CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/03/18

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03160621
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 18, 1959

Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03160621
vear 1 %or aL�KC I
Nue
18 March :1959
Copy No.
C
CENTRAL
63
IYTELLIGENCE
BULLETI\
DOC! !%"EN 1 NO.
NO C.; i;J�,1'7-',F:: IN r,!
�. Et) TO:
[1;1;174" REVIEVVER:
044
--TOP -SEC-R-ET-
rcm7ecTf;rTRjle�as-e: "2020/02/21 CO 1 1 go 62
Approved TO [7R-el ea-ie7-2-010762721 C03160621
TAD creory
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03160621
411,3prTve-d7or-Rele-a-se7.-k20/02/21 C03160621
13 MARCH 1959
I THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR arranging for return of 500
Kurds to Iraq.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Sudan - Army move to force further
political changes may be imminent.
Indonesian Army mission authorized
to seek arms from either West or
bloc.
i�
f '7
7-'-- ) t- i - i -
r
III. THE WEST
0 West Germany - Adenauer publicly re-
jects all plans for limiting or withdraw-
ing forces in Central Europe.
LATE ITEMS
0 The Panamanian Government has been
alerted to an imminent revolutionary
attempt.
0 Jordan - Bedouin officers may attempt
to seize control of government after
Premier's departure for US.
TOP SECRFT
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03160621
id�
�
Approv7d for Release: 2020/02/21 C03160621
New
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
18 March 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
477
USSR-Iraq: tcans being worked out by Soviet and Iraqi
officials to return 00 Kurds to Iraq from the USSR are "w
along," according to an Iraqi diplomat in Moscow. At the
present time, Moscow and Iraqi Communists appear to be
playing down the theme of an independent Kurdish state in fa-
vor of joint Kurdish-Arab support for the "progressive" Qasim
regim.3 (Page 1)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Sudan: alle dissident officers group in Sudan led by Brig-
adier Shannan, commander of the Northern Command, is re-
ported to have advanced the date from 22 to 19 March for its
attempt to take full control of the government.
the commander of the
Western Command was proceeding that day by plane to Khar-
toum "on a very important mission." The trip would appear to
be connected with current political maneuvering there. Con-
tinuing scheduled rotation of troop units could provide a screen
for another abrupt movement of troops to the capita
Indonesia: An army mission is now exploring the feas-
ibility of further military procurement in the United States and
in Western and Eastern Europe. It is authorized, at its dis-
cretion, to investigate Czech and Polish offers for the construc-
tion of an arms factory in Indonesia. The air force is believed
arranging additional purchases of aircraft and equipment from
Czechoslovakia. (Page 2)
�7e-13�SECRET
A;c1Z7;;Tr7lielease: 2020/02/21 C03160621//
- Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03160621
I I I. THE WEST
West Germany: Chancellor Adenauer has publicly made
a sweeping rejection of all plans for limiting or withdrawing
armed forces in Central Europe. Despite an appearance of
"complete unanimity" in his 12-13 March talks with Macmillan,
Adenauer's attack on disengagement is aimed at London; it is
also designed to correct any public misinterpretation of Bonn's
position. Etop foreign policy adviser in Adenauer's party, f
ing it necessary to make concessions to public opinion, favor
putting forward a disengagement Ian c_ipgd._01.rwilzever._t.()_
be unacceptable to Moscow:
(Page ay
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached
by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee
pointed out that its conclusions were to be used in context with
SNIE 100-2-59 (24 February 1959) and with the review of that es-
timate in SNIE 100-2/1-59 (17 March 1959):
1, The USSR will not turn over access controls
to the GDR in the near future. However, the Soviets
continue to carry out measures necessary to a with-
drawal of their forces from East Berlin, and the phys-
ical transfer of access controls could be accomplished
with very little or no advance warning.
2. There are no reliable indications of a Soviet
intent in the near future to harass or blockade Allied or
West German access to West Berlin, or to seal off West
Berlin from the East. However, the Soviets could take
such actions with little or no warning.
3. The West Berlin population remains basically
calm and believes that if the West stands firm, the USSR
will not drive the matter to armed conflict. However,
18 Mar 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
--TOP�SEC-R-EF-
Airp-p7oTeTfOrgele-a-s-e716657657ilaiiiiifigir
ref/Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03160621
Ni;le
some informed West Berliners are concerned
over what they consider an apparent lack of
Allied unity on what actions should be taken.
(dECRET)
LATE ITEMS
*Panama: The government has been alerted to expect an im-
minent revolutionary attempt, possibly as early as 18 March.
The interior minister expects simultaneous uprisings in Panama
City and in the interior. He believes the effort is to be led by
dissident First Vice President Diaz, who has the backing of
Roberto Arias, a wealthy political intriguer who has recently
been in Cuba seeking arms for an attemPt against the moderate
De la Guardia administration. The interior minister said the
government will welcome the revolutionary attempt since it is
confident of suppressing it and administration leaders are tired
of the opposition's continual thrpa f rvf vinhn which hcivP ron-
nornarl thprn frvr nvpr vPa r
*Jordan: (Qfficers of the influential Bani Sakhr Bedouin tripe
may Tireinpt to seize control of the government following Pre-
mier Rifai's scheduled departure on 18 March to join King Husayn
in the United States.,1
the con-
tention that the Bedouin officers have obtained Nasir's assur-
ance of support because the tribesmen have traditionally sup-
ported the monarchy; however, :UAR contacts with Bedouin
officers have been reported in recent months. The current
withdrawal of certain military units from West Jordan will further
increase Bedouin strength around Amman. Last week end's ar-
rests of about ten officers of a rival faction, at the direction of
Armed Forces Chief of Staff Habis Majalli, a Bedouin, was re-
oortedlv intended to prepare the ground for the Bani Sakhr coup.
18 Mar 59
DAILY BRIEF
TOP SECRET
z
4Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO3160621
_ Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03160621
Nor
NIS
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR to Repatriate Kurds to Iraq
lans now being worked out by Soviet and Iraqi officials to
return 500 Kurds to Iraq from the USSR are "well along,"
Of this number, about
100 were said to be located in the Moscow area, with the remain-
der around Tashkeny
ffhese Kurds are almost certainly from among those who
fled to ,:he USSR following the suppression of the short-lived
Kurdish People's Republic which was established with Soviet en-
couragement in northwestern Iran in late 1945. Individual Kurds,
such as Mullah Mustafa Barzani�military leader during the 1945
uprising--have returned to Iraq since Qasim's coup, but this would
be the largest group of returnees to date. Soviet authorities can
be expected to make an effort to include among the returnees
agents and Communist sympathizer s3
aurdish responsiveness to bloc and local Communist agita-
tion for an independent state constitutes a potentially useful Soviet
instrument for exerting pressure on the countries in which the
Kurds reside. However, both Moscow and the Iraqi Communists
at present are playing down the theme of an independent Kurdish
state in favor of joint Kurdish-Arab support for the "progres-
sive" Qasim regime, probably because of the disruptive effect
such subversive activity would have on a pro-bloc Iraq. Further-
more, Mullah Mustafa apparently is satisfied, as are many Kurds,
with Qasim's treatment of the Kurdish minori..t.17.7
-SEGRE-T--
18 Mar 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03160621
Page 1
pre r. r' r. ri ry
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03160621
NNW %me
I I. ASIA-AFRICA
Indonesian Military Missions Seek More Arms
An Indonesian Army purchasing mission is exploring
the feasibility of further military procurement in the United
States and in Western and Eastern Europe. It is authorized
to investigate credit possibilities for the construction of a
$60-$80,000,000 arms factory in Indonesia.
the mission
hopes to interest a West German firm in the project. Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, however, have already sub-
mitted estimates. The satellite credit terms to date have
been so much more liberal than those of the West that a con-
tract with a bloc country appears more likely.
The army mission probably will also purchase additional
arms and military equipment. The Indonesian Army contracted
for $21,000,000 worth of arms from Poland and Czechoslovakia
during early 1958 and has since revealed an interest in further
purchases.
The Indonesian Air Force bought on credit almost $60,000,-
000 worth of aircraft and equipment in 1958, and has since
bought aircraft from the European satellites and Communist
China. It still has about $35,000,000 remaining from its gov-
ernment-approved allotment with which to make additional
purchases. an Indonesian
Air Force mission went to Czechoslovakia in Pebruary and
that another mission will go there in early April in connection
with "Project Chakra," presumably a code name for new
purchases of aircraft.
Indonesian arms purchases under bloc credits now total
more than $170,000,000.
TOP SECRET
18 Mar 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03160621
mem JO. ONE We. IK � ~II V V'
..wApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03160621
Nur
I I I. THE WEST
Adenauer Rejects All Disengagement Schemes for Central
Europe
Chancellor Adenauer on 16 March rejected outright all
plans to reduce or withdraw Western troops from Central
Europe on the grounds that such schemes endanger Western
security. Writing in a Christian Democratic Union (CDU)
publication, he stressed that military solutions were unac-
ceptable unless accompanied by political solutions.
Aaenauer is reportea to have shown "rigici" resistance to
any departure from established positions in the direction of
disengagement:3
Adenauer's sharp attack on disengagement is probably
aimed at London and may reflect a misunderstanding between
him and Macmillan in their talks on 14 March. Despite the
public appearance of complete unanimity in the talks, no
agreement was reached on the problem of thinning out forces
in Central Europe. Adenauer's remarks are probably an ef-
fort to counteract the widespread German press comment to
the effect that he accepted the British view on relaxing ten-
sions in Central Europe through an inspected "freeze" on
military forces followed by reduction.
CA number of usually firm Adenauer supporters in the
Bundestag increasingly feel that some such flexible plan
must be worked out as a means of retaining public support in
West Germany, and Foreign Minister Brentano is also re-
ported to favor such a tactical move. Adenauer, however,
is opposed to such a plan, even if it is deliberately designed
to be unacceptable to Moscow:1
CONFIDENTIAL
18 Mar 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03160621
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03160621
CONFIVEN1.1AL Nine
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03160621
-TOP-SEC-RE-1r-
0, /4
(7,4
74/44
�J
-TO-P-SECRET-
WMA orfrrn, OrMA Approved for Release: 2020 / 02 /21 C 03160621 Vrndej 7Z, /WM'