CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/03/04

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03023201
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March 4, 1959
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4 March 1959 Copy No. C CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. I DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TIcoCI NEXT REVIEW DATE: ALITH� 70 - DATE. T 0 P -SECRET - Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 AI% --TOP-SECRET-- Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 '4,4 J_ Z �,0 A. MARCH lC I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Khrushchev offers more aid to India. Another hinpn T1PPI,- ing Iraq. II. ASIA-AFRICA Qasim criticizes Nasir; moves to replace Nasir as champion of Al- gerian rebels. Sudan - Abboud summons military conamanders to conference in at- end army rift. Iran may ask UN to consider Soviet propaganda threat. Indonesia - Dissidence continues in North Celebes: government troops reinforced. Nyasaland - Government efforts to end disorders may provoke more violence. '? < , III. THE WEST � French NATO representative ex- pects instrtctions to notify NATO of French fleet withdrawal. � Panama - Dissatisfaction and coup plotting continues; government ar- rests conspirators in Nafional Guard. 0 Bolivia - New anti-American vio- lence likely. ll_1) Colombia - Students stage large- scale and violent antigovernment demonstration. Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 'Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO3023201 . %se Nee CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 4 March 1959 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR-India: ; to assist in the development of the pharmaceutical industry and in the construction of an oil refinery with a capacity of about 45;000 barrels a day at Barauni. The Soviet mission may also offer additional support for India's third five- year plan (1961-66) which probably will continue to emphasize government rather than private investmei29 (Page 1) USSR-Iraq: another -4 hipment of Soviet arms is expected to arrive in Iraq soon. This will be the fifth shipment since last November when the Soviet-Iraqi arms agreement, reportedly in the amount of $168,000,000, was concluded. The first four ship- ments were limited to land armaments; the agreencalls fnr dplivpriPc of aireraft and motor tornedo boats II. ' ASIA-AFRICA Iraq: Prime Minister Qasim in a speech on 2 March re- plied publicly for the first time to UAR propaganda attacks on his policies. Without mentioning Nasir by name, Qasim accused him of refusing to give full support to the Algerian rebels and in general of obstructing Arab cooperation in foreign, economic, and military policies. Inusingthe Algerian issue, Qasim has seized Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Akpproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201v /r/ TOP SECRET on one of Nasir's vulnerabilities. Relations between Nasir and the Algerian rebels appear to have deteriorated recently and Qasim has the opportunity to replace Nasir as the champion of the rebel cause. Closer relations between Baghdad and the Algerian leaders would also provide opportunity for increased Communist contacts with the Algerians. (Page 3) Sudan: all Sudanese military commanders have been ordered to Khartoum for a conference on 7 March. The con ference, which is to be chaired by Prime Minister Abboud, presumably is an attempt to resolve the split in the army co mand following the abortive coup attempt on 2 March. lithe split persists, opportunity for anti-Western elements to exploit the situation will increas,e (Page 5) Iran-USSR: Usan has informed UN Secretary General Ham- marskjold that if Soviet press and radio attacks continue, it will be "compelled" to take the matter before the United Nations. Hammarskjold has advised the Soviet UN delegate of Iran's con- cern and has indicated that he will discuss the subject during his forthcoming trip to Moscow:] DISSEMINATION) (Page 67 Indonesia (North Celebes): Dissidence in Indonesia's North Celebes continues to be a severezproblem for the government and a steady drain on its energies. In recent weeks, rebel troops in Celebes have demonstrated increased aggressiveness which has forced the government to bolster its hard-pressed units there with air and ground reinforcements from Java. The dissidents, apparently in control of most of the countryside, have recently threatened Manado the former rebel capital, and its nearby air- field. (Page 7) Rhodesia-Nyasaland: he actions taken on 3 March by the Nyasaland Government against African nationalists included the arrest of extremist leader Hastings Banda, who has been seekin the role of martyr as means of increasing the influence of African extremists throughout the federation. A campaign ofj 4 Mar 59 DAILY BRIEF II -TOP SECRET- / Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 lot 1.3GLJIL Nero '04.00 Eivil disobedience and antiwhite violence may follow, particu- larly in Nyasaland where the government's crackdown has al- ready provoked new rioting. The situation in the federation has become a partisan issue in British politics; the expulsion an rough handling of a visiting British Labor MP by federation authorities may spur demands for a complete reappraisal of London's Central African policy] (Page 9) III. THE WEST *France: the French representative to NATO expects in- structions, probably on 4 March, to notify NATO of De Gaulle's recent decision to withdraw the French fleet from its present status in NATO. The representative added that every effort would be made to keep the move secret, and that from "a mil itary point of view" the fleet would still cooperate with the NATO commands Panama: Open dissatisfaction with presiaent tirnesco cie la Guardia has caused dissension within the governing coalition party and is probably encouraging activity among numerous groups known to be plotting to overthrow the government. A number of officers and soldiers and three civilians were ar- rested on 2 March and accused of plotting a coup. They were said to be planning seizure of guard commandants who have been De la Guardia's chief support. (Page 10) *Bolivia: A scheduled mass demonstration at the funeral on 4 March of a student killed in Monday's rioting may incite new anti-American riots and increase Bolivian instability. The cen- tral labor organization, which has participated in recent riots and is led by President Siles' powerful left-wing rival, appar- ently plans to join the demonstration. Meanwhile, US prestige is reported to be suffering badly in provincial cities where usu- ally friendly elementhaveJpme almost indifferent to anti- American violence. (Page 12) 4 Mar 59 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 _Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 N., A ��.1, 11. .16.� A *Colombia: A large-scale and violent antigovernment dem- onstration by students in Bogota on 3 March may be part of a developing nationwide plan by opposition elements to undermine the authority of President Lleras' national-front government of Conservatives and Liberals. Since early January Communist agitators have been in the forefront of periodic demonstrations against increased bus fares, a bona fide public grievance which dissident Conservatives and possibly followers of former dic- tator Rojas are attempting to magnify. (Page 13) 4 Mar 59 DAILY BRIEF iv TOP SECRET VA 14 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Approved for Release: 2-6-Z)/02/21 C03023201 NINO I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Additional Soviet Aid for India Reported Nego- tiations for this and other assistance apparently are being carried on by a Soviet ,Iission in New �Delhi Soviet premier lauds Nehru's qualities of leadership. Soviet le�ters are making a con- certed effort to ease Indian irritation resulting from a widely circulated magazine article by Pavel Yuclin, the Soviet ambas- sador in Peiping, which criticized Nehru's views on Communism and contrasted India's relatively slow economic progress with Communist China's "marvelous successes.5 a long-term $25, 000, 000 loan will be granted for the development of the pharmaceutical industry. Soviet technicians have been studying this project for over a year and late in 1958 recommended that this aid be granted. American and West German private funds already are being invested in the Indian pharmaceutical development prograng a_Chrushchev also promised Soviet equipment and technical aid for the construction of an oil refinery with a capacity of about 45,000 barrels a day at Barauni. In February the Indian minister of mines told the American Embassy and free-world bidders that he was "committed" to accept the Soviet offer on this project. Construction cost of the refinery is estimated at more than $80, 000, 000, of which about $60, 000, 000 will be re- quired in foreign exchange is possible that in addition to the specific Khrushchev aid proposals, the Soviet delegation in New Delhi will indicate-) SECRET-- 4 Mar 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 NINO Ether areas where future Soviet assistance may be granted. Soviet-bloc aid already extended and accepted by India totals $304,000,00_0:1 4 Mar 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Nip* IL ASIA-AFRICA Iraqi Prime Minister Publicly Criticizes Nasir Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim now has publicly criticized UAR President Nasir. In a speech to Iraqi reserve officers on 2 March, Qasim made point-by-point charges against the UAR and Nasir, although he mentioned neither by name. Denying that Iraqi Communists are a dangerous force, Qasim called them "sons bf the country" no different from other Arab nationalists. Attacking the "mercenary" UAR press, which has been carrying on a propaganda campaign against the Iraqi regime, Qasim charged that it had created discord between the Arab countries. Nasir, whose relations with the Algerian rebels appear to have been deteriorating recently, was accused of re- fusing to give them full support in their struggle against the "oppressive" French forces. Evidently hoping to supplant Nasir as the champion of the Algerian rebel cause, Qasim used the attack on Nasir as a springboard to announce a $5,600,000 annual budget allocation for the Algerian cause. Qasim failed to mention that Iraq had pledged this amount at the Arab League meeting last October, at the same time that the UAR pledged $16 000.000 to the leaffue budget for sub- sidizing the Algerians. In addition to the financial grant, Qasim promised the Algerians extensive arms shipments, as well as military training. This closer collaboration between Iraq and the Al- gerian rebels could provide the Communists with increased Algerian contacts. Qasim also used the Algerian question to accuse Nasir of sabotaging the Arab nationalist cause by his failure to sever economic and political relations with France. Echoing recent Iraqi Communist propaganda, Qasim 4 Mar 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Approved for Release: 20702/21 C03023201 Nese charged Nasir with "autocratic and dictatorial rule," and promised that Iraq would be ruled by the "people." A ref- erence to Syria intimated that the bond between the Iraqi nationalists and those of Syria was stronger than that be- tween Egypt and Syria. Qasim stated that Iraqi nationalists 1 had supported Syrian nationalists 19 na before Nasir had ar- rived on the Arab political scene. 4 Mar 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Noir Sudanese Situation Elie abortive coupeattempt of 2 March has left the Abboud military government seriously split. Before the attempt, the Supreme Military Council was reported almost evenly divided over the demands of the dissidents for changes in the ruling council's personncg Lit council's decision after the coup attempt, simply to order he dissidents back to their military commands makes further trouble very likely. Major General Abd al-Wahab, and the three other council members whom the conspirators temporarily "arrested" and sought to oust, have pressed Pre- mier Abboud to take disciplinary action. In this they have been joined by Umma party leader Khalil and Sayyid Abd al- Rahman al-Mandi, leader of the Ansar religious se) /Abboud himself, continuing his public denials that any- thing untoward has taken place, is trying to smooth over the situation and hold his government together. If the split per- sists, the way will be open for an intensification of the behind- the-scenes struggle between leaders of the two major religious sects and for new maneuvering by the leaders of the suspended but still influential political parties.) CIlhe coup effort itself points up the increasing dissatisfac- tion in the Sudanese officer corps with the regime. Abboud's summoning of all military commanders to a conference in Khartoum on 7 March is presumably designed to re-establish support for his government throughout this key group..) ere has been no indication of United Arab Republic in- volvement in the coup attempt. Continued sharp differences within the Sudanese military government, however, would pro- vide new opportunities for the extension of UAR influence through pro-Egyptian army officers and through the political party leaders who are recipients of Egyptian subsidies.) 4 Mar 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Iran-USSR TEan is thleateniug w Lumplain Lo tne united Nations if the violent Soviet radio and press campaigns against the Shah and other Iranian leaders continue. The Iranian dele- gate to the United Nations gave this information to Secretary General ilammarskjold on 2 March and the latter reportedly informed Soviet delegate Sobolev of the contemplated Iranian action. Hammarskjold also plans to discuss the question with Soviet officials following his arrival in Moscow on 24 Marcg EThe Soviet propaganda campaign against Iran began im- mediately after the 10 February collapse of Iranian-Soviet negotiations for a nonaggression pact. The Shah has reacted angrily but with increasing apprehension to the Soviet attacks which, in Iranian eyes, have become open attempts at inciting the Iranian population to revolg TLanian leaders originally discussed the possibility of severing diplomatic relations with the USSR. Subsequently, they have concentrated attention on the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921,, which permitted the USSR to move troops into Iran under certain conditions. Threats to denounce the pertinent articles of the treaty have been followed by a Foreign Minis- try statement that Iran finds those articles no longer applicable;) 'd.'he present warning to Hammarskj old may be designed primarily to emphasize to him and to Western leaders the in- creasing danger faced by Iran and its need for continued sun- port in the face of Soviet provocations CONFIDENTIAL 4 Mar 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Pap 6 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Nee Dissidence Remains Severe Problem in Indonesia The Indonesian Army continues to be pressed by dissidents of the Provisional Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) in Sumatra and North Celebes. At the same time, it is faced with the continu- ing guerrilla activities in South Celebes and Java of the Darul Islam, the long-standing Moslem dissident group. Army chief Nasution's concern over the general state of insecurity and over army losses, which are estimated to total about 7,500 men since the PRRI rebellion began one year ago, is reflected in his recent emergency decree ordering two-year compulsory military service for all males between 18 and 23 years of age. CA.Pout 1,200 government reinforcements left Java on 25 Feb- ruary for Celebes, whereJ the PRRI rebels and the Darul Isl have recently become iffore aggressive. Other units and aircraft have been flown to the area. communications and supply lines disrupted and the former rebel capital of Matiado and its nearby airfield threatened. Three days later the rebels still controlled the Manado water supply, and rebel fire on a nearby port was forc- ing government supply ships to enter only at night. The North Celebes dissidents were described in another re- cent government message as having "heavy arms, new weapons, and good reserves of ammunition." Erpese rebels, who were re- supplied by ship from Taiwan in mid-January, were said to have been planning attacks on all major towns) In South Celebes, gov- ernment troops have been engaged for several weeks in contain- ing the activities of the Muzakkar dissidents, the Celebes affiliates of the Darul Islam. he PRRI dissidents there are continuing their sporadic attacics on government-held towns and outposts. ff.p. addition, they recently resumed their raids on foreign-owned rubber estates south of Medan. A US Rubber estat was attacked on 24 January, and Goodyear's Wingfoot estate was raided on 28 January and again one month later. Each incident) 4 Mar 59 TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Nrise Nrsi Ellvolved considerable property damage") Government forces have placed high priority on re-establishing security in the estates area to ensure continued production and revenues. Ellie Sumatran dissidents, who have been in a severe sup ply position for some time. are now attempting to arrange a resupply by shiyi they are als attempting to arrange an alliance with the Darul Islam - affiliated dissidents in northernmost Sumatra, but to date have made little real progress. On Java itself, where the Darul Islam movement is based, guerrilla depredations continue at a high rate,/and the group is rtannrtpd nlanning inereased efforts over the next few months-.7 4 Mar 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 hal ANI'l6+ IOLA 4 *efoo Situation Deteriorating in Nyasaland CI:he government of the British ,.;rotectorate of Nyasaland on 3 March took action against the African nationalists who have been provoking disorders since January. The governor, apparently yielding to pressure from the settler-dominated governments of Southern Rhodesia and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, proclaimed a state of emergency, banned African nationalist parties, arrested prominent na- tionalist leaders, and deported extremist Dr. Hastings Banda to Southern Rhodesia. This action provoked a renewal of nationalist rioting which caused at least 20 African deaths] *nda's deportation will make him a martyr in the eyes of his followers and may increase the influence of African extremists throughout the federation. Meanwhile the con- tinued Nyasaland disorders tend to harden the racial attitudes of European settlers. Banda's arrest may lead to a campaign of civil disobedience aimed at disrupting transport. Extrem- ists may assassinate some Europeans to get arms and ammuni- tiolg Nyasaland governor admits that police action cannot contI1 the situation and believes that constitutional reform to increase African participation in the government is needed. In February, a top Colonial Office official canceled plans to come to Nyasaland to discuss reforms when he was unable to obtain Banda's cooperatiolip tin_ London, the British Labor party's criticism of present policy will increase as a result of the Rhodesian Government's forcible deportation of Labor MP Stonehouse, who was touring the area under African nationalist sponsorship. Although top levels of the British Government have become increasingly concerned over general African problems and there appears to be growing sentiment that a complete reappraisal of London's Central African policy is needed, the Colonial Office is be ircuarl fn nn anon nrrio-rn m f 1-hic fiivu1 4 Mar 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Napo III. THE WEST Renewed Opposition to Panamanian President A struggle for control of Panama's governing coalition party (CPN) has again raised political tensions which may result in renewed attempts to oust President de la Guardia. One such attempt was apparently uncovered on 2 March when the commandants of Panama's armed force, the National Guard, arrested nearly 40 guard officers and men and sev- eral civilians. Leaders of the majority faction in the CPN, UN delegate Alejandro Remon and Second Vice President Barletta, have criticized recent presidential appointments, but their real target may be former President Ricardo Arias, now ambas- sador to Washington, who is making a determined bid for the impending CPN presidential nomination. Arias, an acknowledged leader of the coalition's other major faction--to which De la Guardia belongs, is probably the most powerful member polit- ically and economically of the oligarchy which has ruled Panama since its independence from Colombia in 1903. Remon, who also has presidential ambitions, has evidently lost power in the past years most recently when De la Guardia replaced the corrupt and Remon-dominated Panama City munici- pal council on 24 February in response to public pressure. If Remon becomes convinced that his influence in the administra- tion and the coalition is seriously threatened, he might try to make a deal with dissident First Vice President Diaz, who has been involved in several attempts to oust De la Guardia. The civilians arrested on 2 March were Diaz followers, but he is not known to have been involved. The three powerful guard commandants have political and personal ties with various critics of the President,. However, SECRET 4 Mar 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 N�e they probably will continue, at least for a time, to support De la Guardia, who has not interfered with their side activi- ties in his attempts to improve Panama's government. -SECRET-- 4 Mar 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 11 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 h.71.1110G1- New Anti-American Rioting May Occur in Bolivia A scheduled mass demonstration at a funeral on 4 March of a student kiljed in Monday's rioting may incite new anti- American violence and increase Bolivian instability. The central labor organization, which has participated in recent riots and is led by President &les powerful left-wing rival, has indicated it will march with students escorting the body. A group of armed miners who usually support President Siles are expected to arrive in La Paz and may clash with the demonstrators. The regular armed forces would be un- able to control a clash between the two groups. CA simultaneous demonstration protesting the Time mag- azine article is planned for the provincial city of Cochabamba on 4 March) The American consulate there reports that the national government has ordered all local department heads, party leaders, and police to give the strongest protection to US citizens and property, but that US prestige is suffering badly and normally friendly elements have become almost in- different to anti-American violence. SECRET 4 Mar 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 12 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 - � - - - Noe Student Violence in Colombia � A sizable and violent student demonstration in Bogota on 3 March against recent increases in city bus fares reportedly caused serious damage and injuries and may be part of a de- veloping plan by opposition elements to undermine President Lleras' coalition government of Liberals and Conservatives. Since early January, Communist agitators have been prom- inent in periodic student-worker demonstrations against the fare increases and they were probably involved in recent seri- ous rioting in provincial cities. Since regaining legal status in late 1957, the Communists have displayed increasing cap- ability for exploiting popular unrest and strikes. Colombia's second largest labor organization, in which Communists have won a strong minority influence, now has reversed its initial decision to support the fare increases. Dissident Conservative elements apparently have been supporting the demonstrators in an effort to embarrass the gov- ernment. In addition, followers of former dictator Rojas, now on trial for misconduct during his presidential term, may be expected to support any opposition activity against the govern- ment. Rojas himself was placed under detention last Decem- ber for alleged plotting to overthrow the incumbent regime. The government's use of strong repressive measures against the demonstrators is likely to erode its popular sup- port and stimulate non-Communist opposition activity. On the other hand, the government is likely to lose considerable face and establish a precedent for mass agitation against its author- ity if it backs down on the fare increases. Indecision could provoke additional and more serious violence. CONFIDENTIA 4 Mar 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 13 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 � a a a,' =��� � � � � � 'tope Nov THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201 ZW/r/ZI WZIZZZ, ZZ,Z, /Xi Approved for Release. 2020/02/21 CO3023201 4/: 4114-1�Tlar-5ECRET 411� Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03023201