CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/04/18

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03177889
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RIPPUB
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U
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14
Document Creation Date: 
March 17, 2020
Document Release Date: 
March 26, 2020
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Publication Date: 
April 18, 1960
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NNW Approved for Release. 2020/03/13 C03177889 TOP 5KLT 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 18 April 1960 Copy No. C CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT _ Po OANGE`INL DECLAIIED CLASS, CHAN4C- � 0 NEXT IILVIEW 041114 kola ACTH: HQ TO-2. ��9 JUN 1980 tApi IIIVIIWIR, -TOP�SECRET- / zyez ZAp�pTO;e5 ror .... Ja;e:"252-6/6371 60i1 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177889 N %Pr" J IG 111- AMS6 Approved for Release: C03177889 'Ir. 41 r r"%e1r 1r, Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177889 18 APRIL 1960 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR--Second vehicle launched from TTMTR within 25 hours; neither be- lieved to have achieved its objective. Mikoyan, at end of visit to Iraq, says no change envisaged in Soviet aid program for Baghdad. ASIA-AFRICA South Africa's most influential African leader reported dying as result of police beatings. Change or overthrow of Sudanese Govern- ment increasingly likely. Greek Government under increased pres- sure to improve relations with USSR be- cause of planned Menderes-Khrushchev visits. III. THE WEST �Castro planning to use May Day rally to demonstrate hemisphere and Sino-Soviet support of his regime. . "rrID 17' F1A IT NT'7' Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177889 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177889 . FA � �CIL'I' CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 18 April 1960 DAILY BRIEF 0(31 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC *USSR: Two vehicles were launched from the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range about 25 hours apart. The first was launched at 1007 EST, 15 April, the second at 1108 pST, 16 April. Although there is evidence to the contrary, the 15 April event was some type of space ven- ture--probably with a lunar mission. Preliminary calcula- tion reveals that the probe attained only enough velocity to go into space about 115,000 miles. The continued lack of a public announcement and the low velocity achieved indicate that the vehicle failed to reach its objective. Preliminary analysis of the 16 April event indicates that the vehicle lifted off the launching pad but failed almost imme- diately thereafter. The possibility exists that this was a stand- by lunar vehicle, inasmuch� as it was launched at the next op- timum time. The 25-hour interval between the launchings is less than half the previous shortest interval and suggests that at least two launchinff pads arp availahlP nn thc Tviir Torn vorirra ubbit-iraq: mikoyan s statements to the press on 16 April at the end of his visit to Iraq were mostly cordial generalities. Although he had several private talks with Qasim, no joint com- munique was issued. The Iraqi Government's reception of Mikoyan was correct but not enthusiastic, and the military and the press continued their efforts to undermine the Communists. 11doscow would oe receptive to Iraqi requests for additional economic aid. In response to a direct question at his final press conference, how- ever, Mikoyan said that no alteration of the existing $137,500,000 '/ AApproved for Release: 020/03/13 C03177889r '7 ,,/"/ i :///7/7/# 'ApprcCvea for Release: 2020/03/13 C0317 to89 -"/ --T-49/2�SECRET- aid program was envisaged because "we have such a good agree- ment that there is no desire from either party to change it." (Page 1) II. ASIA-AFRICA South Africa: /Albert Luthuli, the president of the African National Congress and the most influential African nationalist in South Africa, appears to be dying as a result of the harsh treat- ment he received after his arrest on 30 March, The death or permanent incapacitation of Luthuli, who had exercised a restraining influence over African extremists, would provide Africans throughout the country with a rallying symbol for further action against the government. Re- gardless of Luthuli's condition, serious disorders may occur if Africans provoke police retaliation by heeding nationalist appeals to begin a week-long stay-at-home campaign on 19 April. Sudan: !Dissension within the top leadership of the Abboud military regime is growing, as each of the several factions tries to line up army and civilian supporters. The regime's unpopular- ity has increased, partly as a result of strong pressures by influ- ential political and religious leaders for a return to civilian gove ment. Junior army officers and elements of the National Unionist party reportedly are again planning a coup� It seems doubtful that all five regional army commanders would sutmort the regime in the event of a showdown. (Page 3) Greece: jThe recent announcement that Turkish Prime Minis- ter Menderes and Soviet Premier Khrushchev will exchange visits this summer has created difficulties for the Greek Government, according to Foreign Minister Averoff. Opposition groups, both left and right, are again denouncing the "inflexible" foreign policy which has left Greece almost alone in its opposition to the USSR's economic and cultural offensive. Thus the government may decide I 18 Apr 60 DAILY BRIEF ii - T ,Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 CO3177889:0- /7 7 /077 Ak41%,' 41 UP Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177889 (J1 LLtL1 / / at must make some dramatic move toward imnrovinff relations with the bloc,D (Page 4) III. THE WEST Cuba: Fidel Castro seems intent on making the May Day rally in Havana a demonstration of strong support for his regime not only by the Cuban masses but also by public sentiment through- out the hemisphere. Evidently aware of the cool attitude of most 1.4 Latin American governments, he is trying to show hemisphere fisupport by inviting numerous political figures who are out of of- , ( flee but have widespread reputations as liberal or "anti-imperi- alist" leaders. he Cuban Communist party is taking a leading part in preparations for the rally, and almost 100 representatives from Cdmmunist China and Soviet bloc countries are expected to participate A (Page 5) 18 Apr 60 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET / Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177889 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177889 TOP SECRET I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC The Mikoyan Visit to Iraq Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan's eight-day visit to Iraq did not inhibit the Iraqi government and army from continuing strong measures to undermine the Iraqi Commu- nists. The government's reception of Mikoyan was correct but not particularly enthusiastic. Although he talked pri- vately with Qasim several times, no communique was issued. His statements to a press conference on 16 April, the day of his departure, were mostly cordial generalities. In a mes- sage late in March reporting arrangements for the visit, the Soviet Government had indicated that it would be receptive to Iraqi requests for addi- tional economic aid. In response to a direct question at his final press conference, however, Mikoyan revealed that no al- teration of the $137,500,000 economic aid program was envis- aged. He said, "We have such a good agreement that there is no desire from either party to change it." Nationalist newspapers used the visit as an occasion for new attacks on Iraqi Communists, and one paper asked directly, "Have you, 0 Comrade, come to communize?" The Baghdad military court began trials of a large additional group of Com- munists, and the army used force to break up several small strikes, apparently Communist inspired. [When Mikoyan went to Basra on 14 April, the Iraqi army and police sealed off all avenues approaching his routelinto the city and beat off crowds of Communist demonstrators who attempted to break through.-1 Soviet displeasure at these tactics--and perhaps at the en- tire tone of Mikoyan's reception in Iraq--was reflected by an Izvestia criticism that Mikoyan was Drevented from having con- tact with "the Iraqi people." TOP SECRET 18 Apr 60 (Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177889 Page 1 Approved for Release:_2020/03/13 C03177889 woo stew II. ASIA-AFRICA South African Native Leader �porteaDying 114..lbert Luthuli, the president of the African National Congress and the most influential African nationalist in South Africa, ap- pears to be dying as a result of the harsh treatment he received from the ace ter his arrest on 30 March, Luthuli is reportedly suffering from danger- pressure as a result of police beatings. ven if Luthuli should survive, he will be a "dull and shuffling moron] ii.iuthuli is almost the only African nationalist whose prestige extends throughout South Africa. His program has been moderate, emphasizing peaceful reform. He has favored the creation of an African-dominated state, with non-African minority rights consti- tutionally guaranteed. Although government-imposed restrictions have hindered his activities, he has heretofore acted to restrain African extremists. His death or permanent incapacitation would provide Africans throughout the country with a rallying symbol for further action against the government] Re ardless of Luthuli's condition, serious disorders may oc- cur if Africans provoke police retaliation by heeding nationalist appeals to begin a weeklong stay-at-home camiain --SEC-RE-T-- 18 Apr 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177889 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177889 �Alik The Sudanese Situation The possibility of a sudden move to change or overthrow the Abboud military regime in the Sudan is growing. Dissen- sion within the Supreme Military Council--the top governing body--has become acute, as each of its several factions tries to line up army and civilian support. Two council members, Deputy Army Commander in Chief Hasan Bashir Nasir and Minister of Information Talat Farid, have resorted to the use of spies to keep track of each other's activities lInfluential political and religious leaders have sustained their pressures for a rapid return to civilian government, and the Supreme Council members have been unable to agree on how to deal with them. The minister of interior has refused to pre- sent them with an ultimatum to desist or be jailed unless such action is endorsed by all army leaders. The head of the Ansar religious sect, which could probably muster several thousand partially armed tribesmen in an emergency,has warned the gov- ernment that action against him would force "drastic counter- measures."] /Junior army officers are again plotting a coup; elements of the National Unionist party are reportedly in contact with some of them for the purpose of joint planning to seize control of the government. A week ago, a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition was allegedly stolen from Khartoum military stores; almost immediately army units in the Khartoum area were put on standby alert.] Lit seems doubtful that the regime can count on support of all five regional army commanders in the event of a full-scale show- down.] SECRET 18 Apr 60 rpkITI1 Al IkITICI I leockiee DI III ETIkl Page 3 �Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177889 f""q .#0.1 FIL PIM Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177889 vir# Greek Government Faces Increasing4I�ressure to ImprOve Relations With USSR (The announcement on 12 April that Turkish Prime Minister Menderes and Soviet Premier Khrushchev will exchange visits has caused the Greek Government more domestic difficulties than it had anticipated, according to Greek Foreign Minister Averoff. The opposition press, both the far left and the anti- Communist center, is again attacking the government's "inflex- ible" foreign policy. Several non-Communist political leaders have denounced the government for permitting Greece to become isolated in its opposition to the Soviet bloc's economic and cul- tural offensive. Liberal party leader Venizelos has seized the opportunity to announce that he has accepted a month old Soviet invitation to visit the USSR. Venizelos, although a non-Commu- nist, is sufficiently vain and ambitious to be used by the USSR for propaganda to undermine Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis:] he USSR has alternately used the "carrot and the stick" in attempting to "normalize" its relations with Greece, and late last year the Soviet ambassador in Athens vainly attempted to arrange an exchange of visits between Karamanlis and Khrushchefl athens is "resentful and unhappy" over Ankara's precipitate announcement of the visits and its omission of the fact that Men- deres will visit Athens before going to Moscow,_] EAveroff has told the American ambassador that Athens must soon decide if it will "fall in line" and abandon its resistance to a detente. Thus Athens may decide to make some dramatic move to improve its relations with the blneD 18 Apr 60 CENTRAI IKITFI I intrtorp RI III PTIM Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177889 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177889 40111k. #101k. III. THE WEST Plans for Cuban May Day Rally Fidel Castro seems determined to make the May Day rally in Havana a demonstration of strong support for his re- gime not only by the Cuban masses but also by public senti- ment throughout the hemisphere and by the Sino-Soviet bloc. A parade by the armed forces and militia units is planned to show Cuba's capacity to repel the foreign invasion Castro of- ficials insist is being plotted by "imperialism!' (-Previous plans for a march of a million workers are rumored to have been abandoned because of a bitter fight within the Cuban Labor Con- federation (CTC) over the government's endorsement of efforts to purge non-Communist leaders. The Cuban Communist party has taken advantage of this situation to usurp CTC responsibility for organizing the May Day celebration, hoping thus to strengthen its influence with Castro and within the CTC.I Delegations invited from other Latin American countries in- clude liberal leaders--many of them widely respected--who re- cently signed a "statement of solidarity with the Cuban Revolu- tion." Their presence would be used to demonstrate support by nonofficial hemisphere groups and to offset the coolness of most Latin American governments toward Castro and their concern over his rejection of the Rio de Janeiro Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. iCastro will also probably attempt to attract to Havana a large number of the prominent liberals and leftists from all Latin Amer- ican countries and the United States who have been invited to Maracay, Venezuela, from 21 to 26 April to attend the schedr. uled conference of the Inter-American Association for the Defense of Democracy and Freedom--a meeting which is supported by Vene- zuelan President Betancourt's regime. Those invited to the Maracay conference include eight former chiefs of state and other inf1uent1a17 SECRET 18 Apr 60 CApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177889 Page 5 r.r.....mr.frz.r.r.rnzzzzzdr.orsmdrzdrzz.,..r.ez_zrz.,,,zzmArzzzmz.vz, Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177889 LILL1'.._..11.C� I Gpolitical leaders and government officials, several of whom have long been considered unfriendly toward the USJ The Cuban Government reportedly is paying transportation and lodging costs for 18 Chinese Communists who will participate in the May Day rally. Along with 73 Soviet visitors and other bloc delegations, the Chinese will probably be given a prominent place in the demonstration. The American Embassy in Havana is convinced the rally will have a strong anti-US and Communist-line flavor. SECRET 18 Apr 60 CEKITD AI IKITPI I trzrkirc RI III PTIKI Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177889 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177889 I S. I 11.1-1 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177889 f,trZ/Zir/zzzzzzzzz# # z z z z z Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C0317788971 � maw � 11111, MN NI vi I1� ,ZZ 07/M WiZZZ fj Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177889W////////ZWZ//1,