CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/05/11
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
03153741
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
13
Document Creation Date:
February 25, 2020
Document Release Date:
February 27, 2020
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 11, 1959
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15787561].pdf | 551.96 KB |
Body:
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741
K IC I 3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
11 May 1959
Copy No. C 62
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. AlisiV �
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: T
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AU
TI-: T1/21;100 REVIEWER
for Release:
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741
TAD
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741
�
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741
11 ivm.y. 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR launches test ICBM to full 3500-
ran7 On 9 May.
Soviet party central committee to con-
vene on 24 June to discuss implemen-
tation of economic program.
USSR population 208,800,000, accord-
ing to official census. Males number
94,000,000, or 5,000,000 fewer than
estimated in US.
Moscow commentator says Secretary
Herter in his 7 May speech has "com-
promised faith in good intentions of
Western powers."
IL ASIA-AFRICA
UAR reiterates policy of "positive neu-
trality" to its dinlomats abroad.
Yemen - Imam and Crown Prince quoted
as wanting to "disengage" from commit-
ments to 3ino-Soviet bloc.
Government crisis in Somalia.
\
/N
TO RET
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741
/
/
VA
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741
0!2--
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
11 May 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-ICBM: A valid operation began on the Tyura Tam
missile test range at 0701 EDT on 9 May 1959. The count-
down proceeded smoothly and culminated in the launching of
an ICBM test vehicle at about 1459 EDT.
the test ICBM traveled
the full 3500-nautical-mile range, probably impacting north-
east of Klyuchi on the KamchatkaL ninsula. The success o
the re-entry and guidance is not known.
This is the fifth ICBM event occurring on the Tyura Tarn
range this year: three were successful; one was canceled just
prior to launch; and the last previous ICBM firing--on 30 Marc
1959--did not reach the impact area and is considered a prob-
able in-flight failure.
An ICBM firing at this time would not interfere with a
possiblin--1--%-unr-h_i Vanils nrnh on or about 8 June
1959.
USSR: Soviet news media hlave announceu tnai tneoviet
party central committee, will convene on 24 June and have out-
lined its agenda. Publication of such a meeting so far in ad-
vance is contrary to past practice. The convening of the plenum
reflects determination to maintain heavy pressure for fulfill-
ment of its Seven-Year Plan economic goals. The plenum is to
discuss implementation of key sectors of the economic program--
expansion of the chemical industry and further mechanization of
industry--only a few months after the party congress formally
approved the plan. Economic officials apparently have been put
on notice that they can expect periodic accountings to high party
authorities. The plenum may also be given a formal briefin
on the outcome of the Geneva foreign ministers' meeting.
(Page 1)
TOPS
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C031535ar ,
A
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741
USSR census: The Soviet Union has announced that its
total population was 208,800,000 in January 1959, as indi-
cated by the results of the first general census taken since
1939. This total is only about 800,000 smaller than current
US estimates, but the number of males is about 5,000,000
smaller and the urban population about 5,000,000 larger than
estimated. The Soviet population is currently growing at a
rate of 1.7 percent per ear which is about the same as that
of the United States. (Page 2)
t10
USSR-Geneva: A Soviet commentary on Secretary Her-
ter's speech"of 7 May claims that he has "compromised faith
in the good intentions of the Western powers" by his stand on
Western rights in West Berlin--"that the West would not yield
one inch." The broadcast, maintaining that the Western pack-
age plan for Germany was based on the concept of free elec-
tions, attacked it as a sign that the West intends to follow
"a line of rigidity and pressure" at Geneva.
UAR:
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Tairo to continue a policy
of tepositivp nputralitv" and not to become a "cat's paw" in the
prAti war
the UAR and the Philippines are
in basic agreement in uze bLruggle against the Communists.
UAR heads of missions were advised to avoid any Western ef-
forts to "draw us away" from neutrality and to avoid being
"deceived" by praise of the UARts anti-Communist campaign.
Cairo's continuing suspicion of theWest
ntailLtheappearance of neutrality.
Yemen- rthe Imam told the Italian ambassador to Yemen
and Crown Prince Badr agree that
now is a good time for Yemen to "disengage" from its commit-
ments with the USSR and Communist China. The Imam said
that if Western countries, meaning the United States, will fi-
nance and continue road and port construction, he is inclined
11 May 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
TOP ET
ii
r/
// ,kp�p�rove'd for Release: 2Z20/02/21 C03153741/ f
A
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741 A.
Now
5 end his agreements with the Communist countries. The
Italian ambassador believes that the reported plan for closing
all diplomatic missions in Yemen is a sincere effort to oust
the Communists, but a top Yemeni official told him that it would
take months to; carry out the plan.)
(Page 3)
*Somalia: Prime Minister Issa's action in accepting the res-
ignation of Minister of Interior Bogor, an influential tribal lead-
er, has precipitated a government crisis in the Italian Trust
Territory of Somalia and threatens to cause a split along tribal
lines in the governing party, the Somali Youth League (SYL).
The issue of a party split is expected to come to a head at the
SYL party congress, scheduled to begin on 16 May. Political
Instability resulting from a party split along tribal lines would
ide influence, especially from the UAR.
(Page 5)
11 May 59 DAILY BRIEF
iii
TOP SECRET
,Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741 ,/,/ r
'Ng-% rth
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741
,00�1
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Central Committee Meeting Scheduled
Moscow announced on 9 May that a plenum of the Soviet Com-
munist party central committee is scheduled to begin on 24 June.
The plenum will discuss implementation of directives laid down at
the party congress in January on the extension of mechanization
and automation in Soviet industry.
For various reasons--preoccupation with maximum output
at the expense of efficiency being one of the more important--the
level of Soviet technology varies both between and within the sev-
eral sectors of the economy. Under the theme of "catching up with
the West," the gap between "average" and "best" practices in Soviet
production is to be narrowed considerably by 1965; the agenda for
the June meeting suggests that such improvements are to receive
immediate impetus.
The plenum will also review the first year of the program to
expand the Soviet chemical industry by an outlay of between 15 and
20 billion dollars. This programs outlined by Khrushchev at a
May 1958 plenum, appears to be in jeopardy unless increased
amounts of chemical equipment can be procured from the West.
Before last December's central committee meeting, which
the Soviet press reported on a day-to-day basis, public announce-
ment of plenums had always been withheld until their conclusion.
The advance notification of the June meeting and of its principal
agenda topics may be a further step in stripping the secrecy from
central committee sessions in cases where this secrecy is self-
defeating. In the present instance, fuller publicity for the central
committee proceedings will help goad economic officials toward
maximum performance and will indicate that the party intends to
maintain constant pressure for fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan
goals.
Although the central committee has little or no substantive
role in the formulation of foreign policy, the timing of the plenum
would permit the Soviet leadership to review the results of the
Geneva conference and the USSR's premsummit position for the ben-
efit of top party officials.
CONF
AL
11 May 59 CFKITRAI INITFI I InFt�ICT RIII I FTIN
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741
Page 1
Approved forfiele3.s7:2020/02/21 C03153741
Nor'
USSR Census
The USSR has announced that its total population at the be-
ginning of 1959, as determined by a nationwide census conducted
during the week of 13-22 January, was 208,800,000. This figure
is essentially in line with the last Soviet estimate--200,200,000
in April 1956�and with subsequent Soviet statements of the rate
of increase. The announcement states that the total population
has increased 18.1 million, or 9.5 percent, since 1939, the date
of the last Soviet census, and places the total urban population
at 99,800,000--about 5,000,000 more than estimated by the United
States.
If the latest census was conducted as planned, the results
should be quite reliable. It was planned as a house-to-house
canvass of the entire country, to be carried out by a staff of
500,000 persons.
The figures show there are 94,000,000 men and 114,800,000
women in the USSR, the excess of women being the result of two
world wars. Since US estimates had placed the number of men
at about 99,000,000, the United States may have overestimated
the size of the military age group.
SE
11 May 59
CFKITDAI INTF1110.FkIrF RI II I FTIN Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741
Prrtri c' r1
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741
�4.00
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Imam Favors Yemeni Disengagement From Sino-Soviet
Commitments
dhe Imam of Yemen has informed the Italian ambassador
that Yemen is now inclined to "disengage" itself from commit-
ments made with the Sino-Soviet bloc, provided the West--
meaning the United States�will "take over." He added this
would involve financing and continuing Sino-Soviet work now
in progress in Yemen, as well as talFirnr narp nf thck r1p1-11- in-
curred for work already performed3
Bloc commitments to Yemen under the economic aid pro-
gram consist of a $25,000,000 Soviet credit and a $16,000,000
Chinese Communist interest-free loan; about $25,000,000 of the
total commitment has actually been allocated. Soviet techni-
cians are engaged in constructing port facilities and airfields,
opening industrial and agricultural schools, and other projects.
Communist China is building a road from the Red Sea at Al-
Hudaydah to the capital at Sana and, along with some of the
European satellites, is providing aid for the development of
light industrial enterprises.
Soviet military aid to Yemen, under which the Imam re-
ceived aircraft, armor, artillery, and other weapons, amounts
to over $30,000,000. Yemen, however, presumably is required
to repay only about one third the amount�probably in the form of
exports, such as coffee.
There are believed to be more than 400 bloc personnel in
Yemen, including over 50 military specialists. Approximately
300 of those working on economic projects are Chinese Commu-
nists engaged in road building.
here have been indications that Crown Prince Badr� who
previously favored closer ties with the bloc, is moving to curtaili
11 may 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCF RIII I FTIKI
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741
Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741
Nor
ino-Soviet influence, presumably with UAR,encouragement.
Sino-Soviet missions appear to be the primary target of a re-
ported plan to close all diplomatic installations in Yemen; a
top-ranking Yemeni official reportedly stated, however, that
this action cannot take place for many months. Foreign rela-
tions would be conducted through Cairo for the United Arab
States�the UAR-Yemeni federation.)
Back has recently
expelled a number of Soviet doctors from Yemen and may be
taking steps to strengthen his control over other bloc person-
nel. The recent arrival of an Egyptian economic mission and
plans for accepting a similar mission for agricultural train-
ing appear to be additional moves to reduce dependence on
Sino-Soviet aic3
71�f?E79
11 May 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETiN Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741
Approved for7R-el-e-a7e:-25-2-0702/21 603153741
Split in Somalia's Governing Party Appears Imminent
The long-expected split in Somalia's moderate governing
party--the Somali Youth League (SYL)--may be imminent fol-
lowing the government's acceptance on 8 May of Minister of
Interior Hagi Musa Bogor's resignation. Hagi Musa is the
recognized leader of the Darots--the country's second largest
tribal group--and they, together with the politically advanced
Hawias, constitute the coalition SYL. The Darots frequently
have charged the Hawias with using their government positions
to increase their control over the SYL and their prestige in the
government. This issue prompted Hagi Musa to precipitate a
government crisis in December 1957.
Hagi Musa's surprise resignation, which set off a gov-
ernmental crisis, resulted from his unilateral order--against the
will of the prime minister, who is a Hawia--to withdraw the
25 February ban imposed by the government on two smaller par--
ties accused of inciting violence preceding the March parliamen-
tary elections. The resignation must be confirmed by the Ital-
ian administrator, but in the past he has always supported the
prime minister.
As a result of his resignation, Hagi Musa probably will
either leave the SYL voluntarily or be expelled from the party
at its forthcoming party congress, which is scheduled to begin
on 16 May to consider the composition of the government for the
next five years. Hagi Musa then may join the UAR-supported
Greater Somalia League--one of the two parties banned by the
government on 25 February--or form a new party composed
largely of Darots.
The semblance of political unity which the SYL sought to
preserve before the world and the United Nations, at least un-
til the country achieved independence in December 1960, will
end abruptly if the party splits along party lines. Moreover,
the political instability which would result from such a split
would provide an atmosphere conducive to further outside in-
fluence, especially from the UAR.
CL) NE I D 'ENT I A
11 may 59 CPKITPAI IRJTFI I InFKICT R1111 FTIN Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741
-vale
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONEID ENTIAL
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741
rd rdrZfdrd rjed Approved firCsleasealirrik
.7z
0
T. RET
ZAI;p7oved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741,,MMAernmie,