CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/06/24

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03189343
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: June 24, 1960

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24 June 1960
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN-
DOCUMENT NO. �/l7
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JUN 1980
DATE: REVIEWER:.
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24 JUNE 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Peiping representative's speech at Bucha-
rest judiciously worded but makes no
concessions to Khrushchev. 0
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Japan--Kishi's impending resignation has
brought shift to more conventional politi-
cal activity.
Top Indian officials tour Tibetan frontier. 0
III. THE WEST
France- -Soustelle launches "French
Algeria" group.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
24 June 1960
DAILY BRIEF
V-.F\5*/ I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China - USSR: The major Chinese address
at the Rumanian party congress on 22 June was judiciously
worded to avoid antagonizing the congress and was devoid of
either support for or sharp criticism of Soviet positions on
points at issue between Peiping and Moscow. Eastern Euro-
pean delegation heads also addressed the congress on 22
June and, with the exception of Albania, appeared to support
strongly Khrushchev's speech of the previous day. Propa-
ganda emanating directly from Peiping continued to be sharp-
() r ly critical of Khrushchev's foreign policies. As far as is
knowp,Sino-Soviet political differences have not so far affected
economic and military cooperation between the two powers,
but continuation of current polemics could make collaboration
in these spheres more difficult to maintain. For this reason,
further attempts to resolve these differences may be expected.
(Page 1)
II. ASIA -AFRICA
t,Japan: Prime Minister Kishi's impending resignation
has shifted political activity to more conventional tactics and
r\ IL� has reinforced expectations of early general elections. Al-
-' -though demonstrations have subsided, the leftists retain their
capability for violence and large-scale action in the election
campaign. Major factors in the leftist success thus far have
been failure of the government to declare an emergency and
5 _ issue appropriate orders and unwillingness of police authori -
ties, in the absence of such orders, to jeopardize their pub-
lic standing by using the strong measures needed to control
the riots and demonstrations. (Page 3)>
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India: Several top defense officials are inspecting remote
outposts along the Tibetan frontier, probably in a concerted
effort to answer domestic criticism of the government's "in-
action" and to bolster the morale of border units. Defense
Minister Krishna Menon, accompanied by Air Force Chief of
Staff Mukherji, has been inspecting posts in Ladakh, while
V Army Chief of Staff Thimayya is touring the Sikkim-Darjeeling
area. Nehru Wang tn viqit flip Ladakh frontier-fin latp .1iinp
or early Ju1y.7
III. THE WEST
C France: Soustelle has associated some well-known politi-
cal figures from most major non-Communist parties with his
recently launched "French Algeria" group and is directing
Its primary efforts toward gaining support within the army
for his goal of completely integrating Algeria. into France.
If De Gaulle makes significant concessions in his forthcoming
negotiations with the Algerian rebels, Soustelle and a number
of his group may join forces with more extremist groups and
make an attempt to overthrow the regime. French security
officials are aware of at least some of the details of the plot-
ting but do not expect major disturbances at the present time.
(Page
IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Probable Trends in the Horn of Africa. NIE 76-60. 21
June 60.
24 June 60 DAILY BRIEF Page ii
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CONFIDENTIAL
Peiping Stands Firm in Political Disputes With Moscow
The major Chinese address at the Rumanian party con-
gress--delivered by politburo member Peng Chen on 22 June--
made no concessions to Khrushchev's authoritative restate-
ment of Soviet policies toward the West delivered at the con-
gress the previous day. Peng did, however, attempt to
avoid exacerbating the situation in Bucharest by presenting
a judiciously worded statement. He blurred the question of
the inevitability of war by quoting contradictory statements
from the 1957 Moscow Declaration, but he made no mention
of peaceful coexistence and limited his endorsement to Khru-
shchev's attack on the United States at the summit. Peng gave
credit for China's economic success to the regime's "leap
forward" and commune programs--Chinese domestic develop-
ments in disfavor with Moscow.
Propaganda emanating directly from Peiping continued
to voice sharp criticism of Khrushchev's foreign policies. An
article in the official party paper, People's Daily, on 21 June--
broadcast on 22 June--made many of Peng% points but in.
much stronger language. Reflecting the Chinese view that
the bloc is in a position to deal from strength, the article re-
jected Khrushchev's policies of "active coexistence" and "friend-
ly cooperation" with the West, calling instead for a "resolute
struggle" against imperialism as the only assurance for peace.
By implication, the article names Khrushchev a "renegade" for
branding the Chinese interpretation of Leninism as "stiff dogma-
tism" and takes the Soviet leader to task for lauding what the
Chinese call "shameful actions of betrayal" as creative Marxism-
Leninism.
As far as is known, Sino- Soviet political differences have
not so far affected economic and military cooperation between
the two powers, but a continued deterioration in political re-
lations would make close cooperation difficult to maintain. For
this reason, further attempts to resolve these differences may
be expected.
On the. same day Peng spoke, all the Eastern European
satellites except Albania wholeheartedly supported Khrushchev's
CONFIDENTIAL
24 June 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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WAT1rrtrirlhtfiri7
speech, calling it of "fundamental significance for the entire
workers' and Communist movement." The head of the Al-
banian delegation�the only East European group not led by
its party leader--not only failed to mention Khrushchev's
speech but generally reaffirmed a view similar to that of
the Chinese on some aspects of foreign policy.
24 June 60 CENTD A I IMITC1 I letckir'e DI II I eTikl Page 2
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Japanese Demonstrations Subside, Elections Awaited
Prime Minister :Kishi's impending resignation--the date
of which is contingent on the outcome of the struggle within
the ruling Liberal-Democratic party (LDP) to select his suc-
cessor--has temporarily calmed political tensions in Japan
and reinforced expectations of early elections to the lower
house of the Diet.
With the new US-Japanese security treaty in force, Kishi's
announcement that he intends to resign has deprived the leftists
of issues for continuing widespread disturbances. The Social-
ists persist in claiming that the treaty ratification was illegal.
As yet they have given no indication that they will end their
boycott of the Diet, and they apparently intend to maintain a
united front with other leftist groups in opposing the treaty.
The leftists retain their capability for violence and large-
scale action.
Major factors in the leftist success thus far have been the
failure of the government to proclaim an emergency which
would authorize maximum police measures and the unwilling-
ness of police authorities without specific instructions from
the government to exercise powers necessary for controlling
the riots and demonstrations. L Senior Japanese police officials
have complained that they did not receive explicit directions
to put down the disturbances, that governmental officials prob-
ably would not have accepted responsibility for strong police
measures, and that the police themselves would be left to take
the blame.
Despite restraints on their action and the fact that they
sustained numerous injuries, policemen have maintained ex-
cellent discipline and morale while avoiding leftist attempts
to have them create martyrs during the outbreaks. The Amer=
ican Embassy in Tokyo concludes that the Japanese police re-
main an effective and courageous force, needing only adequate
support at the political level to function satisfactorily.
--SEGREZ._
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Opponents of De Gaulle's Algerian Policy Active
/Former Vice Premier Soustelle's recently launched move-
ment advocating the maintenance of a "French Algeria" now
has the support of some well-known political figures from most
major non-Communist parties. These include former Resident
Minister for Algeria Lacoste (Socialist), former Premier
BittauIt (Christian Democrat), former Defense Minister and Pre-
mier Bourges-Maunoury, (Radical), former Defense Minister
Mcikice (dissident Radical), and head of the National Assembly
Defense Committee Francois-Valentin (Independent). A simi-
lar movement has been started in Algeria under the leadership
of a Moslem vice president of the French National Assembly.
The "French Algeria" groups aim to unite various elements
opposed to De Gaulle's Algerian policy and are directing their
primary efforts toward gaining support within the army for Sou-
stelle's goal of completely integrating Algeria into France. The
US consul general in Algiers views the army as essentially loyal
and ready to obey De Gaulle's orders.
Soustelle and some of his associates may be planning moves
to overthrow the regime if De Gaulle makes significant con-
cessions in his forthcoming negotiations with the Algerian rebels.
French police are aware of a "serious" plot for combined
civilian and military operations in France to seize the govern-
ment. There reportedly are some contacts between these
plotters and Soustelle's group. Extremists in Algeria have
been heard commenting, "Let it start in Paris this time."
French security officials have begun to relax the special
precautions instituted on 20 June when the rebel leadership
agreed to negotiate. Pro-integrationist elements now indic te
that, since everyone favors ending the war, cease-fire talks
in themselves would not be a popular reason for rebellion.
They may still plan to act, however, if and when De Gaulle's
talks with the rebels :result in political agreements which
could be attacked as leading to the "loss" of Algeria.
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24 June 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
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CONFIDENTIAL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office cif Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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