CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/10/31

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03031257
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: October 31, 1959

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31 October 1959
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
Copy No. C 65
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
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31 OCTOBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet bloc may renew bid for Balkan con-
ference on atom-free zone.
Serious drought in Poland, Czechoslovakia
and East Germany, 0 X
khfl i.:\
East German plans, still subject to Soviet
approval, for new flag display in West
Berlin reported. 0
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Burmese premier considering trip to Pei-
ping on border problem./
Ceylonese Government wins confidence
vote, but remains in vulnerable position.
Iraqi troop move may reflect fear of
Iranian action in Shatt al-Arab area.
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III, THE WEST
�Brazil, not USSR, supplied initiative
for planned Soviet-Brazilian trade talks.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
PP
31 October 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Bloc-Balkans: The Soviet bloc may be planning to renew
Its bid for a conference of Balkan countries to consider the
bloc's scheme for a Balkan-Adriatic atom- and rocket-free
zone and related proposals. Bloc leaders are probably aware
that Turkey expects shortly to announce its acceptance of NATO
missile bases. While they probably would not expect a confer-
ence bid to be accepted by nonbloc, countries, they may calcu-
late that such a bid, coming just before any Turkish announce-
ment, would further "justify" countermeasures such as siting
of Soviet missile bases in the Balkan satellites.
(Page 1)
Eastern Europe: A serious drought in Poland, Czechoslovakia,
and East Germany-has-been hampering T� sowing and will jeopard-
ize the winter wheat and rye crops,which account for over half of
all the grain produced in these countries. Poland already faces a
decline in public morale because of a shortage of meat and other
r" foods. All three countries will probably have to increase su
tially their normally heavy imports of grain and fodder.
(Page 2)
Berlin: East German authorities have plans to display the new
East German flag on all elevated railway stations in West Berlin
on 7 November, and to organize goon squads to resist the expected
police action to remove the banners,
A one- or two-day suspension o e evated service in West
iUuiis also planned if the flags are torn down. These plans are
said to be still subject to Soviet approval, however, and any displays
may be limited to flags on moving trains and in relatively inaccessi-
ble installations in order to uphold East German pestiithouL
risking serious disorders.
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Burma - Communist China: Burmese Premier Ne Win is
considering a visit to Peiping in an effort to settle the long-
standing dispute over the Sino-Burmese border.
he is prepared to make the trip
provided the Chinese give some "prior indication" that an
l
narppmant tn ?lenge" the border chiestion can be reached.
(Page 3)
Ceylon: Although Parliament defeated a motion of no
confidence in the Dahanayake government by a margin of 48
to 43 on 30 October, the government remains in a vulnerable
position because of serious cabinet dissension and charges im-
plicating top officials in the Bandaranaike assassination. The
continued unwillingness of certain opposition leftists to face
elections in the near future apparently is the key factor in en-
abling Dahanayake to remain in office.
(Page 4)
Iraq-Iran: Iraqi troop movements on 27 October south
from Basra along the Iraqi side of the Shatt al-Arab appear to
have resulted from Iraqi fear of possible Iranian military ac-
tion in that area. Continuing efforts by Iran to get negotiations
started with Iraq on the long-standing dispute regarding sov-
ereignty over the river and regulation of navigation therein have
been unsuccessful. On 23 and 24 October, in defiance of warn-
ings by Iraqi port authorities, Iran moved ships under naval
escort to and from the Iranian port of Khosroabad. On 29 Oc-
tober, however, an Iranian Foreign Ministry official stated
that the situation was quiet along the river; he indicated that
while his government would "stand firm," it would be ready for
negotiations whenever the Iraqis were willing.
III. THE WEST
Brazil-USSR: The initiative for the Soviet-Brazilian trade
talks planned for late November in Moscow came from Brazil
rather than the USSR,
31 Oct 59
DAILY BRIEF
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N delegate.
a New York Times article had falsely attrib-
u e ea I so "insistent invitations from the USSR' and
had implied that Poland's role as a go-between in the talks
had influenced Brazil to vote for Poland in the Security Coun-
cil elections. (Page 5)
31 Oct 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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1.111Pft-TTAL
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
illoc May Renew Bid for Balkan Summit Conference
Racent events suggest that bloc leaders are planning to re-
new their bid for a summit conference of the Balkan-Adriatic
countries to consider the Soviet scheme for a "zone of peace" in
which atomic and rocket weapons would be prohibited. SLch a
rove may have figured in Khrushchev's unannounced visit to
Bucharest from 19 to 25 October and the recent approach of the
,3oviet ambassador in Belgrade to Yugoslav President Tito. The
Rumanian and Bulgarian ambassadors in Belgrade reportedly
also have talked with Tito recently.
The day after Khrushchev's return to Moscow, Bucharest radio
renewed the 1957 Rumanian appeal for a Balkan conference. Bloc
propaganda is continuing to refer to "favorable conditions for inter-
Balkan collaboration" and has recalled the earlier Rumanian "in-
itiative" for a conference and Khrushchev's proposal for an atom-
free zone. There has been only mild propaganda reaction, however,
to reports that Turkey will soon agree to the establishment of
NATO missile ba.., es on its territory, in contrast to the flood of
sharp statements, notes, and speeches that followed reports in
April and May of NATO plans for missile bases in Italy and Greece.
On 30 October, TASS reported without comment that "detailed
agreement had been reached "between the United States and Tur-
key on erection of a "rocket base."
Early last summer Moscow formally proposed a Balkan-
Adriatic "zone of peace" to include the Balkan satellites, Yugo-
slavia, Greece, Turkey, and Italy. According to the plan, the
United States, Britain, and France would join the USSR in "guar-
anteeing the security and independence of the countries in the zone."
Rumania on two previous occasions has taken the lead in introduc-
ing proposals for a Balkan conference and would be the logical
choice for renewing the offer.
While bloc leaders probably would expect nonbloc countries to
reject this bid for a conference, they may think that renewal of such
an overture, coming just before an official Turkish announcement on
missile bases, would serve to "justify" countermeasures such as
establishing Soviet missile bases in the Balkans.
CONFID
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Drought Intensifies Satellite Problems
A serious drought in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and
Poland of over two months' duration has been hampering fall
planting and is threatening the winter wheat and rye crops,
which account for about 60 percent of the total. grain output
of these countries. The drought is also affecting the current
harvests of potatoes, sugar beets, and fodder. Output of
dairy products has been reduced. East German Premier
Grotewohl called a special meeting "to ensure the food sup-
ply," and the Polish party central committee held an extra-
ordinary plenum to discuss the subject.
It is unlikely that any losses of winter grain could be
made up in spring planting. The result would probably be a
further decline in stock breeding, with particularly heavy im-
pact on Poland, where the population has already shown its
irritation over a six-month meat shortage. Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, and East Germany normally import about 4,500,000
tons of grain annually, largely from the USSR. Grain imports
will probably have to be increased substantially.
31 Oct 59
CENTRAL INTFI I IC;FKICP RI III rrim
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
liarmese Premier May Go to Peiping to Seek Border Settlement
Premier Ne Win is considering a visit to Peiping in the hope
of settling the long-standing Sino-Burmese border issue,
Ne Win's decision to visit uommunist
China would depend upon nis receiving some prior indication that
an agreement can be reached.
Premier Ne Win recently informed the American ambassa-
dor that Peiping's response to a Burmese "take-it-or-leave-it"
package settlement plan, delivered last May, appears to offer a
basis for further negotiations. His immediate personal interest
in the problem reportedly stems from a casual suggestion by for-
mer Premier U Ba Swe that he go to Peiping, settle the border
issue, and thus go down in Burmese history as a "great man." Ne
Win asked for Foreign Office views of this suggestion.
The Burmese Foreign Office reportedly is divided on the ad-
visability of such a visit. One faction has argued that the trip
would be futile. This group fears the visit might weaken Burma's
bargaining position by reviving discussion of the McMahon line as
the basis of Sino-Burmese border delineation and recommends
awaiting the outcome of the present Sino-Indian border dispute.
The other action has contended that Ne Win should seize the initia-
tive, capitalizing on Peiping's recent conciliatory gestures toward
Burma.
The Chinese Communists, in order to allay Burmese fears
of incidents like those along the Sino-Indian border, may again sug-
gest that renewed border talks would be fruitful. However, Peiping
is probably unwilling to boost Ne Win's prestige by giving him a
quick settlement.
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Ceylon's New Prime Minister Survives First Crucial
Parliamentary Vote
The position of new Prime Minister Dahanayake's govern-
ment remains vulnerable despite the ruling group's defeat on
30 October of a no-confidence motion by 48 votes to 43. Daha-
nayake is assured of remaining in power at lea3t for a short
period, but serious cabinet dissension and growing public aware-
ness of charges implicating top government officials in former
Prime Minister Banclaranaike's assassination cast doubt on his
ability to retain his position throughout the remaining 18 months
of the present government's term.
The division of votes on the no-confidence motion indicates
that the government mustered its total voting strength, while the
combined opposition suffered four abstentions. The ruling par-
ty's winning of this particular vote thus resulted primarily from
the continued reluctance of certain leftist opposition members to
oust the government and face elections, as well as from the sup-
port of six government-appointed members and two independ-
ents. Future votes probably will involve similar uncertainties.
In addition to dealing with the difficulties of the political
situation he inherited,Dahanayake will also have to prove as
capable a party leader as Bandaranaike and try to improve on
the former prime minister's handling of long-standing economic
and communal problems.
CONFJDFNTJAL
31 Oct 59
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III. THE WEST
Brazil Took Initiative in Trade Talks With USSR
Schmidt, complainec
a recent New York Times article on Brazil's trade talks with
the USSR--to begin in late November--had attributed the talks
to insistent invitations from the USSR, "when in fact the initia-
tive came from us on this occasion." He said the article also
referred to the fact that the negotiations for the talks were con-
ducted through Poland and gave a "completely unjustifiable in-
terpretation" of Brazil's support of Poland's candidacy for the UN
Security Council. He added, "It had been agreed that Poland's
role in the negotiations would be kept secret," and suggested that
Brazil must "assume a cautious position toward the USSR in or-
der to avoid disagreeable reactions."
Schmidt reminded his government that Polish Foreign Min-
ister Ftapacki had suggested that the Brazilian mission visit only
the USSR, probably thinking that a visit to Warsaw would strengthen
suspicions that Brazil's support of Poland was in part based on
commercial considerations, rather than on the "gentlemen's agree-
ment" of 1946.
Poland was probably chosen to act as a go-between in arrang-
ing the talks, because Brazil does not have diplomatic relations
with the USSR.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
C9LPENT1AL
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