CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/04/23

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03156039
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: April 23, 1959

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3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
23 April 1959
Copy No, C 5.2
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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23 APRIL 1959
I. THE COMMUNDT BLOC
Chinese Communist budget for 1959
calls for even greater economic ef-
fort; planned outlay does not measure
up to claims of production already
achieved.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq - Communist-dominated organi-
zations schedule mass rallies against
"Imperialism" for 24 April.
Nehru tells Indian cabinet that Chinese
Communists will have to rule Tibet in-
definitely by suppression.
Japanese officials now believe talks
with North Koreans on repatriation
issue will fail.
Sukarno's call for return to 1945 Con-
stitution with strengthened executive
power will be opposed by all political
parties.
\
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III. THE WEST
0 France studying ways of stopping ship-
ments of bloc arms to Guinea.
Finnish President raises suggestion
with cabinet members that time may
be right to explore possibility of neu-
tral Nordic bloc.
Fidel Castro's brother, Raul, attacks
United States as "enemy of the Cuban
Revolution."
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
14
23 April 1959
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China: China's 1959 economic plan and budget,
presented to the National People's Congress on 21 April 1959,
call for an even greater economic effort than last year. De-
spite shortages of key materials, power, and transport, the
1959 plan schedules an increase in total output larger in abso-
lute terms than the record increase claimed last year. Sched-
uled increases in budget revenues and expenditures do not
appear fully to reflect the levels of production and construction
said to have been achieved last year. Direct outlay for defense
of about $2.36 billion is up by some $325,000,000, and amounts
to 11 percent of total spending. the smallest percentage since
Peiping came to power. (Page 1)
Watch Committee conclusion�Soviet bloc: (No Sino- Soviet
bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direc military ac-
tion against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral
to the Orbit ip. the immediate future)
Berlin: No significant changes bearing on the possibility
of hag-a:Ties.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq: Mass rallies against "imperialism," commemorat-
ing the Bandung conference, are scheduled for 24 April in Bagh-
dad and elsewhere in Iraq. These demonstrations will be spon-
sored by numerous Communist-dominated mass organizations
and will serve to keep non-Communist elements aware of the
Communist "power of the street." Communist leaders might al-
so take the Opportunity to complicate further the Qasim regime's
relations with the West by staging incidents involving Western.-
personnel and property.
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Watch Committee conclusion�Middle East: Situations
susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action
which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East,
particularly in Iraq. The situation in the area remains pre-
carious, but a deliberate initiation of large-scale hostilities
is unlikely in the immediate future.
Iraq: The Communists are progressively achieving con-
trol Tic-Ea% although for the present they may prefer not to
move to take power in their own name.
India-Tibet:(Nehru is reliably reported to have told his
cabinet on 2 0 Apri that the Chinese Communists, having
failed from the very first to respect the internal autonomy
of Tibet, created rebellion and now will have to rule indef-
initely by repressive measures. He labeled the Chinese Com-
munists as "naturally cruel" and their behavior "brutal." He
said the Dalai Lama's return to Lhasa seems out of the ques-
tion, since Chinese policy in Tibet is unlikely to change. Nehru
plans to inform Peiping of the "facts" surrounding the Dalai
arrival and his rights in India, but not to apologize for
Indian popular reaction) (Page 2)
Japan-Korea: 6apanese Foreign Ministry officials now
believe that agreement with North Korea on repatriation of
Koreans in Japan is unlikely. During negotiations in Geneva,
the North Koreans have adamantly opposed any form of screen-
o ing by the International Committee of the Red Cross, as in-
sisted on by Japan. Unless North Korea relaxes its stand, the
talks may be broken off, paving the way for a possible resump-
tion ok Japan's negotiations with South Korea on over-all prob-
lems.)
Indonesia: President Sukarno's call for a return to the 1945
Constitution, which greatly strengthens executive powers, may
meet with obstructive tactics in the Constituent Assembly. Po-
litical parties, whose importance Sukarno plans to diminish,
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are likely at least to attempt amendments of the document.
If serious opposition develops, Sukarno may dismiss the as-
sembly and, with army backing, resort to an executive pro-
clamation of the 1945 Constitution. (Page 5)
III. THE WEST
France - Guinea -bloc arms: _.aris is studying means,
including interception at sea, to control future shipments of
Soviet bloc military equipment to Guinea and is likely soon
to request US-British concurrence in its decision. French
officials profess fears--probably without foundation at this
time--that Sekou Tour d intends to use his new arms supply,
which appears to be in excess of the needs of Guinea's approx-
imately 2,000-man security force, to support early guerrilla
operations against neighboring states of the French Community.
In addition to a gift shipment of arms from Czechoslovakia last
month, Guine has recently reportedly received a newstrnnly of
other materiel
(Page 6)
Finland: resident Keldconen in late March informally in-
dicated to sothe of his cabinet ministers that "now might be the
time" to look into the possibilities for a neutral Nordic bloc
composed of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. While
any precise proposal by the Finnish Government is unlikely,
the idea, if advanced, would attract neutralist sentiment among
some Danes and Norwegians, though not enough to alter their
NATO commitment.) (Page 8)
Cuba: Raul Castro, the irresponsible Communist-influ-
enced brother of the prime minister, strongly attacked the
United States as one of the "enemies of the Cuban Revolution"
in a speech in Havana on 20 April. Raul Castro's statements
are consistent with the public anti-American position he has
taken in the past and are considerably at -variance with Fiders
conciliatory attitude during his visit to the US, which Raul's re-
marks are probably intended to offset.
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CORRECTION: (The Conclusions of the Special USIB Committee
on Berlin Situation published in the Central Intelli ence
Bulletin of 22 April 1959 should have been marked
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China's Economy
Communist China's 1959 economic plan and budget, pre-
sented to the National People's Congress on 21 April, pic-
ture an. economy which will continue to "leap ahead" at
unprecedented speed. The 1959 plan gives every indication
of having been based on Peiping's 1958 production claims,
which--at least in the case of agriculture�are not accepted
outside of China. It is certainly an ambitious plan, retain-
ing the high targets for key commodities set last December
and scheduling a larger absolute increase in total value of
industrial and agricultural output than last year.
The congress was warned that the lag in the availability
of key materials, power, and transport will persist in view
of the regime's continued insistence on the most rapid over-
all development. Speakers at the congress pointed to the
"impracticality" of achieving larger percentage increases
in output every year and cautioned that in the course of fur-
ther leaps forward it is entirely possible that production in
some fields, particularly agriculture, might even decrease
on occasion.
A "bold and well-founded" 1959 budget calls for balanced
revenues and expenditures at a new high of $21.4 billion al-
though the increases do not appear to reflect fully the levels
of production and construction said to have been achieved un-
der the giant leap. Most of the 24-percent increase in rev-
enues will come out of increased earnings by state enterprises.
Budgeted spending is up 27 percent.
Direct allocations for defense will increase 16 percent to
$2.36 billion, the largest figure since 1956. However, it amounts
to only 11 percent of total programed spending2 the smallest per-
centage since the Communists came to power. Substantial ex-
penditures for defense are believed to be hidden elsewhere in the
budget. The new budget sets aside, for the first time, some
$400,000,000 for investment in communes with "poorer economic
conditions."
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Indian Government Reactions to Tibetan Border Issues
(p spite the cautious wording of some of their public state-
ments, Indian Prime Minister Nehru and his government have
made their attitude toward Chinese Communist actions in Tibet
clear. Nehru, who recalls Chinese promises in 1950 not to in-
vade Tibet by force of arms, is reliably reported to have told
his cabinet on 20 April that the Chinese Communists had failed
from the beginning to respect Tibetan autonomy. He foresees
that Chinese repressive measures will have to continue indefi-
nitely because of the "foundering" of Peiping's Tibetan policy,
and he expects no reversal of the present tough policy. Conse,-
quently, Nehru believes the Dalai Lama cannot return to Tibet)
Accusing the Chinese Communists of being incapable of un-
dertanding democratic freedoms, Nehru states that Peiping
will probably interpret pro-Tibetan reactions in India as in-
spired by an unfriendly government. Nehru, however, does
not intend to dispel these impressions. He expects to com-
municate with Peiping shortly, giving the Chinese a factual ac-
count of the situation and of the Dalai Lama's rights in India. In
this communication, Nehru willprobably indicate his acceptance
of the Lama's statement that he did not flee Lhasa under duress.
He probably will also repeat that the Dalai Lama will be given
freedom of religious expression but that he will be expected not
to engage in political matters. Nehru has already indirectly ac-
cused the Chinese of espionage by telling Parliament of his pre-
sumption that Chinese intelligence agents in Kalimpong were re-
sponsible for he reports that Kalimpong was the center of the
Tibetan revolt.
t)
C_Other evidence of Indian interest in the Himalayan border
situation includes one report that Nehru has given the Indian
Army orders to plan for a defense of Bhutan. A Delhi broad--
cast says India has decided to establish a radio station and a
printing press in Sikkim, near the Tibetan border. The former
may be situated close enough to Tibet to make jamming difficur9
_
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6nd be intended to carry news to Tibetans cut off from the out:-
side world. The press could be used for printing propaganda
leaflets. News from Nepal that Chinese troops are pursuing
fleeing Tibetans across the Nepalese border and killing Nepa-
lese citizens will undoubtedly increase Indian interest in the
strength of border posts in that country. New Delhi is also con-
cerned over the Soviet Union's reported plan fn establish a resi-
dent embassy in Nepa9
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Japanese - North Korean Repatriation Agreement Unlikely
Cresponsible Japanese Foreign Ministry official be-
lieves, under present circumstances, that the current discus-
sions in Geneva between the Japanese and North Korean Red
Cross societies are unlikely to result in agreement on a plan
to repatriate Korean residents in Japan. He expects that the
talks will be broken off "after two or three more meetings"
if North Korea continues opposed to any screening of poten-
tial repatriates by the International Committee of the Red
Cross, as insisted upon by Japan, and maintains its demand
that repatriation lists submitted by the association of leftist
Korean residents in Japan be accepted as final
North Korea probably sees in the Geneva negotiations an
oppor unity for enhanced international standing and a chance
further to irritate South Korean - Japanese relations. Rather
than permit a breakdown in the talks, Pyongyang may modify
its position on ICRC screening. It will probably not press for
an early settlement, however, since implementation of any
agreement would reveal that only a very small number of North
1 Korea s in Japan wish repatriation, contrary to Pyongyang's
claims
(The Foreign Ministry official has asserted that failure of
the talks is the best solution to the repatriation crisis because
it would permit the resumption of negotiations with South Korea
on the over-all problems�the status of Koreans in Japan, the
Rhee line, and Korea's detention of Japanese fishermen. Seoul
has called for a resumption of negotiations with Japan, which
were suspended on 13 February, but indicated that the Geneva
talks must first be broken off
n addition, North Korea's rejection of an impartial super-
visio f the repatriation program would enable the Kishi gov-
ernment to convince the Japanese public, prior to the important
upper-house elections in June that it had gone to reasonable
lengths to solve this probleml
CONFIDENTIAL
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Indonesian Political Parties May Oppose Sukarno's Plans
For Reorganized Government
President Sukarno's formal request to the Constituent
Assembly that it return to the 1945 Constitution and his an-
nounced plans to decrease party activity and influence, which
must be endorsed by parliament, may encounter renewed op-
position in the next few weeks from the political parties. The
1945 Constitution, under which Indonesia was governed during
the struggle for independence, would increase the powers of
the executive and reduce those of parliament.
Within the elected Constituent Assembly�which has the
task of producing a new constitution�the Moslem parties and
possibly the Communist party may resort to obstructive tac-
tics. Sukarno had achieved reluctant agreement to his plans
from the various political parties at a series of conferences dur-
ing the winter. The Moslem Masjumi and the Nandlatul mama
now are reported prepared to repudiate their concurrence and to
sponsor an amendment incorporating religious guarantees for
Islam. The Moslem bloc in the Constituent Assembly lacks suf-
ficient strength to carry the amendment but can prevent the two-
thirds majority necessary for adoption of the unamended consti-
tution. The Communists, depending on the temper of the assem-
bly, appear prepared to delay matters with a flood of proposed
amendments on minor matters,
Should serious obstruction develop, Sukarno and the army
may dismiss the Constituent Assembly and proclaim the 1945
Constitution by executive decree. The threat of such action,
however, might be sufficient to persuade the parties ultimately
to accept Sukarno's plans.
all regional war authorities to form "action
committees for the return to the 1945 Constitution," presuma-
bly pressure groups to arouse public interest and thereby influ-
ence the political parties and the Constituent Assembly.
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III. THE WEST
France Considering Naval Action to Check Flow of Soviet
Bloc Arms to Guinea
Paris is studying means, including interception at sea;
to con rol the flow of Soviet bloc arms to Guinea, and intends
to raise the matter in later Western tripartite talks on policy
coordination, according to French officials participating in
the current series of tripartite talks on Africa. French civilian
and military officials in West Africa allege that Guinea, as part
of an "arms bargain" with the bloc, is arming guerrilla bands
for operations against neighboring states of the French Commu-
nit9
High Paris officials, in arguing for closer Western policy
cooIdination, have cited Guinea as a focal point for Communist
penetration of Africa and as a potential security threat to its
neighbors. In the tripartite talks, French representatives have
characterized the area from France's southern coast to the
equator as a sin le strategic zone of vital importance to Firench
national interests
An initial gift shipment of military materiel from Czecho-
slov1da arrived in Conakry aboard a Polish ship on 18 March.
It was reliably reported to include 8,000 rifles, 3,000 revolvers,
30 machine guns, 12 antitank guns, two armored cars, up to
60,000 grenades and 50 bazookas, 42 field radio sets, and ap-
proximately 150 tons of ammunition. A subsequent Czech ship-
ment including two or three light tanks and some army field
kitchens, presumably part of the same gift arrangement, re-
portedly arrived late last week, also via a Polish vessel. In
addition to re-equipping and perhaps expanding Guinea's pres-
ent 2,000-man security force, Toure may assign some of this
materiel to militant members of Guinea's single political party)
Any Western interference with bloc shipments consigned to
Guin would be bitterly resented and vehemently protested y
Tours and might make him even more receptive to close ties
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Lth the bloc than he is now. He has said several times re-
cently that he regards acceptance of Czech arms as a normal
development in Guinea's neutralist foreign policy. He has al-
ready accused France of exploiting the issue as Dart of a gen-
eral diplomatic effort to discredit Guinea9
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Finnish President Kekkonen Favors Neutral Nordic Bloc
Finnish President Kekkonen informally indicated to some
of his cabinet ministers in late March that now might be the
time to investigate the possibilities of a neutral Nordic
consisting of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland,
Cekkonen may believe that Premier Khrushchev's forth-
coming visit to Scandinavia in August will direct Scandinavian
attention to the question of neutrality. Kekkonen expressed
the hope that if the formation of a Nordic bloc leads to the with-
drawal of Denmark and Norway from NATO, the USSR might
release Finland from the 1948 Treaty of Friendship and Mutual
Assistance. He and many other Finns feel that Scandinavian
neutrality would increase the possibilities for Finland's avoid-
ing a Soviet occupation in another war. Although the USSR has
occasionally suggested that the Finns should try to induce the
Scandinavians to follow the polcy of neutrality, the Finns have
not actively attempted to do so
Any tentative feelers regarding a neutral Nordic bloc would
attra some neutralist support, particularly in Denmark where
a recent Gallup Poll indicates a sharp drop in public support
for NATO. However, the governments of Denmark and Norway
will continue to support NATO; Sand pro-NATO elements Would
interpret any Firinfsh feeTers as indicative of Soviet pressure on
Finland.)
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Raul Castro Implicates United States as "Enemy
Of Cuban Revolution"
Raul Castro, irresponsible and bitterly anti-US brother of
the Cuban prime minister, lambasted "enemies of the Cuban
Revolution," including the United States, in a speech at the
University of Havana on 20 April. The speech, which Raul
Castro himself termed "carefully considered," was described
by the US Embassy as "unrestrained and savage." It stands
in sharp contrast to Fidel Castro's attempts during his visit
in the United States to minimize anti-US sentiment in Cuba and
to discount the "neutralist" policy espoused in his own speeches
prior to his arrival in Washington.
The speech did follow the prime minister's most recent pub-
lic statements that Cuba, adhering to the principle of noninter-
vention in the internal affairs of other countries, would not allow
revolutionary expeditions against Latin American dictators to
embark from Cuban soil. Several such expeditions have been
stopped, but none of them involved groups generally considered
to be supported by Raul Castro and the pro-Communist military
leader "Che" Guevara. Both Raul and Fidel Castro have stated
that antidictator exiles will continue to be welcomed and given
moral support in Cuba.
Raul Castro's speech may well have been an attempt to en-
hance his position during his brother's absence. He had gained
considerable prominence during the last six months of the fight
against Batista, particularly following his kidnaping of US cit-
izens in late June, but has been eclipsed by his brother's pop-
ularity and dominant position since 1 January. Perhaps of sig-
nificance in the speech was Haul's reference to the kidnapings,
of which Fidel had strongly di sanoroved, as an important mile-
stone in the revolution.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
rewrinrArry A I'
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