CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/06/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03191553
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: June 22, 1959

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22 June 1959
SC No. 03287/59
Copy No. C 62
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
4/0
DOCUMENT NO
1,4
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THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL
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The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including
COMINT.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS
INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES
It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated
and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
information; its security must be maintained in accordance with
COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.
No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLI-
GENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages
to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director
of Central Intelligence.
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22 JUNE 1959
I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet - East German communiqu�
reiterates refusal to sanction "occu-
pation regime" in West Berlin.
New Yugoslav oil field may make
Belgrade self-sufficient in crude oil
and eliminate one source of Soviet
pressure.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Tension remains high over CAR re-
fusal to permit Israeli ships to use
canal.
Indonesia�US Embassy sees political
deadlock contributing to economic de-
terioration and growth of Communism.
Malaya--Pro-West ruling party suffers
surprise defeat in state assembly elec-
tion.
Japan apparently determined to carry
out repatriation of Koreans in Japan
to North Korea.
A
III. THE WEST
Cuba�Drastic purge of air force of-
ficers follows army command shake-
up. Cpposition to regime apparently
increasing.
Dominican Republic considering "de-
fensive military action" against Cuba
or any other nation aiding rebels.
Haiti fears involvement.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
22 June 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR - East Germany: The communiqu�igned on 20
June at the conclusion of the East German party-government
delegation's visit to the USSR reiterated the major points made
by Khrushchev in his Kremlin speech on 19 June. Expressing
regret that the Western powers had thus far rejected Soviet
proposals on Berlin, the communiqu�arned that the USSR
and East Germany "will not sanction the preservation of the
occupation regime indefinitely" and are determined to take
"all necessary measures for an earliest elimination of the ab-
normal situation in West Berlin." At the same time, however,
it stated that the time limit on the Soyipt-nrnnnsPri ilnrnvisinnal
7tatu5" of West Berin is negotiable.
Yugoslavia: The recent completion of a series of oil
wells in Croatia, which has resulted in proved reserves cap-
able of producing a total of at least 15,000 barrels per day,
will have important implications for the Yugoslav economy.
The field, the largest in Western Europe, "closely resembles
the great fields of California and Venezuela,"
When in operation, the 20 wells already drilled could
make Yugoslavia self-sufficient in crude oil production. Yugo-
slavia imported approximately 60 percent of its total crude oil
requirements in 1957. Since threefourths of these imports came
from the Soviet bloc, this discovery will eliminate one source
of economic pressure which the Kremlin has used on Tito.
(Page 1)
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j
IL ASIA-AFRICA
UAR-Israel: Tensions continue over UAR actions to deny
the use of the Suez Canal to Israeli-owned or -chartered mer-
chant ships. The UAR is still holding the Israeli-chartered
freighter Inge Toft and its cargo. On 17 June, UAR authorities
detained for 24 hours a Panamanian freighter--bound from Ant-
werp to Japan--on suspicion that it was carrying Israeli cargo.
Two other ships of non-Israeli registry are now reported
to be loading in Haifa and may attempt to transit the canal.
Israel may respond to any UAR action against these freighters
by direct interference with UAR shipping between Egypt, Syria,
and Lebanon. The UAR Government, concerned over the pos-
sibility of such retaliation, is reported to have ordered that only
ships of foreign registry be q,se0,fpr sucll voyages._
inaonesia:Gne pontical aeaalocx in1)jaicarLa is deceieruL-
ing the deterioration of the Indonesian economy, with accompany-
ing benefits for the Communist party,
Inflationary shortages are "beginning an ominous
kp pinch" on urban workers and armed forces personnel, and this
is increasing the following of the Communists in these influentia
circles. There appears to be little prospect of effective govern-
ment action, even when President Sukarno returns from his for-
eign travels.) (Page 2)
Malaya: The first major defeat to be suffered by the mod-
erate Alliance, Malay's pro-Western ruling party, has threaten-
ing implications for future stability there. The Alliance was
defeated in a state assembly election on 20 June by the narrow,
racially oriented Pan-Malayan Islamic party, thus raising the
v possibility of a break in Malay support for the Alliance concept
Dr' of multiracial cooperation. Such cooperation is essential to, the
maintenance of peaceful relations between the Malay and Chinese
communities. Recent reports state that the Islamic par
receiving support from Indonesian Communist sources.
(Page 3)
22 June 59 DAILY BRIEF
11
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Japan-Korea: (Japanese determination to carry out the re-
patriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea is reflected by
the ambassador to Switzerland is
instructed to go to Geneva to seek quick approval by the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of the repatriation
agreement "before there is meddlesome interference." The am-
bassador was also directed to request ICRC assistance for the
release of some 150 Japanese fishermen held by South Korea--a
more serious and urgent matter from a "domestic viewpoint"
than the repatriation issue.
"11
III. THE WEST
Cuba: The drastic purge of air force officers carried out
during the past week apparently was instigated by Raul Castro,
the extremist young armed forces chief and brother of the prime
minister. The affected officers, including most of Cuba's rated
pilots, were known to be seriously concerned over Communist
penetration of the armed forces. The purge follows an impor-
tant shake-up in army commands and reports of the discharge
of army officers in various parts of the country. Meanwhile;
rising opposition to the regime among other groups resulted dur-
ing the week in the first wave of antigovernment terrorism since
the fall of Batista. (Page 5)
Dominican Republic: As many as 100 of the estimated 150
'nsurgents may have survived the initial landings on the north
!oast made at dawn on 20 June. The Dominican Government has
vidence that the attackers came from Cuba, and it expects fur-
her landings by insurgents coming from Cuba and Venezuela.
Vleanwhile, Dominican troops apparently have not liquidathd the
mall rebel force that landed by plane on 14 June in a mountain-
)us area of the interior.
W June that his government is seriously considering "defensive
22 June 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
4..
Fri-% T1 117,1 T1
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military faction" against Cuba and any other nation aiding the reb-
els. While he did not specify the nature of such action, it would
probably include an attack by'Cuban exiles who, with Dominican
support, are preparing for action against the Castro regime in Cuba.
(Page 6)
*The .Raitiran government has been informed by the Dominican
Republic that additional forces from Cuba will land in Haiti shortly
to establish a "second front" for the invasion of the Dominican Re
public. Haiti, which fears-opposition groups abroad may join the
invaders, is urgently seeking help from the United States and the
Organization of the American States.
22 June 59
DAILY BRIEF iv
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CONFIDENTIAL
41111
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Significant Oil Fields Discovered in Yugoslavia
The Yugoslays have recently completed exploration of an
oil field in Croatia which is the largest in Western Europe,
now has 20
wells and is capable of producing 101000 barrels per day, which
would raise Yugoslav production 166 percent. Exploitation of
this field can begin after the construction of tanks and pipelines.
If the field is exploited in the proper manner and the wells pro-
duce at their maximum efficient rate, Yugoslavia will be at
least the second largest crude oil producer in Western Europe
by 1963, according to the source.
This discovery will have sizable implications for the Yugo-
slav economy, as the 20 wells can make Yugoslavia self-
sufficient in crude oil production and enable it to conserve--
perhaps even earn�badly needed foreign exchange. In 1957
the country imported approximately 60 percent of its total crude
oil requirements, with three fourths coming from the Soviet bloc;
the withholding of crude oil shipments has been one of the bloc's
principal means of putting economic pressure on Yugoslavia.
22 June 59
CONFIDENTIAL
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
1,1
The inability or unwillingness of Indonesian Government
and my leaders to take effective action to break the political
deadlock over constitutional reform in President Sukarno's ab-
sence is tontributilig to a continued and accelerated decline
in Indonesia's economy. The economic decline in turn is fur-
ther strengthening the Communist party of Indonesia (PKI),-on
which Sukarno is already dependent for his constitutional re-
forms')
the
current economic crisis is beginning to cause an ominous
pinch" among urban laborers, white-collar workers, and mem-
bers of the armed forces, although it has not yet affected the
bulk of the population. The pinch, however, is building up
PKI following among the influential groups from which the Com-
munists must draw strength for their ultimate revolutionary
goals.)
Illustrating Djakarta's economic plight,
prices on essential commodities have doubled in the
past year while wages have remained relatively constant ma-
jor import; handled by inexperienced army officers through
government monopolies, have fallen off to the point where, be-
cause of shortages of raw materials, factories are operating at
only 50 percent of capacity; and government employees are ig-
noring their official functions in order to take outside jobs to
supplement their incomes. Labor discontent, bottled up by gov-
ernment prohibition of strikes, is increasing, and owners of
capital are attempting to exchange their money for hard cur-
rencies and gold. In the pasi two weeks the rupiah has declined
one third on the free market.
There is no assurance that President Sukarno will take ef-
fective action after his keturn to Djakarta on 29 June, even though
he might achieve his aim of a reversion to the 1945 constitution.
Previous economic crises have found Sukarno quite unconcerned,
and it seems unlikely he will resolve the political conflicts wrack-
ing the country)
22 June 59
crkiTD Al !MITI I inpkwp RI II I FTIKI Page 2
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-e0NHDENTIAL
Ruling Party in Malaya Receives Sharp Setback in State Election
The ruling Alliance party of Malaya suffered its first major
defeat on 20 June when it won only seven of 24 seats in the Treng-
ganu state assembly election. The� narrow, racially oriented
Pan-Malayan Islamic party (PMIP) won a clear majority of 13
seats, and the equally narrow Negara party. won four. This is
the first time since Malaya achieved independence nearly two
years ago that the politically predominent Malays have failed to
give a large majority to the United Malay National Organization
(UMNO), the Malay organ and leading component of the Alliance;
the development represents a serious threat to the Alliance con-
cept of multiracial cooperation which is essential to stability in
Malaya, where half the population is non-Malay. Chinese com-
prise about 37 percent and Indians 11 percent of the total popula-
tion.
While the Alliance has swept eight previous state elections
in the past month, there has been a definite increase in Malay
support for the PMIP in most states. Federation officials have
recently expressed considerable concern over the apparently
large resources of the PMIP and reportedly have good evidence
that Indonesian Communists are extending considerable financial
support. The PMIP is headed by a political opportunist who ap-
parently is willing to accept support from any source.
The victory in Trengganu can be expected to improve the
P/vIIP's chances in the last two state elections in neighboring
Kelantan and Pahang and may significantly reduce Alliance pros-
pects of winning an overwhelming maority in the national elec-
tions in August.
CONFIDENTIAL
22 June 59
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Japanese - South Korean Disputes
6_'plcyo's determination to carry out the repatriation of Koreans
in Japan to North Korea is suggested
which the Japanese ambassador to Switzerland is instructed to go
to Geneva and seek quick approval by the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) of the repatriation agreement "before there
is meddlesome'interferenee." He is also to ask for greater efforts
by the ICRC to obtain the release of the 150 Japanese fishermen
detained in South Korea)
ejGpan� apparently considers the problem of the detention of
the fishermen more serious and urgent than that of repatriation.
The question of what Tokyo has done so far and what actions are
contemplated to obtain their release is. certain to plague Prime
Minister Kishi's new cabinet at the special Diet session which
opens on 22 June. Foreign Minister Fujiyama said the govern-
ment would "go ahead and take every conceivable measure" to
secure the release of these men)
CTky oo is attempting to provide greater protection to Jap-
anesef ishing vessels operating near the "Rhee line" by increas-
ing the number of patrol craft and fitting them with armor plate.
Despite growing pressure, however, Kishi is unlikely to use
force to protect the boats--except as a last resort--but he could
be forced to take the matter to the United Nations)
South Korea refuses to discuss the release of the fishermen
untiITapan suspends negotiations with North Korea. Seoul has
broken trade relations with Japan; a complete break in diplomatic
relations may follow if the agreement is consumniated, popular
and official feeling is high in South Koreas and President Rhee
may resort to additional action--such as seizure of Japanese ship-
ping--as a means of rallying support for his administration)
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22 June 59
CFKITI2A1 IkITFI I laFkIrr RI III FTIKI
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A
III. THE WEST
Cuban Air Force Purge Coincides With Rising Opposition
To Regime
Major Raul Castro, brother of the prime minister and chief
of the Cuban armed forces, was responsible for the drastic air
force purge which resulted in the dismissal of most of the force's
rated pilots,
The purge, which became public knowledge on
18 June, also resulted in the replacement of Major Pedro Diaz
Lanz as air force chief.
Diaz Lanz, who was prominent among those officers seriously
preoccupied with Communist penetration of the armed forces, is
believed to have been particularly worried about the Communist
influence in the recently established schools that have been giving
six-week courses in political indoctrination to many Cuban Military
personnel. Diaz Lanz' half brother approached the US Embassy on
1 June for an opinion as to whether anti-Communist Cuban officers
should go into exile or remain to resist Raul Castro's policies fa-
voring the Communists.
The air force purge follows an important shake-up in army
commands and reports of the discharge of army officers in sev-
eral parts of the country. These moves reflect the regime's ef-
forts to remove potential dissidents from the military.
Rising opposition to the regime among other groups led dur-
ing the week to the first significant wave of antigovernment ter-
rorism since the fall of Batista last January and to increasing
evidence of government fear of an imminent counterrevolutionary
effort.
The American army attache in Cuba believes Raul Castro's
frequent trips to eastern Cuba during the week may be related to
fear of an attack from the Dominican Republic in retaliation for
probable Cuban support of the 14 June rebel landings in that coun-
try. A knowledgeable Cuban exile in the Dominican Republic told
an American Embassy officer in that country on 18 June that an
armed Cuban exile force there was nearly ready to attack Cuba,
but that he believes the attempt will probably fail.
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22 Juhe 59
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Dominican iwpublic Considers Attack on Cub.. After New
Insurgent landings
Dominican authorities claim that about 50 of the estimated
150 insurgents who landed on the north coast of the Dominican
Republic at dawn on 20 June have been killed or captured.
me landings were undetected until after
the insurgents had moved inland.
The landings were made about 75 miles from the moun-
tainous area in the interior where a small group of rebels
landed by plane from Cuba on 14 June. The latter group, with
whom local civilians apparently collaborated, had inflicted
"substantial losses" on the Dominican Army,
operations were pro-
ceeding successfully against this group, but by 20 June fighting
was apparently still in progress in this area.
The Dominican Government has confirmed that the air and
sea incursions were made from Cuba; it expects further landings
by insurgents coming from Venezuela, as well as by two other
groups from Cuba which intend to invade via Haiti.
The Dominican foreign minister told
that his government is seriously considering "defensive
military action" against Cuba or any other nation aiding the reb-
els. Such action will become imperative, he said, if there are
further landings. He indicated that his government has little
confidence that an appeal to the OAS would result in effective
assistance, but added that if assured that the US would take "a
definite stand" in that body, the Dominican Government might
consider an appeal prior to taking military action.
Dominican action against Cuba would probably include the
mounting of an invasion by Cuban exiles now in the Dominican
Republic. These exiles were preparing for imminent action on
20 June,
inaatista: also in exile there, is disinclined to support
such a move, however.
22 June 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCF RI 11 I Frim
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ILJILIN 1 1.11,1.4
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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