CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/06/26

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03191556
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: June 26, 1959

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26 June 1959
Copy No. C 62
CENTRAL
3.3(h)(20
3.5(c)r
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
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26 JUNE 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Comment on Soviet call for Balkan
"Zone of Peace."
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iran--Shah approves plan for Hammar-
skjold to try to end Iranian-Soviet
controversy.
UAR apprehensive over possible
Israeli reprisal for Cairo's refusal
to permit Israeli use of canal;
Hammarskjold arrival in Cairo
1 July makes Israeli action unlikely
at this time.
Iraq--Army issues orders designed
to tighten controls over Communist-
infiltrated Popular Resistance Forces.
South Africa--Authorities concerned
over possibility of African outbreaks
today.
r-
/
/
III. THE WEST
0 Finance Minister Pinay disagrees
with De Gaulle's refusal to permit
nuclear arming of nine USAF
squadrons in France.
0 New rebel incursion into Nicaragua.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN �
26 June 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
.*USSR_ Balkan "Zone of Peace": Moscow's formal call,
in its 25 June notes to 10 nations, for an atom- and rocket-
free zone in the Balkans and Adriatic is a further bloc effort
to bring pressure on the West to modify plans for establish-
ing missile bases in Greece, Italy, and Turkey. The notes,
in suggesting a "great-powers guarantee" of the security and
independence of the countries in the zone, are intended to
elicit a more direct American, British, and French reaction
to the Soviet campaign against rocket bases. Moscow prob-
ably believes that rejection of its overture would serve to
justify a future Soviet decision to establish rocket bases in
Albania and other satellites. Continued Soviet attention to
the atom-free zone issue suggests that the USSR anticipates
that the broader questions of disengagement and disarmament
in Europe will be raised in future high-level East-West nego-
tiations. (Page 1)
II, ASIA-AFRICA
Iran-USSR: The Shah has approved an attempt to resolve
the Soviet-Iranian controversy through the intercession of UN
Secretary General Hammarskjold�
In transmitting the Shah's
t.b comments on the proposal to newly appointed Foreign Minister
Abdoh in New York, Tehran said this action would "automat-
ically be a preliminary to the improvement of relations" be-
tween Iran and the USSR. (Page 2)
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UAR-Israel: ( public Israeli
statements suggesting that Israel may retaliate against UAR
shipping in reprisal for UAR refusal to permit Israeli-chartered
vessels in the Suez Canal have caused apprehension in Cairo,, In
view of Hammarskjold's scheduled arrival in Cairo on 1 July to
discuss the canal issue, Israel is unlikely to resort to such re-
taliation. UAR naval forces, however, apparently continue to
be alert to the possibility)
(Page 3)
Iraq: Army headquarters has issued orders designed to
bring the Communist-infiltrated Popular Resistance Forces
(PRF) under close army control, to curtail their activities,
and to permit them to carry arms only during training periods.
These orders were sent by the army chief of staff on 21 June
to the major army, police, and PRF commands.
these orders apply
to all PRF units throughout the country. This is an indication
that Qasim is moving slowly and cautiously to strengthen his
controls and that he is apparently aiming to reduce the power
of the Iraqi Communist party. (Page 4)
*Union of South Africa: The government has recently made
several moves reflecting official concern over the possibility
that African elements may take violent action on 26 June, but
the American Embassy believes that disturbances will be of lo-
cal character and that the police will be able to cope with them.
The African National Congress (ANC) has reportedly called
for rallies on 28 June as well. Since 3 June, authorities, in
renewed repression of native political movements, have banned
political activities on the part of at least five prominent anti-
government leaders, including the three top officials of the
ANC. These moves will probably force the ANC into increased
clandestine and subversive activity.
DAILY BRIEF
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III. THE WEST
France:
\�
strong differences of opinion between
Minister of Finance Pinay and De Gaulle over the pending with-
drawal of nine USAF strike squadrons from France as a result of
the French President's refusal to permit their being armed with
nuclear weapons. Pinay, in a recent cabinet meeting, is said to
have stressed to De Gaulle the importance to the French economy
of US military spending in France and that De Gaulle's attitude
might endanger Pinay's campaign for American investment in
France. De Gaulle rejoined that Frances in contrast to Great
Britain, had been treated unfairly by the US as regards aid on
nuclear weapons. (Page 5)
Nicaragua: New rebel incursions by two groups of about
50 men each were confirmed The rebels crossed
from Honduras and are operating in mountainous terrain, The
U lsgader of one of the groups is said to be a former Nicaraguan
4fficer who was recently in Cuba, where he was associated with
the group of pro-Communist Nicaraguan exiles being supported
I, by the Cuban Government. Previous incursions by anti-Commu-
nist insurgents from Costa Rica were eliminated by mid-June,
\\ but the Nicaraguan Government fears further attacks by Costa
Rica - based rebels. (Page 6)
26 June 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Moscow Formally Proposes Balkan-Adriatic "Zone of Peace"
In notes on 25 June to the United States: France, Great
Britain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania,
and Rumania, the Soviet Union formally proposed creation of an
atom- and rocket-free zone for the Balkan and Adriatic area.
According to the Soviet plan, the United States, Britain and
France would join the USSR in "guaranteeing the security and
independence" of the countries in the zone--expanding a recent
Rumanian proposal--and "facilitate in every way its establish-
ment." The notes expressed regret that Italy, Turkey,, and Greece
in permitting missile bases on their territories had created a
"serious obstacle" to the creation of such a zone and suggested
that these nations "heed the sensible voice of their neighbors be-
fore it is too late."
The notes pointed with favor to the Rumanian proposal for
a conference of the heads of government of the Balkan countries
to "discuss pressing matters concerning that area" and cited a
statement on 8 June by President Tito as support for creation
of the zone.
This latest move on the part of the USSR climaxes the Soviet
bloc diplomatic and propaganda attack on projected American mis-
sile bases in Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Since Khrushchev's call
during his recent Albanian visit for the creation of an atom-free
zone, formal notes have been issued to Greece and Italy by the
Soviet Union, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania, interspersed with
a strong propaganda campaign on the subject.
The notes of 25 June were probably designed to force a more
direct American, British, and French reaction to the bloc cam-
paign. The Soviet leaders probably feel that any Western rejec-
tion of this formal proposal could be used to justify the installa-
tion of Soviet missile bases in Albania and the other satellites.
CONFIDENTIAL
26 June 59
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
ASIA-AFRICA
UN Secretary General May Mediate Iranian-Soviet Controversy
UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, during recent discus-
sions with Iranian Foreign Minister Abdoh� agreed to take steps
to break the deadlock in Iranian-Soviet relations,
Hammarskjold
asked Abdoh to provide him with details concerning Soviet prop-
aganda, which he intends to use as the basis for a note to the
Soviet foreign minister proposing that hostile propaganda cease.
In the note he will also suggest that direct contact be made be-
tween Iran and the USSR "for the purpose of improving relations."
The Shah has approved the plan to have Hammarskjold take
the initiative, which he characterized as "not a bad idea"; but
he probably is doubtful that it will succeed. Because it lost face
last February when the negotiations for a nonaggression treaty
were broken off, Moscow has been insisting that Tehran must take
the first step to improve relations. The Shah, on the other hand,
has been equally intransigent and demands that before any Soviet
suggestion can be considered the USSR must cease its hostile
radio propaganda against Iran.
Abdoh may hope, as one of his motives for pressing this
plan, that the Shah will permit him to remain at the UN where
he has been Iran's permanent representative since 1955. Abdoh
recently accepted the post of foreign minister with considerable
reluctance and is privately critical of the Shah's policies.)
Meanwhile, the Iranian ambassador to Moscow continues
to report that Soviet leaders desire to imnrove relations with
Iran. , he told Tehran that
he received this impression in recent talks with Khrushchev
and First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov.
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The Israeli-UAR Suez Canal Dispute
Cr.he UAR Navy apparently continues alert to possible Israeli
action against UAR shipping in retaliation for harassment of
Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal. UAR motor torpedo
boats are reported escorting merchant ships between Alexan-
dria and Latakia. The torpedo boats are said to be in constant
radio contact with Ras al-Tin naval base in Alexandria, and to
be detouring the merchant ships around Israeli waters. Other in-
formation has suggested that the UAR soon may employ merchant
ships of foreign registry on such voyages),
public Israeli statements
apparently have caused this annrehension in Cairo.
information had
been received to the effect that Israel was preparing for a naval
engagement with the UAR. Israeli
torpedo boats have been instructed to hunt down all UAR ships
coming from or going to Syria, as well as those traversing the
Red Sea, on the pretext that they are invading Israeli territorial
waters. Israeli aircraft allegedly are to take part in these engage-
ments. Israel has emphasized in its public statements, however,
that it would take retaliatory steps only if UN Secretary General
Hammarskjoldrs projected visit to Cairo on 1 July failed to pro-
duce a satisfactory settlement of the case involving the Danish
freighter Inge Toff)
0....VIeanwhile, one of Nasies advisers has intimated that the UAR
is considering a solution which might involve a public statement
that no ship chartered by or registered in Israel would be permitted
to transit the Suez Canal under any circumstances, following which
the passage of neutral vessels carrying Israeli cargoes would be
quietly tolerated if Israel did not attempt to "exploit" the UAR po-
sition. Foreign Minister Fawzi and other Cairo officials have
said that in matters regarding Israel the UAR would always have
to pay more attention to public opinion in the Arab states than to
opinion in the UN)
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26 June 59
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let
Qasim Government Orders Close Army Control Over
Popular Resistance Forces
from the Iraqi army chief of
staf in bagnaaa to the major commands of the army, police,
and Popular Resistance Forces (PRF), directing all PRF units
to turn in their ammunition and revert from ale...^t to training
status. In addition, the PRF units
are to conduct themselves in accord with administrative orders
Issued by the military regions, and it forbade them to carry
arms except during training periods.
This is an indication that Qasim is moving slowly and
cautiously to strengthen his own controls and is apparently
aiming to reduce the power of the Iraqi Communist party. The
Popular Resistance Forces, some 35,000 strong, are Commu-
nist infiltrated, and the Communist party has exerted constant
pressure to have them expanded and equipped with their own
supplies of weapons and ammunition.
Sporadic past efforts by Iraqi army divisional commanders
to assert control over individual PRF units were none too suc-
cessful, and in many parts of the country the PRF undertook
violent measures in the name of security. In early June, the
army chief of staff issued a directive calling upon the PRF to
desist from such practices, pointing out that these are the re-
sponsibility of the police and courts. The Communist party
newspaper immediately charged that "unnecessary restraints"
were being placed on legitimate functions of the PRE Since
the present order has clearly been approved by Qasim himself,
however, the PRF units are likely to comply, although grudg-
ingly.
26 June 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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III. THE WEST
e Gaulle- Pinay Differences over NATO Policy
very strong differences of opinion be-
tween De Gaulle and Minister of Finance Pinay over De Gaulle's
refusal to permit the arming of nine USAF strike squadrons in
France with nuclear weapons .not under French control.
Pinay reportedly warned
De Gaulle at a recent cabinet meeting that US military spending
in France "makes up a great part" of French foreign currency
receipts and that, "if De Gaulle should speak out bullishly," it
might endanger Pinay's campaign for American investments in
France.
De Gaulle rejoined that "it was not right" that France was
criticized for not doing its share in NATO. France should have
a greater voice in the alliance because it is fighting in Algeria
for the defense of NATO itself. De Gaulle complained also that
the US had given Great Britain "a dreadnaught, enriched uranium,
and an entire engineer crew for a nuclear submarine," but had
no intention of giving the same treatment to France.
De Gaulle told Socialist
leader Mollet that US-French tensions would continue until he
met with President Eisenhower, emphasizing that France must
persuade the US: (1) to treat France as an equal partner in NATO;
(2) to share US atomic "know-how"; and (3) to consult France on
world-wide problems...)
A recent survey of the Gaullist UMR party, the leading mem-
ber of the Debre coalition, indicated that only a quarter of the UMR
believed France benefited from the NATO alliance. The Independent
party has publicly expressed "grave concern," however, over the
government moves affecting the Atlantic Alliance, and similar
alarm has been expressed by the Popular Republicans, the third
member of the Debre coalition, and by the Socialist and Radical
parties. There is also opposition to De Gaulle's attitude toward
NATO among some of the President's top military and civilian
advisers.
26 rune 59
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New Rebel Force Enters Nicaragua
Two rebel groups of about 50 men each crossed the Honduran
border into Nicaragua late on 23 June. Their presence in the
mountainous border area was confirmed by Nicaraguan authorities
the next day, and troops were sent to engage them. These rebels
are probably part of the force of 150 to 175 armed civilians which
Honduran authorities were attempting to disperse near the border
last week.
Nicaraguan officials claim that one of the two groups is led
by Rafael Somarriba, a former officer of the Nicaraguan National
Guard who has recently been associated with a pro-Communist
group of Nicaraguan exiles in Cuba. Major "Che" Guevara1 close
associate of Cuban Prime Minister Castro, was reported
last April to have named Somarriba commander
of a rebel force being formed with the assistance of the Cuban Gov-
ernment; Nicaraguan exiles in Cuba publicly announced earlier
this month that Somarriba was already inside Nicaragua with a
well-armed band of guerrillas.
instructions to massacre' the rebel forces, revealing a
change from the tactics used against the incursions early this
month, which forced surrenders with a minimum of bloodshed.
Whereas the earlier invaders were predominant-
ly members of the opposition Conservative party, some of them of
prominent families, the current incursionappears to be led by pro-
fessional revolutionaries who have been in exile many years and
probably do not retain significant political associations inside the
country. They are probably relying on the false assumption that
domestic opposition to the Nicaraguan Government is so widespread
that their forces will quickly swell to sizable proportions.
Nicaraguan officials, who had been expecting Somarriba's at-
tack from Honduras, also fear new attacks by Nicaraguan rebel
groups now in Costa Rica who,
have been armed by the Castro regime of
Cuba,
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26 June 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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( F!1-i
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director. International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
IFIDENTAL
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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