
restrictive measures are to be taken in the near future directly
affecting access to West Berlin. The regime appears to be torn
between its own urgent desire to curb flights of refugees to West
Berlin--it has already greatly cut the flow over the East.- West
German frontier--and Khrushchev's apparent desire to avoid in-
eidents nvpr wpst Berlin at this timED
(Page 2)
USSR-Iraq: The Soviet Union has agreed to increase its
$137,500,060 economic aid credit to Iraq, which was granted in
March 1959, by an additional $45,000,000 for rehabilitation of
the Basra-Baghdad railway. Soviet leaders probably hope this
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will help arrest the slow decline in Soviet-Iraqi relations over
the past six months. In view of the slow pace of Iraq's devel-
opment program, drawings against the original credit have
reportedly been modest,. (Page 3)
I I. ASIA-AFRICA
Indonesia: One of the top-ranking military leaders of the
Sumatran rebels, Lt. Col. Nainggolan, on 17 May described
the rebels' position on Sumatra as critical, with daily neces-
sities down to the "absolute minimum" and military equipment
sufficient only for "incidental defense."
Nainggolan claimed that the Indo-
nesian Government's over-all position was likewise gloomy, and
that only the Communists could benefit from such a situation. He
stated that negotiations with Djakarta's Army Chief of Staff Gen-
eral Nasution should be conducted concurrently with the dissi-
dents' struggle, with the aim of at least insinuating rebel ideas
"into the structure of the Sukarno regime "overt feelers on
a truce or cease-fire have been extended by the Djakarta govern
ment since mid-1958; Nainggolan's statement is the strongest in-
dication to date that some rebel leaders are seriously interested.
(Page 4)
Singapore: g_he Singapore government's insistence on grant-
ing a six-month visa to a Soviet trade official remains an issue
in Singapore's relations with Malaya and could affect various as-
pects of the British position on the island. Malaya's opposition
to Singapore's proposal resulted in a deadlock at a recent meet-
ing of the tripartite Singapore Internal Security Council (SISC).
Malaya has threatened that if Singapore persists in its decision,
It will withdraw from the SISC and impose stringent restricti
at the causeway ennner ing Singapore with the mainland.
Page 5)
Mali: khe Mali Federation of Senegal and Soudan plans to se
up an embassy in Moscow as well as in three Western and four
African capitals following its attainment of independence within,.
27 May 60
DAILY BRIEF
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Ethe French Community on 20 June. In the UN, to which Mali ex-
pects to be admitted this fall, the new state probably will support
the admission of Communist Chin)
(Page 6)
III. THE WEST
Cuba: Eighty Russians arrived in Cuba on 22 May to join the
SovieTTFade Commission established during Miknvan vigil- in
ebruarv.
fle k.astro regime is granting visas to numerous Soviet
tic) bloc personnel without apparent regard to their status or activities.
Cuba has asked agrenient for an ambassador to Warsaw, and Cuban-
Polish diplomatic relations will Probably be announced shortlyj
(Page 7)
IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
West New Guinea Problem SNIE 65-2-60. 24 May 60.
LATE ITEM
*Turkish Military Seizes Government:, (information as of \
0400 EDT, 27 ay)' Turkish Army units supported by Navy and Air \
Force elements seized control of Ankara and Istanbul in an ap-
parently bloodless coup in the early morning of 27 May. President
,
Bayar, most cabinet ministers in Ankara, and several of the highest �\
,
ranking army officers are reported under arrest, Prime Minister \
Menderes, who was last reported touring in western Anatolia
\
about 125 miles west of Ankara, apparently has not yet been taken. X
The coup was carried Qut by younger officers, with cadets of the mili-
tary academy apparently taking a major role. Representatives of :
the "military council" which is in control called at the American Embas-
sy almost immediately to give assurances that the coup was directed k:
only against the Menderes government and that Turkey would remain t\
"a stanch ally of the United States as well as a devoted member of
NATO." These military representatives promised early free elections
27 May 60
DAILY
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� and stated that those government officials responsible for the
previous regime's undemocratic measures would be tried by
civilian courts. Brigadier General Ref 1k Tulga has taken over
as mayor and governor of Istanbul. He is a former military
attache in the United States and is littlArrihtad ac
pro-American."
27 May 60
DAILY BRIEF
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Views on Future US-Soviet Relations
Private comments by Soviet diplomats, together with the line
taken by a public lecturer in Moscow, are designed to emphasize
that the breakdown in the Paris talks does not herald a far-reach-
ing revision of Soviet policy toward the West. At a lecture on
the international situation on 25 May, the speaker spelled out this
approach along the lines established by Khrushchev in his Berlin
speech on 20 May. The lecturer emphasized that the current in-
crease in tensions was of a temporary nature and assured his
audience that the "basic forces" leading to relaxation of tensions
were still operative.
The lecturer claimed that, in contrast to "consistent failure"
prior to Stalin's death, subsequent Soviet efforts to reduce tension
had been successful; as the summit approached, however, it be-
came clear that no progress could be expected on Berlin, and the
US announcement on 7 May of plans to conduct nuclear tests to im-
prove detection techniques "scuttled" the sole issue with good pros-
pects for agreement.
According to an American Embassy officer attending the
lecture, the speaker was on the defensive in justifying Khrushchev's
stand at Paris and in minimizing the adverse consequences. The
comments and questions of the audience revealed skepticism over
the objectives to be gained by the Soviet actions in the Security
Council. The audience also appeared concerned over the possible
effects on US-Soviet relations of a trial of Francis Powers and
the conclusion of a separate East German peace treaty.
Soviet diplomats apparently have instructions to offset the
shrill public attacks on the United States by taking a conciliatory
line in conversations with Americans. A Soviet official in Bel-
grade expressed the belief that US-Soviet relations would im-
prove soon and that new negotiations could be held "at any time."
He added that Khrushchev had the "highest regard" for President
Eisenhower. Op Vienna� a Soviet Embassy officer told the New
York Times correspondent that there would be no "basic change"
in Soviet policy toward the Wes.
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East Germans Reportedly Planning Measures to Curb
East German Travel to Berlin
� (-Since Khrushchev's departure from East Berlin on 21. May,
party boss Walter Ulbricht is reliably reported to have called a
series of meetings to consider problems relating to West Berlin,
particularly existing regulations governing travel to East Berlin
by East Germans, District and county leaders for the Berlin
area were to meet on 26 May, with police and customs officials
in attendance. On 28 May, Ministry of Interior officials, under
the chairmanship of the minister, are to cliScuss the results of
these meetings._
no restric-
tive measures are to be initiated directly against West Berlin in
the near future�apparently meaning that the East Germans will
not harass travel between East and West Berlin or from West
Berlin to West German:72
LA mounting proportion of the total East German escapes--
more than 50,000 in the first four months of 1960�have been
made through West Berlin; the regime has been able to impose
increasingly effective security precautions on the East - West
German frontier. In an effort to discover potential refugees,
police now make frequent checks of credentials of East Germans
going to East Berlin. Nevertheless, more than 3,800 persons
fled to West Berlin in the week ending 1.7 May, and flights are
continuing at a high level. The regime may be considering some
new type of identity document as part of its campaign against
escapes)
Llihrushchev's failure to take any immediate steps toward a
separate peace treaty, which would transfer West Berlin access
controls to the East Germans, has placed Ulbricht in a difficult
position. Evidently barred from imposing harsh controls on travel
to and from West Berlin, he is casting about for additional meas-
ures to make East German access to East Berlin still more diffi-
cult, although he claims the city is the East German capita1.1
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USSR Makedditional Aid Commitment to irtiq
The Soviet Union has agreed to add $45,000,000 to the
$137,500,000 economic aid credit to Iraq granted in March 1959.
The new aid is to be used for the reconstruction of the Basra
Baghdad railway,
This project involve the construction of a new stand-
ard-gauge line connecting these cities, in keeping with the sur-
veys called for under the 1959 aid agreement; it may also include
Soviet supply of locomotives and other rolling stock. Baghdad's
announcement did not specify the terms of the new credit, but it
probably carries the earlier, credit's low rate of interest and will
also be repayable 12 years after the individual projects have been
completed.
Prior to First Deputy Premier Mikoyan's visit to Baghdad in
April, Soviet officials had informed the Iraqi ambassador in Mos-
cow that the USSR was willing to expand its aid commitments.
Mikoyan's talks with Qasim reportedly
did not go smoothly, however, and no additional aid was announced
at the time.
Soviet leaders probably hope that the additional credit will
arrest the slow decline in Soviet-Iraqi relations over the past six
months which has resulted from the Qasim regime's series of
anti-Communist measures and signs that Baghdad would like to
improve its relations with the West. While Moscow is on sched-
ule in carrying out its commitments for industrial, hydroelectric,
irrigation, and other projects under last year's aid credit, Qasim's
promises of rapid economic development and the USSR's propaganda
exploitation of its program have led the Iraqi public to expect rapid
results.
Rehabilitation of the Basra-Baghdad railway�a high-priority
goal of the Qasim government--is therefore probably designed to
restore Iraqi confidence in bloc aid. The badly run-down condition
of this link--the main means for moving cargo from Iraq's prin-
cipal port to the interior--has been a key factor causing the pres-
ent economic stagnation,
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Sumatran Rebel Leader Advocates Talks With Indonesian
Army Leaders
Colonel Nainggolan,
a ranking reb el officer in Sumatra, said negotiations with
Djakarta's Army Chief of Staff General Nasution should be re-
garded as a strategic aspect of the dissident struggle. Naing-
golan described the rebel situation in Sumatra as critical,
with supplies of daily necessities down to the "absolute minimum"
and military equipment sufficient only for "incidental" defense.
He alleged that economic and monetary problems rendered
Djakarta's position equally gloomy and that only the Commu-
nists stood to benefit from the situation. He was even concerned
over possible Communist infiltration of the rebel movement. Ac-
cording to Nainggolan, the increasingly tense political atmosphere
in Djakarta and growing Communist agitation have created a situa-
tion favorable to discussions with anti-Communist elements in the
Indonesian Government with the aim of at least insinuating rebel
ideas "into the structure of the Sukarno regime."
While Nainggolan's message is the strongest indication to date
of rebel interest in talks, the two sides still appear to be far apart.
CSince mid-1958, the Indonesian Government has extended covert
feelers toward a truce or cease-fire, but its terms requiring sur-
render and at least temporary exile of key rebel leaders have been
unacceptablej The rebels also have made unrealistic demands in
the past.
There is no indication that this interest in negotiations on the
part of dissident leaders in Sumatra is shared by the RPI leaders
in the Celebes, where the rebel military situation apparently is
less critical.
SECRET
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Imre �Cafe/4E1-T--
Impasse Developing Over Question of Soviet Trade Representation
In Singapore
the local
government's insistence on granting a six-month visa to a So-
viet trade official, I. S. Gazov, had developed into a crisis
which could affect many aspects of the British position on this
island as well as Singapore-Federation relations. An impasse
developed between Singapore and the Federation of Malaya at
the 19 May meeting of the Singapore Internal Security Council
(SISC), the regulatory body responsible for internal security
decisions in Singapore. Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan
Yew refused to back down on the visa question, despite ada-
mant Malayan opposition and implied threats against Singapore]
/he UK representatives at the SISC failed in their efforts
to reach a compromise under which Gazov would be permitted
to stay for six months without a staff or privileged communica-
tions and Singapore would agree henceforth not to issue visas
to bloc nationals for more than two weeks without SISC approval.
Malaya reserved its position until the next meeting of the
council, scheduled for 30 May, but since the meeting, Malaya
has told British officials that if Singapore persists in its posi-
tion, the Federation will quit the MSC and close the causeway
connecting Singapore with the mainland. Closing the cause-
way would result in increased customs controls on all com-
modities and require passports and visas for all travel from
Singapore.]
EThe British reportedly are inclined to support the Federa-
tion and inform Singapore that the UK is prepared to make the
decision stick and to use emergency security measures to
cope with any rioting which might break out. In this connec-
tion, plans for military action
in the event of an emergency are being reviewed_ j,
Eunder the Singapore constitution, Malaya's withdrawal
from the SISC would reduce it to a consultative body. In this
event, London could not, use it to solve touchy security prob-
lems and would be forced to impose its decisions unilaterally
and possibly to amend or revoke the constitution in case of
serious disagreement. The British would be reluctant to
take these steps, in view of their belief that the present gov-
ernment is the best that. can be obtained under present condi-
tions in Singapore3
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Mali PlanntligDiplomatic Relation With Blothe Federation LvxdaL, .uL11bL1I1wvL Lue vieSt African states
of Senegal and Soudan, plans to establish an embassy in Moscow
following Mali's attainment of independence within the French Com-
munity on 20 June, according to Senegalese leader Leopold Senghor,
who is expected to become president of the new state. Initial dip-
lomatic missions also are planned for Paris, Washington, London,
and four African capitals, including Conakry. Mali will be rep-
resented elsewhere by France, under the terms of a diplomatic
accord signed last month)
[In a conversation on 23 May with the American consul general
in Dakar, Senghor indicated that he personally had favored delay-
ing for a year or two any exchange of representatives with the
USSR, but that the Soudanese had insisted on taking such action
immediately. Many Soudanese leaders are strongly influenced
by Marxism and predisposed toward friendly ties with Communist
countries. Their influence seems certain to predominate within
independent Mali's foreign ministry as a result of a recent deal al-
locating that portfolio to Soudan and the presidency and defense min-
istry to SenegaD
aenghor stated he had been "categoric" in resisting Soudanese
arguments to send an ambassador to Peiping as well as Moscow,
At the same time, however, he voiced a preference for recogniz-
ing "both Chinas" and indicated that Mali intended to support the
admission of Communist China to the UN. Mali itself expects to
become a UN member this fall, along with a number of other new
African states. Earlier, Senghor had told a correspondent for the
North Vietnamese news agency that Mali ,favored the establishment
of relations with "all states of Indochina, including the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam19
eiping, which succeeded in 1958 in obtaining recognition from
Morocco, the Sudan, and Guinea, recently has been faced with lively
competition from Taipei, which established diplomatic relations
with both Cameroun and Togo earlier this year. A pending request
by Nationalist China to open a consulate in Dakar, the Mali capital,
has reportedly been approved by Senegal but seems likely to be
blocked by the Snuclanpstp )
CONFIDENTIAL
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III. THE WEST
Cuba - Soviet Bloc
Eighty Russians arrived in Cuba on 22 May to join the
Soviet Trade Commission established during Mikoyan's visit
in February.
Caracas newspapers
this week reported that groups of Russians and Czechs have
recently been passing through Venezuela en route to Havana
by several airlines. Their documents described them as
mechanics, technicians, and experts in varying fields, and
a "diplomatic mission of techni en1 as st.nce."
in the past three
months the Castro regime has admitted numerous bloc na-
tionals without much apoarent regard to their status or ac-
tivities.
The attaches report that the influence of Russians is be-
ginning to be felt all over Cuba, and they believe that Soviet
advisers assisted in the planning which led to the recent order
for substantial use of Soviet crude oil in all refineries in Cuba.
Five Soviet tankers have already delivered oil, and others
are en route under a reported agreement calling for 1,500,000
tons to be received by Cuba in 1960. This probably includes
some refined products. Cuban-flag vessels will commence
direct trade with Russia this month.
70 to 80 young Cubans have
been sent to the USSR for jet training has added to specula-
tion that the Soviet bloc may soon provide Castro with jet
planes�probably through Czechoslovakia, with which he
has just resumed relations.
university students from all Cuban provinces are in the
USSR for an "indoctrination course." They may also re-
ceive technical training, which Castro officials consider a
primary need since many trained technicians have broken
with the regime.
CCuba has asked agrement for Salvador Massip as am-
bassador to Warsaw, and Cuban-Polish diplomatic relations
will probably be announced shortly. Massip cooperated
closely with Soviet diplomats in Mexico City while he was
Castro's ambassador ther_eD
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Now CONFIDENTIAL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Departmrnt of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs �
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
T.he Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
T.he Director, The joint Staff
C.hief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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