CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/02/04

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003303
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: February 4, 1959

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3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
4 February 1959
Copy No. C 63
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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4 FEBRUARY 1959
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR - Ambassador Thompson cites
Importance of Mikoyan claim that US
aware of shift in balance of power to
the bloc.
0
USSR planting contradictory statements
on turnover of Berlin access control;
latest convoy incident probably premed-
itated and an attempt to emphasize West-
ern vulnerability. 0
Tito warns uncommitted Asian nations
against Moscow and Peiping,
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iran at point of breaking off negotia-
tions with USSR.
Nasir continues activities against Iraqi
regime and Arab Communists; Qasim
bickering with nro-Comraunist aides.
�
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nrs:
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1
.1
�Tunisia to claim prospective Algerian
oil area.
Greece and Turkey to continue efforts
to solve Cyprus issues.
�India - Election of Nehru's daughter as
Congress party president provides no
solution for party's problems.
Omani rebels dispersed by British and
Muscati forces.
III. THE WEST
Bonn advises UK of its review of re-
lations with USSR
03 Cambodia and Thailand agree to re-
ELUME_dinlnmatir_reiations.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
(914
1. February 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: Ambassador Thompson underlines the importance
of Mikoyan's thesis in his speech to the party congress that
the improved atmosphere in Soviet-American relations stems
from awareness of American leaders and public that the bal-
ance of power is shifting to the Soviet bloc. Mikoyan suggests
that the United States is becoming reconciled to the status quo,
especially in Eastern Europe, and that the US may seek to
avoid a showdown on Berlin.
USSR-Berlin: Soviet detention of a US truck convoy from
Berlin at the checkpoint on the East - West German frontier
is the first incident involving Soviet detention of a US military
truck convoy since 14 November when one was held near Ber-
lin. At that time, US officials in Berlin believed it was a
deliberate probe of US reactions. The present incident also
appears to be premeditated. It was probably designed to point
up the vulnerability of Western access as Secretary Dulles be-
gins talks with Western allies on the Berlin and German issues.
The USSR has been planting contradictory statements through
diplomatic and press channels in an effort to confuse the West
concerning the time and circumstances under which access con-
trols will be turned over to the East Germans.
(Page 3)
Yugoslavia:ciito's unprecedented statement to Ceylonese
officials that "on Ty American power prevents world domination
by Moscow" may have been in reaction to increasingly aggres-
sive bloc policies. He displayed considerable apprehension
regarding Peiping's efforts among the uncommitted Asian na-
tions and warned them against too close relations with Moscowp
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'and Peiping. While Belgrade is likely to become more sym-
pathetic to Western positions, it will continue to give full -
support only to uncommitted states.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
*Iran-USSR: ahe Shah and his top advisers, having second
thoughts on the benefits of a Soviet-Iranian nonaggression pact,
are trying to disengage themselves. Foreign Minister Hekmat,
in a reversal of attitude, claims he is "fed up" with Soviet ne-
gotiators, is breaking off the negotiations, and is prepared to
sign the bilateral agreement with the US immediately. Hekma
said he had been commissioned by the Shah to determine how
to breakoff negotiations, withthe Soviets and the timing for sig-
nature of the bilateral agreement. The Shah earlier had said
he would go ahead with the nonaggression pact if the USSR yielded
on all points of disagreement!j (Page 4)
UAR-Iraq: Nasir's conflict with the Iraqi regime and Com-
munist activities in the Arab world continues. Cairo s re-
ported ready to undertake a new campaign of arrests of Egyp-
tian Communists anithas suggested that the pro-UAR press
in Beirut play up a reported clash between Qasim and two of
his pro-Communist advisers--his aide, Col. Wasfi Tahir,
and the president of Baghdad's "People's, Court," Fadil Mah-
dawi. The Baghdad press is replying vigorously to UAR at-
tacks on Qasim and his regime, and an Iraqi delegate has used
the Moscow party congress as a forum for a thinly diseuised
affark nn Nasirls nti-Communist actions.
(Page 5)
Tunisia: CPresident Bourguiba will probably soon reiterate
Tunisia's claim to a part of the Algerian Sahara which, accord-
ing to the Tunisian foreign secretary, comprises the greater
part of a concession which France last month granted to a cor-
poration owned half by French interests and half by Standard
Oil of New Jersey. The Tunisian Government does not object
to exploitation of the area but expects Standard Oil to "make ar-
rangements directly with the rightful owner.'
4 Feb 59
DAILY BRIEF
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Cyprus:G.11e Greek and Turkish foreign ministers are
planning to meet again soon in an effort to resolve the re-
maining outstanding issues preventing a Cyprus settlement]
(Page 8)
India: The electionof Indira Gandhi, Nehru's 42-year-old
daughter, as Congress party president is unlikely to assure
the strong leadership the political organization now needs.
Mrs. Gandhi probably will be unable to revitalize and unify
the national party. Her socialist views, which some top
leaders apparently hope will check the influence of conserva-
tive Congress politicians, are likely to accentuate the dif-
ferences between the left and right wings of the party.
(Page 9)
Britain-Muscat:CBritish commando-type units have ap-
parently driven the Omani rebels from their mountain strong-
hold. As of 29 January, Muscati and British forces were
reported in complete control of the rebel territory and the
three rebel leaders had fled to Saudi Arabia. This defeat,
however, is unlikely to reverse the UAR- supported
long-term efforts to undermine the British position on the
periphery of the Arabian Peninsula'.
ii
III. THE WEST
West Germany: 6onn's deputy foreign minister, while
maintaining that Germany's position on relations with the USSR
is basically negative and rigid, has indicated
the extent of Bonn's review of these relations.
He suggested several possible concessions which
Bonn would consider in the event of high-level East-West
talks, such as West German establishment of relations wit
Poland, eventual recognition of the Oder-Neisse border, a
possible "thinning out" of troops, curtailment of certain
Western propaganda and intelligence activities in Berlin, and
prohibition of nuclear weapons if not applied solely to Germany)
(Page 10)
4 Feb 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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LATE ITEM
*Thailand Cambodia: Thailand and Cambodia have agreed
to resume diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level be-
inning 20 February,
The agreement, to be announced in a joint commu,
nique on 6 February, was effected through the good offices of
UN mediator Beck-Friis. Cambodian
Premier Sihanouk had broken off relations with Thailand last
IsITovember out of�pique over anti Cambodian commentary in
the Bangkok press.
4 Feb 59
DAILY BRIEF iv
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Mikoyan and Gromyko Speeches at Party Congress
The foreign-policy speeches by Gromyko and Mikoyan at
the 21st party congress carried forward the Soviet leaders'
efforts to create a political atmosphere which they believe will
bring the Western powers to high-level talks on terms favor-
able to the USSR. Moscow appears to believe that if these ef-
forts are unsuccessful, such moves as Mikoyan's visit to the
United States and pronouncements designed to show the USSR's
flexibility and reasonableness will make it difficult for the
Western powers to react firmly to a transfer to the East Ger-
mans of Soviet controls over Allied access to Berlin.
Ambassador Thompson has underlined the importance of
Mikoyan's thesis that the improvement in Soviet-American rela-
tions reflects awareness of American leaders and public that
the balance of power is shifting to the Soviet bloc. The ambas-
sador suggests that Mikoyan was trying to-convey the impres-
sion that the United States is becoming reconciled to the status
quo, especially in Eastern Europe, and may therefore seek to
avoid a showdown on Berlin.
Mikoyan told the party congress that he had concluded from
his talks with American leaders that they now are inclined '''to
recognize the principle of peaceful coexistence of countries with
different social and political systems." He noted that "in con-
trast to earlier times, the US statesmen expressed a readiness
to negotiate" and that they no longer talked of a "policy of con-
taining, repelling, or liberating." Mikoyan also attempted to
cast doubt on the firmness of American policy on Berlin and
the German question by stressing an alleged divergence between
the American people's desire for an end to the cold war and the
policies of their government.
Foreign Minister Gromyko's speech provided further evi-
dence that Moscow intends to use its moves on Berlin and a
German peace treaty to maneuver the West into at least tacit
recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe. His remarks
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4 Feb 59
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reflected the Soviet leaders' concern over the growing military
power of West Germany and their desire to contain this poten-
tial threat to the East German regime before it reaches danger-
ous proportions.
Gromyko denounced Chancellor Adenauer for rejecting
Soviet proposals aimed at easing tension, and charged that
West German leaders are seeking to prevent any East-West
accommodation until West Germany has built up sufficient
military power to "impose its terms" for reunification and
a peace treaty.
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4 Feb 59
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USSR Detains American Convoy on Berlin Access Route
Soviet border guards at the East - West German frontier
detained a United States Army truck convoy coming from West
Berlin on 2 February after the American personnel accompany-
ing the partially covered vehicles refused to permit the Rus-
sians to carry out a detailed inspection. Previously the trucks
had passed through the Soviet checkpoint at Babelsberg out-
side West Berlin with the usual cursory examination. On the
same day the same procedure was used on a single British
truck which was then passed through apparently after a "satis-
factory" inspection was made over the driver's protest.
These harassments are probably timed to demonstrate
the West's vulnerability to interference on the access routes
in order to complicate Secretary Dulles' talks with Allied
leaders on the Berlin issue. This is the first incident involv-
ing Soviet detention of a US military truck convoy since 14
November, when one was held near Berlin. It represents a
further step in the long-range effort to erode the West's posi-
tion in Berlin.
This move follows Soviet efforts to promote confusion and
disunity in the West over the Berlin issue by planting in diplo-
matic and press channels reports that are at variance with the
Kremlin's public position. The most recent was a statement
by a high-ranking Soviet Embassy officer in East Berlin that
when the six-month grace period ends, the German Democratic
Republic will be given contro over Allied access without re-
gard to other developments.
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Now
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iran Intends to Terminate Treaty Negotiations With USSR
Gran intends to break off negotiation of the proposed non-
aggression treaty with the USSR, according to Iranian Foreign
Minister Hekmat, who has been one of the principal advocates
for a reassessment of Iranian foreign policies. Hekmat told
Ambassador Wailes on 2 February that he was "fed up" with
the Soviet negotiators. He said he has been "studying" the
terms of the bilateral agreement pending with the US and now
is prepared to sign. He claimed the Shah instructed him to
end the negotiations with the USSR and to determine the tim-
ing for signature of the US agreement.7
[Negotiations, with the USSR reportedly became snagged
on Iranian insistence on remaining in the Baghdad Pact and
on canceling articles 5 and 6 of the Soviet-Iranian treaty of
1921. These articles give the USSR the right to advance its
troops into Iran to carry out operations "necessary for its de-
fense" when menaced by military operations of another country:)
Ghe Shah appears to have had some second thoughts on the
benefits of a rapprochement with the USSR and to have sought
grounds for refusal to sign the treaty should Soviet negotiators
agree to all Iranian conditions. The Shah apparently became
increasingly concerned over the prospect of adverse interna-
tional reaction if Iran signed a nonaggression pact with the
USSR. In an audience given to British Minister of Defense
Duncan Sandys on 1 February, the Shah gave the impression
that he did not expect negotiations with the Soviet Union to be
successful, but wished to retain temporarily the threat of agree-
ment as a bargaining point with the West.1
SECRET
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Nigre'
Nasir's Anti-Communist Campaign
Nasir's conflict with the Qasim regime in Iraq and with
Communist activity in the Arab world continues. The Cairo
and Damascus press and the UAR-supported newspapers in
Beirut are carrying on a violent campaign against the Com-
munists and are complaining that Moscow is infringing on
Arab neutrality. In his opening address at Cairo's Afro-Asian
Youth Conference on 2 February, Nasir inserted a few pointed
remarks on the "noninterference" principle of the Bandung na-
tions, interpreted as indirect disapproval of the USSR's sup-
port of Arab Communists. CIn addition, Nasir is reported
readying a new list of 100-150 Egyptian Communists to be
arrested later this month. The list is said to include some
leading party members who were missed earlier this year:
The UAR is also apparently engaged in a clandestine ef-
fort within the USSR to obtain information on Moscow's support
of Iracti and Syrian Communists.
Cairo to make arrangements for
contacting "the Russian officer" in this connection.
pamascus suspects the Communists of
attempting to influence or perhaps bribe the head of the Syrian
Deuxieme Bureau.
a "violent clash" had occurred between Qasim
and two of his most influential pro-Communist advisers--his
aide, Col. Wasfi Tahir, and the president of the Baghdad Peo-
ple's Court, Col. Fadhil Mandawi. Qasim2 who was reportedly
"very much on edge," complained of Mandawi's extremist be-
havior during the prosecutions. Cairo has suggested that pro-
UAR papers in Beirut play up differences within the regime.
Mahclawi lashed out with another blast against the UAR on
2 February. The predominantly leftist Baghdad press joined
the chorus with attacks on the UAR's suppression of the Syrians,
4 Feb 59
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1. e. the Syrian Communist party. Meanwhile, an Iraqi del-
egate used the Soviet 21st party congress as a forum for a
barely disguised attack on the UAt's opposition to the Arab
Communists.
�7`014-SEeRE-1"
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*roe
Tunisia to Demand Revision of Western Boundary
goresident Bourguiba has outlined to a New York Times
correspondent Tunisia's claim to some 69000 square miles of
the Algerian Sahara. The area involved, according to Tunisian
Foreign Secretary Mokaddem, comprises the greater part of
a concession which France granted last month to a French-
American corporation in which Standard Oil of New Jersey has
50 percent participation. The Tunisians insist that the pres-
ent border is a provisional boundary fixed by French officers
and that the line should be drawn due south from Bir Romane
to an east-west line just south of Gadames-3
CMokaddem on 28 January showed Ambassador Jones a pur-
ported map of all oil concessions granted in Algeria. He stated
that the Tunisian Government makes the "most solemn and ex-
press reservations" regarding the Standard Oil concession which
overlaps the disputed area, but added that there would be no ob-
jections to exploitation of the area if Standard Oil makes arrange-
ments with the Tunisian Government
CThe Tunisians expect to make an early demarche to the
French and possibly also the Algerian rebel provisional gov-
ernment. Such a demarche or an announcement of this claim
by Bourguiba is certain to irritate Tunisia's already difficult
relations with France. It may lead to further difficulties with
the Algerian rebels, who resist Morocco's territorial claims in
western Algeria. The Algerians reacted sharply last July when
Bourguiba granted a concession for the pipeline linking the
Edjele oil field in eastern Algeria: to the Mediterranean to
transit Tunisia. They will, however, welcome any legal dif-
ficulties which Tunisia can interject into the exploitation of
this concession.73
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Niro
Cyprus
dhe Greek and Turkish foreign ministers are planning
to meet again this week, probably in Zurich, in an effort
to resolve the remaining issues preventing a Cyprus settle-
ment]
Creek Foreign Minister Averoff predicts negotiations will
be concluded within two weeks, but he has repeatedly stated
his conviction that the British Government will attempt to
sabotage an eventual agreement. London, however, by post-
poning the scheduled publication of a controversial electoral
law for Cyprus, has given evidence of its intention to place
no obstacles in the way of negotiations. While areas of dis-
agreement between Athens and Ankara could still prevent a
solution, many of the barriers to a settlement have been re-
moved. The major remaining problem appears to involve
Turkey's insistence that the proposed independent Cyprus be
precluded from joining the UN.3
CAveroff claimsthatArchbiMop Makarios has been con-
tinually informed about the negotiations and is in agreement
with the Greek Government's position:3
If the foreign ministers' conference is successful, Athens
is expected to agree to the Turkish suggestion that the two prime
ministers join the conference before announcement of a final
agreement.')
Cyprus, there has been no resurgence of violence
despite warnings by Greek Cypriots that the recent British
security operations would provoke an EOKA response. The
operations have now been concluded and new releases f
ical detainees have further improved the atmosphere.
4 Feb 59
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Negri
Neve
Nehru's Daughter Elected President of Indian Congress Party
The election on 2 February of Prime Minister Nehru's 42-
year-old daughter Indira Gandhi as president of the Congress
party is unlikely to assure India's ruling political organization
of the strong leadership it needs. The party lacks discipline
and vitality at a time when implementation of India's develop-
ment program and increasing competition from the Communist
party demand its utmost effort.
Mrs. Gandhi, wife of Parliament member Firoze Gandhi,
apparently was supported by the Congress high command as
well as by many regional party units. However, her election
probably resulted less from enthusiasm for Mrs. Gandhi than
from fear of displeasing Nehru and from lack of an alternative
choice acceptable to all sections of the party. A few top lead-
ers apparently did oppose her selection.
Mrs. Gandhi has been actively associated with the "ginger
group" in the party, which has been working, probably with
Nehru's blessing, to revive the party's socialist ideology. The
high command's somewhat surprising decision has the dual pur-
pose of injecting "young blood" into the party leadership and
checking the "drift toward a rightist trend of thought."
The naming of Indira Gandhi, however, could well have
the opposite effect. She lacks both the experience and the po-
litical leadership necessary for such a big job. Old-line
Congress bosses at the head of various regional party ma-
chines are not likely to be brought into line easily by Mrs.
Gandhi, active in the high command only during the past few
years, despite her unique position as Nehru's closest confidant.
In addition, her identification with the party's left wing may
alienate the more conservative elements and increase the pos-
sibility of an eventual party split.
4 Feb 59
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III. THE WEST
.13-oien Suggests Possible Concessions in East-West Negotiations
CWest Germany's State Secretary for Foreign Affairs van
Scherpenberg on 2 February suggested
several possible concessions which Bonn would
consider in the event high-level East-West talks are held. He
mentioned establishment of diplomatic relations with Poland
and recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, some thinning out of
troops, or a prohibition of nuclear weapons if not directed
solely against Germany;5
tI
even
the revised Rapacki Plan is unacceptable. Bonn also rejects
any proposal for a German confederation, which van Scherpen-
berg characterized as the "road to communization of all Ger-
many." Van Scherpenberg also informed Lloyd that some moves
might be taken to make West Berlin less "provocative," such as
reduction of propaganda ratliobroadcasts, for example those of
RIAS, and certain Western intelligence activities:3
Eihese hints of possible concessions may have been designed
to forestall any British support for German confederation or a
far-reaching disengagement scheme. The German ambassador
in Moscow says Adenauer is prepared to be flexible but opposes
advancing any concessions prior to an East-West meetingo-f
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Nrof
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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