CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/10/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003521
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: October 21, 1959

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ley Approved for Release:
6030:21
3.3(h)(2)
21 October 1959
Copy No. C 65
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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21 OCTOBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Objectives of Khrushchev's policy de-
scribed as isolation of US and gaining
time to build up bloc strength.
Khrushchev
sees improved Soviet-American rela-
tions.
Mao Tse-tung declares Sino-Indian bor-
der dispute is "minor matter" that will
be settled.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Laos- Friction developing between old-
line and younger politicians could lead
to government crisis.
Kenya--Tension continues high between
government and African population.
III. THE WEST
Bolivia--Government minister threatens
coup attempt.
5
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
21 October 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: alle major aims of Khrushchev's policy of "peace-
ful coexistence" are to isolate the United States from the rest
of the world and to gain time in which to build up the bloc's
military and economic power,
Khrushchev's strategy was said
to call for preserving the status quo for the next few years, af-
ter which the USSR and Communist China will be so strong that
they will be able to prevent "imperialist" intervention in coun-
tries where revolutions are taking place.
Khrushchev has also
presented these views to Chinese and other Communist leaders.
Moscow may have felt the need to provide a more complete ex-
planation of the coexistence policy to rank-and-file members of
the international Communist movemeng
(Page 1)
USSR- US: rkhrushchev told
"America was very interesting; I had a lot to learn." Ithrushenev
added that while there still are people in the United States who
want to continue the cold war, and although there are misunder-
standings in the USSR about the United States, this situation will
improve. He believed a summit meeting would still be held be-
fore the end of the year and said the main problems were disarm-
ament, ending the cold war, and Germany including Berlinj
Sino-Indian border: Ilgj.ping's concern that Western influ-
ence could increase in India as a result of the border dispute was
indicated by Mao Tse-tung
SE ,T
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mao discussed the "growth of right reactionaries
and military dictatorships" in Asia and,in this context, stressed
the "great importance" of Sino-Indian friendship. Mao made a
decided effort to play down the Sino-Indian border dispute as a
"minor matter which is going to be settled." According to recent
press reports, as yet unconfirmed, Chinese troops have with-
drawn from the disputed outpost of Longju, which they seized on
26 August. If true, this would indicate Pei-3ing may be moving
toward an accommodation with New Delhiq
�Page 3)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Laos: /Political maneuvering is growing in Vientiane over how
best to postpone elections scheduled for December- a postpone-
ment necessitated by the present insurrection. Friction between
and younger elements appears to be developing and could
lead to a governmental crisis. Premier Phoui himself is con-
cerned over the possibility that younger elements, with army back-
ing, may be considering a take-over. Page 4)
*Kenya: 1Tension continues high between the Kenya Govern-
ment and the Africans after police on 20 October broke up a dem-
onstration by African nationalists seeking the release of Mau Mau
leader Jomo Kenyatta. The demonstration for Kenyatta by follow-
ers of African leader Mboya appears to have been planned despite
the possibility that it might lead to Mboya's arrest, and was prob-
ably directed less toward the release of Kenyatta than toward em-
barrassing the Kenya Government. (Page 5)
III. THE WEST
Bolivia: The moderate Minister of Government Guevara Arce:
a member of the right wing of the governing Nationalist Revolution-
ary Movement who has presidential ambitions, has reportedly
threatened to carry out a coup--backed by 800 armed miners and
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possibly aided by the police--if the Bolivian Congress adjourns
without resolving the struggle between President Siles and the
country's acting vice president, who heads the Senate and op-
poses Siles. Other members of the ruling party have in the past
threatened to stage a coup. Any coup attempt would probably set
off an intense struggle for power and civil strife.
(Page 6)
21 Oct 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Moscow Explains Aims of "Peaceful Coexistence" Policy to
Indian Communists
The major aims of Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful co-
existence" are to isolate the United States from the rest of
the world and to gain time in which to build up the bloc's mili-
tary and economic power.
Khrushchev's strategy is said to call for preserv-
ing the status quo for "seven years or so," after which the USSR
and Communist China will be so strong that they will be able to
prevent "imperialist" intervention in countries where revolutions
are taking place. With this major shift in the international balance
of power toward the Sino-Soviet bloc, recurrence of such situa-
tions as Taiwan and Korea will be avoided, the Indian Commu-
nists were advised.'
Khrushchev has also presented these views to (Au.
nese and other Communist leaders. This suggests that Moscow feels
the need to provide a detailed interpretation of the coexistence
policy to rank-and-file members of the international Communist
movement!
/Soviet leaders are said to feel that "official circles" in the
United States are divided between those who favor coexistence
with the USSR and those who favor a policy of maintaining tension.
The major achievement of Khrushchev's visit to the United States,
was his
exploitation of this rift to gain more support among the "coexistence"
group, which allegedly commands "greater" support with the Ameri-
can people:'
Moscow reportedly assumes that nothing will come of Khrushchev's
proposal for general and complete disarmament. While there may be f
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Cb.artial disarmament, the "imperialists" are fundamentally
opposed to disarmament, in Moscow's view;f
Cithrushchev's peaceful coexistence strategy eventually is to
lead to the "automatic" surrender of the US, after the rest of
the world is Communist. In this connection,
a major Soviet objective is to convince
the American people they would be losers in a nuclear war. They
claimed that the Soviet sputniks and luniks have been successful to
a great extent in demoralizing the American people:]
the Chinese
Communist threats to liberate Taiwan are designed to show that
Peiping does not fear the US, but Peiping will not attack Taiwan
in the foreseeable future and cannot do so without the USSR's
consent.1
Khrushchev at that time reportedly urged that
Communist parties in India and other nonbloc countries should
avoid uprisings and other "warlike situations," on the grounds
that if war can be avoided for three or four years, the military
strength of the bloc will surpass that of the capitalist powers,
especially the United States.
SE
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Mao Tse-tung Reported Concerned Over Western Influence
In India
Mao Tse-tung recently indicated his concern over the in-
roads Western influence could make in Asia and particularly in
India because of adverse reaction to Peiping's role in the Sino-
Indian border dispute,
Stressing the "great importance" of Sino-Indian friendship, Mao
implied
he puts a high value on improving relations with New Delhi as a
useful hedge against "the growth of right reactionaries and mil-
itary dictatorships."'
(,In this context, Mao made a decided effort to play down the
border issue, terming it a "minor matter which is going to be set-
tled" and assuring the Indians that Peiping has no intention of com-
mitting "aggression" against India. The Chinese already may have
taken their first steps toward meeting Nehru's stipulation that Chi-
nese troops must withdraw from Lonju. Recent press reports, as
yet unconfirmed, state the Chinese are withdrawing from the out-
post they seized on 26 August:1
(While Mao is clearly seeking to improve relations with the
Indian Government, he remains distrustful of Nehru's attitude toward
China and the bloc, reported they found both
Chinese and Soviet leaders united in their suspicions of the Indian
prime minister.-
"reR
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Political Maneuvering in .L) s iviay iieaa to overnment Crisis
C.Political maneuvering in Vientiane over how to postpone the
national elections scheduled for December is producing friction
which could lead to a government crisis. Premier Phours con-
servative Rally of the Lao People (RLP) favors a constitutional
amendment extending the incumbent National Assembly's mandate:(
ne army-backed Committee for the Defense of National In-
terests (CDNI), which shares power with the RLP, is obstructing
moves toward a constitutional amendment, however, and appears
to favor permitting the assembly's mandate to expire on schedule
in December, at which time the regent, Prince Savang, would
set a new date for elections and appoint an interim government.
The CDNI probably calculates that the regent, a strong CDNI
supporter, would give it a greater share of cabinet portfolios,
if not eliminate Phoui and the RLP altogethe
(oui himself has voiced concern that the CDNI, with army
backing, may be considering taking advantage of the present
dilemma over the elections to deny the RLP its "rightful share"
of authority until new elections are possible. The extraordinary
powers granted the Phoui government by the present legislature
expire in Ianua,ry, and "Phoui hopes to have them renewed after the
constitutional amendment. On his current trip to the US, Phoui
was careful to include in his entourage Foreign Minister Kamphan
Panya, a leading CDNI figure, and Secretary of State for National
Defense Col. Phoumi, believed to be a strong advocate of thinly
disguised army rule in Laos)
21 Oct 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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African Nationalists Demonstrate in Kenya
t_Tension continues high in Kenya, where police on 20 October
broke up a demonstration by African nationalists for the release
of convicted Mau Mau leader Jomo Kenyatta. Earlier, African
leader Tom Mboya had been forced to sign bond to keep the peace
for 90 days--a move designed to block the demonstration but one
which had little effecto'
!A major source of friction between the government and Afri-
can nationalists is the government's refusal to legalize Mboya's
Kenya Independence Groups on the grounds that it does not meet
he requirement that all parties be multiracial �A second major is-
sue is the government's 13 October proposal that the rich White
Highlands farm area be opened to all races. The proposal has been
attacked by Mboya as well as by rightist settlers; Mboya apparently
believes that the government had not gone far enough, and also may
fear that the government intends economic concessions to be a sub-
stitute for political concessions to Africans.)
1The demonstration for Kenyatta appears to have been planned
in the face of indications that it would lead to Mboya's physical ar-
rest� and was probably directed less toward the release of Kenyatta
than toward embarrassing the Kenya Government. Mboya's leader-
ship of the Kenyatta demonstration may enhance his prestige among
Africans prior to the constitutional conference scheduled for early
1960 and offset to some degree his involvement in the factionalism
which has lately plagued the African members of the Legislative
Council:
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III. THE WEST
Bolivian Minister of Government Threatens to Try a Coup
Minister of Government Guevara Arce--who is aligned with the
moderate faction in Bolivia's government party, the Nationalist
Revolutionary Movement (MNR)--threatens to try to take over the
government if Congress should adjourn without resolving a strug-
gle between President Siles and the country's acting vice pres-
ident, who is also president of the Senate and a Siles opponent.
Guevara's objective is to protect the position of the moderate fac-
tion within the MNR and to prevent left-wing domination of the
MNR's approaching convention. Since the MNR polled 80 percent
of the vote in 1956 and 1958, the candidates nominated by the con-
vention for the presidential and congressional elections to be held
in mid-1960 are virtually assured of victory. Guevara has pres-
idential ambitions.
Guevara would be helped in a coup by 800 armed miners now in
La Paz and possibly by the police. Leftist miners and possibly
other armed militia loyal to leftist labor leader Juan Lechin would
oppose Guevara. The Bolivian Army would tend to side with the
moderate faction, while the widely feared rural militia would prob-
ably favor the left wing. A coup attempt by either the moderate or
the leftist faction of the MNR would result in an in le
for power and possibly in civil strife.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of state
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
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Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
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Federal Bureau of Investigation
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Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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Ned Nor
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on :Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
Arl. T Irt rl, V'
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