CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/06/08

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03191543
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: June 8, 1959

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8 June 1959
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CENTRAL
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INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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8 JIJNE 1959
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Gromyko reaffirms Soviet intention
to transfer Berlin access controls to
East Germans and would guarantee
Western access rights for some
recognition of East Germany's role.
Khrushchev continues public speeches
against "occupation" of West Berlin.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq�Army, in first move against
Basra laborers, arrests leaders of
port-worker strike.
UAR continues propaganda attacks on
King Husayn and is involved in new
border incidents with Israel.
Lebanon�President Shihab is faced
with balancing Christian-Moslem
rivalries in his plans to expand
cabinet.
Laos--Government may release
pro-Communist leaders.
Tibet--Dalai Lama public statement
omits any reference to Tibetan
independence or government-in-
exile.
IIL THE WEST
CI West Germany--Adenauer decision to
remain chancellor attacked in his own
party and in the press.
� Argentina to expel Bulgarian minister.
�Break in Cuban - Dominican Republic
relations imminent.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
8 June 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Geneva: tin the first week of private talks, Foreign
Minister Gromyko adhered firmly to the position that any new ar-
rangements regarding Western access to West Berlin must be
within the framework of the Soviet free-city proposal. He real
firmed the USSR's intention to transfer access controls to the
East Germans but said Moscow would guarantee the West's ac-
cess rights under a new agreement, provided it contains some
form of East German participation. Gromyko rejected, however,
any procedures in which the East Germans would act as agents
for the USSR.) (Page 1)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq: The Iraqi Army arrested 24 foremen who led a strike
of port workers at Basra on 31 May. This is the army's first
firm action to curb defiance of the government's authority by
the Basra laborS force,which. on several past occasions has in-
timidated the Basra garrison through mob violence. No violence
followed the arrests and striking laborers returned to work the
next day.
An IL-28 jet light bomber, the first combat aircraft of So-
viet origin to be observed in the air over Iraq, flew over Baghdad
on 6 Ripe.
:4%
Jordan- UAR- Israel : UAR propaganda media are continuing
to attack King Husayn following Syria's closure of its frontier
with Jordan on 5 June in retaliation for alleged Jordanian harass-
ment of Syrians in the border area. Jordanian authorities have in-
itially taken an attitude of restraint, but have protested the UARts
action to United Nations representatives in the area.
UAR tensions with Israel are also on the rise as a result of an
air clash over the Sinai-Negev desert on 7 June and the reported
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destruction of an Israeli military vehicle by a mine in the same
area a few days earlier. (Page 3)
Lebanon: President Shihab hopes to prevent a recurrence
of political turmoil after 13 June--when the government's emergency
decree powers are to expire--by adding a number of ministers to
his four-man cabinet. Two of the cabinet members have expressed
their intention to resign about 13 June. In attempting to enlarge
cabinet, Shihab must balance the acute Christian-Moslem
rivalries which have been submerged during the seven-month
tenure of the present government (Page 4)
Laos: he rebellious Pathet Lao battalion apparently has
again slipped between units of the Laotian Army and may now be
moving toward the North Vietnamese border? The Laotian cabinet
decided on 6 June to release from house arrest the leaders of the
Communist-front Neo Lao Hak Zat, but to maintain continued
surveillance., The crown prince, however, is considering the
advisability of attempting to reverse this decision and to press
for their prosecution. (Page 5)
Tibet: The statement issued by the Dalai Lama on 6 June in
the form of an interview with The Statesman newspaper contained
no reference to Tibetan independence or to a Tibetan government
in exile. The Dalai Lama, who had planned to issue a strong anti-
Communist statement, apparently was dissuaded by Indian pressure.
.A\ His remarks, as published, confined themselves to deploring Chinese
"torture" of Tibetans. Chinese Communist reaction to the Dalai
Lama's relatively mild statement is likely to take a routine form.
West Germany: Adenauer, in deciding to remain chancellor,
has forfeited some degree of respect and authority in his party, the
a Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and dissident CDU elements will
(J. be encouraged to assert their own views in hindering government
A) policy. Adenauer's move has created unprecedented discouragement
8 June 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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and ceAfusion in the CDU, and has been widely assailed by CDU
leaders and even the pro-government press as a move to retain
personal power and block the appointment of the party's favorite,
Economics Minister Erhard�whom Adenauer could not control--
as chancellor. Despite this bitterness, the CDU is likely to keep
a solid front on major issues and to reject opposition
�
opposition parties to vote Adenauer out of office.
(Page 6)
Ar3entina: ()resident Frondizi, concerned over contillutilk;
Communist-Peronista inspired strikes and riots, plans to expel
the Bulgarian minister within the next few days. The Bulgarian
minister, like the Soviet and Rumanian diplomats who were ex-
pelled in April, is to be accused of involvement in domestic dis-
turbances.) Meanwhile, certain disgruntled military officers and
retired officers are plotting a revolution to take place during
June and July. Continued firm action by Frondizi against Peronista-
Communist agitators, however, will probably result in his enntirnied
support by the bulk of the military. ,
(Page 7)
Cuba - Dominican Republic: Following a shooting incident
between the Cuban charg�nd Cuban exiles in Ciudad Trujillo on
5 June, the Cuban Embassy was sacked and is said to have been
"totally wrecked." The charg�nd his staff have left for Cuba
and a break in relations is probably imminent.
The Cuban ambassador in Haiti has stated his car was ambushed
and his chauffeur seriously wounded early on 6 June. He said he
is convinced that Dominicans encrineprprl I-hp oftark
8 June 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Tactics at the Foreign Ministers' Conference
Foreign Minister Gromyko appears to be playing for time
at Ge eva on the assumption that the Western ministers will
eventually take the initiative in working out an interim formula
on Berlin which would open the way for a summit meeting. In
the first week of private talks on Berlin, Gromyko cautiously
adhered to the position that any new arrangements governing West-
ern access must be within the framework of the USSR's free-city
proposal. He made it clear that Moscow intends to transfer ac-
cess controls to the East Germans but reaffirmed the USSR's
readiness to guarantee Western access rights under a new agree-
ment with which East Germany would be associated. He specifical-
ly rejected any procedures in which the East Germans would act
as agents for the USSR)
(9._romyko offered more detailed proposals than heretofore
on ways to guarantee West Berlin's free-city status. According
to the Soviet concept, the four powers, or neutral states, would
maintain symbolic forces in West Berlin, on the order of a platoon
for each power. A permanent commission composed of representa-
tives of the four powers and East Germany would supervise the ob-
servance of the free-city status. The commission would submit an-
nual reports to the four powers, East Germany, and the UN Security
Council and would inform the four powers of any violations or threats
to violate West Berlin's status. The four powers would take appropri-
ate measures to ensure the observance of the free-city status.)
(Gromyko continues to insist on Western acceptance of the free-
city proposal for tactical purposes, but the USSR may eventually
agree to some modification of existing access procedures short
of converting West Berlin into a free city. Moscow's minimum
terms for an interim Berlin solution apparently include some form
of East German participation and the exclusion of any formal reaf-
firmation of Western rights, including the right to maintain troops
and the right of free access.)
(jGromyko suggested that any new arrangements might take the
form of an agreement, a protocol, or a declaration. He stated)
8 June 59
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in(however,
that the question of Western rights should not be
entioned and suggested there might simply be an agree-
ment on specific procedures. He specifically ruled out includ-
ing East Berlin in any new arrangement
Khrushchev, replying on 6 June to questions put to him by the
Hun rian press, again rejected any agreement which would have
the effect of "perpetuating the occupation regime in West Berlin."
On his arrival in Moscow on the same date, Khrushchev repeated
earlier threats to establish missile bases in Albania and Bulgaria
if Italy and Greece allow missiles to be based in their territory)
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
UAR Tension With Jordan and Israel
UAR propaganda continued to attack King Husayn following
Syria's closure of its frontier with Jordan on 5 June. Syria has
taken the action, which closes the route by which Jordan receives.
virtually all of its imports, in retaliation for Jordanian harass-
ment of Syrians in the border area. Some Syrian newspapers charged
that Husayn's "provocative acts" were planned during his recent vis-
its to the United States and Britain. In an effort to arouse Jordan's
Palestinian Arabs, who comprise more than half the (population,
Husayn was accused of helping carry out an "Israeli-imperialist
plot" to exploit the situation in Iraq and press the UAR to settle the
Palestine question at the expense of the Palestinians. Jordanian
authorities have initially taken an attitude of restraint, and have
protested the UAR action to Jordan's delegate to the UN and to the
UN representative in Amman. If the road blockade continues,
Jordan may again seek increased Western aid.
UAR tensions with Israel have been further increased as a
result of an fair clash over the Sinai-Negev desert on 7 June, and
the reported destruction of an Israeli military vehicle by a mine
in the same general area a few days earlier. Both sides have in
fact long made air reconnaissance flights over the other's positions
in the Gaza Strip, Sinai, and the Negev. In a recent discussion of
the problems of the UN E,..aergency Force, which patrols the Egyptian
side of the Gaza-Sinai frontier with Israel, a UN official reported
that during an unspecified period there had been 188 Israeli over-
flights of the Gaza area and at least 13 Egyptian flights over
Israe9
The Egyptians nave not yet unloaded the cargo of the Israeli-
chartered Danish ship, Inge Toft, which the Egyptian Government
ordered confiscated when it attempted to pass through the Suez
Canal, The American consul in Port Said believes that forcible
seizure of the cargo may be unnecessary, because continued deten-
tion of the ship could increase the charterers' expenses to a point
where they would want to release the cargo. Unofficial Israeli com-
ment on UN Secretary General Hammarskjold's proposal to refer
Israel's case to the InternatlonaLConrLof Justice has been un-
favorable.
8 lupe 59
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Lebanese Political Developments
The Lebanese Government's emergency decree powers,
obtained last November, are scheduled to expire on 13 June.
The speaker of the National Assembly has announced that
a special session of Parliament will convene on 12 June, and
that the government will remain in office until it is dismissed
by President Shihab or receives a vote of no confidence from
the assembly.
Although both Foreign Minister Uwayni and Interior Min-
ister Edde have announced they intend to resign shortly after
13 June, President Shihab hopes to persuade the members of
the present four-man cabinet to remain. Shihab also intends
to add an unspecified number of new ministers in order to con-
tinue present policies and avoid political turmoil by spreading
the administrative burden. However, the problem of appeasing
the many religious and political factions in such a government
expansion may result in increased tension. Moslem-Christian
antagonism has been relatively quiescent during the seven-
month tenure of the present cabinet.
Lebanese security forces, although they are being reorganized,
still are not in a position to control effectively any serious resump-
tion of internal strife. Some arms have been seized during recent
sorties against both Christian and Moslem villages, but sizable
quantities of weapons are still in the hands of the several factions.
dhe agreement on oil pipeline revenues just concluded be-
tween the government and the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC)
may have enhanced the prestige of Prime Minister Karami and
could increase his chance of remaining at the head of a reorganized
government. The agreement was prearranged by Karami with the
IPC so that his overt intervention and "solution" of the complicated
negotiations would give an impression of astuteness. Under the
terms of the agreement concluded on 3 June, Beirut's annual
revenues will be raised from the present $1,008,000 to about $3,433,-
000. In addition Lebanon will receive a $16,174,04C payment in
settlement of government claims dating to 1952. Karami signed
an economic agreement with the UAR durii,g his current vi31t to
Cairo)
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Laos
he rebellious Pathet Lao battalion apparently has escaped
again from loosely encircling Laotian Army forces. Although
the army had taken up new positions near the battalion on the
morning of 3 June as part of a plan to crush its resistance, bat-
talion personnel are reported to have slipped between army units
that night, headed toward the North Vietnamese frontier. On 4
June a LaotianDefenseMinistry spokesman told foreign military
attaches that, with the dispersal of the Pathet battalion, the gov-
ernment's operation was finished anq that a "mission accomplished"
announcement would be forthcoming
Before this indirect admission of failure is made, the army
ma make further attempts to contact the rebel unit. However,
in view of the army's inability in the past to maintain even nominal
contact with the battalion, it seems likely that any such efforts would
again be inconclusive.
The Laotian cabinet on 6 June decided to release leaders of
the Communist-front Neo Lao Hak Zat, who have been under
house arrest, but to maintain surveillance of their activities,
according to the American Embassy in Vientiane. This decision
was made apparently because of insufficient evidence for prosecut-
ing them on charges of incitement to rebellion and in deference
to Western fears that the bloc would seize on such prosecution
as a violation of the Geneva truce agreements. The crown prince,
whose views are aggressively represented in the cabinet by
young reformist elements, is believed strongly opposed to release
of the leaders and may be considering the advisability of attempt-
ing to reverse the decision.
North Vietnam is continuing its heavy propaganda blasts against
Laotian Government "provocations." (The American army attach�
in Vientiane comments that Hanoi's charges of Laotian incitement
to "civil war" on the North Vietnamese frontier could set the stage
for intervention by "volunteers2 Most recently, Hanoi radio has al-
leged that Laotian Army recon issance planes had violated North
Vietnam's air space on 5 June for the third consecutive day.
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"NW New'
I IL THE WEST
Adenauer's Decision to Remain Chancellor Provokes Sharp
Criticism
Chancellor Adenauer, by remaining chancellor, has for-
feited some degree of respect and authority in his Christian
Democratic Union (CDU), and dissident CDU elements will
now be strengthened and encouraged to assert their own views
increasingly in hindering government policy. Adenauer's move
has created unprecedented confusion and resentment in the CDU;
party leaders endorsed his decision on 5 June only to maintain
the "best face" possible and avoid splitting the party. For the
present, the party is likely to attempt to maintain this solid
front on major issues.
Ambassador Bruce comments that Adenauer acted against
the advice of even his closest Bonn advisers, and has provoked
almost unanimous condemnation in the pro-CDU press. Even
Adenauer's mouthpiece, the Koelnische Rundschau, failed for
the first time to support him, questioning why the alleged "well-
considered" decision in April to accept the presidency should be
"ill-considered and wrong" only 58 days later. American of-
ficials in Bonn comment that Adenauer is no longer pictured as a
master politician but as a man no longer capable of choosing and
holding "a clear and correct course."
Adenauer's decision is being interpreted throughout the
Bundestag and press not as a move dictated by the foreign polit-
ical situation but as an effort to retain personal power and deny
it to Economics Minister Erhard, whom Adenauer felt he could
not control from the presidency. In a private interview with a
journalist long very close to him, Adenauer stressed his intense
opposition to Erhard, and maintained that the CDU had not Suf-
ficiently matured in the right direction for him to relinquish con-
trol. He also informed the journalist that French Premier Debre
had warned him of French apprehensions over Erhard as chancellor.
The CDU is in complete confusion and has postponed until 15
June choosing its presidential candidate for the 1 July election,
With no agreement on a strong CDU nominee, the chances for the
popular Social Democratic candidate, Carlo Schmid, are improved.
8 June 59
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Argentina Planning Expulsion of Bulgarian Minister
Argentina's President Frondizi has decided to expel
Bulgarian Minister Boris Popov on 8 June or shortly there-
after in the latest of a series of efforts to shore up his gov-
ernment against insistent domestic pressures. The military
has been increasingly restive over labor defiance of state-of-
siege regulations, and Communist-Peronista agitators threaten
to contin e exploiting the economic situation through strikes and
violence.
A group of disgruntled military officers and retired offi-
cers is reported to be planning a takeover of the Frondizi
government during June or July. They feel the people have
lost faith in Frondizi, that the "desperate economic situation"
is affecting the working class throughout the country, that many
officers of the army garrisons oppose Frondizi, and that they
had better take over the government than permit the ultranational-
ists to seize on an incident to overthrow Frondizi. Frondizi report-
edly says he expects this month to be an especially critical one.
Frondizi plans to release to the press copies of monitored
Bulgarian telegraph messages which presumably will link the
legation to domestic disorders. In April, when one Rumanian
and four Soviet diplomats were expelled, the government an-
nounced it had "irrefutable proof" of Soviet bloc complicity in
serious rioting earlier that month. Frondizi may hope that by re-
newing this charge, he can again postpone the need for unpopular
repressive measures and at the same time persuade the public
that he must have broader legislat've authorization to deal
adequately with subversive activity
�,Lolice have been attempting to control disturbances with
tear gas and water hoses, avoiding recourse to extensive arrests
or shooting. Frondizi reportedly stated
he would order more drastic measures it necessary, but subse-
quent government actions�exposing evidence of joint Peronista-
Communist plotting and appealing to the public for support of the
austerity program--indicate continued reluctance to use force
until all otl_remler _edies are exhausted)
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Nevi Nror
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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