CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/10/16

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03029883
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: October 16, 1959

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16 Oct er 1959
Copy No. C 65
CENTRAL
IVIELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
mint/ o-
DATr- DEVIEWER:
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NO CHANGE IN CLAS .
DE.CLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S L-
NEX1 REVIEW DATE- a 01. 0
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16 OCTOBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Laos--Two UN subcommittee mem-
bers reportedly believe Phoui gov-
ernment should reach accommodation
with Communist neighbors.
UAR may be preparing to shake up
First Army personnel in Syria.
Afghan-Pakistani propaganda ex-
changes at high pitch.
New Ceylonese Government faces
crisis arising from investigation of
Bandaranaike's assassination.
Belgian Congo--Trend toward violence
continues.
South Korea�Government and oppo-
sition agree to halt legislative impasse.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
16 October 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Laos: he Japanese and Italian chief delegates on the
UN subcommittee, in separate talks with Premier Phoui
prior to their recent departure from Vientiane, expressed
their personal opinions that Laos should make the best of a,
bad situation and seek some sort of accommodation with its
Communist neighbors. They suggested presenting to the UN
Security Council a mediation formula designed to achieve this
result. Phoui, upset by theirviews, which he reported to the
US ambassador, plans to fly to New York near the end of the
month in order to argue the Lahtian ease personally:]
(Page 1)
UAR: FT�he visit of UAR Vice President Field Marshal Amir
to Syria emphasizes Nasir's continuing concern over the organiza-
tion and reliability of the UAR First (Syrian) Army. Since forma-
tion of the UAR in February 1958, Cairo has tried hard to re-
move or neutralize Syrian Army elements of questionable loyalty
to the concept of union or those involved in any political action.
A reshuffle of First Army personnel, perhaps of major propor-
tions, appears to be under way, and Amir's presence may be
essential to assure that the changes will be effected without
dangerous repercussion�:\
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Afghanistan-Pakistan: Propaganda exchanges have reached
the highest pitch in recent years. A continuation will put a
severe strain on the already cool relations between the two
countries and will make both sides even less amenable to any
calm consideration of the major irritant, the Pushtoonistan is-
sue. Karachi has dropped its usual propaganda restraint and has
replied to Kabul's allegations of "oppressive colonialism" with
charges that Afghanistan is making "atheistic" moves resulting
from "Sovietization." (Page 2)
Ceylon: The position of the new government has been seri-
ously je-5-irdized by the arrest on 14 October of a Buddhist
priest--a high official of the government party--in connection
with the assassination of former Prime Minister Bandaranaike.
The close association of the priest with several .cabinet
ministers will intensify suspicion that top government officials
were involved in a conspiracy. Those politicians implicated may
b forced to resign from the government and others may defect
from the ruling party, thus depriving Prime Minister Dahanayake
of hisiibare majority in Parliament (Page 3)
Belgian Congo: The two most recent outbreaks of violence
mong Africans in the Belgian Congo have reportedly resulted in
at least 25 deaths. Although not directed primarily against
Europeans, the outbreaks continue a trend toward violence which
has been manifest in numerous incidents since the Leopoldville
riots last January. (Page 4)
South Korea: Government and opposition leaders on 13 Octo-
ber agreed to end South Korea's long-standing legislative impasse.
Opposition Vi lingness to proceed with the election of National
10-- Assembly officers probably stemmed from a recognition that
prq their obstructionist tactics were generating adverse public re-
ction, as well as from a desire to regain their major forum for
criticizing the administration. Although the agreement may
temporarily restore normal legislative activity, further disruptions
are likely until after the 1960 presidential elections.
(Page 5)
16 Oct 59
DAILY BRIEF
SE T
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III, SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Outlook for Peru. NIE 97-59. 13 Oct 59.
16 Oct 59
DAILY 13RIEF iii
S T
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
IL ASIA-AFRICA
UN Subcommittee Delegates' Views on Laos
Laotian Premier Phoui has told the US ambassador that in
separate conversations prior to their departure from Vientiane,
the Italian and Japanese chief delegates on the UN fact-finding
subcommittee expressed their personal opinion that Laos
should make the best of a bad situation and seek closer rela-
tions with Communist China and North Vietnam, The Japanese
delegate stated his belief that the Chinese Communists and the
North Vietnamese genuinely fear that the Phoui government is
allowing Laos to be turned into a base of aggression. He sug-
gested that the only remedy would be to establish relations with
the Communists and let them see for themselves,3
[Both subcommittee representatives, according to Phoui,
agreed that the Laotian Government has furnished considerable
evidence of North Vietnamese participation in recent military op-
erations in Laos and expected the subcommittee's report to re-
flect this belief. They doubted, however, that the UN could pro-
vide a lasting solution to the Laotian crisis, since neither Com-
munist China nor North Vietnam is a memLer?
ifhe representatives also requested Phours, endorse:;.-rient of
their suggestion that a formula for mediation between Laos and
its Communist neighbors be presented to the Security Council,
The American Embassy in Vientiane believes the urprising
blow" of the views expressed by delegates triggered the pre-
mier's decision to fly to New York to argue Laos' case in Le
personally. Formal recommendations would appear to overate
the bounds of the subcommittee's limited mandate, and such pro-
posals are therefore unlikely to appear in the final report pre-
pared in New York. However, their views are likely to have an
adverse effect on the atmosphere in which Laos' case is consid-
ered at the UN in addition to demoralizing the Phoui government.j
I
16 Oct 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page I
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NAY A ISA al 1.1
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Afghan-Pakistani Relations Deteriorating Further
Aelations between Afghanistan and Pakistan seem to be en-
tering a new period of severe strain. Karachi has apparently
changed its policy of ignoring Kabul's attacks on its "suppres-
sion" of Pushtu tribesmen living in Pakistan. In early Septem-
ber it began retaliating against Kabul with its own propaganda
offensive. For example, the Afghan Government's attempts to
abolish the custom of keeping women veiled was termed evidence
of atheism and Sovietization.
In addition, the Pakistanis seem to be delaying the exten-
sion of a railroad track from their own territory into southeast
Afghanistan. This extension is one of the ICA-financed projects
expected to facilitate Afghan use of the Pakistani transit route.
Afghanistan developed an alternate route across the USSR when
Pakistan closed its border to Afghan traders for several months
in 1955 during a crisis in the Pushtoonistan dispute.
Afghan Prime Minister D-ud is likely to be particularly sen-
sitive to Pakistani attacks on his efforts to abolish the veil, fear-
ing that the attacks will intensify the opposition of conservative
Afghan religious and tribal elements to such social reform. The
government-controlled Afghan press has responded by using the
most bitter and threatening language in recent years, declaring
that if Pakistani President Ayub continues to oppress the Pushtus,
he "will start a fire with which the whole world will burn," and
"blood will rain on the Khyber Pass."
CON IAL
16 Oct 59
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*of
Ceylonese Officials Implicated in Bandaranaike's Assassination
al:_lew Prime Minister DahOtayake's governrkent wili be seri-
ously weakened and possibly deprived of its slim parliamentary
majority as a result of a government party official's arrest on
14 October in connection with the inquiry into former Prime Min-
ister Bandaranaike's assassination. The official, a prominent
Buddhist priest and member of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom par-
ty's executive committee, allegedly knew in early September of
plans to assassinate Bandaranaike-.1
The latest issue of a publication which was the Sri Lanka
Free om party organ under Bandaranaike implies in a front-page
story that Prime Minister Dahanayake and at least six other prom-
inent figures were implicated in the assassination. Public suspi-
cion of top government involvement will be intensified by the close
association of the arrested priest with several cabinet ministers
and by the simultaneous arrest of the. brother of one of these min-
isters.. The growing suspicions may force the implicated cabinet
members to resign from the government. On the day prior to the
arrest, three government members reportedly asked Prime Min-
ister Dahanayake to request the resignation of Minister of Local
Government Vimala Wijewardene because of her well-known asso-
ciation with the priest. The three members also requested an
emergency meeting of the govern.ment parliamentary group and
suggested dissolution of parliament and new elections if necessary.
Dahanayake apparently is considering having the cabinet decide
whether the implicated ministers should take leave pending the out-
come of investigations')
SCLiould the issue become the subject of heated public debate or
should Dahanayake attempt to protect the suspected members,
some of his parliamentary support may defect to avoid being iden-
tified with the controversy. Senior cabinet member C. P. de Silva
reportedly arranged to meet on 14 October with Dudley Senanayake,
leader of the moderately conservative United National party.
De Silva's move suggests that his irritation over not being named
Banclaranaike's successor, together with the deepening cabinet rift,
may provoke him to seek alignment with conservative opposition
elements)
16 Oct 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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New Violence in Belgian Congo
Two apparently unrelated outbreaks of violence among
Africans in the Belgian Congo have reportedly taken at least
25 lives since 13 October. Although not directed primarily
against Europeans, the outbreaks continue a trend toward vio-
lence which has been manifested in numerous minor incidents
since the Leopoldville riots of last January.
Tribal jealousies and rivalries appear to have been respon-
sible for the latest incidents at the river port of Matadi and one
at Luluabourg in the central Congo. Three lesser clashes in
late September and a short-lived strike by an estimated 24,000
transport workers apparently were triggered by the discharge
of African employees at a Belgian air base; the arrest of four
Africans not possessing proper identification; and alleged griev-
ances among students at an American missionary school.
While the unrest could lend itself to exploitation by nation-
alist groups, there is no evidence at present of involvement by
either of the Congo's two most influential nationalist organiza-
tions. Nationalist leaders may be awaiting developments in Bel-
gium, where Congo Minister Auguste de Schrijver is expected to
make a statement in the next few days clarifying the government's
program for the Congo and outlining plans to bolster its economy.
...SOLFIEPEN
16 Oct 59
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Two.' -Soo
South Korean Political Leaders End Legislative Impasse
South Korean opposition leaders on 14 October ended the
boycott of National Assembly sessions which had blocked
legislative business for 43 days by withholding the two-thirds
quorum required for election of officers. The opposition prob-
ably realized that the obstructionist tactics were not only be-
ginning to generate adverse public reaction but were denying
the opposition its best forum for criticism of the administration.
Normal legislative functions have been suspended, except
for short intervals, since last December, when the majority
Liberal party forcibly ousted from the assembly chamber
opposition members who were staging disorders to prevent pas-
sage of .festrictive legislation strongly opposed by the Demo-
cratic party.
Although the entente may restore normal legislative ac-
tivity temporarily, recurrent impasses are likely at least
until after the 1960 presidential elections. The government
has indicated it will take whatever measures are necessary to
assure the re-election of President Rhee.
The long-standing suspension of normal parliamentary
processes has threatened to discredit democracy in the eyes
of the public and has delayed the passage of important legisla-
tion. However, the day-to-day operations of the government,
which is dominated by President Rhee and the administration,
have not been seriously. hampered,
CONF
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'LA /1114 1 sa� 144
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CQNTIAL
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