CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/08/27
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03029879
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Document Page Count:
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Document Creation Date:
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Document Release Date:
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Publication Date:
August 27, 1959
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3.3(h)(2)
27 August 1959
Copy No, C
CENTRAL
6::
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
MO CHANGE IN CLASS.
' DECLASSIFIED
CUSS. CHANGED TO:
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
REVIEWER:
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I WI I
27 AUGUST 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chinese Communist party lead-
ers readjust economic targets
downward, but maintain "leap
forward" pressure.
Soviet Navy concludes large-scale
combined air/surface/submarine
exercise in Norwegian Sea.
USSR concludes $35,000,000 aid
agreement with Guinea.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Laos�Guerrilla action now largely
limited to northern provinces, but
Communists possibly preparing for
country-wide operations.
India will not interfere with any ap-
peal, by Dalai Lama for UN action on
Tibet.
Name
TOP SECRET
III. THE WEST
Prominent West Germans press
Adenauer to make gesture aimed
at easing way for ultimate resump-
tion of relations with Poland.
De Gaulle reportedly seeking Alge-
rian solution involving membership
In French Community.
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
27 August 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China: A communique issued by the Chinese
Communist party central committee on 26 August discloses
Peiping's decision to "readjust" significantly downward China's
four main production targets for 1959�coal, steel, grain, and
cotton. The Chinese admit gross "over-assessment" of agri-
cultural production in 1958�grain and cotton output claims are
reduced drastically. The readjustment of targets represents
a setback for the prestige of Mao Tse-tung and those of his
lieutenants, including Liu Shao-chi, who had encouraged the
most extravagant expectations of rapid economic development.
The call by the leadership for further intensive effort on the
economic front indicates that there is to be no relaxation of
"leap forward" pressures on the masses.
(Page 1) (Chart)
USSR: Soviet naval forces have concluded the large-scale
combined air/surface/submarine exercise in the Norwegian Sea
which began 11-12 August. Four cruiser-destroyer groups and
a large number of submarines�probably over forty--participated
in one of the largest Soviet out-of-area exercises yet noted. Nu-
merous, BADGER jet medium bomber aircraft also took part,
with a high of 13 sorties scheduled during one 24-hour period.
Most of the participating units were from the Northern Fleet,
but one group of surface ships and two submarines from the
Baltic Fleet were involved. Exercises of this typed defense of
the seaward approaches to the Murman coast, are usually con-
ducted twice a year. The I
purred in Sentemhpr 1958
vUSSR-blimea: The Soviet Union and Guinea concluded in
,\L Moscow on 24 August an economic and technical cooperation
V
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agreement providing for the extension of a $35,000,000 long-
term Soviet credit. The official communique stated the credit
will be used to purchase Soviet equipment for developing in-
dustry and agriculture and for building roads. Moscow can
also be expected to attempt to exploit Guinea's need for tech-
nicians and specialists. Guinea has recently announced that
it presently is drafting a national plan for economic develop-
ment which, while emphasizing agriculture, also calls for an
expansion of industry. Until the conclusion of this agreement,
bloc economic activity in Guinea, with the exception of a Czech
arms gift, had been limited to the development of closer trade
relations. Page 3)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: Situations
susceptible of direct exploitation by Sib-Soviet bloc action
which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East,
particularly in Iraq and Iran. The initiation of significant hos-
tilities is unlikely in this area in the immediate future.
Watch Committee conclusion--Laos: Laotian Government
forces have redeployed combat units in northern Laos in an at-
tempt to meet the threat posed by insurgent elements, but as
yet no significant military actions have taken place. Dissident
activity with probable North Vietnamese support and guidance
continues in the northern and, to a lesser extent, in the central
and north-central provinces. The North Vietnamese, by provid-
ing guidance and logistic assistance to the dissident elements in
Laos, have the capability of intensifying operations through these
elements, which, if they see government resistance weakening,
may extend the scope of their military operations to include the
greater portion, if not all, of the country.
Laos: The American Embassy states that while guerrilla
�\) combat action is still limited basically to three provinces in
r� the north, there are continuing reports from other provinces
27 Aug 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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that small bands have infiltrated to propagandize and organize
potential guerrilla forces. These activities may be in prepara-
tion for country-wide expansion of guerrilla o er
wet se son en's in about
la Government on 22 August informed
the Da ai Lama that it would not stand in the way of any appeal
by him for UN consideration of the Tibetan question. New Delhi
continues to feel that such a move can serve no useful purpos
ut apparently intends to do nothing either to support or to in-
erfere in any UN action on Tibet. Nehru took a similar line
ith the American charg�n 20 August. Indian officials also
gave clearance for a trip by the Dalai Lama's top adviser on 28
August to Manila, where he may explore possible Philippine
sponsorship of UN discussion of Tibet3
(Page 4)
III. THE WE ST
West Germany - Poland: E, _Vest Germany's leading news-
paper publisher, supported by Foreign Minister Brentano and
several top government and Christian Democratic officials, is
urging Chancellor Adenauer to make a "dramatic declaration"
of friendship toward Warsaw on 1 September, the twentieth an-
niversary of the German invasion. Their aim is to ease the way
a.../ for ultimate resumption of diplomatic relations. While Adenauer
U is reported to have agreed to deal with the Polish question in a
speech, he and significant elements of the party oppose any move
toward formal relations prior to the 1961 elections, because of
strong onnogition from the politically influential refugee groups-.)
(Page 5)
France-Algeria: [be Gaulle plans to propose soon that
Algeria become a member of the French Community, accord-
ing to remarks attributed to Deputy President Jacques Sous-
During his visit to Algeria from 27 to 30 August, De
0 r Gaulle reportedly will try to convince the army that it should
accept this solution. De Gaulle had originally spoken of a
"choice place" for Algeria within the Community. However"!
27 Aug 59
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in view of army insistence on continued close ties between
geria and France, the rebel goal of eventual independence,
and disagreements among African members of the Commu-
nity over the extent of association with France, it is doubtful
that a "Community solution" for Algeria satisfactory to all
elements could be achieved no (Page 6)
27 Aug 59
DAILY BRIEF
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UNCLASSIFIED
COMMUNIST CHINA'S "READJUSTMENT OF
"THE FOUR MAJOR TARGETS"
( PRODUCTION IN MILLION TONS)
CLAIMED
FOR 1958
VERIFIED
1958 OUTPUT
1959 PLAN
( PROMULGATED
FEBRUARY 1959)
ADJUSTED TARGET
FOR 1959
STEEL
11
11*
18**
12***
COAL
270
270
380
335
GRAIN
375
250
525
275
COTTON
3.35
2.1
5
2.3
* 3 "Primitive" and 8 "Modern"
** Both "Primitive" and "Modern"
*** All "Modern"
Qn827
27 AUGUST 1959
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LAilN1 ILL! 1 IPtLo
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China Cuts Back 1959 Targets
The communique issued on 26 August by the Chinese Com-
munist party, following its eighth plenary session at Lushan
during the first two weeks in August, discloses Peiping's deci-
sion to "readjust" significantly downward China's four main
production targets for 1959--coal, steel, grain, and cotton.
The new grain and cotton targets are only half the original
goals, and those for steel and coal are significantly reduced.
The Chinese admit to gross "over-assessment" of their
agricultural production in 1958. Exaggerated reports from
statistical units, together with hasty harvesting and storage
due to inadequate labor, resulted in verification of only
250,000,000 tons of grain (375,000,000 tons had been claimed)
and 2,100,000 tons of cotton (3,350,000 tons had been claimed).
The back-yard steel program was in effect conceded to be un-
successful. Output by local furnaces is no longer to be included
in the national plan, and local efforts toward that end are to be
subordinated to other economic activities.
The communique confirms earlier indications that the slo-
gans "great leap forward" and "leap forward" have been rede-
fined in much more modest terms. The Second Five-Year Plan
targets proposed in 1956, previously set aside as too conserva-
tive, have been revived as realistic goals for 1959 which can be
overfulfilled by sustained maximum effort.
An accompanying resolution reaffirms that significant
changes have taken place in the organization and operation of
the communes during the months of "tidying up." It emphasizes,
however, the superior qualities of the communes as an eco-
nomic organization.
Chinese Communist leaders have not all been committed to
the same degree to the original concept of the "great leap for-
ward." Those whose prestige has seemed most heavily committed
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are Mao Tse-tung; Liu Shao-chi, the second-ranking leader;
Teng Hsiao-ping, the party's secretary general; and Tan
Chen-lin, the secretariat's specialist in agriculture. These
men played the leading roles in exhorting the "leap" and in
threatening those opposed to a headlong course. Party lead-
ers who had seemed to have reservations about the "leap"
were senior administrators and economic specialists, pos-
sibly including Premier Chou En-lai.
Mao appears still to dominate the party; the communiqu�
notes that the party plenum was held under Mao's "guidance,"
and it concludes by urging the party and people to unite under
Mao's leadership. It is not yet clear whether Mao intends to
fix any blame for the leap's shortfall on other party leaders
rather than low-level cadres.
27 Aug 59
CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Soviet Economic Aid to Guinea
Moscow, in a move designed to strengthen its relations
with Conakry as well as to enhance the bloc's position in West
Africa, concluded an economic aid agreement with Guinea on
24 August. According to TASS, the Soviet $35,000,000 long-
term, low-interest credit is to cover the cost of economic and
technical assistance to Guinea for constructing industrial enter-
prises, developing agriculture, and building roads. Moscow,
in keeping with its economic aid policy in the underdeveloped
areas, presumably will accept partial, if not complete, repay-
ment for its aid in the form of Guinean commodities.
Guinea has recently announced that it is drafting a national
plan for economic development which, while emphasizing agri-
culture, evidently also will provide for the expansion of its
nascent industry. The aid agreement will provide Moscow
with an opportunity to exploit GUinda's need for qualified tech-
nicians and specialists. The bloc, furthermore, may have of-
fered to guide Conakry in efforts to develop the industrial sector.
The Soviet aid program was agreed upon during the good-will
visit to the USSR of a Guinean government delegation which left
for home after a stay of about ten days. Since Guinea achieved
its independence last year, bloc economic activity--with the ex-
ception of a Czech arms gift this spring--has been essentially
limited to attempts to develop trade relations. There are, how-
ever, at least 30 bloc specialists, mostly Czechs, providing
technical assistance on public works projects being carried out
by the Guinean Ministry of Interior. In addition, there are re-
portedly a few Czech officers working with the army.
27 Aug 59
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Nigie
India Adopts Hands-Off Policy on UN Consideration of Tibet
C_Indian officials, in response to a request for guidarice
from the Dalai Lama on an appeal to the UN, informed his
advisers on 22 August that India would neither support nor
interfere with any action on the Tibetan question in the UN.
The Tibetans were told that New Delhi could not advise the
Dalai Lama on the public appeal he plans to make soon,
since it conflicts with India's recognition of Tibet as part of
Communist China. The Indian officials also suggested that
the Dalai Lama in future make his decisions independently
and act in his own interest without seeking clearance from
New Delhi. This position, which is in sharp contrast to the
Indian Government's earlier desire to restrict the Dalai
Lama's political activities, was explained as being necessary
to protect Indian interests but was interpreted by the Tibet-
ans as tacit encouragement of their resort to UN acticrinq
Ll_5;rime Minister Nehru also indicated to the American
charg�n 20 August that he planned no definite move to op-
pose UN consideration of the Tibet issue, but he reiterated
his view that UN discussion could not lead to any useful ac-
tion on the matter. Nehru, apparently disillusioned with
Peiping, implied that his government would maintain a cor-
rect attitude toward the Chinese Communists at the interna-
tional level, but would be less cooperative toward them than
in the pasq
ajespite Nehru's unwillingness to support the Tibetans in
the UN, the Dalai Lama has been invited to make an official
visit to New Delhi and has been given travel clearance for
several Tibetan delegations to travel abroad for publicity
purposes. From 28 to 31 August, the Dalai Lama's brother
and chief adviser will visit Manila, where he probably will
explore the possibility of Philippine sponsorship of a request
for UN discussion of Tibet. Talks with officials of South Viet-
nam, Nationalist China, and Australia are also planned. There
is a possibility that some Latin American country may be will-
ing to initiate such a request and to organize support among
other UN members.]
27 Aug 59
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III. THE WEST
Influential West Germans Urging Adenauer to Improve
Relations With Warsaw
&est Germany's leading publisher, Axel Springer, is
urging Chancellor Adenauer to make some dramatic ges-
ture of friendship toward Warsaw on 1 September, the 20th
anniversary of the German invasion of Poland. Springer's
idea is that a declaration of German-Polish friendship could
ease the way toward establishment of diplomatic relations.
Poland has recently been irritated by German plans to in-
clude prominent refugee leaders in the German delegation
to the Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting in WarsaW.J
(Vice Chancellor Erhard, Bundestag President Gersten-
maier, and Minister for All-German Affairs Lemmer are
reported to support Springer's efforts. Foreign Minister
Brentano and Press Chief von Echardt have also backed
such a move in discussions with Adenauerj
be chancellor reportedly has promised Springer to
deal with Polish-German relations in a speech about 1 Sep-
tember, but he will probably not go beyond a declaration of
friendship and a promise not to use force in settling the
boundary question. While Adenauer agrees some under-
standing must be reached with the Poles, he does not intend
to take steps toward formalizing relations until after the
1961 elections. Pe fears that establishment of diplomatic
relations, implying renunciation of the German eastern
territories as the Poles demand, would alienate 6,000,000
refugee and expellee voters. During the Geneva conference,
refugee leaders in the Christian Democratic Union were in-
strumental in killing Foreign Minister Brentano's proposal
for a German-Polish nonaggression pactV
-SEC-REF
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De Gaulle Reportedly to Propose Algeria Become Member
Of French Community
De Gaulle plans to propose soon that Algeria become a mem-
ber of the French Community, according to remarks made by
Deputy Premier Jacques Soustelle on 18 August to an Algerian
who formerly served as secretary of state for Algerian affairs
in the French cabinet. During his visit to Algeria, the French
President is expected to sound out key French Army elements,
whom he has previously felt it necessary to reassure as to his
intentions,
if the FLN has not ac-
cepted De Gaulle's standing offer to negotiate a cease-fire be-
fore the French Community executive council meets on 10 Sep-
tember, De Gaulle will ask the council to propose that Algeria
become a membei,
Several previous suggestions that an Algerian solution be
sou within the Community framework have been made by
various French officials and other political leaders. De Gaulle,
in his early public discussions concerning the Community, re--
served a "choice place" for Algeria. The conflicting demands
of the key elements involved in the Algerian problem indicate,
however, that a satisfactory "Community solution" will be dif-
ficult to achieve without considerable "give" on all sidesV
ake French Army and nationalists in France adamantly op-
pose any form of Algerian independence. The European settlers
in Algeria hope to maintain their privileges by total integration
of Algeria with France. FLN leaders have recently indicated
some opposition to Community membership and probably would
not accept it without at least some recognition of their right to
independence. A further complication stems from disagree-
ments among the African members of the Community over the
extent of their association with Fran.s.F)
27 Aug 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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IL/CAN I UAL,
"'gene
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
off ice of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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