CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/06/19

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03191551
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: June 19, 1959

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19 June 1959
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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19 JUNE 1959
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Tyura Tam launching of 18 June.
IT. ASIA-AFRICA
Iran--Tehran unwilling to make con-
cessions to USSR for better relations.
Iraq--Kurdish tribal elements again
clash with security forces near Ira-
nian border.
Burma--Chinese Nationalist irregu-
lars threaten aggressive action un-
less army ceases operations against
them.
Kishi supporters in most key posts
of_new Japanese cabinet.
\..
TOP SECRET
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II L THE WEST
Adenauer planning to visit UK and
France during July; wants meeting
with Macmillan and De Gaulle during
any Geneva recess.
Haitian opposition plans to step up
terrorist activities.
Nicaragua--Castro promises money
and troops to rebel leaders in exile.
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TOP SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
(se')
A�
19 June 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*USSR: The vehicle launched from the Tyura Tam Missile
Test Range shortly after 0400 EDT, 18 June 1959, apparently
failed after being air-borne for several minutes. It was rob-
ably a space vehicle attempt, possibly a lunar probe.
Page 1)
Iran-
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Tehran is continuing its firm posture toward
Moscow and is dissatisfied with the attitude of its ambassador
there. Acting Foreign Minister Sadr told the ambassador that
his recommendation for an Iranian good-will mission to the
USSR could only be considered after Moscow ceased its hostile
propaganda.
Tehran is still unwilling to make any unilateral
or substantial concessions in order to establish better relations.
(Page 3)
Iraq: Dissident Kurdish tribal elements are again clash-
ing with Iraqi security forces in northeastern Iraq near the
Iranian border. The local security officials estimate the
strength of the "rebels" at 700 to 1,000 men armed with "ri-
fleq,� machine guns, a mortar, and grenades." The government
V. is preparing to use Barzani Kurds and other loyal Kurdish tribes
to assist in overcoming the dissidents. As before, Iraqi offi-
cials suspect Iran of supporting this "rebellion."
(Page 4)
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Burma: urmese officials have received a threat in a
letter from the commander of the Chinese Nationalist irregu-
lars that his forces will undertake aggressive action in collab-
oration with dissident tribal groups unless the Burmese Army
calls off its operations against the irregulars. The Burmese
interpret this threat as a warning that the irregulars will sup-
part the Shan dissidents, now a poorly organized racial minor-
ty ' movement. The irregulars, however, might also be
considering a renewal of joint, operations with the Karen dis-
b? sidents� Burma's most troublesome insurgent group)
(Page 5)
Japan: Prime Minister Kishi has probably strengthened
his control in the new :cabinet announced on 18 June by appoint-
ing his supporters to most of the key posts. The inclusion of
Hayato Ikeda, a top leader of the ruling Liberal-Democratic
party who formerly opposed Kishi� will broaden support for
10.shi's pro-US policies. The refusal of Ichiro Kono, an as-
pirant to the prime ministership, to accept a party or cabinet
post leaves him as a rallying point for continued party faction-
alism. (Page 6)
III. THE WEST
West Germany: denauer tentatively plans to visit Mac-
millan in London during July and probably De Gaulle in Paris
shortly thereafter. He expects to ask De Gaulle to call a
European "summit" meeting of the three leaders. Adenauer
feels that the recess Bonn anticipates in East-West negotiations
must be used to strengthen Western unity for the next and "most
crucial" phase of negotiations)
(Page 7)
Haiti: Haitian opposition groups are planning to step up
j terrorist activities in order to weaken further the regime of
(0�President Duvalier, who is still disabled from his recent heart
�\.) attack. Although opposition groups remain divided, they have
19 June 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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succeeded in conducting a series of bombings and other public
disorders in recent days. The government feels itself trapped
between Castro and Trujillo� and three top Haitian officials
displayed "almost hysterical fear" while discussing the polit-
ical situation with Ambassador Drew on 15 June,
(Page 8)
Nicaragua,: Nicaraguan rebel leaders in exile, ch'agrined
over the failure of the invasions early this month by political
moderates based in Costa Rica, have turned in desperation to
Cuban Prime Minister Castro for assistance and also appear
Inclined to accept the support of pro-Communist revolutionary
groups in the Caribbean area for a new effort against the Somoza
regime. Castro promised financial assistance and Cuban troops
to fiaht in Nicaragua.
(Page 9)
W. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Otlook For West Africa Through 1960. NJ E 70-59. 16 June
1959.
Soviet Tactics on Berlin. SNIE 100-7-59. 11 June 1959.
19 June 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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TOP SECRET
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
1. Shortly after 0400 EDT, 18 June 1959, the USSR launched
a vehicle from the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range.
this
was probably a space vehicle rather than a test ICBM.
2.
the vehicle left the launch pad and was air-
borne for several minutes. However, it apparently failed shortly
thereafter as:
3. The type of space vehicle attempt cannot be determined
with confidence, the time of day was
not favorable for a venus probe, but both time of day and date
were satisfactory for a lunar shot. The time of day or time of
month of course i not a consideratiop in the launching of an earth
satellite vehicle,
favor a lunar probe over an
earth satellite vehicle primarily because of the coincidence of time.
4. The Soviet space-venture tally now stands as follows:
a. Three successful earth satellites (4 October
and 3 November 1957; 15 May 1958).
b. One failure, after launch, of a probable earth
satellite (27 April 1958).
c. One lunar probe (MECHTA - 2 January 1959).
TOP SECRET
19 Rine 59 CENTRAL INTFI I InENCE BULLETIN
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d. Three failures, after launch, of probable
lunar probes (23 September, 11 October, and 4 De-
cember 1958).
e, The failure, after launch, of this possible
lunar probe (18 June 1959).
TOP SECRET
19 June 59 CENTRAL INTFI inmicE RLILLETIN
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JUl .N.A.;KL
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Tehran Continues Firm Policy Toward Moscow
Ansari that no consideration could be given to his proposal for
an Iranian good-will mission babe sent to Moscow until the USSR
ceases its hostile propaganda.
Ansari on 9 June had asked to be informed at once of the
Shah's decision on his recommendation regarding such a good-
will mission, because he saw no other way to "end this radio
brawl." Tehran, dissatisfied with Ansari's recommendations.
told him to clarify
views are his own and which are the official views of the Soviet
Government.
Commenting on Ansari's suggestion that such a mission
should confirm the nonaggression provisions of the 1927 Soviet-
Iranian treaty and reassure the USSR that Iran will not permit
its territory to be used as a military base for another power,
Sadr pointed out that the Shah has repeatedly announced that
Iran would not allow such a base. Sadr asked whether Moscow
is ready to agree with Iran that the controversial articles of
the 1921 and 1927 Soviet-Iranian treaties are invalid, provided
Tehran gives "acceptable" assurances that foreign bases would
not be permitted in Iran. Sadr specifically defined a foreign
base as an installation used by foreign troops and not subject
to Iranian administrative regulations- a definition which is
probably unacceptable to Moscow.
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19 June 59
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Current Iraqi Developments
New clashes are taking place between dissident Kurdish
tribal elements and Iraqi security forces in northeastern Iraq
near the Iranian border. Baghdad is preparing to use Barzani
Kurds and other loyal Kurdish tribes to overcome the "rebels,"
whose strength the local security officials estimate at 700 to
1,000 men armed with "rifles, machine guns, a mortar, and
grenades." The northern headquarters- of1 the Popular Resist-
ance Forces at Kirkuk on 17 June directed all its posts near
the Iranian, Turkish, and UAR frontiers, "to be prepared for
emergencies." As before, Iraqi officials suspect that the dis-
sidents are receiving support from Iran.
In Baghdad, both Communist and anti-Communist elements
are continuing to maneuver for position. The provincial gov-
ernors whose 13-14 June conference there was attended by the
directors general of police and security are reported to have
stressed that Baghdad authorities, should look to them--and not
to local Communists--as the sole reliable source of informa-
tion on security matters in their areas. The Communist press
and leaders of Communist-run mass organizations countered on
16 June with calls for special and immediate vigilance to guard
against "evil imperialist plots" to overthrow the government
and kill Qasim.
Reconnaissance of the Baghdad area on 15 and 16 June by
the US military att chd disclosed an unusual concentration of
troops and equipment on the western, as well as the northern,
outskirts of the city.
these troops were shifted to
the area for rehearsals and other preparations for a big anni-
versary parade on 14 July and not in anticipation of imminent
trouble in the capital.
19 June 59 CFKITI?Al MITFI I ICPk1r i iii PTIM
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Chinese Irregulars in Burma Threaten Military Action
Against Government
Ghe commander of the Chinese Nationalist irregulars in the
Burma-Laos border area has threatened military counteraction
against the Burmese Government in collaboration with tribal in-
surgents unless the Burmese Army ceases harassment of his
forces. Burmese officials interpret this threat as a warning
that the irregulars will support the Shan dissidents; the irregu-
lars may lso be considering renewed operations with the Karen
insurgents.
In letter to government authorities, the commander pro-
tested that the attacks on his forces which began on 9 May were
a breach of an April 1956 agreement, purportedly reached be-
tween himself and the Burmese Army commander in Kengtung,
permitting the Chinese irregulars to settle peacefully in the
border area)
Th
Shan dissidents, estimated at about 3,000 men, consti-
tute a loosely organized and poorly equipped guerrilla force,
capable only of minor harassments in Kengtung State. With the
support of the Chinese irregulars, however, they could become
a serious problem for the Burmese Army.
Closer cooperation between the irregulars and the Karen National
Defense Organization, currently receiving limited supplies and
training from Taiwan, would also increase the military potential
of this minority group which has been the Burmese Governthent's
most troublesome insurgency problem.)
c Burmese Army spokesman Colonel Maung Maung has charged
that oth the irregulars and the Shan dissidents are armed with
weapons of American manufacture and wear American-type uni-
forms. He has urged the United States to use its influence to
stop the flow of supplies from Taiwan. In response to US rep-
resentations, Nationalist Security Chief Chiang Ching-kup stated
recently that Taipei would discontinue supplies to the irregulars
if the Burmese would cease their attacks.
9 June 5 97,619X stela)
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New Japanese Government
Prime Minister Kishi appears to have strengthened his po-
sition by placing his supporters in most of the key positions of
his new cabinet, while still providing for representatives from
some of the major factions in his ruling Liberal-Democratic
party. Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama and Finance Min-
ister Eisaku Sato are the only holdovers in the cabinet, which
will face an all-out fight with the Socialists over consideration
of the US-Japan Security Treaty at the Diet session this fall.
The entry of Hayato Ikeda, a top leader of a party faction
which previously opposed Kishi's leadership, will probably
broaden support for Japan's policy of cooperation with the United
States. Financial interests in japan are generally pleased over
the inclusion of Ikeda as minister of international trade and indus-
try and view his appointment as a continuation of sound financial
policies.
Kishi was unable to satisfy all party groups, and the refusal
of Ichiro Kono--an aspirant to the prime ministership�to accept
a party or cabinet post leaves him as a rallying point for con-
tinued party factionalism. Kono has publicly threatened that he
will no longer cooperate with the government because Kishi re-
fused to appoint him secretary general of the party. He could
cause Kishi trouble over the revision of the security treaty and
relations with Communist China by cooperating with the Socialists.
19 June 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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III. THE WEST
Adenauer Attempting to Arrange European Summit Meeting
With De Gaulle and Macmillan
(West German Chancellor Adenauer tentatively plans to
visit London and probably Paris soon after the 1 July West
German presidential election,
He will propose that Presi-
dent de Gaulle act as host for a "European summit conference"
of the three powers. Adenauer feels strongly that Western unity
must be strengthened for the next and "most crucial" round of
talks with Moscow)
uring his visit to London, Adenauer will attempt to pro-
mot settlement of UK-French differences on the British pro-
posal for a free trade area. The German delegation at the Ge-
neva conference also hopes that Adenauer will take the opportunity
to ease the strains in British-German relations which were ag-
gravated by Macmillan's trip to Moscow),
Adenauer probably wants to use these talks to regain some
of the international prestige he lost as a result of his maneuvers
with regard to the West German presidency)
In recent public statements Adenauer indicated he would sup-
por De Gaulle's desire for a greater French role in NATO in re-
turn for French willingness to step up the pace of European eco-
nomic cooperation, including the free trade area. He apparently
fears that if these problems of NATO organization and European
integration are not resolved, Moscow can exploit the situation
to its advantage in summit talks)
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CONFIDENTIAL
*vole
Haitian Opposition Groups Plan Increased Terrorism
Two opposition factions in Haiti are planning to step up
terrorist activities against the shaky Duvalier regime. The
two groups, followers of exiled political leaders Daniel
Fignole and Louis Dejoie, in recent weeks have staged bomb-
ings and other public disorders which aggravated the already un-
stable political situation.
The Duvalier government, dependent for survival on the
President's secret police, has become increasingly unpopular
during its year and a half in power. Opposition elements have
been quick to exploit the confusion within the regime resulting
from Duvalier's heart attack on 24 May, which will probably pre-
vent his return to active politics for several more weeks. Al-
though divided, the opposition may succeed in stirring up con-
siderable unrest, and the armed forces, alienated by Duvalier's
continuing efforts to undermine their power, cannot be relied
upon to support the government.
Three top Haitian officials-including the chief of the secret
police--while discussing the political situation with Ambassador
Drew on 15 June, displayed "almost hysterical fear" that Haiti
might be caught between its two hostile and more powerful neighbors,
Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Foreign Minister Mars requested
that US naval vessels increase visits to Port-au-Prince to act as a
deterrent to a possible invasion from abroad.
19 June 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Nicaraguan Rebels Seek Cuban Assistance
Nicaraguan rebel leaders in exile are turning in desperation
to Cuban Prime Minister Castro for assistance following the
failure early this month of the invasion of Nicaragua by political
moderates based in Costa Rica. Castro has promised $100,000 to
$150,000 and "a large number of Cuban troops to fight in Nicaragua,"
according to a rebel emissary who returned to Costa Rica on 15
June from a hurried trip to Cuba.
the Nicaraguan rebel leader who apparently
sent the emissary to seek Castro's aid, had earlier told the Costa
Rican foreign minister that he had launched the invasions without
Cuban help since he felt Castro's terms would have made him a
mere puppet. The American Embassy in Havana has become con-
vinced that the Cuban Government is supporting revolutionary ex-
peditions against the Nicaraguan and Dominican governments.
appears inclined also to accept support
from Communists and from pro-Communist revolutionary groups
throughout the Caribbean.
asked Costa Rican Communist leader Manuel Mora
to draft a document on the policies of a post-revolutionary Nicara-
guan government. The Costa Rican Communist party resolved on
6 June to fully support the Nicaraguan revolution. Nicaraguan
university students in Costa Rica
to be expecting a new revolutionary of-
fensive in Nicaragua, this time with considerable Communist
participation.
Nicaraguan armed forces chief Somoza told the American
Embassy late on 17 June that he was expecting an attack by an
armed band from Costa Rica early on 19 June. The leader of this
band, Costa Rican revolutionary veteran Frank Marshall, has
threatened to use force if Costa Rican President Echandi attempts
to prevent the departure of his group for Nicaragua. Cti 18 June,
Costa Rican units were preparing an attempt to compel this group
to surrender.
19 June June 59
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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