CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/05/26

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03163335
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: May 26, 1959

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3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
26 May 1959
Copy No. C 62
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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26 MAY 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Indian foreign secretary's views on
Tibet.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Qasim warns Communists not to
engage in political activities.
Laos--Army pessimistic about nego-
tiations with Pathet Lao; Chinese Com-
munist foreign minister requests ICC
reconvene immediately.
IIL THE WEST
De Gaulle and Franco may meet after
Geneva conference.
0
Government-owned West German ship-
yard extends long-term credit to USSR. 0
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
26 May 1969
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Tibet: ale Chinese Communists apparently are hav-
ing some success in inducing Tibetans remaining in Lhasa to
identify themselves with the regime,
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq: Qasimis press conference of 23 May contained a
stronger warning to the Iraqi Communists and associated ele-
ments whose leaders intend to continue their party activities.
He declared that obstruction by any group of his plan to suspend
political activities would be viewed as aetinn afYainqi- tt thp safety of
the republic, even though unintentional." (Page 2)
Laos: CI:he Laotian Army staff reportedly is pessimistic
about the value of further negotiations with the commander of the
escaped Pathet Lao battalion but is still willing to integrate these
troops., The local army commander has been instructed to contain
this unit--elements of which exchanged fire with Laotian troops on
23 May--and ultimately to attack it if it does not return to its camp
on the Plaine des JarreA
The 25 May letter of Chinese Communist Foreign Minister
Chen Yi to the Geneva Accords cochairmen�Britain and the USSR--
called on them to reconvene the International Control Commission
(ICC) In Laos "immediately." (Page 3)
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III. THE WEST
France-Spain: A meeting between President de Gaulle
and General Franco inc e French Pyrenees is reported planned
for sometime after the Geneva conferenc, De Gaulle has been
trying to improve relations between Paris and Madrid and now is
backing NATO membership for Spain. He probably hopes to ob-
tain Spain's political cooperation in North Africa and enlist its
support for a greater French role in the NATO command areas
adjacent to Spain and in the western Mediterranean.
(Page 4)
West Germany - USSR: Recent efforts to achieve an un-
derstanding among NATO governments against long-term govern-
ment-guaranteed credits to the USSR are threatened by contracts
concluded by a government-owned West German shipyard. Credits
extending for at least five years have been arranged to finance
the construction of three merchant vessels costing ten million
dollars, and negotiations are continuing for shipbuilding con-
tracts involving at least an additional thirty million dollars.
Bonn defends the projects as necessary to meet competition
from other Western European countries and alleviate serious
unemployment in the shipyards. The British have reaffirmed
their willingness to give guaranteed credits of just under five
ir effort to expand Anglo-Soviet trade.
(Page 5)
26 May 59
DAILY BRIEF If
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THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Tibet Situation
ripiping is having some success in inducing Tibetans re-
maining in Lhasa to identify themselves outwardly with the
Communist regime. Tibetan officials there have cut off their
pigtails and have shifted from wearing traditional cloaks to
Communist-style coats and trousers,
Life is returning to "normal," and
the sole Lhasa cinema has been reopened as the "People's
Cinema House" to show propaganda films.
Military operations against the rebels in other areas of Tibet
continue.]
.piping apparently is seeking to transfer the Dalai Lama's
prestige to the tractable Panchen Lama, who is being used to
eliminate the Tibetan theocracy's political power. While Pei-
ping has not abandoned its claim that the Dalai Lama is in
India "under duress," it has sharply curtailed press attacks.
The strain in Sino -Indian relations continues, and the Indian
ambassador to Peiping states that he feels "isolated" even
though treated with "courtesy." The Soviet ambassador, the
Indian diplomat reported, felt New Delhi "had gone too far"
in criticizing Chinese actions in Tibet]
he Indians are attempting to repair the surface damage
to relations with Peiping but, as Nehru said, the presence
of the Dalai Lama in India will be the subject of continuing
strain. India's Foreign Secretary Dutt stated on 21 May that
Nehru has no hope the Dalai Lama will ever return to Lhasa
in a status comparable to that which he held before his flight.
Indian attitudes toward Communist China will also be adversely
influenced by the psychological effect of the suppression, of
which the 13,000 Tibetan refugees will serve as a remi
TOP RET
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Qasim Warns Iraqi Communist Party
Iraqi Communist leaders insist that party activity should
continue, although they have announced the abandonment of their
"educational" campaign for appointment to the cabinet of acknowledged
Communist party representatives and have dropped their demand that
political parties be given official sanction immediately.
In a press conference on 23 May, Prime Minister Qasim warned
that "unintentional" obstruction by any group of his plan to suspend
partisan political activities would be considered "unintentional action
against the safety of the republic." The official Communist newspaper
omitted this passage in reporting Qasim's statements, and the follow-
ing day it published a long editorial stressing the need for "sincere
party activities" to "assure the success of the republic."
Elements of the Communist-penetrated left wing of the socia.-
ist National Democratic party have denounced the decision of the
party's leadership to suspend party activity and have declared, 'We
will persist in our party work."
There are signs that the Communists' open dispute with Qasim
has cost them a measure of their control over Baghdad's press and
radio. Three Baghdad newspapers which usually echo the Commu-
nist line have veered away on the question of legal sanction for po-
litical parties. Director General of Guidance Ayyub has gently
criticized the press and radio for unfounded charges against some
Iraqi officials. On 24 May, Radio Baghdad broadcast the text of a
Canadian journalist's interview with Qasim on 20 May, in which
Qasim was more friendly toward the West than previously and indi-
cated that the Iraqi people should no longer have reason to hate the
Western allies of the old regime.
CONEJ19ENTIAL
26 May 59
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Nam,
Pathet Lao Battalion Commander Breaks Off
Surrender Negotiations
he commander of the escaped Pathet Lao battalion
broke off his negotiations with Laotian Army representa-
tives in the field following an exchange of fire between ad-
vance elements on 23 May. The Laotian Army staff, re-
portedly pessimistic about the value of any future nego-
tiations with the Pathet battalion, nevertheless is still
willing to integrate these troops if they return to their camp
on the Plaine des Jarres. Laotian Army strategy is to con-
tain these troops and to seal off all trails leading to the North
Vietnamese frontier. The army is prepared Ultimately to at-
tack the Pathet unit but apparently would prefer to effect its
surrender through psychological-warfare methods7i
/high-ranking Lao Army officer says he has advised
Premier Phoui Sananikone to require former Pathet Lao
chief Souphannouvong to appeal to-the unit in person. He
also said that Crown Prince Savang told Phoui on 23 May
that the government should take immediate and drastic re-
pressive measures against the Neo Lao Hak Zat--the Com-
munist-dominated legal political successor to the Pathet
Lao. Phoui reportedly replied he was not yet prepared to
do sco__
the 25 May letter from Chinese Communist Foreign
Minister Chen Yi to Geneva Accords cochairmen Britain
and the USSR, which called on them to reconvene the Inter-
national Control Commission (ICC) in Laos "immediately,"
is designed to maintain the momentum of the Communist
campaign and embarrass the British, who have been active-
ly seeking to avoid a reconvening:7
EL. o military officials have received reports from
Laotian irregular forces that an estimated 50 Communist
Vietnamese soldiers wearing Laotian Army uniforms had
crossed into Laos, but this is unconfirmectl
26 May 59
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Nair" LIfT WEST
Meeting Between De Gaulle and Franco Planned
LPlans for a meeting between President de Gaulle and Gen-
eral Franco have been tentatively arranged by high-level French
and Spanish officials who met in Madrid in mid-April,
The two leaders are
somewhere in the French Pyrenees sometime after the Geneva
conference-,3
De Gaulle has been trying to improve French-Spanish rela-
tions, which have generally been strained since 1936. A series
of contacts between French and Spanish officials�mostly mili-
tary officers--have occurred over the past year, and Paris now
is publicly sponsoring Spain's entry into NATO. De Gaulle has
long maintained that Spain's exclusion from Western defense
was "ridiculous" and that the character of its political regime
was irrelevant.
The French President probably hopes, in return, to obtain,
a friendly Spanish attitude toward French policy in Africa, particu-
larly North Africa. Paris may also be seeking Spanish support
for activation, under a French admiral, of the NATO "Iberlant"
command�the eastern Atlantic area adjacent to Spain between
Brest in the north, 2,nd Dakar in the south--as well as support for
changes in defense arrangements for the western Mediterranean.
Socialist opposition to Franco in Norway, Denmark, and
certain other NATO countries is still a substantial obstacle to
Spain's admittance to NATO, but the French Socialist party
is no Longer sufficiently strong to block a Paris-Madrid rap-
prochement. De Gaulle's most difficult task will probably be
to allay Spanish suspicions that France is seeking to expand
its influence pain's expense.
SE
26 May 59
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West German - Soviet Negotiations For Ship Construction
Contracts concluded by the West German government-
owned Howaldt shipyard threaten to undercut a proposed
ban against the participation of NATO governments in long-
term credits for the USSR. Credit extending for more than
five years has been arranged to finance the construction of
three fruit carriers, costing ten million dollars, and nego-
tiations are continuing for contracts involving at least thirty
million dollars for the construction of five or six floating
fish canneries.. Half the payment is to be made on delivery,
with the balance to be paid in five annual installments. The
time from the beginning of construction to final payment
will exceed the five-year limit being sought among NATO
.countries for medium-term credits.
Bonn officials. argue that their position in NATO op-
posing such credits is not affected because the deal is
guaranteed by a state government rather than by the Fed-
eral Republic and is a "one-time exception" which does not
vitiate Bonn's general policy. Bonn officials maintain the
projects are necessary to alleviate serious unemployment
in the shipbuilding industry. They feel that if West Germany
refuses the contracts, other Western nations are sure to
fill them. Previous negotiations by a Hamburg shipyard for
the construction of passenger ships for the USSR failed be
of Soviet insistence on long-term financing. Bonn
claims the contracts were later awarded to Dutch shipbuild-
ers. West German approval of the contr cts appears likely,
and arrangements are pending for an additional 19 ships.
These developments coincide with the conclusion of an
extensive British-Soviet trade agreement calling for a sub-
stantial increase in trade during the next five years. In-
creased British exports will, at least in part, be financed
through government-guaranteed "intermediate" credits--
for less than five years- -which the British have made
available in an attempt to obtain a substantial share of the
Soviet program of nurchasina chemical plants
CONHfENTIAL
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CONFiLitba
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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