CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/09/19

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03163353
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: September 19, 1959

4.
INTELLIGENCE
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19 September 1959
Copy No,
CENTRAL
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
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19 SEPTEMBER 1956
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Test ICBM launched from Tyura
Tam.
USSR continues relaxation of VOA
jamming during Khrushchev visit.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Algerian rebel leaders expected to
attack De Gaulle's unwillingness to
Initiate cease-fire proposals but may
offer counterproposals.
Laos�Communists conduct propaganda
campaign in Vientiane to undermine
government.
Indonesia�Sukarno continues to culti-
vate Communist support.
Nepal asks US to help it get aircraft
through some neutral European source.
Iran-- gmh insists he will maintain
firm attitude toward USSR; his advisers
have expressed doubts about his ability
to withstand neutralist pressure.
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Makarios-Grivas rift threatens unity
1 anti-Communist Greeks on Cyprus.
0 Bonn apparently prepared to accept
East German consulate in Cairo in view
of extensive West German interests in
the Middle East.
Zinnish-Soviet trade agreement for
1961-65 virtually complete.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
19 September 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*USSR-ICBM:CAt about 1602Z (1202 EDT) 18 September
the Soviet Union launched a test ICBM from the Tyura Tam
Missile Test Range. Preliminary information indicates a
generally successful 3,500 nautical mile flight to the Kamchatka
Peninsula area. The launchin followed a four-hour countdown
which proceeded without delay.
USSR-VOA: The selective relaxation for the first time of
Soviet jamming of VOA broadcasts beamed to the USSR is de-
signed to support Moscow's campaign for "peaceful coexistence"
during the Khrushchev visit to the United States. Moscow em-
ployed similar tactics with respect to BBC broadcasts beamed
to the Soviet Union during the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to
Great Britain in 1956. The Soviet leaders then offered to al-
low two half hours of unjammed program material per week and
also suggested the possibility of exchanging material for rebroad-
cast, rushchev ma ut
visit.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Algeria: Rebel leaders are meeting in Tunis to draft
a formal reply to De Gaulle's 16-September proposals. CTu-
nisian President Bourguiba is reported to believe the offer
is inadequate because it does not contain sufficient guarantees
for free elections and fails to be a "serious proposition" be-
cause it does not take the Algerian Army of Liberation
into account. However, Bourguiba will probably urge the-\)
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Algerians to avoid a blanket condemnation?, The rebels appear
'likely to attack De Gaulle's unwillingness o carry out negotia-
tions.. oposals.
(Page 1)
Laos: A Communist propaganda effort to undermine the po-
sition of the Phoui government is under way in Vientiane. Open
approaches by Communists to newspaper correspondents dem-
onstrate the ease with which such activities can be carried out
in Laos. North Vietnam has broadcast a statement on behalf of
the Laotian Communist party charging that the United Nations
action "will not bring peace, but will lead to enlarged civil war
in Laos and war in Indochina." (Page 2)
Indonesia: President Sukarno's laudatory remarks about the
Communist Party at a reception following its sixth national con-
gress indicate his continuing cultivation of Communist support in
implementing his "guided democracy" program and in preserving
his political position. Sukarno said that the party had made con-
tributions to the revolution and that the Indonesian Communists
are fighters for independence and against imperialism. He said
his ideal still is to set up a "cooperation cabinet," presumably
meaning one that would include Communists.
(Page 3)
Nepal: (Prime Minister Koirala, worried by the Sib-Indian
border dispute, has asked whether the United States could ar-
range to supply Nepal through some neutral European source
with a few aircraft capable of carrying troops, conducting re-
connaissance missions, and expediting the movements of adminis-
trative personnel. Katmandu recently accepted several US air-
craft for Nepal's small civil airline, turning down an earlier So-
viet offer. King Mahendra has an IL-14 aircraft--a gift from the
USSR--which is being flown by a Soviet crew while two Nepalese
pilots are being trained in the Soviet Union)
(Page 4)
19 Sept 59 DAILY BRIEF
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Iran: CThe Shah, in recent discussions with American offi-
cials in Tehran, has insisted that he will maintain a firm atti-
tude toward the Soviet Union. However, some of his top advisers
have expressed doubts over his ability to withstand neutralist
pressures.
the Shah's approval of informal gestures to top Soviet officials
suggesting a willingness to compromise3
(Page 5)
III. THE WEST
Cyprus: Archbishop Makariost recent disclosure of an ex-
tremist conspiracy against his "regime" and his refusal to meet
extremist leader General Grivas in open debate on the Cyprus
agreements have brought to the surface the sharp differences
among the non-Communist Greeks on Cyprus. This split could
lead to a struggle for power on Cyprus and give the Communists
a situation they could exploit to increase their political influence.
(Page 6)
West Germany-UAR: The Bonn Foreign Ministry is appar-
ently prepared to accept the establishment of an East German
consulate in Cairo since the UAR has made an explicit state-
ment denying that this implies diplomatic recognition. Bonn's
standing policy has been that it would break diplomatic relations
with any nonbloc country establishing such relations with East
Germany. West Germany's extensive interests in the Middle East
have evidently been the main factor in the present decision.
(Page 7)
Finland-USSR: The Finnish-Soviet trade agreement for 1961-
65 is now complete except in regard to crude oil. The USSR wants
to supply all of Finland's crude requirements but the Finns do not
expect that Moscow will jeopardize the entire agreement by insist-
ing on this point. Finland may feel obliged to accept some Soviet
"economic assistance" in connection with the long-standing offer
of $100,000:000 - $125,0002000 credit in ruhlec which the USSR has
suggested be discussed later this fall. Page 8)
19 Sept 59
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Algerian Rebels Discuss De Gaulle Proposals
The Algerian rebel "cabinet" has gathered in Tunis to draft
a reply to De Gaulle's new program for Algeria. The rebels are
expected to condemn most of the program, but may offer counter-
proposals.
The atmosphere in Tunis is described as tense by the Amer-
ican Embassy, but President Bourguiba reportedly hopes the
Algerians will avoid a blanket condemnation of De Gaulle's pro-
gram. Bourguiba is said to regard the French proposals as a
step forward even though insufficient. [-He is reported to believe
the offer is inadequate because it does not contain sufficient guar-
antees for free elections and fails to be a "serious proposition"
because it does not take the Algerian Army of Liberation into ac-
count. At the same time, however, Bourguiba is said to be pre-
pared to put maximum pressure on the Algerian rebels to react
positively. He is expected to urge them to hold an informal round-
table with other Algerian elements in order to work out a joint
program. He has also invited Morocco to join in consultations
with rebel leaders aimed at agreeing on a Maghrebian position:'
The rebels will probably consider that De Gaulle recognized
Algeria's "right to independence" but will attack his unwillingness
to negotiate an end to the fighting and underscore the conditions
which he has attached for Algerian independence.
Tunisia alone among the Arab states appears to accept De
Gaulle's proposals as a possible step in the direction of an Alge-
rian settlement. While most Arab states appear to be awaiting
the Algerian statement before reacting officially, the government-
controlled Cairo press has assailed the French program as expos-
ing De Gaulle's "imperialist intentions," and the Moroccan radio has
reacted critically.
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Communist Agents Propagandizing Journalists in Laotian
Capital
Several newspaper correspondents in Vientiane report
being approached recently by "some young Laotians" peddling
the line that the current rebellion in Laos is strictly an internal
affair set off by elements opposed to the Phoui Sananikone gov-
ernment. A number of journalists have also received a letter
from a "Lao citizen" attributing the crisis in Laos to the sabo-
tage of the Geneva agreements by the royal government acting
under American pressure. The letter claimed that the Com-
munist partisans have developed into a genuine popular army
determined in its struggle against the "despotic" Phoui govern-
ment. Charges of North Vietnamese involvement were derided
and doubt cast on the ability of the UN mission to stop "this
murderous war." The letter concluded with a reiteration of the
Communist prescription for resolution of the crisis--the reac-
tivation of the International Control Commission for Laos.
The American Embassy in Vientiane believes the letter
may forecast the general line the Communists hope to take in
connection with the UN fact-finding subcommittee and may
herald a flow of Neo Lao Hak Zat- or North Vietnam-inspired
"citizen petitions," a normal Communist tactic. The embassy
also finds in the open distribution of the letter to correspondents
a disconcerting exhibition of the impunity with which the NLHZ
operates in Vientiane.
On 17 September, Hanoi made public a statement attributed
to a spokesman of the central committee of the NLHZ which
declared that the UN decision on Laos would open the way for
further US interference, enlarge the "civil war," and lead to
war in Indochina. Recent suggestions that representatives
of the UN investigative subcommittee remain for some time
in Laos were also attacked. Although the NLHZ spokesman
reiterated charges that the UN action is illegal, the statement
concluded with they hope that the UN would "take positive measures
to settle the Laos issue on the basis and within the framework" of
the Geneva accords.
CONFIDENTIAL
19 Sept 59
CENTD A I IMTDI I inckir= DI III DTIKI
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President Sukarno Praises Indonesian Communists
President Sukarno's remarks on 16 September at a recep-
tion given by the Indonesian Communist party at the close of its
sixth national congress reflect his continuing cultivation of Com-
munist support for the implementation of his concept of "guided
democracy" and for the preservation of his own paramount polit-
ical position. He reiterated his oft-repeated theme of national
unity through cooperation and mutual help and stated his aim
is still to form a "cooperation cabinet," an obvious allusion
to Communist participation. He strongly implied that he would
appoint Communists to the new legislature, as he has to top
planning and advisory councils.
Sukarno noted that the Indonesian Communist party had
advocated national unity in recent years, had supported his
move to return to the 1945 constitution, and had made con-
tributions to the revolution. He described the Indonesian Com-
munists as fighters for independence and against imperialism.
Sukarno's laudatory remarks countered some of the effect
of army restrictions which earlier had prevented the Commu-
nists from obtaining any significant publicity from the congress.
Despite his current policy of giving his primary support to the
army, Sukarno wants to retain Communist good will as a balance
against his non-Communist critics. Since both he and the Com-
munists derive their principal strength from the Javanese masses,
Sukarno hesitates to challenge the party lest he lose some of
this popular support.
The Communists similarly need Sukarno and have built their
large electoral following in great part by identifying themselves
with his policies. Although displeased with the present Sukarno-
Djuanda cabinet, they have avoided direct criticism of Sukarno
and have pledged to support the cabinet's program.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Nepal Asks United- States to Supply Planes to Help Defend
Tibetan Border
(Prime Minister Koirala of Nepal on 6 September asked the
American charg�n Katmandu whether it would be possible for
the United States to arrange for Nepal to acquire a few additional
aircraft for defense purposes from some neutral source such as
Switzerland or a Scandinavian country. Koirala indicated his con-
cern over the Sino-Indian border dispute and the relative defense-
lessness of Nepal's border with Tibet. He desired some sort of
small, high-altitude aircraft which could be used in civil aviation
but could also carry troops, conduct reconnaissance missions,
and speed the movements of administrative and government per-
sonnel()
(Nepal now has a government-owned civil airline consisting
of two aircraft, one of which it owns and one which it charters
from India. Since the King's visit to Moscow in mid-1958, the
USSR has pressed him to accept Soviet aircraft to re-equip this
airline. Subsequently, however, the King decided to accept an
American offer of three DC-3 planes and two smaller craft. For
his personal use the King has an 1L-14 plane presented to him by
the Soviet Union. It is flown by a four-man Soviet crew; two
Nepalese pilots are undergoing training in the USSR, presumably
to learn how to fly this plane
(With the opening of a new Soviet embassy in Katmandu, ex-
pected momentarily, Soviet pressure for Nepal to accept addi-
tional Peonomie aid from the USSR may be expected to increase)
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CENITPAI INTFI LIGENCE BULLETIN
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Shah Attempts to Reassure Allies
@lie Shah, in an effort to reassure his allies that the recent
return of Soviet Ambassador Pegov to Iran and the softening of
Soviet propaganda will not lead to Iranian concessions to the USSR,
emphasized to Ambassador Wailes on 17 September that he intends
to continue a firm policy toward the USSR. He stated his belief
that the "Soviets cannot be trusted and that their agreements are
not worth the paper they are written on."
CNevertheless, Iran and the USSR continue to appear to be ap-
proaching the point of opening diatussions on their problems.
Some of the Shah's top advisers have expressed doubts over his
ability to withstand neutralist pressures for a rapprochement with
the USSR.
the Shah's approval of in-
iormai gestures to top soviet oinciais suggest a willingness to
compromise with the USSR. The Shah,
who during the period of the most intensive personal attacks by
Radio Moscow became worried over their possible domestic ef-
fect, may be willing to go to great lengths to forestall the resump-
tion of such attacks.`;
(.1..n any discussions the USSR will probably again press for con-
clusion of a nonaggression pact and Iran's renunciation of the bi-
lateral treaty of defense with the United States signed in March,
while making veiled threats to resume intensive propaganda at-
tacks unless these conditions are met.)
(Meanwhile, the Slab has also told the US ambassador that he
intends to attack the problem of corruption in Iran energetically.
In referring to reforms already carried out he mentioned a "clean-
up" of the gendarmerie and said approximately 400 persons in
"other areas" have either been dismissed or are under indictment;
several high military officers have been arrested for taking bribes
from draft evaders. The Shah predicted that a high official of the
National Iranian Oil Company would be exposed next. While the
Shah made many promises in late 1958 to institute major reforms,
he has not vet made an impressive effort to fulfill them)
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III. THE WEST
Split Between Archbishop Makarios and General Grivas
Becomes More Pronounced
Recent events have emphasized the developing split in Greek
Cypriot ranks and have brought into the open the dispute between
Archbishop Makarios and former EOKA leader Grivas. Makarios
launched the attack by disclosing details of an extremist right-
wing conspiracy against the moderate Greek Cypriot leaders and
linking Grivas and Bishop K3Tprianos with the conspirators. The
extremists apparently planned the arrest or assassination of sev-
eral members of the transitional government. Kyprianos�a bit-
ter rival of Makarios and uncompromising advocate of "enosis"--
reportedly was to become leader of the Greek Cypriots.
General Grivas called the disclosures "fairy tales" and offered
to meet Makarios in Greece for open discussion so that "peace and
normal conditions" could be restored to. Cyprus. Makarios' mod-
erate reply indirectly, relected the proposed meeting, and the arch-
bishop for the first time openly criticized Grivas for his "disrup-
tive activities." Grivas answered that if the archbishop refused to
meet him the Greek and Cypriot people woad have to draw their
own conclusions.
The increasing bitterness between the two factions, which ap-
parently has had little adverse effect thus far on Makarios' support,
may yet present the larg3 and well-organized Communist party of
Cyprus with a situation it can exploit. Spokesmen for the Commu-
nist party�technically still proscribed on Cyprus--are remaining
in the background in the present controversy. The pro-Communist
press in Greece, however, has recently become less critical of
Grivas' statements and activities.
The extremist criticism of Makarios may force him to take a
firm�possibly uncompromising�stand in his present difficult
negotiations with the Turks and British or face the charge of a
"sell-out" of Greek Cypriot interests.
CONFIDENTIAL
19 Sept 59
CENTD Al IMTPI I ICZFMCF RI II I FTIKI
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Bonn, Apparently Acquiescing in Establishment of East German
Consulate in UAR
The Bonn Foreign Ministry is apparently prepared to accept
the establishment of an East German consulate in Cairo, in the
light of an explicit UAR statement that this did not imply diplo-
matic recognition. Bonn had previously threatened to break off
diplomatic relations with any nonbloc country extending recogni-
tion to East Germany. Although Bonn fears that other govern-
ments may follow the UAR example, West Germany's extensive
economic interests have evidently outweighed this consideration
with regard to the UAR itself.
Achievement of this degree of de facto recognition will be
interpreted by the Ulbricht regime as a major step in its unceas-
ing campaign to gain full recognition. The regime will use the
UAR action as justification to increase pressure on other uncom-
mitted countries for formal acknowledgment of East German
trade missions as consulates or consulates general, probably
concentrating on Iraq, India, and Indonesia.
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Finnish Trade Relations With the USSR
Finland and the USSR have reached agreement on a long-
term (1961-65) trade protocol except with regard to oil. The
USSR wants to supply all of Finland's crude oil, while the Finns
wish to limit imports from the Soviet Union to about two thirds
of Finnish crude requirements. The Finns apparently feel that
the USSR will not jeopardize the agreement by insisting on sup-
plying all of Finland's crude oil. Finnish officials expect the
agreement to be signed in late September or early October.
The Finns want to assure Moscow of their determination
to maintain trade and economic ties with the USSR and the So-
viet bloc. The USSR has informed Finland that it is ready to
enter detailed discussions in late October or early November
regarding a $100,000,000 - $125,000,000 Soviet credit in rubles
simultaneous with the 1960 trade negotiations. The credit offer
was originally made to President Kekkonen in May 1958 and was
renewed in January 1959 following the replacement of the Fager-
holm government, which the USSR distrusted. Despite their re-
luctance to become more dependent on the USSR economically,
the Finns may feel obliged to accept some "economic assistance,"
The unsigned five-year Soviet-Finnish trade agreement, as
well as upcoming negotiations regarding the 1960 exchange of
goods, provides the USSR with continuing opportunities for exert-
ing quiet economic pressure on Finland during the coming months.
Finland is considering some kind of affiliation with the projected
Little Free Trade Area, provided such action does not antagonize
the USSR. Moscow has not yet officially objected to Helsinki's
participation but has warned against association with a group
which the Russians consider would be under NATO domination.
CONFIDENTIAL
19 Sept 59
cENATD A I IkITEI I it-Ekif^e n� Iii TIkI
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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