CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/10/15

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03184153
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RIPPUB
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U
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14
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February 25, 2020
Document Release Date: 
February 27, 2020
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October 15, 1959
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/ Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 vaf 15 October 1959 3.3(h)(2) Copy No, C CENTRAL 6 5 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. NO Cl IANC E IN CLASS. DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHAN'..';E0 FO: T" NEXT REVIEW DATE: OA otre0_ REVIEWER: kit" 1111470-2 -TOP-SECRET- /Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153r Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 wisto,� Jost V' A ICI " E"Ir Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 TrID CPC'R'T Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 rnod 15 OCTOBER 1959 I. TEE COMMUNIST BLOC Soviet ambassador to Communist China replaced. Indonesia.n foreign minister, after visit to Peiping, sees China as grow- ing problem for future in Asia. Bloc continues to negotiate arms and economic aid with UAR despite irrita- tion at Cairo's policies. II. ASIA-AFRICA Strained Saudi Arabian - ARAMCO re- lations make shutdown of TAPLINE in- creasingly likely. UAR orders its missions to propagandize Nasir's statement that he will accept UN resolutions if Israel does likewise. (TOP 0 Imam of Yempn asks Nasir for $58,000, - 000 loan. South Vietnam concerned over deteriorat- ing security in southern Laos; plans to expand training of Laotian troops. rrrin crtir)r4 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 z z `-Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C031841537 CENTRAL -INTECCial4ct�uudETIN oy- jo 15 October 1959 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR - Communist China: Pavel Yudin, Soviet ambassador to Communist China since December 1953, has been replaced by a relatively obscure Ukrainian party secretary, Stepan Chervo- nenko. Yudin, once one of the Soviet Union's top ideologists, was due for reassignment and has been absent from his post for long periods during the past two years. Chervonenko accompanied Ithrushchev on the Chinese trip and was apparently designated for the job well in advance of the official announcement. Yudints transfer, therefore, may be routine. However, the actions, com- ing at a time when Sib-Soviet relations apparently are strained, and the obscurity of the replacement, could be further indica- tions of irritation between Peipin_g and Moscow. Indonesia - Communist China: Foreign Minister Subandriots recent trip to Peiping resulted in a tentative agreement for the establishment of a Sino-Indonesian working group for "solving the problem of the Over se in Indonesia" This arrangement may even- tually involve some modifi aUonofPjakartasban on alien mer- chants in rural areas. *ng Peiping, subandrio he was taken aback by uninese Communist arro- giceThnd seeming confidence and believes China will nose an increasing problem for Asia in the future. (Page 1) Bloc-UAR: negotiations for long-term economic ana military aid are continuing in Mos- cow, even though there has been increasing irritation between the bloc and Cairo over the past two months. A Czech trade delegation is due to arrive in Cairo this week. It is expected to include officials who are authorized to negotiate a new mil- itary aid agreement with the UAR. The delegation will probably also discuss Prarnicitc ptember offer of economic assistance. (Page 2) V. TOP SECRET z 4Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 A //// //// / Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 II. ASIA-AFRICA Saudi Arabia: iThe relations of the managements of ARAMCO and the Tapline Company with Prince Faysal and Petroleum Di- rector Tariki have become so strained by a number of issues that a shutdown of the Tapline is increasingly likely. For further de- tails on this situation, see page 3.) UAR-Israel: the UAR has ordered its dipi�tithisSJanr ons launch a large-scale propaganda campaign to exploit Nasir's 8 October press interview in which he stated willingness to accept all United Nations resolutions for settlement of Arab-Israeli problems, provided Israel also accepts them. The Israelis have dismissed his interview as "deliberate propaganda." Nasir probably hopes his campaign will put Israel on the defensive, create an impression of UAR moderation, and im- prove his international prestige, particularly in the West. Some of his recent statements also suggest that he may have a row- ing respect for the authority and effectiveness of the UN. (Page 4) Yemen-UAR: The Imam asked Nasir for a loan of 20,000,000 Egyptian pounds (about $58,000,- 000 at the official exchange rate) to assist him in unspecified "projects" which he intends to undertake. Although Nasir has indicated willingness to help solve the Imam's financial difficul- ties, he is unlikely to furnish an amount of this size. He is likely to make a small-scale effort to assist in order to placate the Imam, who has shnwn siens of being disturbed by UAR ac- tivities in Yemen. (Page 5) South Vietnam - Laos: he Diem regime in South Vietnam is becoming increasingly concerned over what it regards as worsen- ing security conditions in adjacent southern Laos. South Vietnam reportedly intends; with Laotian cooperation, to expand its training of Laotian military personnel and to send additional civilian prop- aganda and welfare teams into Laos. Saigon's increasingly activistj 15 Oct 59 DAILY BRIEF ii trr TOP SECRET _,Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO3184153% ,,,a" % 'Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C031841531 TOP SECRET ale in Laos risks provoking countermeasures by North Vietnam affecting not only the Laotian situation but also South Vietnam's internal securiy2) (Page 6) Watch Committee Conclusions: atuations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeop- ardize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East, par- ticularly in Iraq-3 Laos: atssicient activity has remained at a low level. The dissidents, however, with probable North Vietnamese assist- ance, continue to have the objective of establishing themselves in a strong position which they could use as the basis for polit- ical bargaining or for the expansion of military operationsj Middle East: th_e situation in Iraq remains tense. While order has been well maintained, factional strife may break out and further attempts against Qasim are possible. In these cir- cumstances, the UAR may become more deeply involved. � 15 Oct 59 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Indonesian Talks in Peiping Reported Unsuccessful Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio he had made no progress with Peiping on the Overseas Chinese problem during his 7-11 October visit to China; he seemed incensed over the treatment he had re- ceived. Apparently he had made the visit at his own initiative, in an effort to overcome Chinese opposition to an Indonesian decree requiring withdrawal of alien merchants from rural areas. Prior to the trip, he had confided to the American am- bassador in Djakarta that Communist China was exerting "ter- rific" pressure for repeal of the decree/ Subandrio speculated in Hong Kong that Communist China's strong position in behalf of Overseas Chinese stemmed from a desire to maintain them as a potential vehicle for new aggres- sive designs. He said he was taken aback by Chinese arrogance and seeming confidence, and believes China will be an increas- ing problem for Asia in the future. He felt the Chinese position was a denial of the Bandung declarations. Despite failure to resolve difficulties over the decree, tentative agreement was reached for the ettablishment of a Sino-Indonesian negotiating group for "solving the problem of Overseas Chinese in Indonesia," In addition to considering the problems posed by Chinese merchants, this group may also address itself to implementation of the 1955 treaty abolishing dual nationality for Overseas Chinese in Indonesia. Ratifica- tion instruments putting the treaty into effect reportedly will be exchanged soon. The treaty requires Overseas Chinese to choose either Indonesian or Chinese citizenship within two years. TOP SECRET ic not SQ Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 Page 1 _AppIrovep for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 yore Bloc-UAR Aid Negotiations Continuing a Czech trade delegation is scheduled to arrive in the UAR this week and that the delegation will include negotiators "to conclude the military agreement." The UAR last month asked Czechoslovakia to provide addi- tional military goods, including spare parts for the arms previ- ously received. At that time, Prague expressed its displeasure with Cairo's "discriminatory" policy on pricing cotton exports. UAR officials have since stated that once the cotton-pricing prob- lem is solved the arms agreement probably will be concluded. In addition to trade and arms, the Czech delegation presumably will discuss Prague's offer of last September to extend $28,000,000 in economic aid, in addition, that negotiations for long-term Soviet economic and military aid are continuing in Moscow, The remaining contracts for projects called for under the Soviet $175,000,000 economic aid credit are being worked out. Moreover, the UAR arms-purchasing mission in Moscow now is con- tracting for the delivery of materiel under a new major agreement, the general terms of which were agreed to in August by Moscow and Cairo. These negotiations are taking place against a background of increasing irritation between the bloc and Cairo. On 10 October, Radio Moscow in an Arabic broadcast accused Cairo of seeking military aid from the West and apparently sought to imply that bloc aid programs might be affected if relations continued to de- teriorate. On 12 October, Cairo's Al Ahram replied with an ed- itorial accusing Radio Moscow of committing "several unpardon- able blunders of late" and deny:17 the UAR had requested Western arms. -TOP-SECRET 15 Oct 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 iLASIA-AFRICA ARAMCO's Position in Saudi Arabia Endangered 1Relations, of the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) and the Trans Arabian Pipeline Company (TAPLINE) with Prime Minister Faysal and Petroleum Director Abdullah Tariki have become so strained that a shutdown of the Tapline carrying Saudi oil to the Mediterranean now appears increasingly likely. Tariki claims ARAMCO has been diverting profits and calculates that the company owes the government more than $180,000,000. He has rejected all company proposals to negotiate and apparently has Faysal's complete support for a pIa.n 'to own and operate ARAMCO or to destroy it."1 'Since a settlement of the ARAMCO-Saudi dispute has been a precondition in TAPLINE's parallel negotiations with the UAR for increased transit fees for the pipeline passing through Syria, Cairo now may implement its earlier ultimatum to TAPLINE that it must pay these fees by the end of October or face the imposi- tion of a tax which will bring in the amount of money demanded. TAPLINE's position is that the proposed UAR tax is contrary to the company's concession agreement with the Syrian Region and will therefore be ignored. TAPLINE plans to continue opera- tions unless shut down by direct UAR action-J In anticipation of such a shutdown� the owners of TAPLINE-- the same American oil companies which own ARAMCO--have given orders to speed construction of a pipeline to increase Saudi oil export capacity at the Persian Gulf:i iKing Saud, who has been gathering political support in recent months, may use the approaching oil crisis to provide additional justification for an attempt to reassert his own authority. There are signs of increasing frictions between Saud and Faysal. For example, Saud has issued orders to the di/et:tor 01 oroaacastmg that no statement made by Faysal could be published until it had been cleared by himself. Concern that Saud might move to enhance his own authority has already caused the crown prince to put off a contemplated trip�qhmq_d_f_nr medical treatment of his serious stomach disorder 15 Oct 59 OP SECRET &Tr% A II I I.^�����1 � � ...wok �Aoram. EN" �� � m������� � Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 1.1.4 I WV UAR Propaganda to Stress Willingness to Accept UN Resolutions On Israel Cairo has instructed its diplomatic missions abroad to launch a large-scale propaganda campaign pegged to Nasir's 8 October press interview advocating acceptance of all United Nations resolu- tions on Arab-Israeli problems and a UN commission for implement- ing the resolutions. Nasir specifically declared himself willing to accept the 1951 resolution on freedom of transit through the Suez Canal. He added the condition that Israel must also accept the resolutions. The Israeli reaction, as Nasir probably anticipated, �was to dismiss his remarks as "deliberate propaganda." Israel has frequently expressed its readiness to negotiate wail the Arabs, but has consistently rejected any suggestion on implementation of the 1948 resolution on repatriation or compensation of the Arab refugees and--like the Arabs--has opposed implementation of the UN's 1947 resolution on the partition of Palestine. Nasir probably hopes to create the impression that he is sponsoring a moderate approach to the solution of Arab-Israeli problems and in this way to improve his international prestige, particularly in the West. He is almost certainly aware of the un- favorable picture of him fostered by his adamant stand against Israeli transit of the canal, and is also anxious to smooth the way for Western approval of his request to the World Bank for funds to improve the waterway. In some of his recent statements, how- ever, there has been an indication of a growing, genuine respect for the UN's authority ard ability to implement its decisions. -TO-P-SEGRET 15 Oct 59 CENTRAL INTELLIC;Fkirp IIIlTIkl Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 JP SECRET Imam Requests $58,000,000 Loan From Nasir Imam Ahmad of Yemen asked UAR President Nasir for a loan of approximately 20,000,000 Egypt pounds (about $58,000,000) to assist him in unspecified "proj- ects." He had previously advised Nasir of his need for an in- definite sum, and apparently received Nasir's assurances of assistance. Nasir is unlikely to provide such a large amount, but probably will offer some assistance in order to avoid of- fending the Imam, who has shown signs of displeasure over recent UAR activities in Yemen. The Imam's need for funds is known to be urgent, as re- flected in his recent decision to reduce the pay of civil servants and the army. The sum requested, however, is believed to be considerably more than that required for meeting usual govern- ment expenses. The reference to "projects" suggests new un- dertakings. There have been numerous reports that the Imam hopes to lessen his dependence on the Sino-Soviet bloc by draw- ing funds from the UAR, but there is no indication that he has actually adopted such a policy. The Imam may also be considering some action against the British-supported federation of Arab states in the Aden Protec- torate. The request may be merely a maneuver, however, to get as much assistance from Nasir as possible, and the Imam probably has as little concern over repayment of this loan as he has over hisother international financial commitments. TOP SECRET 15 Oct 59 A � �� e.o.m... � 3.0.4.,L11�,.i.r.I.uIrIkI Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 Page 5 Approved for Release: i70/02/21 C0314153 � � � � � South Vietnam Increasingly Concerned Over Laos Ffhp Diem regime, which has closely followed developments in Laos since the outbreak of Communist hostilities there in mid- July, is becoming increasingly concerned over stepped-up dissi- dent activity in the southern Laotian provinces adjacent to South Vietnam. Vietnamese leaders are particularly disturbed by the "vacuum" in southern Laos resulting from the commitment of the bulk of Laotian forces in the north. They fear that a critical situation inimical to South Vietnam's security is developing thelij the Diem government has been in close consultation with Laotian leaders during the past few months, and reportedly has engaged in contingency planning for joint anti-Communist efforts. President Diem recently informed American officials in Saigon that, in agreement with Lao officials, South Vietnam intends to expand its training of Laotian military personnel and to send ad- ditional "civic action" teams, made up of personnel trained in propaganda and welfare work, into Laos. Diem and his advisers additionally have long considered the covert introduction into southern Laos of Vietnamese troops disguised as civilians as a means of bolstering limited Laotian security assets-.1 qvyanwhile, South Vietnam has augmented its representa- tion in Vientiane, and stepped up its intelligence operations in Laos, South Vietnam's newly appointed ambassador to Laos, is known as a loyal supporter of the Diem government's 'ac- tivist" win] Wi_igon's increasing role in Laos risks provoking counter- measures by North Vietnam affecting not only the Laotian situa- tion but possibly also South Vietnam's internal secur1ty:1 TOP SECRET1 15 Oct 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 r AI 61, ' r r Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 Ai . At A Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 h. - -1/kirr'rIVTIAT tikh, THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Cperations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director T1DENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153 for !R!,!a TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 77 ZApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03184153/37,,,MWMZ/ZI