CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/11/03

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02977804
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: November 3, 1960

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3 November 1960
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CE\TRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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3 NOVEMBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Moscow apparently has accepted Iranian
proposal for "good-will mission" to USSR
headed by Premier Sharif-Emami
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Gursel regime in Turkey, its prestige
damaged by political trials and university
dismissals, faces prospect of increasing
organized opposition.
Situation in the Congo.
III. THE WEST
Leftists in El Salvador launch bid for
power; situation appears heading for open
clash between military and mobs stirred
up by leftist agitation.
Possible threat to Panama's newly in-
stalled Chiari administration seen in
activities of country's powerful Arias
Madrid family.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
3 November 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Iran: The Soviet Union apparently, has accepted
an Iranian proposal for the dispatch of a "good-will mis-
sion" to the USSR headed by Prime Minister Sharif-Emami.
Soviet officials have renewed an
Invitation, for a visit by the Shah's sister. Although the tim-
ing of the visits does not appear to have been worked out,
Soviet policy makers probably hope such exchanges will
bring about a more favorable climate for eventual Iranian
willingness to make concessions to Soviet demands for a
guarantee against foreign military bases of all types on
Iranian soil. L_Sharif-Emarni has claimed to an American
official that he is firmly resolved to refuse to discuss "po-
litical" matters in Moscow.j
(Page 1)
II. ASIA -AFRICA
Turkey: The Committee of National Union (CNU) which (c,,
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has ruled Turkey for over five months now faces the pros-
pect of increasing organized opposition. The prestige of the
Gursel regime has been somewhat damaged by its handling zi A)-
of the current mass political trial of former 1VIenderes gov- ,le
ernment officials, as well as by the widely criticized recent
dismissal by the CNU of nearly 150 faculty members of Tur-
key's five universities. As long as the bulk of the military
establishment remains loyal, however, the CNU should have
little difficulty in controlling the country, although force may
be necessary. (Page 3) �
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Republic of the Congo: The projected trip to New
York by UN representative Dayal-,who is expected to
leave Leopoldville shortly appears designed in part to
permit him to lend support to UN charges that Belgium
and "independent" Katanga are obstructing the UN mis-
sion in the Congo.
Dayal is bringing pressure for a negotiated political set-
tlement on all factions, but especially on anti-Lumumba -1/1-A;'
elements. Dayal stated
he had sent enemies of President Tshombe
on a "conciliation" mission among warring Katangan tribes-
men "in order to weaken Tshombe's position." Criticism
by UN officials of the influx of Belgian returnees to the
Congo stems in part from their belief that Belgian techni-
cians are a major prop for the Tshombe regime and there-
fore an nhstarlp fn Cinnan unity
III. THE WEST
El Salvador: Communists and other leftist elements
launched a strong bid for power on 1 November, less than
a week after the military coup that ousted the Lemus admin-
istration. Their demands, circulated in street manifestoes
and radiobroadcasts, include the elimination of the military
from the government. Ex-President Osorio, the military
figure who masterminded the 26 October coup and sought to
win backing from the leftists by having them included in the
provisional government, now is reliably reported to be un-
easy and not in full control. The situation appears moving
rapidly toward an open clash between the military�which,
according to sources of the US Embassy, is rent by inter-
nal dissension�and civilian mobs stirred up by leftist agi=
tation. (Page 4)
� Panama: Activities of the powerful Arias Madrid fam-
ily are causing political uncertainty which could split Pres-
ident Chiari's weak coalition and threaten his month-old
3 Nov 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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administration. Influential ex-Presidents Arnulfo and
Harmodio Arias and Harmodio's sons are exploiting the
deep-seated social discontent in the country to arouse
students and the restless lower classes and to obtain the
ouster of National Guard Commandant Col. Bolivar Val=
larino, who, despite his general unpopularity, has for
some time been one of the major forces for stability in
Panama. (Page 5)
3 Nov 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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USSR Apparently Agrees to Iranian Good-Will Mission
The Soviet Union has apparently accepted an Iranian pro-
posal, first made to the Soviet ambassador in Tehran in early
October, to send a "good-will mission" headed by Prime Min-
ister Sharif-Emami to the USSR.
Soviet
officials have also renewed an invitation for a visit by Princess
Shams, sister of the Shah and honorary head of Iran's public
aid organization. No date has been set for the visits.
Since the breakdown of Soviet-Iranian negotiations for a
nonaggression pact and the conclusion of the US-Iranian bilateral
defense pact in early 1959, relations between the USSR and Iran
have been strained over the issue a Iranian participation in de-
fense arrangements with Western countries. The Shah has of-
fered on a number of occasions to give the USSR a guarantee to
ban foreign missile bases from Iranian soil, while Khrushchev
has demanded--as the price of "normal" relations--that the guar-
antee be extended to exclude foreign military bases of all types.
Last April, Moscow rejected Iranian proposals for a similar good-
will mission to be headed by ex Foreign Minister Aram and for
a meeting between the Shah and Khrushchev, unless the Iranian
Government would first agree to make concessions on the issue
of banning foreign military bases.
When Sharif-Emami replaced the stanchly anti-Communist
Eqbal as prime minister late in August, the USSR relaxed its
propaganda attacks on the Shah and the regime's policies and the
Soviet ambassador returned to Tehran. Moscow may also have
decided to drop its demand for concessions prior to any good-will
visit in the hope that a more favorable political climate would
eventually result in Iranian willingness to yield on the issue of
foreign military bases. Khru-
shchev told the Iranian foreign minister in a talk in New York
that an Iranian concession on this point is necessary for "normal"
relationi.1
Sharif-Emami has told Western officials that he considers im-
proving relations with the USSR one of the most important tasks
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muse
facing his government, but that he is not willing to impair
Iran's ties with the West. Lille prime minister, who has dis-
played reluctance to head the mission, told an American of-
ficial that he intends to avoid any discussion of political is-
sues.
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Turkey's Miluiotry Regime Losing Popular Supprirt
The Committee of National Union (CNU) is being widely
criticized in Turkey and faces the prospect of increasing or-
ganized resistance. Popular criticism currently ranges
from expressions of general disenchantment to organized
conspiracy. ithe most recent plot, reported to include re-
tired army officers, air force noncommissioned officers,
and civilians, led to several arrests and prompted special
security measures throughout the military establishment.
The plotters reportedly had planned to overthrow the CNU
between -28'October,and 1 Novembefj
Discontent has also apparently increased among the
peasants and in intellectual circles, contributing to the gen-
eral atmosphere of uneasiness. There is no indication to
date that the regime's conduct of the mass political trial of
former Menderes government officials has succeeded in dis-
pelling any of Menderesipopularity. In fact, the CNU's at-
tempt to propagandize the trial has caused more damage to
the prestige of the interim regime than to that of its pred-
ecessor. Nearly 50 of the accused face possible death sen-
tences, and concern over the fate of ex-Premier Menderes
is common to most expressions a discontent. rGeneral Gur-
sel and Foreign Minister Sarper, fully aware of the foreign as
well as domestic impact of political executions, are working
discreetly to avoid death sentences-.1 The final decision will
rest with a majority vote of the entire membership of the CNU,
among which there appears to be considerable support for the
proposed executions.
The CNU is also being strongly criticized for the recent
dismissal of nearly 150 faculty members from Turkey's five
universities. The dismissals were followed by numerous faculty
resignations and student boycotts in protest of the government's
action. In the face of the strong protest, the CNU is apparently
reconsidering its action.
If the regime continues to lose prestige, support for the
CNU may also diminish among the military, enhancing the pos-
sibility of further instability. As long as the bulk of the army
remains loyal, however, the CNU should be able to maintain con-
trol, although force and further repression may be necessary
3 Nov 60
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Salvadoran Communists Join in Strong Leftist Bid for Power
Communists and other leftist elements in El Salvador
launched a strong bid for power on 1 November, less than a
week after the military coup that ousted the Lemus adminis-
tration. Leftist demands, circulated in street manifestoes and
in Communist-prepared radiobroadcasts, call for the imme-
diate elimination from the governing junta and the cabinet of
the "tools" of ex-President Osorio, who, they charge, is re-
sponsible for "all the political, moral, and administrative
ills" of the country. The three military members of the six-
man junta and the three military cabinet members are all
known supporters of Osorio, who is probably the most influ-
ential military figure in the country. The demands, therefore,
are in effect a call for the removal of all military officers
from leading positions in the civil government. Under pres-
ent circumstances, this would mean turning the regime over
to the highly articulate leftists, who are strongly influenced
by the Communists.
Osorio, who as president from 1050 to 1956 inaugurated
moderate reforms designed to alleviate the country's deep-
seated socio-economic problems, masterminded the coup
against Lemus. He retains wide popularity among lower in-
come groups and sought to win leftist backing for the junta by
having leftists included in the provisional government. Osorio
apparently intended to play a dominant role in the provisional
government from behind the scenes. Now, however, he is
reported to be very uneasy and worried, and his friends fear
he may lose control.
The situation appears to be moving rapidly toward an
open clash between the military and the civilian mobs stirred
up by Communist agitation. Although the military is-sthil
the major force in the country, sources of the American Em-
bassy claim that the army is split with internal dissension and
may be seriously weakened. Unless Osorio or another pop-
ular military figure shows decisive leadership in meeting the
leftist challenge, the Salvadoran Government could soon be-
come completely dominated by pro-Communist elements. Such
a development would have very serious implications for the
stability of other Central American governments, particularly
Guatemala and Nicaragua.
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Political AgiL,.On in Panama .4re
Activities of the powerful Arias Madrid family are caus-
ing political uncertainty and instability in Panama which could
split President Chiari's weak coalition and threaten his month-
old administration.
Through Finance Minister Gilberto Arias, who represents
the family's strong influence in the coalition, many strategic
government posts have been filled by known leftists and sedi-
tious elements. Although he denied on 28 October that he was
advocating revolutionary overthrow of the government, Roberto
Arias has been ranting about the inevitability of social revolu-
tion to Panama's restless students and lower classes since his
return from political exile a few weeks ago. Roberto led an
abortive revolt against former President de la Guardia--whose am-
bassador in London he had been--which coincided with a Cuban-
sponsored expedition against Panama in the spring of 1959. He
is closely associated with irresponsible pro-Cuban revolution-
aries, boasts of his friendship with Fidel Castro, and is known
to be in contact with the Cuban Embassy in Panama.
Behind his sons is powerful lawyer, publisher, and business-
man Harmodio Arias, himself a former president who for 40 years
has plotted with and used any group he considers useful to his de-
termination to dominate the country.
Also recently returned to political activity is Harmodio's
half brother Arnulfo, a demagogic political strong man who re-
tains strong popular appeal despite having twice been ousted from
the presidency. Although Arnulfo usually operates as a lone wolf,
he has worked with Harmodio when it suited their purposes.
The activities of the Arias group are strengthened by owner-
ship of three newspapers and some radio stations which they use
for all-out campaigns such as the current one to oust National
Guard Commandant Bolivar Vallarino, who has in recent years
used his power to maintain Panamanian political stability.
President Chiari may soon be forced to break with the Arias
forces, although such action might bring down his government.
He will probably postpone his plan to reorganize the unpopular
Guard and to transfer Vallarino, for fear of losing his strongest
support.
CONFIDENTIAL
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11 1 " 1 L1.11-a 11 1 1It Li
Nesse VOW
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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