CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/11/18

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03148922
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: November 18, 1959

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18 November 1959
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CENTRAL
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IYTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
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18 NOVEMBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Peiping has reportedly disagreed with
Moscow over how the current bloc line
on relaxation of tension should be re-
flected in the tactics of the Western
Communist parties.
Soviet ambassador cites "Camp David
spirit" in urging Turkey to improve re-
lations with the bloc.
Mao Tse-tung warns Indonesian political
leader of diplomatic break if repressive
measures against Overseas Chinese con-
tinue.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq- Qasimis release from the hospital
likely to provoke clashes between Com-
munist and nationalist elements.
Guinea--President Toure extending his
current foreign tour to the USSR and pos-
sibly Czechoslovakia and East Germany. C.V
III. THE WEST
�France- Movement of personnel and
equipment to Saharan nuclear weapons
test center continues. France
wait until qnrina fr7 first test.
�Cuba- Brazilian ambassador fears that
it is a "deliberate policy" of Cuba to
keep its relations with the US in a natatp
of agitation."
--T-QP�SEeRET-
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
18 November 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR - Communist China: Peiping and Moscow have
disagreed over how the current bloc posture on relaxation
of tension should be reflected in the tactics of the Western
Communist parties,
me =nese representatives ailegectiy
insisted on "sharper lines" between Communists and non-
Communists and declared that Western Communist parties
must tighten discipline and increase their aggressiveness
during the period of international "thaw" to prevent "revision-
ist softening" within the parties. The Chinese also believed
the "anticolonial struggle" should be encouraged, while the
Russians felt such support should be qualified in view of
broader Soviet foreign policy considerations with respect
to the UK and France
(Page 1)
USSR-Turkey:
evi-
dence of Soviet diplomatic efforts to exploit the "Camp David
spirit." in light of the im-
proved international situation Turkey should respond to Mos-
cow's desire for friendly relations. Soviet produc-
tion successes as an additional reason why Ankara should
",not delay" in establishing friendly relations with the USSR.
_Coninaunist_ChinalndonesizT:_(
-Communist China will
break off diplomatic relations if Indonesia persists in carryin
out its program of removing Overseas Chinese from rural
areas. The Chinese Embassy in Djakarta is demanding com-
pensation for Chinese in West Java who were allegedly beaten-)
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Cor resisting resettlement and is insisting that they be per-
mitted to return to their homes.
\ government will
proDanTy e orcedTn the end to acquiesce in the Indonesian
measures, Peiping can be expected to continue its pressures
in the hone of obtaining some moderation of the program.")
(Page 2)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq: Prime Minister Qasim's departure from the hos-
pital on�17 November was greeted by a number of laudatory
statements from Radio Baghdad. If demonstrations scheduled
to celebrate his release are held, clashes between Commu-
nists and anti-Communists are likely despite tight security
measures.
Support for the formation of a single political party led
by Qasim is growing. All five army divisional commanders,
three cabinet ministers, and nine provincial governors have
endorsed the idea. The Communist press vigorously opposes
the action, charging that it is a violation of "democratic prin-
ciples." The middle-of-the road National Democrats take the
same line, perhaps because they hope to become Qasim's
chosen instrument. Its sponsors see the move as a device
to limit Communist influence. Qasim has promised the re-
newal of political party activities by 6 January, and although
he has remained silent on the issue, he may feel that a single
party would eliminate present political rivalries.
(Page 3)
Guinea - Soviet Bloc: President Sekou Tour 6 of Guinea
is extending his current foreign tour, which has included of-
ficial visits to the US, Britain, and West Germany, to the
USSR and possibly to Czechoslovakia and East Germany. His
apparently impromptu decision was probably influenced both
by practical considerations and by a desire to demonstrate in
dramatic fashion his continued adherence to a neutralist
foreign Tliev_ such visits may lead to new bloc aid offers to
iinpn
16 Nov DU
DAILY BRIEF ii
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III, THE WEST
French Nuclear Test:
continued movement of personnel and equipment to
France's Saharan nuclear weapons test center at Reggane.
Cooler weather now permits renewed preparations for the
first French nuclear test. All components necessary for a
successful test are probably now available, but France is
likely to wait until March or April to allow for installation
of more complete test-recording intruments and possibly to
conduct a series rather than a single test. The first test is
expected to a 20-kiloton-yield weapon fired from a 300-
foot tower.)
Cubt.: The Brazilian ambassador-in kiavanal wno nas
been considering a discussion with Castro over some means
of bringing about a rapprochement with the US, has reported
that he fears "it is the deliberate
policy of the Cuban Government to maintain its relations with
the US in a state of agitation." In addition Castro appears to
be alienating certain Latin American governments by his ex-
cesses. President Betan-
court personally demanded the recall of the Cuban ambassador
for his indiscretion and irresponsibility. The ambassador has
since left Caracas. (Page 4)
18 Nov 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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N..) I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China China and USSR Diverge on Tactics for Western
Communist Parties
CPeiping and Moscow disagree on how the current bloc line
on relaxation of tension should be reflected in the tactics of the
Western Communist nartieg
soviet and Western delegates favored closer cooperation
with non-Communist political parties. The Chinese, however,
insisting on "sharper lines" between Communists and non-Com-
munists, declared the Western parties must tighten discipline
and increase their aggressiveness during "a period of detente"
to prevent "revisionist softening" within their ranks.
The Chinese also took issue with the USSR on the nature of
support to be given the "anticolonial struggle" Unencumbered
by policy commitments in Western Europe, the Chinese advocated
support for nationalist movements in underdeveloped areas. The
Soviet delegates, on the other hand, felt foreign-policy objectives
toward Paris and London must be taken into account and that sup-
port to "anticolonial struggles" must be qualified by these dip--
lomatic considerations. The Soviet representatives refused to
consider a tougher attitude toward Nasir to help the Egyptian party,
a suggestion made by the Chinese and Italian delegates.
The Italian felt the conference did not resolve the differences
between Peiping and Moscow on these basic issues, but it was his
opinion that a "limited compromise" would be reache
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Peiping Increases Pressure on Djakarta Over Status
Of Overseas Chinese
Communist China
will break off diplomatic relations if Indonesia persists in re-
moving Overseas Chinese from rural areas. The Chinese Em-
bassy is demanding compensation for Chinese in West Java who
were allegedly beaten for resisting resettlement and insists
that they be permitted to return to their homes.
Peiping will probably make further representations on be-
half of the Overseas Chinese. About 300,000 of an estimated
three million Chinese in Indonesia will be affected. Indonesian
Foreign Minister Subandrio, after an hour's meeting with the
Chinese ambassador on 17 November, indicated, however, that
both sides want to prevent permanent damage to hitherto friend-
ly relations. Subandrio brought the dispute into the open when
he told a press conference the interests of 80,000,000 Indone-
sians would not be sacrificed for "a small group of alien peo-
ple." He added, however, that Indonesia would carry through
with the resettlement program in areas where it was under way,
but in other areas Would reconsider its implementation. Suban-
drio said that the Chinese ambassador, while asking Djakarta
to prevent more "excesses" in its implementation, expressed
readiness to support the program.
Peiping probably will be
compelled eventually to acquiesce in the Indonesian measures.
� During the first week of November, the Indonesian Gov-
ernment was considering the expulsion of a Chinese Embassy
official who had been active among Chinese merchants in West
Java. In view of the suggestions of compromise in Subandrio's
17 November statement, however, Indonesia may change its
plans and not insist that the official leave.
18 Nov 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Support For Qasim-Led Single Iraqi Political Party Growing
The campaign for the formation of a single political party
to be led by Prime Minister Qasim continues to gain support
from influential Iraqis. The campaign, launched by a, newspaper
editor close to Qasim, has received the adherence of all five
army divisional commanders, three cabinet minister; and nine
of Iraq's fourteen provincial governors. These influential sup-
porters, none of whom are connected with any of the present
political parties, probably view the one-party state as a means
to curb Communist influence.
The Communists vigorously oppose the single-party concept
and charge that it is "undemocratic" and inspired by Nasir's
monolithic National Union. The official National Democratic
party paper has also taken a stand against the plan, which it de-
clared would not serve "democratic principles." Qasim, who
has promised the resumption of party activities by 6 January,
may favor the movement as a means of eliminating present po-
litical rivalries. He has not, however, given any overt indica-
tion that he endorses the single-party movement,
Qasim has resurrected the old fertile crescent plan, originally
proposed by Nun i Said in December 1942, which envisions the un-
ion of Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Palestine. Arab nationalists have
long attacked this plan as "imperialist," but Qasim has stated that
"now this plan is a national one�Iraq has been liberate" This
scheme would make Baghdad a center of power in the Middle East
rivaling Cairo.
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II I. THE WEST
New'
Castro Excesses Apparently Alienating Other Latin
American Countries
Brazilian Ambassador Cunha in Havana fears that the
Cuban Government intends deliberately to keep its relations
with the US in a state of tension and feels that a proposed
Brazilian approach to Fidel Castro to discuss a Cuban-US
rapprochement would be inopportune. Cunha recently ad-
vised Foreign Minister Lafer to refuse Cuban Foreign Min-
ister Roa's invitation to Havana unless the visit would clear-
ly be useful, since he feared it would be used to indicate
Brazilian sympathy and to give prestige to the Cuban Gov-
ernment's "irresponsible anti-US tendency." Lafer's ap-
parent decision not to go to Cuba seems indicative of a
growing disapproval of Castro's excessive methods which
is also apparent in other Latin American countries.
President Betancourt of Venezuela, one of Latin Amer-
ica's most respected democratic leaders, in early Novem-
ber criticized signs of Castro's "authoritarian rule, and
told the Cuban Government that a proposed visit to Vene-
zuela of Raul Castro and "Che" Guevara would be "in-
convenient." Betancourt personally demanded the recent
recall of the Cuban ambassador in Caracas for his "in-
discretion and irresponsibility." The Colombian ambas-
sador recently advised the Cuban Foreign Ministry that
its toleration of activities by Colombian political exiles
could seriously affect good relations between the two coun-
tries. In a message to his government, he characterized
Castro's accusations against the US as ill-advised and false.
Chile's irritation over the arrival of a planeload of armed
Cubans without passports or prior notification during the
August meeting of the American foreign ministers in Santiago
was heightened by the extradiplomatic propaganda activities
of the Cuban ambassador. Guatemalan President Ydigoras
was disturbed by the visit of ex-President Arevalos to Cuba
at Raul Castro's invitation, and by the financial and other
encouragement he believes the Castro regime has eiven
Guatemalan opposition elements.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Cperations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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