CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/11/28

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03166571
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
15
Document Creation Date: 
February 25, 2020
Document Release Date: 
February 27, 2020
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 28, 1959
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Body: 
ft/A Approved fok' jac�inC I *ago J CJD Nocumun Nfl.024/ NC 014.04Ott OLOLAatitillio IlEXT DATli OLAZS. tit nit. :442 AWN' tit To-2 BAAA.A.m. 1:10.tbitwu:, 28 November 1959 Copy No. C 65 CENTRAL 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c)7 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN �TOP�SECRET� ZApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571 R- bftme P SECRET� Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571 ve,r, vir Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571 28 NOVEMBER 1959 L THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR--Personnel changes being made in secret police organization. Khrushchev to be among bloc notables at Hungarian party congress next week. North Vietnam preparing to receive large number of Vietnamese refugees who have been in Thailand. II. ASIA-AFRICA Hammarskjold says Laotian officials im- pressed him as being unopposed to de- tente with North Vietnam and return of ICC. American Embassy comments on situa- tion in Iraq. Ethiopia reportedly considering Soviet of- fer to hell) with agricultural development program. 0 .---- - , III. THE WEST .���-' ,4-' ,,f(;-.1,----,:���,.. ,----- \ � --.,/�-�,.;;; \ 0 Cuba--Latest cabinet shake-up reflects Yr-- , --, continuing trend to left. / � -,a,r1 - -z---,_.: 0 Panama--Further anti-US demonstra- ! I Tc tions being planned for today. l _ 4 SF.C121-"T Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571 0 US and British oil representatives con- cerned by French plan to get preferred, position for Saharan oil in European Common Market. A Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571 - CENYRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLE IN 28 November 1959 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR: A new state security chief was appointed in Soviet Belorussia on 25 November, bringing to five the number of republics to which a new secret police chief has been assigned in the past two months. The new appointees, for the most part, are veteran security officials who have been sent out from im- portant posts in the KGB apparatus in Moscow. In addition, two Mew deputy chairmen of the all-union KGB were appointed in October. This is the first sizable shake-up in KGB ranks since 1954. The shifts almost certainly reflect a drive by KGB chair- man Aleksanak: Shelepin to reorganize the secret police appara- tus he took over from Ivan Serov a year ago. They may also be related in part to Moscow's annoyance at the persistent prob- lems of nationalism and localism in the minority republics, where some ranking officials have been fired for placing local economic interests "above those of the Soviet state." gear-leas Pi-9 +.4 n-rs vrai s - Khrushchev-Hungary: Khrushchev will be among the bloc leaders atte dim. the Hunaarian ',tarty nrwrPss onpnino rm fln November. Khrushchev uecision was macte witnin tne past week and was unexpected; he will stay only two days. This visit--his fourth since the 1956 revolt�will further underline Moscow's support of Hungarian chief Janos Kadar, whose regime has been faced with criticism from within the party in recent months. Khru- shchev will probably echo Kadar's boast that the Hungarian party has "come of age," that it has repaired the damage inflicted dur- ing the revolt, and that it is prepared to match the political progress of other bloc states. He may also use the congress as a forum for announcing another foreign policy initiative, such as a proposal for reduction or withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, although no evidence of preparation for such a with- drawal has been discerned. East German party leader Ulbricht will also attend the congress, SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C0316657f A II Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571 41S 60~ 'WI FANO 11110 � North Vietnam - Thailand: Hanoi will take maximum prop- aganda advantage of the decision by the overwhelming majority of Vietnamese refugees in Thailand to return to North Vietnam. More than 45,000--some 90 percent--of the refugees requested repatriation to the north during the 18-day registration period which ended 20 November, according to a Thai Government of- ficial. North Vietnamese authorities plan to break up the group ana integrate the return- ees where possible by requiring them to join relatives who are military and civil functionaries�especially those working on state farms. (Page 1) 0110 ASIA-AFRICA Laos:(jON Secretary General Hammarskjold, in reporting on his recent trip to Laos, says he received impressions from ranking Laotian officials, including the new King, that the door Is not closed to a detente with North Vietnam or to the return of the International Control Commission. These statements run counter to views expressed by Laotian leaders to American of- ficials, and could represent some softening of the Lao position. They may, however, have been advanced to Hammarskjold to encourage him in his efforts to provide a UN presence and eco- nomic assistance for Laos. (Page 2) - � Iraq: Although quiet prevails on the surface, there is un- easiness and maneuvering behind the scenes, according to the latest appraisal of the Iraqi situation by the American Embassy. The Iraqi economy is stagnant, unemployment and prices are highs, agrarian reform is lagging, and the development program is bogged down. Aid from the bloc is unlikely to bring about early improvement. Prime Minister Qasim remains an enigma. Plotting by Nationalist elements and the Communists is likely to continue. ) (Page 3) 28 Nov 59 DAILY BRIEF ii SECRET AApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C031665/1 A Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571 Ethiopia-USSR: Haile Selassie is reported to be consid- ering a Soviet offer to provide financing and personnel to help carry out his ambitious agricultural development program. He discussed land reform with officials in Moscow last sum- mer and at the time accepted a $100,000,000 Soviet credit for economic development, including agricultural as well as in- dustrial projects. The Emperor may hope the Soviet offer will attract increased Western- articularly US--interest in the program. (Page 4) III, THE WEST Cuba: The shake-up in high government posts on 26 Novem- ber is a further step in the leftist trend that has been evident for the past three months. "Che" Guevara, named to head the Na- tional Bank, will now be in a position to implement his convic- tion that Cuban independence must be achieved by shifting trade patterns away from reliance on the United States. The new min- ister of public works, Osmani Cienfuegos, is probably ,a Com- munist. The officials replaced were relatively moderate, and the remaining moderates in the government, convinced that Cuba is rapidly heading for economic collapse and Communist take- over, will almost certainly be replaced. (Page 5) Panama: Anti-US demonstrations will probably take place on 28 November in spite of some recent lessening of tenSion. Panamanian student groups, civic organizations, political op- portunists, and professional rabble rousers are continuing to plan demonstrations pressing for the right to fly the Pan- amanian flag in the Canal Zone and other US concessions. Long- time American residents in Panama say the undercurrent of anti-American feeling is stronger now than at any time within memory. Members of the weak De la Guardia administration are disturbed at the prospect of mob violence, which could turn 'against the Panamanian Government; they again may take no de- cisive action to prevent or control outbreaks. 28 Nov 59 DAILY BRIEF iii 14 SECRET AApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571r A V A Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571 European Common Market� Sharp tensions between the European Economic Community EEC or Common Market) and the newly formed European Free Trade Area (Outer Seven) are likely to be aggravated by determined French efforts to secure a preferred position for Saharan oil in the EEC. Under the French plan, EEC oil products not produced from Saharan and EEC crude would be subject to a special internal tax. British oil representatives and the American industry are concerned that their share of the EEC oil market will be greatly reduced if the French plan goes through. The British Government re- portedly believes Paris will make major concessions to its EEC partners to secure adoption of the plan (Page 6) 28 Nov 59 DAILY BRIEF iv SECRET 4Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571 A Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571 *Rod �.wif Bulk of Vietnamese in Thailand Ask Repatriation Hanoi can be expected to take maximum propaganda advan- tage of the decision of about 90 percent--over 45,000--of the Vietnamese refugees living in Thailand to request repatriation to North Vietnam. Recent broadcasts from Hanoi have an- nounced the formation of welcoming committees to receive refugees from abroad, and intercepted messages indicate that detailed plans are being prepared for their settlement. The messages suggest that North Vietnamese authorities intend, where possible, to integrate returnees by requiring them to join relatives who are members of the armed forces or civil functionaries�especially those associated with state farms. Hanoi has carried on a lengthy propaganda campaign among the refugees to encourage repatriation and recently began beam- ing special broadcasts to northern Thailand. Hanoi's broadcasts have reportedly been the only information medium available in many refugee areas. The repatriation program is scheduled to be completed in mid-1962, but the American Embassy in Bang- kok doubts that Hanoi will carry out the agreement in good faith, the first group of 1,000 repatriates is scheduled to leave for Haiphong on 5 Jan- uary 1960. Members of this group have already disposed of their property, according to Thai press reports, and Thai Red Cross officials are making arrangements for their transporta- tion to the port of Bangkok. Travel facilities from Bangkok have not yet been arranged, but the North Vietnamese Red Cross "advisers" in Bangkok are reported to be satisfied with the repatriation proceedings to date. These developments will further disturb relations between Thailand and South Vietnam, which have been strained since the Thai - North Vietnamese Red Cross agreement on repatriation was concluded last August. South Vietnam, which claims legal jurisdiction over the Vietnamese refugees in Thailand, holds that Bangkok's actions are affording Hanoi a gratuitous psychol- ogical victory. SECRET 28 Nov 59 EkITIN Al IkITICI I I"Elkle"C DI II I ET11.1 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 003166571 Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571 Tor* IL ASIA-AFRICA Hammarskjold's Impressions of Trip to Laos eUN Secretary General Hammarskjold, reporting on his trip to Laos after his return to New York, said he had re- ceived the impression from talking with Premier Phoui, King Savang, and other leaders that the Laotians were not unalter- ably opposed to the International Control Commission and would "welcome" its return if India would "play ball" by limiting ICC activities to border inspections at the Lao Government's re- quest. Hammarskjold termed this idea unrealistic, but felt that it represented more flexibility concerning the ICC than he had anticipated) (On the subject of Lao-North Vietnamese relations, Hammar- skjold said King Savang had told him that a cable received from President Ho Chi Minh on the occasion of Savang's recent acces- sion to the throne was "just one of many in a chain of communi- cations between the President and myself." The King was said to have described Ho's outlook as favoring discussions with him and looking on Laos as a friendly county. Savang told the secre- tary general, however, that he was unwilli:zg to start negotia- tions at this time because Ho refuses to withdraw North Viet- namese troops and describes the Lao Government as "against the people." Hammarskjold regards the hitherto unpublicized communications between Ho and Savang as a favorable develop- ment iHammarskjold's impressions of LOtian attitudes on the re- turn of the ICC and a possible detente with North Vietnam run counter to the views on these issues expressed by Lao leaders to American officials, and could represent some softening of their position. Any such softening might reflect confusion and discouragement over the conflicting counsel the Lao may feel they are receiving from friendly countries. These views may have been advanced to Hammarskjold, however, only to en- courage him in his efforts to provide'a UN presence and eco- nomic assistance for Laos.i CONFIDENTIAL 28 Nov 59 CFNTRAI INTFI I IC:,FKICF RI II FTiki Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 003166571 Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571 The Situation in Iraq An air of uneasy calm prevails in Iraq, according to an appraisal by the American Embassy in Baghdad. Qasim's impending departure from the hospital is engendering a feel- ing that something will break very soon. Maneuvering be- tween contending Communist and anti-Communist factions continues. The Communists appear to be disheartened by Qasim's failure to give them full backing, while Arab nation- alists resent his support of many pro-Communist policies and of the execution of Arab nationalist officers last Septem- ber. Moderates are fearful of the Communists and discour- aged by Qasim's failure to provide the country with effective lea,dership and guidance. The Iraqi economy is stagnant, and unemployment al- ready high, is increasing, as are prices. Political uncertain- ties have put a damper on investments. The important devel- opment program is bogged down because of inadequate plan- ning and the almost total lack of competent technicians in the government to carry it out. The highly publicized agrarian reform program is lagging, the crops this year have been poor, and little improvement is in sight for 1960. Soviet bloc economic assistance appears unlikely to bring about any early improvement in the country's economic situation. Qasim's recent utterances have degenerated to near inco- herency, while his messianic complex seems to have grown, according to the American Embassy. His personal popularity has dropped greatly, and his exhortrtions to the people seem to have less effect. 28 Nov Nov 59 r�EkITEI Al IkITGI I 1/-E1�1/^0 DI II I GTIk.1 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571' Page 3 CONFID1NT1 A I . Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571 Nur� Ethiopia Considering Soviet Aid for Agricultural Program Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie is reported considering a Soviet offer to assist his ambitious agricultural development program. The Emperor discussed land reform with officials in Moscow last summer and at that time accepted a $100,000,000 Soviet line of credit, part of which presumably will be utilized to develop Ethiopia's primitive but potentially rich"agric'ultUral resources. The Emperor, who has long sought to modernize agriculture In Ethiopia and thereby increase the living standard of his 16,- 000,000 subjects, first announced the development program on 28 August following his return from visits to Moscow and Prague. A major item in the program, which is still in the formulation stage, would make available 50,000,000 acres of government- owned land on both a cooperative and an individual settlement basis. The program apparently also envisages providing the services of agricultural technicians and government-sponsored experimental farm projects, in addition to liberal credit terms both for purchasing land and for securing technical advice. While Moscow is anxious to begin implementation of its economic aid agreement with Ethiopia, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union has offered to finance and assume responsibility for the whole land reform program. The USSR probably has of- fered, however, to furnish agricultural equipment and techni- calassiStancQ. Haile Selassie, aware of Western concern over Soviet aid to Ethiopia, may hope the offer will attract increased We US--interest. The composition of the Soviet delegation now in Addis Ababa indicates that Moscow probably will also offer to aid Ethiopia in exploiting its gold mines and in constructing an oil refinery. The Soviet credit will probably also be used to develop light industry, including such projects as a pharmaceutical plant. A Czech mission which arrived in Addis Ababa on 5 Novem- ber is discussing with Ethiopian officials implementation of an economic aid credit reportedly amounting to $20,000,000. CONFIDENTIAL 28 Nov 59 CFKITDA I IkITPI I inckirc DI I CTiki Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571 Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571 %IS Cuban Government Changes Increase Leftist Power The shake-up in high government posts on 26 November is a further important step in the leftist trend that has been ac- celerating in Cuba for the past three months. Ambassador Bon- sal sees it as stressing Fidel Castro's commitment to extreme leftist policies and his growing receptivity to guidance by Communist-oriented elements. Ernesto "Che" Guevara, new head of the National Bank, now will be in a position to determine the allocation of foreign exchange and thus implement his precept that to achieve true independence Cuba must shift the pattern of its trade away from dependence on the United States. He laid the basis for expanded trade contacts during a three-month trip last summer to nine Afro-Asian countries and Yugoslavia. Guevara is likely also to be instrumental in implementing Castro's long-planned na- tionalization of private banking in Cuba. The 31-year-old Guevara, an Argentine by birth, is one of the 12 survivors of Castro's original landing force that launched the two-year guerrilla war. Castro relies heavily on him for advice. Gue- vara's economic knowledge is basically weak and colored by his concept of the Cuban revolution as a class struggle in which the government, in alliance with the peasant and worker classes, must "change the economic panorama" of the country and its social system. The new minister of public works, Capt. Osmani Cien- fuegos, is probably a Communist. He has served since last March as director of the Cuban Army's indoctrination program. The new minister for the recovery of misappropriated assets, Lt. Commander Rolando Diaz, is a naval officer of unknown po- litical orientation. The three officials replaced are relative moderates. The remaining moderate officials, including the ministers of fi- nance and communications, have lost virtually all influence and are almost certain soon to be replaced. They are convinced that Cuba is rapidly headed for economic collapse and a Commu- nist take-over. 28 Nov 59 rrkITD A I 114.1T=1 I irIckie-c DI II I CTiki Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571 Page 5 �CONRDENT�A� Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571 *woe French Petroleum Plan Likely to Aggravate European Rivalries (Existing tensions between the European Economic Commu- nity (EEC or Common Market) and the newly formed European Free Trade Area (Outer Seven) led by Britain are likely to be aggravated by determined French efforts to secure a preferred position for Saharan oil in the EEC. Like the American oil in- dustry, British oil representatives are concerned that the French plan will greatly diminish their share of the EEC oil market, and London reportedly believes Paris is prepared to play "trump cards" to secure its objectives) ainder the EEC treaty, crude oil, as a raw material, is not subject to a tariff. Paris now is suggesting that the mem- ber countries levy an internal tax on petroleum products re- fined from "non-Community" crude. To take account of the EEC's requirements for crude of various types the tax system would operate after exclusion of a tax-free quota at least equal to the gap between EEC oil production and consumption needs) 4rance appears to be making headway in selling the plan to its EEC partners. Paris is rumored willing to offer to support Brussels' desire to become the EEC "capital" in return for Belgian support for this proposal. The Dutch have hinted they might be "forced" to accede to the French plan if offered con- cessions on agricultural exports to France. West Germany's position will probably be determined largely by the present close political ties between Bonn and Paris--and perhaps by the fact that utilization of Saharan crude (which is high in gasoline con- tent but low in fuel oil) could have some advantages for the Ruhr's hard-pressed coal industry. Although a responsible Rome official has said Italy could not accept the plan because Italian refineries use non-EEC crude, the French may be will- ing to make exceptions for crude produced in areas in which EEC countries have a financial interest) -CONFIDENTIAL 28 Nov 59 rpm-rDet map' I inciorc Di II cTlkl Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 003166571 Page 0 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571 or AIMMZZAIZZZIWZ/Z/ZZ/Z/Z4Z/ZZ/Z/Z/ZZ Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03166571 visperlanr�aCVICCii� - II jApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO31665717