CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/11/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03157409
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: November 10, 1959

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10 November 1959
Copy No. C 67
CENTRAL
TELLIGENCE
BULLETIN-
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Novi
10 NOVEMBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chinese Communists propose each side
withdraw its troops 12 miles from pres-
ent positions on Sino-Indian border.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Libyan premier again complains of
"inadequacy" of American aid.
\
III. THE WEST
0 Panama- -Anti-US campaign, apparently
government-inspired, may bring further
incidents.
LATE ITEM
�Sudan- -Army coup attempt fails; polit-
ical agitation expected to continue
�SECRET�
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
10 November 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China - India: Chou En-lars letter of 7 No-
vember to Nehru portrays Peiping as wishing to head off new
border clashes which would result in further deterioration of
Sino-Indian relations. Chou proposed a mutual 12-mile troop
withdrawal from the McMahon line in the east and from the line
up to which each side_ exercises actual control in the West.
Chou urged Nehru to meet with him "in the immediate future"
to discuss a permanent settlement. Chou's letter seems in-
tended to leave Nehru with the choice of agreeing to Peiping's
initiative--which makes no concessions on Chinese territorial
claims--or of appearing the intransigent party.
Nehru reportedly told Congress party leaders on 9 Novem-
ber that while "the spirit of the Chinese letter is not bad," the
demilitarization proposal would benefit China, not India. Nehru
may eventually agree to some such arrangement. on the north-
eastern frontier of Assam, since Chou implies he is ready to ac-
cept the McMahon line there as a basis for negotiations. He is
not likely, however, to agree to maintain the "status quo" in the
Ladakh region of K;shmir, since this would amount to accepting
Chinese control of large sections of Indian-claimed territory.
(Page 1)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Libya: Premier Kubaar, claiming that the issue of the
American Wheelus Air Base is a "'live bomb" in his hands, has
again complained over the "inadequacy" of American aid. I In a
talk with the British ambassador, Kubaar also said that his
government would prefer to lose the economic benefits deriving
from the air base rather than face a continuation of the "ten-
sions which its presence creates." Libyan-American negotia-
tions on the base have been in process, in their latest phase,
for nearly a year.
A
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III. THE WEST
Panama: A mounting anti-US campaign, apparently
government-inspired, has developed since the demonstrations
against the Canal Zone and other US installations on 3 Novem-
ber. Propaganda films and documents are reportedly to be
supplied to Panamanian missions abroad in an effort to influ-
ence world opinion. The tacit support of the De la Guardia
administration for plans of opposition leaders to intensify fric-
tion over canal issues may result in further violent incidents
and a continuing deterioration of US-Panamanian relations.
Rage 3)
LATE ITEM
*Sudan: A group of disgruntled junior army officers failed
in the first s ages of a coup attempt launched early this morn-
ing, and the Abboud military government has announced the ar-
rest of the ringleaders in the Khartoum area. The group's sup-
porters in the Eastern and Central commands apparently did not
commit themselves. The government is still under pressure
from elements, ranging from the conservative Ansar religious
sect to the Communist party. These elements are demanding a
return to civilian government, using propaganda, agitation and
strikes in their efforts to undermine the regime.
(Page 4))
10 Nov 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chou En-lai Suggests Troop Withdrawal on Sino-Indian Border
Chou En-lars letter to Nehru of 7 November portrays Pei-
ping as wishing to head off new border clashes which would
result in a further deterioration of Sino-Indian relations. ,h1-
nese Communist leaders recently have shown concern that the
border dispute might lead to a pro-Western shift in New Delhi's
foreign policy and, by proposing that both Indian and Chinese
troops withdraw 12 miles from their present frontier positions,
Chou apparently hopes to prevent encounters similar to the 21
October Ladakh incident which inflamed Indian opinion.
Chou's suggestion that the troops withdraw, leaving the de-
militarized zone under "civil administrative personnel," actually,
is only a refinement of his previous call for return to the "status
quo" under which Peiping "respects" but would not acknowledge
the McMahon line and would be left in unchallenged possession of
northeastern Ladakh. Besides soliciting a military disengagement
with no real Chinese concessions, Chou's letter seems intended
to break the impasse created by Nehru's stipulation that Chinese
troops must withdraw from disputed outposts before negotiations.
This "prior condition" apparently was viewed by Peiping as inim-
ical to its eventual bargaining position and damaging to its pres-
tige.
Chou attempts to leave Nehru with the choice of accepting
the Chinese proposal or appearing the intransigent party, but
there is a note of urgency in the Chinese premier's request that
Nehru meet with him "promptly" to discuss a border settlement
and thwart "those who seek to disrupt" Sino -Indian relations.
Nehru, following intensive consultation with his cabinet on
Chou's letter, reportedly told Congress party leaders on 9 Novem-
ber that while "the spirit of the Chinese letter is not bad," the de-
militarization proposal would benefit China, not India. Nehru may
eventually agree to some such arrangement on the northeastern
SECRET
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frontier of Assam, since Chou implies he is ready to accept the
McMahon line as a basis for negotiations. Nehru is not likely
to agree to maintain the "status quo" in the Ladakh region of
Kashmir, however, as this would amount to accepting Chinese
control of large sections of Indian-claimed territory.
New Delhi probably will counter with its own demilitariza-
tion proposal in order to protect Indian interests while at the
same time furthering progress toward negotiations. Nehru,
cjtho recently vetoed a Chinese suggestion that Indian Vice Pres-
ident Radhakrishnan visit Peiping probably will consider Chou's
proposal for a meeting of the tw prime ministers as premature.
(SECRET NOFORN)
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
III. THE WEST
Panamanian Government Encouraging Anti-US Attitudes
For Political Reasons
For reasons of political expediency, Panama's De la Guardia
administration is expected to continue its demands for more
canal benefits, and it may provide further tacit support to ex-
tremists who seek to promote new anti-US outbreaks. Another
demonstration is reported to be scheduled for 28 November--
the anniversary of Panama's formal independence from Spain--
in order to "reaffirm Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal
Zone."
The government has apparently begun an anti-US publicity
campaign, and there are growing indications of plans to use all
public information media to influence world opinion against the
US and for Panama.
Evidence from authoritative sources indicates that the
Panamanian Government refused to take measures to end the
violent demonstrations of a November
the Panamanian National
Guard headquarters instructing troops not to interfere in fighting
near Zone borders. Minister of Government and Justice Hector
Valdes reportedly ple ded unsuccessfully at great length with
President de la Guardia for authority to use National Guardsmen
to disperse the crowds. The President refused, Valdes said, re-
plying that he wished to divert the outburst away from himself and
his administration and gain support for the government.
It is extremely doubtful that any Panamanian Government could
survive were it to reject perennial Panamanian demands for in-
creased benefits from the Canal Zone. Faced with the necessity
of winning widespread domestic support before next May's pres-
idential election, the administration will probably redouble its ef-
forts to present itself as the champion of those forces fighting
for greater control over the Panama Canal.
CONFIDENTIAL
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LATE ITEM
Junior Officer Coup Fails but Political Tensions Remain
High in the 3udan
The Abboud military government as announced the arrest
of the ringleaders of a dissident junior officers group which be-
gan a coup attempt in the Khartoum area early this morning.
The group failed in the initial sta:ges of its efforts to take con-
trol of Khartoum military units. Cit. s plans had called for the
arrest of government leaders, after which supporters of the
conspiracy were to lead troops to the capital from the Eastern
and Central regional commands. �The disgruntled officers out-
side the Khartoum area apparently did not commit themselves:
however, and as yet there has been no indication of government
action against them)
Strong religious and political elements, usually antagonis-
tic toward each other, have been intensifying their pressures
to undermine the Abboud regime and force a return to civilian
government. They include the head of the powerful, conserva-
tive Ansar religious sect, the leaders of the major political
parties, and those officials of the Sudanese Communist party
who are not in jail.
These elements have used propaganda and agitation and
have been behind a small walkout of railroad workers and wide-
spread strikes by university and secondary school students.
plans for a general strike on or
before the 17 November celebrations planned by the government
to commemorate the anniversary of its assumption of power.
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*INS
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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