CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/07/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03029875
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: July 22, 1959

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22 July 1959
Copy NO. t.; 63
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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22 JULY 1959
THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Ambassador Thompson comments
on Khrushchev's designation of
Koslov as his eventual successor.
Two additional Soviet destroyers
reach Indonesian waters, apparent-
ly for transfer to Indonesian Navy.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Yemen�Tension rising at prospect
of Imam's return.
Burma�Military regime making
creditable record; faces internal
disagreement on best means of stay-
ing in power.
Afghanistan--Soviet technicians to as-
sist in bridge construction in sensitive
area near Pakistani frontier.
III. THE WEST
IV.
Conclusions of special USIB committee
on Berlin situation.
Treft---s.,FGRELT
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
22 July 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*USSR:ommenting on Khrushchev's statement that he
and iirkWan had agreed on Kozlov to succeed them, Ambas-
sador Thompson believes that Kozlov might take over in the
event of Khrushchev's disappearance from the scene, but tha
he would not be capable of maintaining power, and that he has
probably been selected to be front man while the power strug
is decided behind the scenes. Suggesting that Mikoyan would
prefer a relatively weak character as nominal leader since this
would increase his own influence, the ambassador, despite
Khrushchev's disparagement of Kirichenko, considers him al-
most the only presidium member who appears to have the abil-
ity and drive to win out in a power struggle. In Thompson's
view the party presidium is strikingly weak, with a large num-
ber of older men who have little influence in their own right
and younger members most of whom appear to have little per-
sonal following and who owe their positions to Khrusliche.0
USSR-Indonesia: Two additional Soviet Skoryy-class de-
stroyers, apparently transferred to the Indonesian Navy under
an arms agreement with Poland, have arrived in Indonesian
waters. Two destroyers and eight subchasers had previously
been supplied and two submarines remain to be delivered to
Indonesia under its agreement with Poland. Djakarta's arms
purchases since mid-1958 total approximately $300,000,000, of
which about $175,000,000 has been procured from the Sino-
Soviet bloc, mainly from Poland and Czechoslovakia. Nego-
tiations are in progress for additional arms from Communist
China. r
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Yemen �
new trouble may occur
Jo
oK
k
soon.
"the people and tribes are in a mood to take action" and that
"the authorities are in a state of confusion fearing the Imam's
return!' The UAR military mission, which in addition to its
training functions has supported Crown Prince Badr, appears
concerned about its own role in the situation. The Imam re-
portedly hopes to leave Rome by air today.
Burma: me army-contronea aaministration ifl rburnid,
now TthiCit'nonths old, has made a vigorous approach to eco-
nomic and political reforms and has taken an increasingly open
pro-Western stand. Dissidence by the Shan ethnic minority
and disagreement among army leaders on how bet to perp
uate army control, when and if Prime Minister Ne Win steps
dowLij are the principal domestic political issues now facing
the regime. (Page 1)
Afghanistan-USSR: Afghanistan and the USSR on 18 July
announced a new agreement under which Soviet technicians will
assist in the construction of three motor-road bridges in the
eastern province of Ningrahar, near the Pakistani frontier.
This activity would place Soviet personnel in sensitive tribal
territory where disorders occurred last December in protest
against government road-building operations.
(Page 3) (Map)
III. THE WEST
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE ON
BERLIN SITUATION
The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached
by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee
pointed out that its conclusions are to be used in context with all
SNIE s re levant to the Berlin situation.
22 July 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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I. The USSR continues to maintain its hard position at
Geneva by linking an all-German commission with a specified
time limit to an agreement for an interim solution on Berlin,
apparently in anticipation of gaining further Western conces-
sions. Furthermore, Gromyko has refused to clarify the Soviet
position on the duration of Western rights in relation to an in-
terim Berlin agreement.
2. So long as the Soviet leaders estimate that the pros-
pects for negotiation with the West over Berlin are favorable
to them they will not conclude a separate peace treaty with the
GDR or turn over access controls to the East Germans, The
USSR will continue to use threats of such actions is a form of
pressure on the West. The actual physical transfer of controls
could be accomplished with little or no warning.
3. While there are no reliable indications of a bloc intent
to deny Allied or West German access to West Berlin, or to
seal off West Berlin in the immediate future, such actions could
be taken with little or no warning.
4. There has been no significant change in West Berlin's
favorable economic situation.
5. There have been no significant changes in Soviet ca-
pabilities to respond to possible Western actions in the event
of turnover, harassment, or blockade.
6. There were no major intelligence indications of Western
allied diplomatic intentions, apart from information obtained
through official contacts with US representatives.
22 July 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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A-A A %LI A
I. TEE COMMUNIST B1176
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Army-controlled Regime in Burma Continuing Vigorous
Reform Efforts
General Ne Win's army-controlled government is con-
tinuing its vigorous efforts to reform and revitalize Burma's
political and economic life. Inept political appointees of the
former government are being weeded out, and officials are
being scrutinized for indications of corruption. The Ne Win
regime also seems to be moving toward a reorganization of
the labor movement which would neutralize labor as a political
instrument.
Ne Win and the army are maintaining their campaign of
attrition against the Communist insurgents and their above-
ground counterparts in the National United Front (NUF). The
NUF has been especially hard hit by the detention of a substan-
tial number of its national and local leaders.
The strongly anti-Communist bias of the Ne Win govern-
ment is also increasingly apparent in the execution of Burma's
ostensibly neutral foreign policy. Burma seems to be slowly
liquidating its once substantial economic ties with the Sino-So-
viet bloc. Perhaps the best measure of the degree to which Ne
Win has reoriented Burma's foreign policy is the recent agree-
ment to accept American grant aid, a step which the former
government refused to take after Burma unilaterally terminated
an American technical-assistance program in 1953.
Dissidence among Burma's 1,000,000 Shans, who occupy a
large area bordering on Communist China, is increasingly becom-
ing the government's major internal preoccupation. While the
Shan rebels probably still number considerably less than 1,000,
Rangoon fears the movement may gain momentum unless sup-
pressed in the near future. Of prime concern is the possibility
that the Shans and the Chinese Nationalist irregulars may join
forces.
Ilie question of how best to perpetuate army influence in
the government when and if Ne Win steps down is apparently stil.
22 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page
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6mresolved. Ne Win personally leans toward holding elections
late this year or early next year in the expectation that the Ba
Swe - Kyaw Nyein faction of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom
League will win. Certain of his most trusted lieutenants are
believed to favor postponement of the elections at least lon
enough to permit a select group of army officers, already
deeply involved in governmental affairs, to prepare them-
selves to contest the elections as a "third force" seeking the
parliamentary balance of power. Ne Win made clear to Israeli
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion during his recent visit to Israel
that the one thing he would not permit would he former Pre-
mier U Nu's return to powEg
22 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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IMO
Afghan-Soviet Bridge Construction Agreement Announced
Afghanistan and the USSR on 18 July announced a new
agreement under which Soviet technicians are to assist in the
construction of three motor-road bridges in the eastern province
of Ningrahar, near the Pakistani frontier. This activity would
place Soviet personnel in the region opposite the Pakistani states
of Chitral and Dir, which are subject to only limited and indirect
control by Karachi, and near the sensitive Mohmand tribal area
which lies astride the Afghan-Pakistani border.
The projected bridges apparently are part of an Afghan
Government program for road development in this region. This
program is probably partly intended to facilitate the development
of mineral and forest resources in the province. The restive
local tribes have opposed this construction because such road
development facilitates the extension of central government con-
trol in their territory. An Afghan district official was murdered
in this area last December by Mohmands, one of the Pushtu
tribes, and Kabul sent troops which suppressed the agitation
and arrested a number of Mohmand leaders. Afghan Prime
Minister Daud as reported to suspect that Pakistan had a
hand in this incident, tIgmay intend the new agreement as a
show of confidence in his ability to control the local tribes.
22 July 59
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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CONFIDENTIAL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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