CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/12/07

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03007355
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: December 7, 1959

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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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7 DECEMBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR plans to follow up present economic
talks with Brazil in Moscow with hi h-
level trade delegation to BraziL
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Pakistan may have asked Peiping for nego-
tiations on Kashmir border demarcation. 0
Iran�Shah says he will not go beyond his
original offer to Moscow to guarantee
that Iran will permit no foreign missile
bases.
III. THE WEST
()Belgium planning to reduce its NATO de-
fense expenditures.
�De Caulle-Adenauer talks reached agree-
ment on summit agenda, Berlin, and dis-
armament, but French views on NATO
unchanged.
�Promotion of controversial Portuguese
Army officer may cause discontent in
military leadership.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
7 December 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Brazil: The Soviet Union plans to send a high-
level trade delegation to Brazil soon as a follow-up to
current negotiations in Moscow,
The USSR reportedly hopes these
negotiations will open the way for discussions of a resump-
tion of diplomatic relations. Moscow may estimate that the
present international "thaw" has created favorable condi-
.on..s_tcii:tresilleA;Ins7ilian Government for such a decision.
(Page 1)
II ASIA-AFRICA
Pakistan -! Communist China: The Pakistani Govern-
ment may have suggested to Peiping negotiations for formal
demarcation of the border between Pakistani-held Kashmir
and Sinkiang. Earlier indications that Pakistani officials were
considering such an approach are supported by a 24 Novem-
ber press report quoting "informed" sources in Rawalpindi
that diplomatic discussions have already been opened. Pak-
istani authorities have played down reports of Chinese "incur-
sions" into northern Kashmir but have tightened security
measures on the Sinkiang frontier. President Ayub's govern-
ment probably hopes that by initiating negotiations it can fore-
stall any serious incidents while gaining Chinese recognition
of the "traditional" border. Peiping may display willingness
to discuss the Pakistani border but is unlikely to commit it-
self to a formal settlement.
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Iran-USSR: he Shah of Iran on 2 December told an
American Embassy official that, despite Soviet pressure,
he� is determined not to go beyond his original offer of a
written guarantee that foreign missile bases would not be
permitted on Iranian soil. Moscow has requested a guaran-
tee that no foreign bases whatsoever will be permitted in
Iran. The Shah feels the Russians may eventually be satis-
fied with his more limited offer.
Meanwhi41 in response to a recent re-
quest for instructions, the anian ambassador in Moscow
was told emphatically
Iran's offer of assurances does not include short-range mis-
siles, which the Iranian Army itself may have at some future
date.
III. THE WEST
Belgium: The Belgian representative to NATO warns
that his government not only will not meet NATO targets call-
ing for a 10-percent increase in Belgian defense expenditures,
but that, starting in February, it plans to reduce expenditures
by withdrawing one third of the Belgian troops now in West
Germany, decreasing regular army manpower, and making
other cuts. The president of the Belgian joint chiefs committee
recently resigned in protest. The Belgian representative feels
that his government is weak and under pressure over the Congo
issue, and that it therefore is likely to nersevere in its intention
to cut military costs-.1
(Page 2)
France - West Germany: Accounts of the talks between
De Gaulle and Adenauer on 1 and 2 December indicate that while
the two leaders reached agreement on Berlin, disarmament,
and a summit conference agenda, De Gaulle did not alter his po-
sition on NATO in any important respect. Be Gaulle left Adenauer
"considerably reassured" on France's basic commitment to NATO,
but the French position of refusing further integration of forces
7 Dec 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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and of withholding the Mediterranean fleet apparently was main-
tained. De Gaulle also indicated his desire to have NATO cov-
erage extended to Africa. Most responsible press reaction in
both France and West Germany has expressed concern for the
� NATO: despite official reassurances.
(Page 3)
Portugal: The promotion on 2 December of former Defense
Minister Colonel Santos Costa, a controversial figure who was
0 dropped from the cabinet in 1958, to brigadier general raises
the possibility of extensive discontent among higher echelons
of the army, which dislike him intensely.
(Page 4)
7 Dec 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR May Press Brazil to Resume Diplomatic Relations
The USSR hopes that trade negotiations with Brazil will
open the wav for disunissions of a ragaimntinn of dinlnrriatin
relations,
Therefore, he said,
the Soviet Government plans to send a high-level trade del-
egation to Brazil as a follow-up to the negotiations which
opened in Moscow on 25 November and are still in progress.
the delegation, which will be
headed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade P. G. Shmakov
and include the presidents of such important Soviet trade or
as Mashinoeksport, will have the underlying aim
of "trying to send in an ambassador by buying coffee."
Soviet First Deputy PremiVr Mikoyan's trip to Mexico in
November to open the Soviet exhibition there and the invita-
tion to the Brazilian Government to send a trade delegation
to Moscow are the most recent indications that the USSR in-
tends to take full advantage of the present period of interna-
tional "thaw" in order to foster increased Latin American
contacts with the bloc. In an interview in November 1957 with
Brazilian journalists, Khrushchev said the USSR would wel-
come any step conducive to the restoration of Soviet-Brazilian
diplomatic and trade relations. Moscow may feel that political
pressures in Brazil before elections in 1960, which contributed
to Rio de Janeiro's decision to accept the Soviet invitation to dis-
cuss trade possibilities, will also make it difficult for the gov-
ernment to turn down specific Soviet overtures for the normali-
zation of political relations.
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
III. THE WEST
Belgian NATO Program in Danger
Th
resignation on 30 November of General Jacques de
Dixmude, president of the Belgian joint chiefs of staff, is in
keeping with other indications that the future of the Belgian
military program is in jeopardy. According to the chief of
the Belgian NATO delegation, the government is weak and un-
der pressure, due to the Congo situation, and is very likely
to cut defense costs despite the opposition of the minister of
war and the military. This would necessitate withdrawing one
third of the Belgian troops in West Germany, decreasing the
number of regular soldiers, and making other reductions as
well. These moves, he feels, would set a bad example to other
NATO members�particularly the Dutch, who are under popular
pressure for similar reductions.
The impending cutback in Belgium's military effort is caus-
ing concern in NATO quarters. Although Defense Minister
Gilson had requested an increase in the 1960 budget, the cab-
inet compelled him to reduce his estimates by $10,000,000, and
further cuts by the cabinet, Parliament, or both, are likely:
Pressure to reduce the defense budget has been growing because
of over-all budgetary problems and the feeling that Belgium is
contributing to the defense of the West by increasing its expend-
itures in the Congo. Earlier this summer, Finance Minister
van Houtte stated that Brussels would not be able to attain its
goals under the NATO minimum essential force (MC-70) require-
ments, and that it would be impossible to comply with SHAPE
recommendations for a 10-percent increase in the defense budget.
Another cause for the dissatisfaction within the Belgian de-
fense forces--which reportedly has caused two other generals
to resign--is the belief that the politically inspired volunteer pro-
gram threatens the effectiveness of existing forces. The coali-
tion government formally reduced the military service term to
12 months inkeenin ithe2m inn1dies in the 1958 election.)
7 Dec 59
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Adenauer - De Gaulle Talks Indicate No Basic Change
In French Position on NATO
The French-German talks on 1 and 2 December, partic-
ularly those between French President de Gaulle and West
German Chancellor Adenauer, left the chancellor "consider-
ably reassured" as to De Gaulle's attitude toward NATO, ac-
cording to briefings given the American Embassy in Paris.
De Gaulle reportedly agreed with Adenauer that the United
States is necessary to European defense, and stated that
NATO organizations should be "preserved." However, a
French Foreign Ministry spokesman's press conference re-
mark that France would not ask for "immediate, profound
changes" and that the French position on withholding the
Mediterranean fleet from NATO control and opposition to in-
tegrated air forces had been maintained suggests no basic
change in De Gaulle's position. De Gaulle is said to have
stressed to Adenauer his view that the changed situation since
NATO Was formed requires "transformation" of the alliance
in the direction of extending its coverage to the Mediterranean
and Africa.
The two leaders reportedly agreed that any summit con-
ference agenda should involve disarmament, aid to under de-
veloped countries, and the German question--including Berlin.
On disarmament, De Gaulle apparently again mentioned the
French plan--recently advanced at the UN--for controlling
missiles and launching ramps as a first step. He rejected any
form of disengagement in Europe. Both men also agreed that
the legal basis of Berlin should not be altered and that no steps
should be taken toward recognizing the East German regime.
During the talks both French and Germans apparently expressed
disquiet as to the US position on Berlin and indicated that clari-
fication would be sought at Western meetings later this month.
Most of the responsible press reaction in both countries
has taken the line that although De Gaulle and Adenauer agreed
on Berlin, disarmament, and the summit agenda, they failed to
agree on the role each should play in NATO or on the future of
the alliance in the defense of Europe.
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Promotion of Former Portuguese Defense Minister May Have
Serious Repercussions
Portuguese Prime Minister Salazar's regime may find con-
siderable resentment among higher echelons of the army as a
result of the promotion of former Defense Minister Colonel San-
tos Costa to brigadier general on 2 December, Santos Costa is
a,bontroversial figure who is reported to be unpopular with many
of the military because of the corruption and favoritism that ex-
isted under his administration and of his tendency to inject the
army into politics. In addition, since his elimination from the
cabinet in August 1958, Santos Costa has incurred the enmity of
the present defense minister, General Botelho Moniz, who fears
he may be scheming to return to power.
It is possible, in view of the promotion, that Moniz may feel
Impelled to attempt a coup in order to save face among the mil-
itary and forestall a switch in their u
ca ion suc a sw g was imminent would precipitate
action on his part to remove Salazar. The American Embassy
believes, however, that the regime is capable of mastering any
situation likely to develop over the matter of the pr0m0t10n:3
Meanwhile, the regime is showing concern over the activ-
ities of Fernando Quet)roga, former Portuguese Army officer
now reportedly engaged in recruiting volunteers in Tangier for
guerrilla-type landings in southern Portugal and subversiv
erations a ainst ain stry
is keep ng n
touch with the Spanish and French authorities on this matter,
since there is evidence of international Communist involvement.
Extensive discontent in the armed forces over Santos Costa's ad-
vancement could make more difficult the government's task of
preventing landings by subversive elements which,
might be able to carry out
ammabbillci,L10115 on a Limited scale.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special A6sistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretzry for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department cf Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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