CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/06/08

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03189331
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: June 8, 1960

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CENTRAL
IYTE LIGENCE
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8 JUNE 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Peiping's People's Daily, while giving gen-
eral support to Soviet disarmament pro-
posals of 2 June, dissents from Soviet
view that war now can be ''fundamentally
eliminated." 0
Moscow encourages Ankara to continue
steps begun during Menderes regime for
improving Soviet-Turkish relations.
Communist China sends "agriculturists"
to help improve rice cultivation in Guinea,
agrees to provide scholarships for
Guinean students. 0
II. ASIA -AFRICA
Japanese leftists plan new and bigger
demonstrations; although Kishi probably
can get US-Japan treaty ratified as
planned, his prospects remain uncertain
for retaining office for long thereafter.
calls for insurgents
to step up activities and frustrate Lao-
tian Government's efforts to recapture
Souphannouvong and other NLHS leaders.
'
OUAR seeking private West German fi-
nancing for Syrian Region's five .year
industrialization plan.
ir
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
8 June 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China USSR: In their dispute with the
USSR over tactics toward the US, the Chinese Communists
have directly attacked Moscow's justification for its policy
as presented in the Soviet disarmament proposals of 2 June.
The Peiping People's Daily of 7 June, although it generally
supported the Soviet proposals as an effort toward "consol-
idating world peace," stated flatly that the Chinese cannot
agree that war now can be "fundamentally eliminated"--a
paraphrase of the text of Moscow's proposals. In attacking
the Soviet view as an "unpractical illusion about peace," the
Chinese leaders are making it clear that they have no inten-
tion of altering their bitter hostility toward American policy
in the Far East. (Page 1)
r-
L *USSR-Turkey: Moscow is encouraging the present pro-
visional government in Ankara to continue the steps begun
during the Menderes regime for improving Soviet-Turkish
relations. Khrushchev has sent a personal letter to General
Gursel, presumably urging him to visit the USSR as Menderes
had planned to do. Soviet Ambassador Ryzhov on 4 June em-
phasized to Foreign Minister Sarper the USSR's willingness to
extend economic assistance. In conversation with the US am-
bassador on 5 June, Sarper expressed concern over Khru-
shchey's recent public statements and Soviet criticism of Tur=
key's announced intention of maintaining its defense ties with
the West, and he asked for a public US statement of solidarity
with Turkey to strengthen Ankara's hand i dealing with Moscow.
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Communist China Guinea: The arrival of at least 40 Chi-
neseTa-i-EiirU:sT-rri�griculturists" in Guinea to help improve rice
cultivation is another step in Peiping's effort to prove its ability
and willingness to aid underdeveloped areas. The Chinese, who
cannot match the more extensive Western and Soviet financial aid
to underdeveloped countries, apparently feel their help in improv-
ing food productivity will have considerable impact in Guinea, where
rice is a staple often in short supply. On 3 June, Peiping and Con-
akry signed a cultural agreement in which the Chinese agreed to
provide scholarships for Guinean students.
(Page 3)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
['Japan: Extreme leftist elements, encouraged by the lack of
much adverse public reaction to the large-scale work stoppages
and other demonstrations on 4 June against Prime Minister Kishi
and the new. US-Japan security treaty, are planning even larger
demonstrations. The leftist campaign, however, has prompted
most members of the governing Liberal-Democratic party to sus-
pend factional rivalries and rally to Kishi's plan for completing
ratification of the treaty before President Eisenhower's arrival on
19 June. Even if the Socialists go through with their plan to resign
en masse from the lower house of the Diet, Kishi probably will be
able to accomplish ratification as planned, although his prpsnec
for retaining office for long thereafter remain uncertain.
) (Page 4)
Laos: ordered
insuFiaTi to use diversionary tactics and spread false rumors to
throw the Laotian Government off the track in its search for Prince
Souphannouvong and the 15 other Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) leaders
who escaped from jail on 24 May. for "armed
propaganda" forays into the "smaller cities" wherever "conditions
are right," and mentioned several provinces by name as vulnerable
areas in which "you must definitely attack."
(Page 5)
8 June 60 DAILY BRIEF
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� UAR (Syria): The UAR is seeking private West German financ-
ing for the Syrian Region's five-year industrialization plan. The
head of the Syrian Central Bank, on orders from UAR Vice Pres-
ident Amir, asked a West German official on 1 June to request
German bankers to form a consortium for this purpose. Three
successive poor crop years have greatly reduced Syria's ability
to finance its share of projects planned for construction under the
$150,000,000 Soviet credit granted in 1957, and utilization of the
Soviet credit has thus far been modest. (Page 6)
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8 June 60
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7:01'irtErENTIA-t
Peiping Directly Attacks Justification of Soviet Foreign Policy
The Chinese Communists, in their dispute with the USSR
over tactics toward the United States, have directly attacked
Moscow's justification for its policy as presented in the So-
viet disarmament proposals of 2 June. An editorial in the
Peiping People's Daily on 7 June, while generally supporting
the Soviet proposals as an effort toward "consolidating world
peace," flatly stated that the Chinese cannot agree that war
now can be "fundamentally eliminated"--a statement taken
from the text of Moscow's proposals, In attacking this state-
ment as an "unpractical illusion about peace," the Chinese
are making it clear that they have no intention of altering
their bitter hostility toward American policy in the Far East.
The Chinese are also stepping up their criticism of the
concept of East-West negotiations as a means of reducing
American strength and influence. Peiping's delegate to the
World Peace Council meeting in Stockholm stated on 29
May that "if one relies. on negotiations alone rather than re-
lying mainly on the struggle of the people, then imperialists
can never be compelled to accept negotiations and conclude
agreements with us," Regime chairman Liu Shao-chi stated
on 3 June that the "imperialists... will not accept negotia-
tions unless hard pressed by circumstances"--a line that
is consistent with the Chinese position that American hos-
tility toward Peiping has not changed despite talks at Pan-
munjo:m, Geneva, and Warsaw.
The Chinese are clearly concerned about Khrushchey's
apparent desire not to close the door on the possibility of
future summit meetings. Since the Paris meeting, Peiping
has not commented on any of Ithrushchey's remarks on
summit negotiations and has endorsed only his 16 May out-
burst in Paris. At the same time, it has stepped up its
effort to justify hostility toward the United States by citing
American "intrusions" into waters and air space claimed
by Communist China as "proof" that Peipina is not responsi-
ble for tension in the Taiwan Strait.
CONFIDENTIAL
8 June 60
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( USSR Urges Closer Relations With New Turkish Regime
The USSR is apparently encouraging the provisional
Turkish Government to follow through on the steps agreed
to by former Premier Menderes to improve Soviet-Turkish
relations. Soviet Ambassador Ryzhov, in a talk on 4 June
with Foreign Minister rper, emphasized Moscow's will-
ingness to extend economic assistance. Ryzhov also re-
quested a quick response to a letter from Khrushchev to
General Gursel which presumably urged the new Turkish
leader to carry out the exchange of visits and to conclude
economic and cultural agreements with the USSR as pro-
jected by the Menderes regime. Menderes had planned to
visit the USSR in July� and Ithrushchev was to have made
a return trip at a later date.
;' Moscow's public attitude toward the Gursel government,
as shown by Khrushchev's recent statements and Soviet
propaganda, has been characterized by cautious optimism
that Soviet-Turkish relations will become as good as they
were under Kemal Ataturk in the 1920s and by warnings of
the "danger" to Turkey from Western bases on its territory.
Radio Moscow on 5 June especially criticized rper's recent
statement that Ankara intends to continue its NATO and
CENTO membership.
On 6 June Sarper expressed concern to Ambassador
Warren over what he termed "Russian pressure" on the
Gursel government since the coup. Stressing that he has
a free hand in conducting Turkey's foreign policy and that
he would like to hold the line against Moscow, .rper re-
quested that the United States issue a statement of solidari-
ty with Turkey in order to strengthen the Gursel regime's
hand in coping with Soviet overtures and pressure tactics.
Sarper's request was also apparently prompted by his con-
cern over maintaining popular support for the provisional
government and by the vulnerability of his own position in
the interim cabinet.
8 June 60
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law
Chinese Communist Apicultural Aid to Guinea
The arrival of Chinese Communist "agriculturists"- in
Guinea to help improve rice cultivation is another step in
Peiping's effort to prove its ability and willingness to aid under-
developed areas. About 40 Chinese were seen by a US Em-
bassy official in Conakry on 2 June, and he was subsequently
told they would be enga,ged in a rice-growing project. There
have been persistent rumors in the Guinean capital that addi-
tional Chinese workers have or will come to set up rice and
livestock farms near Boke in northwest Guinea.
There have been no official announcements from either
Peiping or Conakry indicating that Communist China has ex-
tended an economic credit or grant to Guinea, but the arriv-
al of the Chinese workers suggests some sort of economic
cooperation agreement has been reached. The Chinese, who
cannot match the more extensive Western and Soviet finan-
cial aid to underdeveloped countries, are taking advantage
of the emphasis which Guinea's President Tourd places on
agricultural development and apparently feel their help in
improving food productivity in Guinea will have considerable
impact.
Rice is a Guinean staple often in short supply and the
Chinese have used it previously to further political objec-
tives. A gift of 5,000 tons was made in 1959 and another of
10,000 tons during the critical food shortage this year. For
the most part, however, bloc economic aid to Guinea has
emanated from the Soviet Union.
CONFIDENTIAL
8 June 60
rekITII A I 11.-ITC1 I intckurc DI II I CTIKI
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CONFIDENTIAL
Japanese Leftists Continue Antitreaty Demonstrations
Japan's largest postwar demonstrations and work stop-
pages were staged on 4 June to protest the new US-Japanese
security treaty and Prime Minister Kishi's refusal to re-
sign. Although the turnout was smaller than extreme left-
ist sponsors had predicted, the relative orderliness of the
participants and the lack of adverse public reaction--even
to the railway strike, which actually was illegal--have en-
couraged the leftists to plan even larger performances.
Kishi's argument that a government surrender to vio-
lence and illegal tactics would be a serious blow to democracy
in Japan has had considerable effect, however. The press,
which has been vilifying him, now is showing uneasiness
over the leftist attacks. All but a small minority in the
ruling Liberal-Democratic party (LDP) have suspended the
intraparty move to oust Kishi and are rallying to his plan
to complete ratification of the treaty in time for President
Eisenhower's arrival on 19 June. Whether or not the Social-
ists implement their decision to resign en masse from the
lower house of the Diet, passage is expected to be completed
as planned.
Kishi's prospects for retaining office for long thereafter
remain uncertain. Intraparty rivals, tacitly backed by busi-
ness interests who finance the LDP, are certain to intensify
their revolt against him because of his handling of the treaty
issue and because he stands in the way of their aspirations
for power. Most informed observers doubt that Kishi will
be able to withstand the pressure.
Meanwhile, the three major leftist groups--the radical
Zengakuren students � federation, the Sohyo labor federation,
and the Japanese Communist party--are planning demonstra-
tions during the Presidential visit. All three, however,
apparently have recognized the overwhelming public opinion
in favor of the trip and have withdrawn threats of violence.
Japanese security authorities nevertheless have indicated
some uneasiness about the possibility that minor extremist
elements may resort to such action.
8 June 60 CMITDAII IkITNI I inckircDIIIITIkI
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Pathet Lao Plans Following Escape of Prince Souphannouvong
The Pathet Lao insurgent high command,
ordered its units to pursue diversionary
tactics and to spread rumors in an effort to throw the Laotian
Government off the track in its search for Prince Souphannouvong
and the 15 other Neo Lao Hak Sat leaders who escaped on 24
May. Among the measures called for were the stimulation
of mass protest meetings against the April elections; "armed
propaganda"; and the circulation of conflicting rumors of
Souphannouvong's whereabouts. False rumors of impending
attacks by the Pathet Lao First and Second Battalions were
also to be circulated, and all provinces were admonished to
"have plans to trick the enemy into thinking that there will
be an attack in this or that place."
provinces to "use force
to enable troops to move down into the plains and cities to
carry on armed propaganda." When conditions in the "smaller
cities" permitted it, the insurgents were to "fight... (their)...
way in by hand-to-hand combat." A number of provinces
were mentioned as especially vulnerable to successful at-
tack; in such areas units were told they "must definitely
attack."
There have been no reports of a significant increase in
Pathet Lao activity in the ten days
; however, several days would have been required for
disseminated to lower echelons, and the
development of the plans called for would presumably require
a certain amount of time. While the instructions seemed
to be specifically tied to Souphannouvong's escape, they ap-
pear to have more general application and could provide a
foretaste of the tactics the Pathet Lao may adopt in combat-
ing the new Somsanith government, which the Communists
can be expected to attack as based on an illegally elected
National Assembly.
TO13-SEC-RET
8 June 60
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CONFIDENTIAL
Syrian Monetary Situation Becoming Increasingly Critical
The cumulative impact of heavy military expenditures
and three successive poor crop years, primarily due to
drought but also due partly to the land reform program, has
resulted in a critical monetary situation in the Syrian Region
of the UAR. The Syrian secretary general of industry told
the US Consulate General a week ago that the government had
"not a penny left." Officials have been sounding out US will-
ingness to provide free wheat, alleging that the Soviet Con-
sulate General had made such an offer on 1 June.
Little progress has been made on the country's five-year
industrialization plan despite a Soviet credit of about $150, -
000,000. Damascus has been unable to finance its share of
projects to be built under the Soviet credit, and only a modest
amount has been used thus far. The recent visit of Soviet
officials attempting to step up construction activity apparent-
ly was only partially successful. In an effort to speed imple-
mentation of the industrialization plan, the governor of the
Central Bank on orders from TAR Vice President Marshal
Amir asked West German officials on 1 June to seek to form
a consortium of German bankers to finance the plan.
During the first half of May the International Monetary
Fund made available $7,500,000 to help ease the Syrian for-
eign exchange shortage, but apparently these funds were
quickly committed without appreciable effect. Recent efforts
by Syrian officials to conserve foreign exchange and re-
strict domestic credits probably will prove ineffective, and
the financial situation is likely to worsen. The institution
of such controls in Syria, however, tends to bring about condi-
tions which favor closer economic union with Egypt, includ-
ing the long-heralded but much-postponed issuance of a single
UAR currency.
CONFIDE
8 June 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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*Nee
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant :for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Adininistration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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