CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/07/17

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03190726
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: July 17, 1959

Z/ZZ/Z/Z/Z/Z7Z/ZZ/Z/Z
� - . Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726.I'1 errnr
/
1401
'11010
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
CONTINUED CONTROL
17 July 1959
Copy No. C 63
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
71 10-P-5-EMU
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CL SS.
t DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: ,S,
NEXT REVIEW DATE: �W_C,01
AUTHL
DATE.
REVIEWER:
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
-TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
Approved for Re1Q-s-e72-6-2-6/02/21 C03190726
NO_
17 JULY 1959
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Renewed plotting against Shah in Iran.
Cameroun--French officials fear out-
lawed extremists may form govern-
ment-in-exile and obtain recognition
from West African States.
Yemen--Delay in Imam's return will
give crown prince more time to
strengthen his position.
Ceylon--Government's firmness in
handling strike puts leftist opposition
at disadvantage but does not alter
Bandaranaike's shaky position.
Thailand--New security controls may
be imposed following discovery of
Communist underground apparatus.
III. THE WEST
0 French authorities highly exercised
over proposed US and Norwegian arms
deliveries to Tunisia.
0 Finland plans to join little free trade
area.
0 Argentina--Navy discontent may weaken
Frondizi's military support.
0 Guatemala--Rioting likely if govern-
ment annuls municipal electoral victory
of Revolutionary party.
Honduras--Government has yet to curb
Communists, whose role enhanced fol-
lowing abortive 12 July rightist revolt.
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
440
.Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO3190726
SECRET
,4�10, 410.,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
17 July 1959
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iran: kahere is apparently renewed plotting against the
Shah in military circles. Two groups seem to be
seriously exploring coup possibilities and attempting to de-
velop more support, but their activities are not believed to
constitute an immediate threat to the Shah. Meanwhile
Soviet propaganda attacks against the Shah continue at a
high level and Iranian officials are showing some concern
over the domestic repercussio.lig
(Page 1)
� Cameroun: Irench officials in Cameroun fear that out-
lawed-nationalist extremists may announce the creation of
a Cameroun government-in-exile during the current meeting
in Liberia of President Tour d of Guinea, Prime Minister
Nkruma,h of Ghana, and President Tub man of Liberia. The
French officials have asked Paris to make an immediate de-
marche to President Tubman to head off recognition by
Liberia and frustrate the Cameroun exiles' reported plan
to gain favorable diplomatic action by the three nations. Both
Guinea and Ghana in the past have shown sympathy for the
extremis12.4
(Page 2)
Yemen: The likelihood of several weeks' delay in the
Imam's MTurn to Yemen from Rome, because of further ill-
ness, will give Crown Prince Badr still more time to
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C0319072/
Napi �SteRET
vir
//
�
14
7
strengthen his position with the aid of UAR military and
?./,'
civilian missions. It will also permit dissident pressures
444 '1.
to build up further in Yemen and these may increase if the
impression is received that the Imam's health is failing.
4 -4 4 44 4
(Page 3)
Ceylon: The powerful leftist party opposing Prime
Minister Bandaranaike�the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaj--
has been maneuvered into a defensive position. The govern-
ment's unusual firmness in dealing with strikes, including
the formation of a strike-breaking volunteer labor force,
has neutralized the leftist challenge. This has not, however,
basically altered the shaky position of the Bandaranaike gov-
ernment.
The unsettled situation apparently has stimulated new
plans by various conservative leaders to seize power. Com-
manders of the armed forces and police,
are preparing such a move at an early date, although
ere is no indication of imminent action.
(Page 5)
Thailand: The recent discovery of Communist under-
ground centers in Bangkok and in southern Thailand has ap-
parently led the Sarit regime to re-examine Thailand's in-
ternal security controls. Among measures that may be taken
Is the introduction of a new antisubversive bill to replace the
1952 Anti-Communist Act, which has provided an inadequate
basis for the successful prosecution of suspected Communists.
(Page 6)
III. THE WEST
*France: fthe American ambassador in Paris reports
y
French authori s are "in a highly charged state" over pro-
posed US and Norwegian arms and ammunition shipments to
Tunisia. Premier Debre, probably under strong pressur27
///
//Z,
17 July 59 DAILY BRIEF ii
7/7
/ -4 .4,
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
AApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO3190726 , /./
'N�01
rf;om the French army in Algeria, has raised the issue with
NATO Secretary General Spaak and with General Norstad,
and is considering taking the issue to the NATO Council.
Meanwhile, on 16 July, the Norwegian NATO representative
said that Norway has decided not to grant export licenses for
the arms delivery. Debre, who had warned that the shipments
may raise the question of France's continued association with
the alliance, will probably continue to press the US to withhold
its shipment. Tunis can be expected to react sharply to any ob-
vious delays in materiel shipments it expects to obtain from the
US, especially if it becomes aware of the latest French de-
marches7/
Finland: The Finns now intend to join the little free trade
area consisting of Britain, Scandinavia, and other non-Com-
mon Market countries, provided the organization is solely
economic and has no political implications. Finland has been
apprehensive about the attitude of the USSR but has lately re-
ceived indications that Moscow would not object to Finnish
participation. Moscow apparently feels that Finland's partic-
ipation would increase the influence of the neutrals in the
group and that the little free trade area might undermine the
Common Market. (Page 7)
Argentina: The outburst of discontent within the navy
over President Fronclizi's refusal to replace Navy Secretary
Estevez has shattered a facade of navy unity, which served
as a stabilizing factor in several past crises involving the
armed forces. The issue will probably be smoothed over,
but it may weaken Fronciizi's military support, which is nec-
essary to counter continuing Peronista and Communist efforts
to exploit popular discontent over living costs.
(Page 8)
Guatemala: A showdown between President Ydigoras
and the leftist but anti-Communist Revolutionary party (PR)
is almost certain if the government annuls the decisive PR
victory in the 5 July mayoralty election in Guatemala City.
,kk There is mounting evidence that the government may do so.
U The American Embassy reported on 15 July that Ydigoras
17 July 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
lifeRE/T-
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
D\(
V74
4.
A
M1:7
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
'401
was under heavy pressure from rightists, including some
army officers, to stop the PR, which has rapidly been gaining
popular strength, "before it's too late." (Page 9)
Honduras: Ambassador Newbegin is concerned that the
failure of Honduran President Villeda Morales to take prompt
action in curbing Communist activity will result in serious
trouble for the government. Communist-led students who took
part in quashing a revolt in the capital on 12 July now control a
radio station and are performing some of the functions of the
national police, who had supported the revolt. The Communists
and their followers probably do not now have the capability to
take over the government, but they may try to prolong tension
by promoting friction between the army and civilians who were
armed by the government during the revolt.
(Page 10)
IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Political Prospects in Ceylon During the Next Two or Three
Years. SNIE 54-59. 14 July 59.
�
17 July 59
DAILY BRIEF iv
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
L THE'CtIVIMONIST BLOC
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Shah of Iran Facing New Domestic Threats
/influential Iranian Army officers, claiming control of a
preponderance of military power in the Tehran area, are re-
ported to be seriously exploring the possibility of ousting the
Shah. Two separate factions are conspiring. Nevertheless,
In the absence of an irresistible opportunity or the threat of
exposure, these groups do not appear to be an immediate dan-
ger to the regime3
ljte leader of one of these factions appears to be General
Teimur Bakhtiar, chief of the Iranian Intelligence and Security
Organization (SAVAK), who is reported
to be carefully cultivating an army following. He has
held several private meetings with army and security officers
who have troop command responsibilities to discuss possible
operations in the event of an emergency situation in Tehran.
Bakhtiar is con-
cerned over possible chaos if something were to happen to the
Saalg
Ogme leaders of one of the conspiracies are apparently
encouraging Bakhtiar to believe they would follow him, while
in reality they continue to seek some other prominent leader
who could give direction and stability to a new governmerlg
dtanwhile the Shah remains firm in the face of sustained
sharp propaganda attacks from the USSR. Despite the increas-
ing nervousness among Iranians over the domestic impact of
the Soviet propaganda, Ambassador Wailes does not believe
there will be any radical change in Iran's policy toward the
USSR, nor any immediate serious domestic disturbances
sparked by the Soviet attacks7
-SECRET-
17 July 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
yr'
Cameroun Government-in-Exile May Be Imminent
(The outlawed nationalist movement, the Union of the
Cameroons Population (UPC), may proclaim a government-
in-exile and secure recognition by several West African
states. Announcement of the formation of such a government
might be timed for the current meeting of President Toure
of Guinea and Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana with Presi-
dent Tubman in Liberia where they are discussing the form of
a future West African association. French officials in Cameroun
have requested Paris to warn Liberia of the consequences of such
diplomatic recognition')
roclamation of an exile government would probably evoke
favorable responses from Guinea and Ghana, which have shown
considerable sympathy for the UPC. They have recently led an
effort to have another review of the Cameroun situation by the
United Nations before the trust territory receives its independence
in January 1960 under its present moderate, pro-French govern-
ment. Both Ghana and Guinea would probably be willing to risk
French diplomatic retaliation. Accra's relations with Paris are
tense because of Ghana's recent recognition of the Algerian rebel
government; Conakry has experienced a general lack of rapport
with Paris since gaining independence in October 1958. Liberia,
however, probably would be reluctant to arouse French hostility
by recognition, although it will be under considerable pressure to
show its devotion to the African nationalist caue2),
Recognition of a Cameroun exile government might also be-
come a subject at the August meeting of nine independent African
states in Liberia when they are expected to discuss the Algerian
situallo.29
17 july 59
-CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
"lase
Yemen Developments
The Imam's continued absence from Yemen will give Crown
Prince Badr more time to strengthen his position with the as-
sistance of UAR military and civilian missions. It will alsos
_b_owever, permit dissident pressures to build up further in Yemen.
As a precaution against further disloyalty in the army and
possible loss of tribal support, Crown Prince Badr
is hastily forming a heavily
armed elite military unit of brigade size--about 3,000 men--
personally loyal to him. This force will be equipped with mod-
ern Soviet bloc weapons, including tanks. Members of the Egyp-
tian military mission, which numbers at least 100 men, now are
moving the tanks from storage near the coast to the northern
capital at Soma. As a major sponsor of Yemen's arms deal with
the Soviet Union in 1956, Badr arranged for acquisition of mod-
ern tanks, artillery, and aircraft, which in the hands of loyal
troops would permit him to press his claim to succession against
expected opposition from important tribal leaders.
13adr's growing reliance on the UAR and his intention to
initiate reforms have increased the resentment of the xenophobic
tribal chiefs. They have grown more restless in the last two
months as internal order has declined but thus far have sup-
ported Badr in return for heavy subsidies, and out of fear of the
authority of the regime, which holds their sons as hostages. The
government's ability to continue subsidy payments, however, is
chronically uncertain.
13adr's enemies in the Imam's entourage:, foremost of whom
is Prince Hasan, the Imam's brother, have sought to convince
the suspicious Imam that Badr and the UAR are plotting to curtail
17 July 59
TOP SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
NMI
the Imam's absolute authority. The Imam evidently planned to
assert his authority fully upon return home, since from Italy
he had reportedly ordered Yemeni workshops to turn out one
thousand iron shackles. A serious failure in the Imam's health
would accentuate the succession struggle in Yemen.
TOP SECRET
17 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
Major Leftisirlarty in Ceylon Suffers Labor gtittack
The Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaj party (LSSP), Ceylon's
leading leftist organization, appears to have been maneuvered
into an untenable position as a result of the Bandaranaike gov-
ernment's firmness in dealing with strike activity.
About 9,000 LSSP-controlled dock and clerical workers in
Colombo port--more than two thirds of the total harbor labor
force--remain on strike, and some LSSP unions in Colombo's
mercantile firms have walked out in sympathy. A group of
less powerful dock unions controlled by the Communist party
and a smaller Trotskyite group accepted Bandaranaike's terms
two weeks ago and returned to work. The LSSP, however,
realizing that it was involved in a significant test of power with
the shaky Bandaranaike government, refused to modify its de-
mands and threatened to extend the port walkout into a general
strike. These tactics only strengthened the government's deter-
mination to make no further concessions.
The LSSP made much political capital out of the strike tech-
nique in 1957 and 1958. Since the leftist element in Bandaranaike's
government coalition withdrew in mid-May, however, the mod-
erates have forced the prime minister to take firm action against
striking unions. Apparently the most effective measure has been
the recent recruitment of an army-controlled volunteer labor
force to replace striking workers in essential services. In ad-
dition, growing public resentment over the detrimental effect
strikes have had on the economy has bolstered the government's
position and jeopardized the LSSPs popular support.
The leftist party probably will be forced to beat a strategic
retreat for the present. However, its considerable following
and effective organization, coupled with the government's pre-
carious position in Parliament, will ensure the LSSP's continu-
ance as a potent opposition force.
Erhe present unsettled political and economic conditions
continue to cause various conservative groups to consider ac-
tion to take over the government. A group including the com-
manders of the armed forces and police is now reported taking
steps in preparation for coup action at an early date, although
other sources do not indicate that such a move is imminen
17 July 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
New
-coo
Sarit Government Re-examining Thai Security Controls
The recent discovery of Communist underground centers
in the Bangkok area and in southern Thailand has reportedly led
the Sarit government to re-examine Thailand's internal security
controls. Thai authorities are said in particular to be consid-
ering a stronger law to replace the 1952 Anti-Communist Act,
which has provided an insufficient basis for prosecution of sus-
pected Communists.
Prior to his summary execution on 6 July, the leader of
the Communist center discovered in the Bangkok area is said
to have been openly derisive of Thai security controls. His scorn,
together with the eVidence of Communist activity uncovered in
the recent police raids, has undoubtedly strengthened elements
in the government who have long argued for tightening internal
security.
The recent raids were apparently the most effective in sev-
eral years. In the Bangkok area, 15 suspects in addition to the
executed leader were arrested, and weapons, documents, com-
munications equipment, and printing equipment were seized.
In southern Thailand, 24 were arrested, and the police report-
edly have some evidence that these individuals had been in con-
tact with Soviet Embassy officials from Bangkok who occasionally
toured the south.
Sarit has ample powers under martial law and the interim
constitution to deal summarily with Communists and other "anti-
social" elements. However, he would probably prefer to use
these powers only in the most glaring and dramatic cases.
CONFIDENTIAL
17 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
III. THE WEST
Finland Plans to Join Little Free Trade Area
Finland definitely intends to join the little free trade
area, consisting of Britain, the Scandinavian countries,
Switzerland, Austria, and Portugal, according to a high of-
ficial of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, provided the organiza-
tion is solely economic and has no political implications.
A decision has been delayed because Finland feared Soviet
objections. Now, however, according to another high official
in the Finnish Foreign Ministry, it has been given a good indica-
tion by a Soviet official that the USSR would not object. Moscow
apparently hopes that the little free trade area will create problems
for and in the long run undermine the Common Market, which So-
viet propaganda has described as an adjunct of NATO and an instru-
ment of West German imperialism. In addition, Moscow may feel
that Finnish participation will increase the influence of the non-
NATO neutrals--Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria--as opposed to
the four NATO members--Britain, Denmark, Norway, and Portugal.
The Finns feel they must participate in order to maintain
the competitive position of their goods in West European markets.
They wish to avoid any implication, however, that they are relinquish-
ing their sovereignty, and they would oppose any statements link-
ing the little free trade area to the Common Market or other West-
ern organizations.
SECRET
17 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
Page 7
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
Argentine Navy Dispute Adds to Military Discontent
The outburst of navy discontent over President Fronditzi's
refusal to replace Navy Secretary Estevez has shattered the
facade of navy unity, which has been a stabilizing factor in
several past crises involving the armed forces. The strong
but previously muffled opposition to Estevez erupted when
Vice Admiral Baroja, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
told the defense minister that a group of important naval of-
ficers had agreed privately at a social gathering on 11 June
that Estevez should resign. Informed of this opinion, Estevez
placed the group under arrest until he learned their views were
not intended as an ultimatum.
Side issues growing out of this incident have probably con-
tributed to the reported requests for retirement by the majority
of ranking officers. As in the case of the recent army dissidents,
however, the situation will probably be smoothed over through
compromise, with most of the retirement requests rejected and
Estevez' resignation eventually accepted.
At the same time, this bitter incident may have weakened
Frondizi's military support, which is necessary in the face of
continuing Peronista and Communist efforts to exploit popular
discontent over living costs. An important reason for navy
criticism of Estevez has been his failure to press Frondizi
for stronger measures against the Peronistas and Communists.
17 July 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
*al
Guatemalan Government May Provoke Showdown With Leftists
There are mounting indications that the Guatemalan Govern-
ment may be preparing to annul the 5 July mayoralty election in
Guatemala City, which was decisively won by the leftist but anti-
Communist Revolutionary party (PR). PR partisans would almost
certainly react with demonstrations likely to result in bloodshed.
The office of mayor of the capital city is generally regarded as
the second most important elective office in the country.
The 5 July election was a re-run of the election last Decem-
ber. Both were won by the same PR candidate, the moderate
Dr. Luis Galich. The government, under strong pressure from
extreme rightists including some army officers, annulled the
earlier election on a legal technicality.
The Guatemalan rightists, who try to monopolize the anti-
Communist label and consider even the moderate PR leaders
Communists, noware pressing President Ydigoras for a second
annulment. They are alarmed by growing PR strength and feel
it necessary to stop the PR before it is too late. Ycligoras lacks
an effective political machine of his own, and from time to time
rightists have threatened to overthrow him if he does not take a
strong stand against the leftists. He may feel impelled to pro-
voke a showdown with the PR at this time, against the advice of
his more moderate counselors.
Galich won more votes in the July election than both his right-
ist opponents combined and a larger total vote than he gained in
December, despite the fact that Communist and pro-Communist
elements had in the meantime split from the PR. The rapidly
mounting PR strength suggests that the party will make a strong
bid for control of the congress in elections scheduled for late
this year.
17 July 59
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
Page 9
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
lupe Nur
Communist Activity Poses Threat to Honduran Government
Ambassador Newbegin fears serious trouble in Honduras
unless President Villeda Morales acts to curb Communist ac-
tivity following the suppression of the revolt which broke out
in Tegucigalpa on 12 July. By 15 July the revolt--which was
led by retired Colonel Armando Velasquez, an inveterate plotter
anxious to become president at any cost--had been crushed by
the army and by civilians who were armed by the government.
alost of the several hundred national policemen constituting
the bulk of Velasquez' support have been made prisoner.!..7
Communist-led students control a radio station in the
capital and have taken over some functions of the national
police. and
are reportedly joining with Communist labor
unions an members of the administration Liberal party in
demanding that a new police force, presumably built around
a nucleus of Communist-advised students, be organized un-
der civilian contr,29, The Liberal party regards the army as
a threat to Honduras' first popularly elected government and
has repeatedly sought to remove the police from army control.
The revival of the civil-military feudq.nd the arbitrary
arrests and intimidations of members of the opposition National-
ist and Reformist parties by armed civilian_sima,y lead to more
violence unless Villeda Morales takes firm steps to curtail the
Communists andto restore the responsibility of preserving order
to the army.
The Communists probably have neither the intent nor ability
to attempt to take over the government at this time and will most
likely be content to continue fomenting disorders.
17 July 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
Page 10
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
Nepre Nue
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03190726
rvzzzzzr Zr