CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/03/04
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Publication Date:
March 4, 1959
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4 March 1959
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TIcoCI
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
ALITH� 70
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DATE.
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A. MARCH lC
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev offers more aid to India.
Another hinpn T1PPI,-
ing Iraq.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Qasim criticizes Nasir; moves to
replace Nasir as champion of Al-
gerian rebels.
Sudan - Abboud summons military
conamanders to conference in at-
end army rift.
Iran may ask UN to consider Soviet
propaganda threat.
Indonesia - Dissidence continues in
North Celebes: government troops
reinforced.
Nyasaland - Government efforts to
end disorders may provoke more
violence.
'? <
,
III. THE WEST
� French NATO representative ex-
pects instrtctions to notify NATO
of French fleet withdrawal.
� Panama - Dissatisfaction and coup
plotting continues; government ar-
rests conspirators in Nafional Guard.
0 Bolivia - New anti-American vio-
lence likely.
ll_1) Colombia - Students stage large-
scale and violent antigovernment
demonstration.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
4 March 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-India: ;
to assist in the development of the pharmaceutical
industry and in the construction of an oil refinery with a
capacity of about 45;000 barrels a day at Barauni. The Soviet
mission may also offer additional support for India's third five-
year plan (1961-66) which probably will continue to emphasize
government rather than private investmei29
(Page 1)
USSR-Iraq:
another -4 hipment of Soviet arms is expected to arrive in Iraq
soon. This will be the fifth shipment since last November
when the Soviet-Iraqi arms agreement, reportedly in the
amount of $168,000,000, was concluded. The first four ship-
ments were limited to land armaments; the agreencalls
fnr dplivpriPc of aireraft and motor tornedo boats
II. ' ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq: Prime Minister Qasim in a speech on 2 March re-
plied publicly for the first time to UAR propaganda attacks on
his policies. Without mentioning Nasir by name, Qasim accused
him of refusing to give full support to the Algerian rebels and in
general of obstructing Arab cooperation in foreign, economic, and
military policies. Inusingthe Algerian issue, Qasim has seized
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on one of Nasir's vulnerabilities. Relations between Nasir
and the Algerian rebels appear to have deteriorated recently
and Qasim has the opportunity to replace Nasir as the champion
of the rebel cause. Closer relations between Baghdad and the
Algerian leaders would also provide opportunity for increased
Communist contacts with the Algerians.
(Page 3)
Sudan: all Sudanese military commanders have been
ordered to Khartoum for a conference on 7 March. The con
ference, which is to be chaired by Prime Minister Abboud,
presumably is an attempt to resolve the split in the army co
mand following the abortive coup attempt on 2 March. lithe
split persists, opportunity for anti-Western elements to exploit
the situation will increas,e (Page 5)
Iran-USSR: Usan has informed UN Secretary General Ham-
marskjold that if Soviet press and radio attacks continue, it will
be "compelled" to take the matter before the United Nations.
Hammarskjold has advised the Soviet UN delegate of Iran's con-
cern and has indicated that he will discuss the subject during his
forthcoming trip to Moscow:]
DISSEMINATION) (Page 67
Indonesia (North Celebes): Dissidence in Indonesia's North
Celebes continues to be a severezproblem for the government and
a steady drain on its energies. In recent weeks, rebel troops in
Celebes have demonstrated increased aggressiveness which has
forced the government to bolster its hard-pressed units there
with air and ground reinforcements from Java. The dissidents,
apparently in control of most of the countryside, have recently
threatened Manado the former rebel capital, and its nearby air-
field.
(Page 7)
Rhodesia-Nyasaland: he actions taken on 3 March by the
Nyasaland Government against African nationalists included the
arrest of extremist leader Hastings Banda, who has been seekin
the role of martyr as means of increasing the influence of
African extremists throughout the federation. A campaign ofj
4 Mar 59
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Eivil disobedience and antiwhite violence may follow, particu-
larly in Nyasaland where the government's crackdown has al-
ready provoked new rioting. The situation in the federation has
become a partisan issue in British politics; the expulsion an
rough handling of a visiting British Labor MP by federation
authorities may spur demands for a complete reappraisal of
London's Central African policy] (Page 9)
III. THE WEST
*France: the French representative to NATO expects in-
structions, probably on 4 March, to notify NATO of De Gaulle's
recent decision to withdraw the French fleet from its present
status in NATO. The representative added that every effort
would be made to keep the move secret, and that from "a mil
itary point of view" the fleet would still cooperate with the NATO
commands
Panama: Open dissatisfaction with presiaent tirnesco cie
la Guardia has caused dissension within the governing coalition
party and is probably encouraging activity among numerous
groups known to be plotting to overthrow the government. A
number of officers and soldiers and three civilians were ar-
rested on 2 March and accused of plotting a coup. They were
said to be planning seizure of guard commandants who have
been De la Guardia's chief support. (Page 10)
*Bolivia: A scheduled mass demonstration at the funeral
on 4 March of a student killed in Monday's rioting may incite new
anti-American riots and increase Bolivian instability. The cen-
tral labor organization, which has participated in recent riots
and is led by President Siles' powerful left-wing rival, appar-
ently plans to join the demonstration. Meanwhile, US prestige
is reported to be suffering badly in provincial cities where usu-
ally friendly elementhaveJpme almost indifferent to anti-
American violence. (Page 12)
4 Mar 59
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*Colombia: A large-scale and violent antigovernment dem-
onstration by students in Bogota on 3 March may be part of a
developing nationwide plan by opposition elements to undermine
the authority of President Lleras' national-front government of
Conservatives and Liberals. Since early January Communist
agitators have been in the forefront of periodic demonstrations
against increased bus fares, a bona fide public grievance which
dissident Conservatives and possibly followers of former dic-
tator Rojas are attempting to magnify.
(Page 13)
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Additional Soviet Aid for India Reported
Nego-
tiations for this and other assistance apparently are being
carried on by a Soviet ,Iission in New �Delhi
Soviet premier lauds Nehru's
qualities of leadership. Soviet le�ters are making a con-
certed effort to ease Indian irritation resulting from a widely
circulated magazine article by Pavel Yuclin, the Soviet ambas-
sador in Peiping, which criticized Nehru's views on Communism
and contrasted India's relatively slow economic progress with
Communist China's "marvelous successes.5
a long-term $25, 000, 000
loan will be granted for the development of the pharmaceutical
industry. Soviet technicians have been studying this project
for over a year and late in 1958 recommended that this aid be
granted. American and West German private funds already
are being invested in the Indian pharmaceutical development
prograng
a_Chrushchev also promised Soviet equipment and technical
aid for the construction of an oil refinery with a capacity of
about 45,000 barrels a day at Barauni. In February the Indian
minister of mines told the American Embassy and free-world
bidders that he was "committed" to accept the Soviet offer on
this project. Construction cost of the refinery is estimated at
more than $80, 000, 000, of which about $60, 000, 000 will be re-
quired in foreign exchange
is possible that in addition to the specific Khrushchev
aid proposals, the Soviet delegation in New Delhi will indicate-)
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Ether areas where future Soviet assistance may be granted.
Soviet-bloc aid already extended and accepted by India
totals $304,000,00_0:1
4 Mar 59
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iraqi Prime Minister Publicly Criticizes Nasir
Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim now has publicly criticized
UAR President Nasir. In a speech to Iraqi reserve officers
on 2 March, Qasim made point-by-point charges against the
UAR and Nasir, although he mentioned neither by name.
Denying that Iraqi Communists are a dangerous force, Qasim
called them "sons bf the country" no different from other
Arab nationalists.
Attacking the "mercenary" UAR press, which has been
carrying on a propaganda campaign against the Iraqi regime,
Qasim charged that it had created discord between the Arab
countries. Nasir, whose relations with the Algerian rebels
appear to have been deteriorating recently, was accused of re-
fusing to give them full support in their struggle against the
"oppressive" French forces. Evidently hoping to supplant
Nasir as the champion of the Algerian rebel cause, Qasim
used the attack on Nasir as a springboard to announce a
$5,600,000 annual budget allocation for the Algerian cause.
Qasim failed to mention that Iraq had pledged this amount
at the Arab League meeting last October, at the same time
that the UAR pledged $16 000.000 to the leaffue budget for sub-
sidizing the Algerians.
In addition to the financial grant, Qasim promised the
Algerians extensive arms shipments, as well as military
training. This closer collaboration between Iraq and the Al-
gerian rebels could provide the Communists with increased
Algerian contacts. Qasim also used the Algerian question
to accuse Nasir of sabotaging the Arab nationalist cause by
his failure to sever economic and political relations with
France. Echoing recent Iraqi Communist propaganda, Qasim
4 Mar 59
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charged Nasir with "autocratic and dictatorial rule," and
promised that Iraq would be ruled by the "people." A ref-
erence to Syria intimated that the bond between the Iraqi
nationalists and those of Syria was stronger than that be-
tween Egypt and Syria. Qasim stated that Iraqi nationalists
1 had supported Syrian nationalists 19 na before Nasir had ar-
rived on the Arab political scene.
4 Mar 59
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Sudanese Situation
Elie abortive coupeattempt of 2 March has left the Abboud
military government seriously split. Before the attempt, the
Supreme Military Council was reported almost evenly divided
over the demands of the dissidents for changes in the ruling
council's personncg
Lit council's decision after the coup attempt, simply to
order he dissidents back to their military commands makes
further trouble very likely. Major General Abd al-Wahab,
and the three other council members whom the conspirators
temporarily "arrested" and sought to oust, have pressed Pre-
mier Abboud to take disciplinary action. In this they have
been joined by Umma party leader Khalil and Sayyid Abd al-
Rahman al-Mandi, leader of the Ansar religious se)
/Abboud himself, continuing his public denials that any-
thing untoward has taken place, is trying to smooth over the
situation and hold his government together. If the split per-
sists, the way will be open for an intensification of the behind-
the-scenes struggle between leaders of the two major religious
sects and for new maneuvering by the leaders of the suspended
but still influential political parties.)
CIlhe coup effort itself points up the increasing dissatisfac-
tion in the Sudanese officer corps with the regime. Abboud's
summoning of all military commanders to a conference in
Khartoum on 7 March is presumably designed to re-establish
support for his government throughout this key group..)
ere has been no indication of United Arab Republic in-
volvement in the coup attempt. Continued sharp differences
within the Sudanese military government, however, would pro-
vide new opportunities for the extension of UAR influence
through pro-Egyptian army officers and through the political
party leaders who are recipients of Egyptian subsidies.)
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Iran-USSR
TEan is thleateniug w Lumplain Lo tne united Nations
if the violent Soviet radio and press campaigns against the
Shah and other Iranian leaders continue. The Iranian dele-
gate to the United Nations gave this information to Secretary
General ilammarskjold on 2 March and the latter reportedly
informed Soviet delegate Sobolev of the contemplated Iranian
action. Hammarskjold also plans to discuss the question
with Soviet officials following his arrival in Moscow on 24
Marcg
EThe Soviet propaganda campaign against Iran began im-
mediately after the 10 February collapse of Iranian-Soviet
negotiations for a nonaggression pact. The Shah has reacted
angrily but with increasing apprehension to the Soviet attacks
which, in Iranian eyes, have become open attempts at inciting
the Iranian population to revolg
TLanian leaders originally discussed the possibility of
severing diplomatic relations with the USSR. Subsequently,
they have concentrated attention on the Soviet-Iranian Treaty
of 1921,, which permitted the USSR to move troops into Iran
under certain conditions. Threats to denounce the pertinent
articles of the treaty have been followed by a Foreign Minis-
try statement that Iran finds those articles no longer applicable;)
'd.'he present warning to Hammarskj old may be designed
primarily to emphasize to him and to Western leaders the in-
creasing danger faced by Iran and its need for continued sun-
port in the face of Soviet provocations
CONFIDENTIAL
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Dissidence Remains Severe Problem in Indonesia
The Indonesian Army continues to be pressed by dissidents
of the Provisional Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) in Sumatra and
North Celebes. At the same time, it is faced with the continu-
ing guerrilla activities in South Celebes and Java of the Darul
Islam, the long-standing Moslem dissident group. Army chief
Nasution's concern over the general state of insecurity and over
army losses, which are estimated to total about 7,500 men
since the PRRI rebellion began one year ago, is reflected in
his recent emergency decree ordering two-year compulsory
military service for all males between 18 and 23 years of
age.
CA.Pout 1,200 government reinforcements left Java on 25 Feb-
ruary for Celebes, whereJ the PRRI rebels and the Darul Isl
have recently become iffore aggressive. Other units and aircraft
have been flown to the area.
communications and supply lines disrupted
and the former rebel capital of Matiado and its nearby airfield
threatened. Three days later the rebels still controlled the
Manado water supply, and rebel fire on a nearby port was forc-
ing government supply ships to enter only at night.
The North Celebes dissidents were described in another re-
cent government message as having "heavy arms, new weapons,
and good reserves of ammunition." Erpese rebels, who were re-
supplied by ship from Taiwan in mid-January, were said to have
been planning attacks on all major towns) In South Celebes, gov-
ernment troops have been engaged for several weeks in contain-
ing the activities of the Muzakkar dissidents, the Celebes affiliates
of the Darul Islam.
he PRRI dissidents there
are continuing their sporadic attacics on government-held towns
and outposts. ff.p. addition, they recently resumed their raids on
foreign-owned rubber estates south of Medan. A US Rubber estat
was attacked on 24 January, and Goodyear's Wingfoot estate was
raided on 28 January and again one month later. Each incident)
4 Mar 59
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Ellvolved considerable property damage") Government forces
have placed high priority on re-establishing security in the
estates area to ensure continued production and revenues.
Ellie Sumatran dissidents, who have been in a severe sup
ply position for some time. are now attempting to arrange a
resupply by shiyi they are als
attempting to arrange an alliance with the Darul Islam - affiliated
dissidents in northernmost Sumatra, but to date have made little
real progress.
On Java itself, where the Darul Islam movement is based,
guerrilla depredations continue at a high rate,/and the group is
rtannrtpd nlanning inereased efforts over the next few months-.7
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Situation Deteriorating in Nyasaland
CI:he government of the British ,.;rotectorate of Nyasaland
on 3 March took action against the African nationalists who
have been provoking disorders since January. The governor,
apparently yielding to pressure from the settler-dominated
governments of Southern Rhodesia and the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, proclaimed a state of emergency,
banned African nationalist parties, arrested prominent na-
tionalist leaders, and deported extremist Dr. Hastings
Banda to Southern Rhodesia. This action provoked a renewal
of nationalist rioting which caused at least 20 African deaths]
*nda's deportation will make him a martyr in the eyes
of his followers and may increase the influence of African
extremists throughout the federation. Meanwhile the con-
tinued Nyasaland disorders tend to harden the racial attitudes
of European settlers. Banda's arrest may lead to a campaign
of civil disobedience aimed at disrupting transport. Extrem-
ists may assassinate some Europeans to get arms and ammuni-
tiolg
Nyasaland governor admits that police action cannot
contI1 the situation and believes that constitutional reform
to increase African participation in the government is needed.
In February, a top Colonial Office official canceled plans to
come to Nyasaland to discuss reforms when he was unable to
obtain Banda's cooperatiolip
tin_ London, the British Labor party's criticism of present
policy will increase as a result of the Rhodesian Government's
forcible deportation of Labor MP Stonehouse, who was touring
the area under African nationalist sponsorship. Although top
levels of the British Government have become increasingly
concerned over general African problems and there appears to
be growing sentiment that a complete reappraisal of London's
Central African policy is needed, the Colonial Office is be
ircuarl fn nn anon nrrio-rn m f 1-hic fiivu1
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III. THE WEST
Renewed Opposition to Panamanian President
A struggle for control of Panama's governing coalition
party (CPN) has again raised political tensions which may
result in renewed attempts to oust President de la Guardia.
One such attempt was apparently uncovered on 2 March when
the commandants of Panama's armed force, the National
Guard, arrested nearly 40 guard officers and men and sev-
eral civilians.
Leaders of the majority faction in the CPN, UN delegate
Alejandro Remon and Second Vice President Barletta, have
criticized recent presidential appointments, but their real
target may be former President Ricardo Arias, now ambas-
sador to Washington, who is making a determined bid for the
impending CPN presidential nomination. Arias, an acknowledged
leader of the coalition's other major faction--to which De la
Guardia belongs, is probably the most powerful member polit-
ically and economically of the oligarchy which has ruled Panama
since its independence from Colombia in 1903.
Remon, who also has presidential ambitions, has evidently
lost power in the past years most recently when De la Guardia
replaced the corrupt and Remon-dominated Panama City munici-
pal council on 24 February in response to public pressure. If
Remon becomes convinced that his influence in the administra-
tion and the coalition is seriously threatened, he might try to
make a deal with dissident First Vice President Diaz, who has
been involved in several attempts to oust De la Guardia. The
civilians arrested on 2 March were Diaz followers, but he is
not known to have been involved.
The three powerful guard commandants have political and
personal ties with various critics of the President,. However,
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they probably will continue, at least for a time, to support
De la Guardia, who has not interfered with their side activi-
ties in his attempts to improve Panama's government.
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New Anti-American Rioting May Occur in Bolivia
A scheduled mass demonstration at a funeral on 4 March
of a student kiljed in Monday's rioting may incite new anti-
American violence and increase Bolivian instability. The
central labor organization, which has participated in recent
riots and is led by President &les powerful left-wing rival,
has indicated it will march with students escorting the body.
A group of armed miners who usually support President
Siles are expected to arrive in La Paz and may clash with
the demonstrators. The regular armed forces would be un-
able to control a clash between the two groups.
CA simultaneous demonstration protesting the Time mag-
azine article is planned for the provincial city of Cochabamba
on 4 March) The American consulate there reports that the
national government has ordered all local department heads,
party leaders, and police to give the strongest protection to
US citizens and property, but that US prestige is suffering
badly and normally friendly elements have become almost in-
different to anti-American violence.
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Student Violence in Colombia
� A sizable and violent student demonstration in Bogota on
3 March against recent increases in city bus fares reportedly
caused serious damage and injuries and may be part of a de-
veloping plan by opposition elements to undermine President
Lleras' coalition government of Liberals and Conservatives.
Since early January, Communist agitators have been prom-
inent in periodic student-worker demonstrations against the
fare increases and they were probably involved in recent seri-
ous rioting in provincial cities. Since regaining legal status
in late 1957, the Communists have displayed increasing cap-
ability for exploiting popular unrest and strikes. Colombia's
second largest labor organization, in which Communists have
won a strong minority influence, now has reversed its initial
decision to support the fare increases.
Dissident Conservative elements apparently have been
supporting the demonstrators in an effort to embarrass the gov-
ernment. In addition, followers of former dictator Rojas, now
on trial for misconduct during his presidential term, may be
expected to support any opposition activity against the govern-
ment. Rojas himself was placed under detention last Decem-
ber for alleged plotting to overthrow the incumbent regime.
The government's use of strong repressive measures
against the demonstrators is likely to erode its popular sup-
port and stimulate non-Communist opposition activity. On the
other hand, the government is likely to lose considerable face
and establish a precedent for mass agitation against its author-
ity if it backs down on the fare increases. Indecision could
provoke additional and more serious violence.
CONFIDENTIA
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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